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Abstract
There  is  a  pronounced tendency within  contemporary  philosophy of  history  to  think  of 
historical  knowledge  as  something  apart  from  the  kind  of  knowledge  generated  in  the 
sciences.  This  has  given  rise  to  a  myriad  of  epistemological  issues.  For  if  historical 
knowledge is not related to the scientific, then what is it? By what logic does it proceed? How 
are  historical  conclusions  justified?  Although  almost  the  entirety  of  contemporary 
philosophy of history has been dedicated to such questions, there has been little real and 
agreed upon progress. Rather than fire yet another salvo in this rhetorical war, however, this 
thesis  wishes  instead to  examine what  lies  beneath the  basic  presumption of  separatism 
which animates it. Part One examines several paradigmatic examples of twentieth century 
philosophy of history in order to identify the grounds by which their authors considered 
history fundamentally different in kind from the sciences. It is concluded that, in each case, 
the case for separatism fows from the pervasive assumption that any body of knowledge 
which might rightly be called a science can be recognised by its search for general laws of 
nature. As history does not seem to share this aim, it is therefore considered to be knowledge 
of a fundamentally different kind. This thesis terms this the "nomothetic assumption.” Part 
Two argues that such nomothetic assumptions are not an accurate representation of either 
scientific theory or practice and therefore that any assumption of separatism based upon 
them  is  unsound.  To  do  this,  examples  of  acknowledged  scientific  problems  from  the 
biological  and  geological  sciences  which  do  not  involve  the  use  of  general  laws  are 
examined, with the aim of discovering how these historical disciplines are able to do the 
work of explanation in their absence. They do so, it is concluded, through a mechanism of 
epistemic (as opposed to literary) narrative. Having thus identified how historical sciences 
proceed without making direct use of laws, Part Two then generalises this model of scientific 
narrative and shows how it can be used to model existing practices in human history. This 
conclusion has far-reaching consequences, for it brings a single definition, method, and logic 
of confirmation to all studies of the past – whether traditionally acknowledged as scientific or 
historical.  Thus  all  historical  enquiries  proceed  by  a  common  logic  and  by  a  common 
method. This effectively and definitively places human history among the sciences, without 
the need for the kind of radical transformation past attempts to do this have required. 
(409 words)
3
Acknowledgements
First  and  foremost,  I  am  most  grateful  for  the  assistance  of  my  supervisor  Professor  Miles 
Fairburn,  whose  unwavering  assistance  and  positivity  over  these  long  years  is  greatly 
appreciated. To say nothing of the fact that some of the most challenging intellectual exchanges of 
my life so far have begun with Professor Fairburn placing a pen and blank piece of paper in front 
of me and asking, “could you please explain to me how...” I would also like to thank my second 
supervisor, Doctor Alexander Maxwell. The fear of Alexander's Disapproving Grammar Finger 
sometimes kept me awake late into the night. I dreaded the seas of red ink my drafts would 
invariably come back covered in. “He's not  mad,” I would tell myself, “only  disappointed.” Not 
being a natural writer by any stretch of the imagination, this thesis almost certainly contains 
much prose that is somewhat less than optimal. Without the input of Doctor Maxwell, however, it 
would have been so much worse. I am also grateful for the assistance of Doctor Benjamin Jeffares, 
who assisted me throughout his  post-doctoral tenure at Victoria University.  When I  first met 
Doctor Jeffares, I knew what I wanted historical explanation to be, but was unsure of how I might  
get there. It was Ben who pointed me towards the work of David Hull, and thus was responsible 
for the almost audible  click that could be heard as the jumble of ideas and plans in my head 
snapped into place.  Ben also deserves  praise for allowing me to borrow half  of  his  personal 
library, and for waiting so patiently for it to be returned. His input is especially valuable in that it  
was entirely in an unofficial capacity, and was given freely without hope of reward. I would also 
like to thank Professor Donald MacRaild who, during his brief time at Victoria University, picked 
me up off the fainting couch after an exhausting Honours year, and patiently (and repeatedly) set  
about convincing me I might maybe have something worthwhile to say about history and theory 
at the graduate level. Thanks are also due to Professor Melanie Nolan, who absolutely  always 
took  the  time  to  aggressively  fight  my  corner  whenever  she  was  asked.  Melanie  was  my 
staunchest ally back in 2008 when I was upgrading from an MA to a PhD, and did more than  
anyone  to  make  that  transition  happen.  Professor  Nolan  was  also  kind  enough  to  give  me 
Research Assistant  work at  a  time when I  was having serious trouble keeping the lights on.  
Thank you, Melanie! 
On a more personal note,  I  would also like to acknowledge those others  without whom this 
would have been impossible. Most importantly, Anna Young, who was always exactly what the 
situation demanded. Supportive when I was despondent, argumentative when I was in need of a 
foil,  and  always far  more  intelligent  than  I'll  ever  be.  Also,  my  mother,  Gail  Hurley,  whose 
unrelenting belief in the ability of her son was quite simply an irresistible and almost  tangibly 
solid force. Whenever I put the phone down from calling home, I felt not merely heartened, but 
invincible. I would also like to thank my friends and fellow graduate students Rebecca Lenihan 
and Megan Simpson. You both proved it could be done. Your tales of a life after graduate school  
were  tantalising  hints  of  a  whole  other  world, and  welcome  reminders  that  I  wouldn't  be 
working on this thing forever. Additional thanks to Megan for buying me dinner all those times. I 
would also like to thank the medical  professionals who kept me on my feet and functioning 
during my time at Victoria. Given my persistent ill health, this was often not a trivial matter. 
Thank you to Doctor Kathryn Leslie, Marion Kirker, and Doctor Susie Poon. Particular thanks to 
Doctor Leslie. Before I met you, I really had almost given up. I would also like to thank my dear 
friend Martinetta Woodfield-Fijn. Not for anything in particular (although you did buy me that  
Piaget book when I was fat broke, thank you!) but for being a source of great support, and for  
turning  up  on  those  random  Wednesday  afternoons  to  force  me  to  take  a  break  and  drive 
somewhere  new  and  interesting.  Thanks  also  to  Simon  Gigg,  for  bravely  and  selfessly 
volunteering to endlessly play video games on my desktop computer, thus preventing me from 
doing the same and forcing me to get on with my work. How did you ever find the courage? And 
lastly, my cat Dax – whose pathological need for human company combined with an actively 
violent resistance to being removed from my lap kept me at my computer and working when I  
would rather have been doing something – anything – else. 
In memory of my beloved cat Marjorie, who passed away on the 31st of August 2006, shortly after 
I began work on this thesis. 
4
Table of Contents
Abstract 3
Acknowledgements 4
Introduction – “Loomings” 7
Part One – The Nomothetic Assumption 10
The Structure of Part One 17
Part Two – Taking Narrative Seriously 20
The Structure of Part Two 33
Part One – “Ask Any Scientician”
The Nomothetic Assumption in Twentieth
Century Philosophy of History
Chapter One – “Introducing the Nomothetic Assumption” 41
The Nomothetic Assumption in Action, or: The Misunderstanding of J. B. Bury 42
Idealism and Historical Autonomy 52
The Infuence of Benedetto Croce 56
Charles A. Beard 60
Carl L. Becker 64
The Covering Law Thesis, or: Laws of History versus Laws in History 67
Problems with the Covering Law Thesis 76
The Impact of the Nomothetic Assumption, or: Universality is the Problem 81
Chapter Two – “The Death of Empathy” 84
The Importance of Empathy for the Covering Law Program 85
Patrick Gardiner and the Assault on Idealism 86
Making History Look Nomothetic 96
W. H. Walsh and the Idea of Colligation 103
Colligation and the Beginnings of Narrative 108
Walsh and the Nomothetic Assumption 111
Colligation versus Classification 114
Chapter Three – “The Rise of Narrative” 121
William Dray's Model of Historical Explanation 123
Dray and the Nomothetic Assumption 129
W. B. Gallie and the Literary Interpretation of Narrative 135
The Role of Explanation in Gallie's Model of Narrative 142
Gallie and Narrative Determinism 145
Arthur Danto and the Logic of Narration 148
'Significance' as the Basis for Danto's Narrative 151
Danto and the Explanatory Power of Narrative 154
Danto's Narratives Considered as Theories and their Relationship to the Scientific 157
Thomas Kuhn's Revision of the Nature of Science 161
Louis Mink, Hayden White, and the Flight from Epistemology 166
Part Two – “Taking Narrative Seriously”
Epistemic Narrative
and the Philosophy of Science
Chapter Four – “The Nomothetic Model and the Historical Sciences” 179
Some Brief Remarks on Contemporary Epistemic Philosophy of History 180
The Failure of the Nomothetic Model to Adequately Capture Scientific Practice 187
The Nomothetic Model and the Early Earth Sciences 189
The Nomothetic Model and the Earth Sciences in the Nineteenth Century 193
The Nomothetic Model and the Biological Sciences in the Nineteenth Century 198
Contemporary Nomothetic Objections to Darwinian Biology 203
5
Chapter Five – “The Science of Stories” 213
An Account of Narrative Explanation in Evolutionary Biology 215
Narrative as a 'Special Case' of the Nomothetic Model 219
Problems with the Confirmation of Narrative 226
Confirmation by Consequences 232
Narratives as Scientific Theories 237
Chapter Six – “The Philosophy of the Science of Stories” 246
Peter Kosso and the Problem of Observation Poverty 247
The Nature of Kosso's Accounting Claims 258
David Hull and Nomothetic Compatibilism 260
Hull's Concept of the Central Subject 263
Central Subjects as Necessarily Historical Entities 266
What is Narration? 272
The Problem of Process versus Particular in Human History 278
Carol Cleland, the Asymmetry of Causation, and Confirmation by Consequences 284
Conclusion – “The Future of Human History as a Science” 297
The Requirement for Transformation 299
Evolution and Human History 304
Final Words 310
Bibliography 313
6
Introduction
“Loomings”
This is, speaking in the broadest sense, a thesis dedicated to a re-examination of one 
of the oldest questions in the philosophy of history – is history a science? The reader 
might be forgiven for rolling their eyes at this. The question of whether history is or  
is not a science is, after all, also one of the most thoroughly discussed questions in the 
philosophy of history. And yet despite – or perhaps because of – this long history of 
discussion,  it  seems  a  common  conclusion  among  contemporary  historians  and 
philosophers of history that this question has long been settled in the negative and 
that there is very little that is new that might be said about it. Indeed, to talk of a  
scientific history now in the age of the linguistic turn and the postmodern seems 
almost gauche. There are still those, of course, who claim that history should reorient 
itself  along scientific  lines.  But  the insistence of  such authors on the  changes that 
would need to be made to historical practice in order for this to be achieved implies a 
tacit acceptance of the premise that, as it presently stands, history is not conducted or 
conceptualised  in  a  way  consistent  with  the  sciences.  As  the  ecologist, 
mathematician,  and  aspiring  philosopher  of  history  Peter  Turchin  has  succinctly 
phrased it:
We must collect quantitative data, construct general explanations and test them 
empirically on all the data, rather than on instances carefully selected to prove our 
pet narratives. To truly learn from history, we must transform it into a science.1
Case closed, it would seem. Whatever history is, it seems generally agreed – even self 
evident – that it isn't science. It is the intention of this thesis, however, to argue that  
there remains a great deal which might yet be said on the subject, and that this most 
basic of questions remains far from settled. To this end, this thesis will not only offer  
a defence of the now somewhat unpopular view that history can be a science, but will 
further argue that it essentially already is. More specifically, it will be argued that the 
basic  form  underlying  historical  explanations  as  they  are  currently accepted  and 
understood is entirely compatible with our most nuanced current understandings of 
science, and that no separate epistemology (or methodological concession to existing 
epistemology)  is  required  in  order  to  claim this.  No deep  structural  revisions  of 
current historical practice are necessary. 
Certainly these are, or least  appear  to be, bold claims. To establish claims of such 
1  Peter Turchin, 'Arise “Cliodynamics”,' Nature. Vol. 454 (3 July 2008). p.35.
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magnitude, which potentially call  into question much of what counts as  received 
wisdom and argument in the contemporary philosophy of history, it will come as no 
surprise to learn that a deep dive into the foundations of that philosophy must be 
undertaken. For the accusation that so many philosophers and historians have been 
so mistaken about a question of such magnitude (or have been correct, but for the 
wrong reasons) suggests that whatever it is that has made such an error possible, it 
cannot be trivial, nor can it be limited in scope. Therefore, the first of the two major 
claims made by this  thesis will  be that  just  such a systemic error can be reliably 
identified throughout  twentieth century philosophy of  history,  and that this error 
takes the form of a persistent assumption regarding the nature of science that has 
informed almost every aspect of the philosophy of history to the present day. We will 
call this the “nomothetic assumption.”2 This term will function here as shorthand for 
the identification of the entire theory and practice of science with the production and 
deployment  of  timeless  and  universal  “laws  of  nature.”  That  is,  a  nomothetic 
assumption is effectively a consideration of physics as the exemplar of  all science – 
and therefore results in the attempt to apply the practices of that field to all other 
branches of science. Or, for those outside of the sciences, it is the tendency to argue 
that if a discipline does not clearly produce or utilise general laws, then that discipline 
cannot  be  considered  scientific.  In  the  first  part  of  this  thesis,  we  will  not  only 
identify  a  persistent  nomothetic  assumption  throughout  twentieth  century 
philosophy of  history,  we shall  also argue that the presence of this assumption – 
whether explicitly or tacitly held – has had a profound impact on the development of 
2  As this term will appear frequently throughout this thesis, let us be clear about its meaning from 
the very outset. “Nomothetic” is a Greek term that has become a commonly used technical term in 
philosophy. The term was originally introduced into philosophy in the late nineteenth century by 
the German neo-Kantian philosopher Wilhelm Windelband. Windelband, building on Kant, used 
the  terms  “nomothetic”  and  “idiographic”  to  describe  what  he  saw  as  two  very  different 
approaches  to  explanation  –  the  former  peculiar  to  the  sciences,  the  latter  to  the  humanities. 
“Nomothetic” – literally Greek for “proposition of the law” – was taken by Windelband to describe 
the efforts of natural science to generalise the objective phenomena of the world into universal 
laws. This is contrasted with the term “idiographic,” which Windelband defines as the tendency – 
as exhibited by the humanities – to deal with particularities, contingencies, and accidents. (See: 
Wilhelm  Windelband,  'Rectorial  Address,  Strasbourg  1894,'  History  and  Theory.  Vol.  19,  No.  2 
(February 1980). pp.169-185.).  Essentially then, this is a more technical way of saying that science 
aspires  to  the  general,  and  the  humanities  to  the  particular.  The  term  “nomothetic”  is  to  be 
preferred to merely “generalising” however, as the etymology of the former makes clear that the 
ideal of generalisation is the universal law. By using this term wherever we wish to imply an ideal  
of general laws, we are freed to use the terms “general” and “particular” in a more relativistic  
sense. That is, the aim of a generalising (as opposed to nomothetic) discipline need not be a law in 
the strictest sense – but merely a conclusion at a higher level of enquiry than the instances used to  
derive  it.  As  Mark  Day  has  phrased  it:  “'Parisian  merchant'  is  a  more  general  property  than  
'Parisian grain trader,' and 'French merchant' is a more general property than both.” (See: Mark 
Day, The Philosophy of History. Continuum: London & New York, 2008. p.55.) We might therefore, in 
a sense, generalise about French merchants, without claiming to have uncovered some truly general 
law. We may not, however, assume the same for a nomothetic discipline – a nomothetic discipline 
aims for nothing less than laws.
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the philosophy of history. For it is this nomothetic assumption which lies at the root 
of  the  widespread  perception  among  historians  and  philosophers  of  history  that 
historical knowledge and scientific knowledge are fundamentally different in kind. 
This is because a thoroughgoing nomothetic assumption regarding science has led to 
the concomitant assumption that any  other kind of explanatory model that history 
might be shown to use is, by definition, not scientific. And this assumption, it will be 
argued,  is  quite  fundamental.  That  is,  while  there  have  been  many  seemingly 
disparate classes of argument which have attempted to establish the autonomy and 
epistemic uniqueness of history, we shall see that all such arguments either rest upon 
some form of the nomothetic assumption or are otherwise unable to achieve their 
purpose  of  distinguishing  between  history  (as  traditionally  understood)  and  the 
sciences.3
Having identified this persistent nomothetic assumption in the philosophy of history, 
this thesis will then proceed to argue that it is a deeply fawed and myopic vision of 
science,  and  that  by  merely  acknowledging  this  fact  we  can  clear  away  many 
objections to considering the basic kind of explanations that history can and does 
offer scientific in principle. That this can be done without requiring any truly radical 
revision of current historical practice is possible because the alternative explanatory 
form that much contemporary philosophy of history has converged upon in order to 
describe its own operation – the concept of narrative – is a concept that can and must 
be  grounded  in  science.  This  claim  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  scientifically 
legitimate “technical sense” of the term narrative, and that history's existing methods 
and explanatory strategies broadly conform to such a sense, represents the second 
major  claim  of  this  thesis.  This  is  a  key  departure  from  much  contemporary 
philosophy  of  history,  which  has  argued  that  history  either  attempts  to  explain 
through the construction of narratives – which are seen as a uniquely literary rather 
than  epistemic mechanism4 –  or  that  history  must  be  grounded  in  some  other 
3  To be clear, this thesis is primarily concerned with the class of arguments which have used the  
nomothetic  assumption  to  argue  for  history's  autonomy  from  the  sciences.  Certainly,  other 
arguments  by which philosophers have attempted to establish this  conclusion –  such as  those 
arguments which claim that “the past is gone” and thus beyond the reach of any empirical enquiry, 
or those which claim that there is simply too much interpretive bias in history – will  make an 
appearance in these pages. But it should be remembered that they are not the primary focus of this 
work. Therefore, in dealing with them, we will content ourselves with showing that, if they  are 
problematic, they are problematic for both history and the sciences in equal measure.
4  Examples of this literary-narrativist position which are to be examined by this thesis include: W. B. 
Gallie,  Philosophy and the Historical Understanding.  2nd Edition. Schocken Books: New York, 1968. 
Louis  O.  Mink,  'The  Autonomy of  Historical  Understanding,'  History and Theory.  Vol.  5,  No.  1 
(1966). pp.24-47. Louis O. Mink, 'History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension,'  New Literary 
History.  Vol.  1,  No.  3  (Spring  1970).  pp.541-558.  Hayden  White,  Metahistory:  The  Historical  
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(presumably more scientifically respectable) explanatory mechanism.5 In neither case 
is the concept of narration taken seriously as an epistemic mechanism. In this respect, 
by dissolving the nomothetic assumption which has held all narrativism – regardless 
of  its  epistemic  merits  –  as  separate from science,  this  thesis  attempts to  offer  a  
genuine  way  out  of  the  apparent  dilemma  which  has  forced  generations  of 
philosophers of history into choosing between science and the status quo. Refecting 
these twin requirements, this thesis will be broken into two parts.
Part One – The Nomothetic Assumption
The  first  half  of  this  thesis  will  demonstrate  the  presence  of  an  underlying 
nomothetic  assumption  throughout  much  of  the  most  infuential  work  in  the 
twentieth century philosophy of history. This assumption, it will be argued, has led 
philosophers  of  history  to  one  of  two broad  conclusions.  Either  history  must  be 
utterly remade in order to conform to this nomothetic-deductive practice in order to 
produce  knowledge worth the  name,  or  history must  not  have any more  than a 
tangential connection to science. However, the most important argument to be made 
in  Part  One  regarding  the  nomothetic  assumption  is  not  merely  that  such 
assumptions have  existed,  but that  they were/are  effectively bipartisan.  That is,  a 
nomothetic assumption was not merely an article of faith held by only one side of a 
broader debate. Were that the case, the assumption itself would rise or fall with the 
success of that faction, and thus be of little more than marginal interest. Instead, it is 
the intention of this thesis to argue that a nomothetic assumption regarding science is 
better understood as having been a basic part of the axiomatic fabric from which all 
twentieth and early twenty-first century philosophers of history have reasoned. That 
is,  it  has guided the reasoning of  all participants in the debate over the status of 
historical  knowledge,  although  not  always  in  the  same way.  Thus  while  we  can 
clearly and unambiguously see the nomothetic assumption as underlying the well-
known arguments of the covering law theorists of the mid-twentieth century (as well 
Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe. Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1973.
5  Examples of such positions which will be encountered here include attempts to cast history in 
terms  of  evolutionary  biology.  See:  Jared  Diamond,  Guns,  Germs  and  Steel:  A Short  History  of  
Everybody  for  the  Last  13,000  Years.  Vintage Press:  London,  2005.  William  H.  McNeill,  'Passing 
Strange: The Convergence of Evolutionary Science with Scientific History,' History and Theory. Vol. 
40, No. 1 (February 2001). pp.1-15. The reduction of history to mathematics and statistics. See: Peter 
Turchin, 'Arise “Cliodynamics”,' Nature. Vol. 454 (3 July 2008). pp.34-35. Contemporary versions of 
the covering law model. See: Clayton Roberts, The Logic of Historical Explanation. Pennsylvania State 
University Press:  University Park,  Pennsylvania,  1996.  And the Bayesian statistical  model.  See:  
Aviezer  Tucker,  Our Knowledge of  the  Past:  A Philosophy of  Historiography.  Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, 2004.
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as  more  subtly  informing  the  more  generalist  predilections  of  their  modern 
successors), we can also identify an acceptance of the same nomothetic assumption 
as a key component in the reasoning of their opponents. For there is also, as Part One 
will  aim to show, ample evidence available  that  both the early twentieth century 
idealists and their mid-century narrativist successors have taken – whether explicitly 
or  merely  tacitly  –  a  nomothetic  assumption  regarding  the  nature  of  science  as 
axiomatic. Thus the nomothetic assumption does not merely represent the strategy of 
a single team, but is a part of the field upon which all have agreed to play. 
Following the identification of this startlingly pervasive assumption, this thesis will 
argue  that  the  seemingly  stark  differences  between the  modern  literary-narrative 
approach to history and the contemporary evolutionarily-inspired offspring of the 
covering law approach have their intellectual roots in what is essentially a difference 
of  response to  this fundamental assumption.  Where the covering lawyers believed 
that the truth of the nomothetic-deductive model required the theory and practice of 
history  be  remade  in  the  likeness  of  physics,  the  idealists  and  their  narrativist  
successors chose the other horn of the dilemma – arguing that history's nomothetic 
failures were evidence of historical knowledge's epistemological separation from the 
sciences. The latter conclusion, however, begged the question: if historical knowledge 
wasn't scientific, what  was it? What unique structures of argument and explanation 
made it knowledge at all? This assertion of a fundamental separation between history 
and science,  while  having  the  advantage  of  freeing  philosophers  of  history from 
having to answer the most awkward questions posed by nomothetic philosophers of 
both science and history, thus brought with it a requirement for the construction of a 
separate epistemological system of explanation and verification specifically for history. 
There have been many attempts to formulate such systems – the two most notable  
being empathy (history as the re-enactment of the thoughts of historical actors), and, 
in the latter half of the twentieth century,  narrativism (historical explanation as the 
contextualisation of an event/object in terms of  the interactions of multiple causes 
over  time).  Building  either  of  these  concepts  into  a  complete,  yet  separate, 
epistemology,  however,  has  proved  just  as  tall  an  order  as  the  covering  law 
requirement  for the remodelling of history into the likeness of nomothetic physics. 
Perhaps even taller, given that the nomothetic scientific epistemology to be opposed 
had attained its status through accretion over centuries rather than emerging fully 
formed in mere decades from the pens of a comparatively few authors.
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The  empathic  approach  to  historical  epistemology,  while  widespread  during  the 
nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries,  was  largely  discredited  by  the  mid-
twentieth  century.  This  was  due  to  both  the  failure  of  empathic  conclusions  to 
properly  submit  to  any  kind  of  empirical  test  and  the  rather  narrow  subset  of 
historical  situations  in  which  empathic  methods  might  have  been  useful  (i.e., 
questions of human intent and motivation). The narrativist school which succeeded 
the empathic instead used the concept of narrative – as opposed to nomothetic laws 
or human thought – as the primary explanatory mechanism for historical knowledge. 
History, they argued, did not produce or consume laws, but narratives – sequences of 
events which attempt to explain a particular event or object in terms of the causal 
sequence of events that produced it.  However, while many narrativist accounts of 
historical  practice  are  compelling  and  describe  actual  historical  practice  well  – 
making  them  by  far  the  most  promising  candidate  for  a  genuine  historical 
epistemology – they have often lacked the most basic philosophical and epistemic 
grounding which might have better legitimised them. That is, no vision of narrative 
has been convincingly shown to fit into either  of  the categories permitted by the 
above dilemma: either being consistent with – and thus assimilable into – nomothetic  
science, or being a fully-fedged – yet fundamentally  separate – epistemology. This 
has led, in turn, to a broad lack of coherence in contemporary philosophy of history 
as a whole. There have been, in other words, about as many narrative approaches to 
the philosophy of history as there have been narrativist philosophers of history. The 
result  is  a  situation  in  which  theoretical  commitments,  models  and  methods  of 
justification,  proposed  logic  of  explanation,  and  even  definitions  of  their  most 
fundamental terms (including “narrative” itself) have been largely idiosyncratic to 
each author. This lack of basic agreement is, of course, true to a certain extent of any 
field of philosophy. But the sheer depth of fux evident among philosophers of history 
represents  evidence  of  the  basic  failure  of  philosophers  of  history  to  adequately 
attend to the task of creating a rival epistemology to the nomothetic-deductive model 
associated  with  the  sciences.  Indeed,  the  only  philosophical  movement  with  any 
broad base of agreement and coherence in contemporary philosophy of history is that 
affiliated with postmodernism. This movement has achieved much of this cohesion, 
however, through a basic claim that the  lack of agreement upon the philosophical 
foundations of historical knowledge constitutes evidence that the establishment of 
such foundations is impossible. The only consistent feature of philosophy of history, 
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in other words, is its inconsistency. And this, they argue, should tell us something. As 
Keith Jenkins has memorably written:
...  would you like to  follow Hegel  or  Marx or  Dilthey or Weber or  Popper or 
Hempel or Aron or Collingwood or Dray or Oakeshott or Danto or Gallie or Walsh 
or  Atkinson or  Leff  or  Hexter?  Would you care  to  go  along with the  modern 
empiricists,  feminists,  the  Annales  School,  neo-Marxists,  new-stylists, 
econometricians, structuralists or post-structuralists... And this is a short list! The 
point is that even if you could make a choice, what would be the criteria? How 
could one know which method would lead to the 'truer' past?6
Despite this apparent commitment to pluralism, however, the substance of almost all 
postmodern philosophy of history is largely derived from the narrative philosophy 
that  preceded  it  –  with  one  important  difference.  Disillusioned  with  previous 
attempts  to  render  history  a  separate  epistemology,  postmodern  philosophers  of 
history  have  chosen  to  interpret  narrativism  in  terms  which  dispense  with 
epistemological  concerns  altogether.  More  specifically,  they  have  abandoned  any 
epistemic  sense  of  the  term  “narrative,”  focusing  instead  on  the  purely  literary 
connotations of the term.7 This blurs the line between history and fiction to a degree 
that  has  made  many  practising  historians  and  philosophers  of  history  extremely 
uncomfortable. The philosophers of history who have sought to explicitly resist this 
conclusion, however, have done so at no small disadvantage. For the fragmentation 
and lack of coherence that makes the postmodern approach possible has also made 
any kind of principled and systematic rebuttal of that position extremely difficult. 
Not only has there not been any truly unified response, such responses as there have 
been  have  been  extremely  philosophically  weak.  Unable  to  cite  any  deep 
epistemological justification for why history has the form it does or how that form is  
related to empirical claims about the world, such replies have tended to rely heavily 
on somewhat glib “common sense” reasoning.8 
6  Keith Jenkins, Re-Thinking History. Routledge: London & New York, 1991. p.15.
7  This is not, of course, the position of  all those critics of history who might consider themselves 
postmodern. Many are far more concerned with issues of objectivity and bias, and think that much 
theory collected under the postmodern banner (Foucault, for instance) is well placed to illuminate 
such issues. Those postmodernists – or philosophers who have been championed by them – who 
have engaged with more substantive issues of what history is and what historical claims represent 
in terms of knowledge, however, have almost all been  literary narrativists. Such authors include 
Louis Mink, Hayden White, and Frank Ankersmit. It is with reference to  these philosophers and 
their  arguments  about historical  epistemology (or  lack  thereof)  that  this  thesis  will  henceforth 
mean by the use of the shorthand term “postmodern.” Even this term, however, is worryingly free 
of informative content. Thus, where issues of narrative philosophy are discussed in any detail in 
the thesis that follows, the more descriptively apt term “literary-narrativist” will be used.
8  We  will  encounter  this  position  towards  the  end  of  Chapter  Three.  Examples  of  these 
epistemologically weak polemics  include:  Richard J. Evans,  In Defence of  History.  Granta Books: 
London, 1997. Arthur Marwick, The New Nature of History: Knowledge, Evidence, Language. Palgrave: 
Hampshire, 2001. Keith Windschuttle,  The Killing of History: How a Discipline is Being Murdered by  
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It  is  not  the  intention  of  this  thesis  to  rehearse  again  the  clash  between 
postmodernism  and  historical  traditionalists,  however.  There  is  much  literature 
already  dedicated  to  this.  Instead,  this  thesis  will  focus  on  the  deeper  issues  of 
foundational  philosophical  weakness  hinted at  by the  scattered and idiosyncratic 
responses  to  the  postmodern  approach.  Whatever  the  merits  of  the  postmodern 
approach, the concern here is with the deep structural faws in history's self-image 
that the philosophically naïve responses to their more extreme claims reveal. For our 
purposes,  the  nature  of  the  attacker  matters  much  less  than  the  inability  of  the 
historical  discipline  to  adequately  defend  itself.  So  why  is  it  the  case  that  the 
historical discipline has such poorly developed and defined epistemic foundations?  
So  poorly  developed,  in  fact,  that  assertions  that  no  such  foundations  are  even 
possible  have  become  routine  and  now  represent  a  significant  fraction  of 
contemporary published work in historical theory? And yet the remaining fraction 
remains as internally incommensurable as has ever been the case.9 Moreover, why is 
it  that  the  perceived self-evidence  of  this  epistemological  separateness  of  history 
from  the  sciences  has  been  so  thoroughgoing  as  to  now  be  effectively  received 
wisdom? How did history become so utterly convinced of its position beyond the 
reach of any serious application of scientific epistemology? This thesis will argue that 
light can be cast upon all of these questions by examining the nomothetic assumption 
persistent  in  almost  all  twentieth  century  philosophy  of  history,  and  which  has 
proved stubbornly persistent to the present day. Moreover, it will be shown that this 
assumption, when uncritically adopted, has been at the root of history's separatist 
impulse, as well  as acting to deny philosophers of history access to the very best 
available arguments regarding the nature of history. 
Literary Critics and Social  Theorists.  Revised and Expanded International Edition. Macleay Press: 
Paddington,  1996.  Perez  Zagorin,  'History,  the  Referent,  and  Narrative:  Refections  on 
Postmodernism Now,' History and Theory. Vol. 38, No. 1 (February 1999). pp.1-24. This is not to say 
that their conclusions are invalid, but merely to suggest that they do not provide support for their 
positions beyond appeals  to  tradition and circular  claims which  imply the  nature of historical 
method to be self-evident.
9  That there is excellent epistemological work being done in the philosophy of history is beyond 
doubt. Examples include: Leon Goldstein, The What and The Why of History: Philosophical Essays. E. J. 
Brill:  New York, 1996.  Aviezer Tucker,  Our Knowledge of  the Past:  A Philosophy of Historiography.  
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004. Mark Day,  The Philosophy of History.  Continuum: 
London & New York, 2008. Clayton Roberts, The Logic of Historical Explanation. Pennsylvania State 
University Press: University Park, Pennsylvania, 1996. C. Behan McCullagh,  The Truth of History.  
Routledge: London & New York, 1998. These works, however, exhibit surprisingly little agreement 
with each other on anything other than the broadest of terms. All agree that history is a knowledge-
generating discipline – i.e., that it possesses a basic commitment to realism – but offer different  
methods for conceptualising, attaining, and verifying historical knowledge. 
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More  specifically,  it  is  the  intention  of  this  thesis  to  argue  that  the  pressure  the 
nomothetic assumption placed upon philosophers of history to establish a separate 
historical epistemology ultimately led post-covering law philosophers of history – 
such as W. H. Walsh, Arthur Danto, and William Dray – to place far more epistemic 
weight upon the concept of narrative than it could shoulder without a firm epistemic 
grounding. That is,  while the concepts of narrative offered by these authors were 
descriptively sound to greater or lesser degrees, they exhibited no deeper structure. 
For unlike the concept of scientific laws, these ideas of narrative were not anchored to 
some  fundamental  fact  of  the  world.  That  classes  of  events/objects  have 
commonalities  that  might  be  abstracted  and  formalised  is  epistemologically 
uncontroversial – not to mention extremely successful at producing descriptions of 
certain aspects of reality. Narrative, on the other hand, did not seem to speak to any 
such fundamental concern – especially when philosophers insisted on confating the 
term with the word “story.”  Thus,  not  only was the development of  the concept 
weakly constrained, and thereby open to a great deal of interpretive fux, it was also 
open to  accusations  that  it  represented  a  post  hoc rationalisation.  The  reason the 
concept of narrative seemed to fit the practice of history so well, in other words, was 
because it had been developed in order to exhibit such a fit. In addition to this, the 
connotations of the term with respect to notions of fiction and story-telling implied 
an  ineradicable  human  subjectivity  wherever  the  term  was  used.  Given  such 
objections,  it  therefore  became possible  to  argue that  the idea of  narrative as the 
explanatory  vehicle  for  history  was  nothing  more  than  a  mere  convenience 
philosophers  of  history  had  granted  themselves  in  order  to  provide  a  veneer  of 
legitimacy while proceeding with business as usual. The literary-narrativist Hayden 
White neatly summarises this viewpoint as follows:
...  it  is  precisely  because the narrative  mode of  representation is  so natural  to 
human  consciousness,  so  much  an  aspect  of  everyday  speech  and  ordinary 
discourse, that its use in any field of study aspiring to the status of science must be 
suspect...  Viewing  modern  sciences  from  this  perspective,  we  can  trace  their 
development  in  terms  of  their  progressive  demotion  of  the  narrative  mode  of 
representation in their descriptions of the phenomena that their specific objects of 
study comprise. And this in part explains why the humble subject of narrative 
should be so widely debated by historical theorists in our time. To many of those 
who  would  transform  historical  studies  into  a  science,  the  continued  use  by 
historians  of  a  narrative  mode of  representation  is  an index  of  failure  at  once 
methodological and theoretical. A discipline that produces narrative accounts of its 
subject  matter  as  an  end  in  itself  seems  theoretically  unsound;  one  that 
investigates  its  data  in  the  interest  of  telling  a  story  about  them  appears 
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methodologically deficient.10
Thus we return to the dilemma hinted at above. History must either be remade in the  
likeness of a nomothetic discipline such as physics, or it must be established as a  
somehow separate sphere of knowledge altogether, with only tangential connections 
to the academic world outside. And although this stems from debates stretching back 
at least as far as the nineteenth century, we can still see contemporary examples of 
just such positions. The modern descendants of the covering lawyers, while having 
abandoned their doctrinaire insistence on the articulation of explicit laws, insist that 
history as currently practised is riddled with subjectivity and sophistry, and that a 
truly scientific treatment is only possible when we begin seeking general conclusions 
and/or  large-scale  patterns  about  the  past.  And  this,  they  say,  is  only  possible 
through the  use  of  very  large  scales  of  time and  place,  over  which  the  effect  of 
particularity  and genuine  contingency might  be  ignored.  The direct  emphasis  on 
laws might be gone, but the insistence that generality is the most essential quality of 
science – and that particularity and contingency are intrusions to be expunged if 
possible and statistically negated if not – represents what might be called a vestigial 
nomothetic  assumption.  For  while  such  assertions  are  true  in  a  more  relativistic 
sense, that is rarely the sense in which they are used. Rather,  it  seems as though 
many such advocates of a scientific history use such terms to fight a rearguard action 
– claiming to have abandoned the old nomothetic certainties while smuggling them 
in through the back door in disguise. At any rate, it is certainly the case that those 
modern advocates of a scientific treatment of history have retained the emphasis of  
their forebears on the requirement for history to be radically transformed if it is to be 
scientific. On the other hand, we have the postmodern philosophers of the linguistic 
turn – themselves the descendants of the twentieth century narrativists – who have 
argued that there is quite simply no firm epistemic basis for history at all. And then 
there are those in the frequently bewildered middle who rightly retain a belief in the 
power  of  the  historical  discipline  to  make true statements  about  the past  and to 
investigate the constellations of causes behind certain events, yet have proved either 
unable to provide satisfactory philosophical arguments as to why this should be so – 
the aforementioned “common sense” thesis – or have persisted in using the same 
well-worn classes of arguments that can be found in late nineteenth/early twentieth 
century books on historical method.11 Such is the current state of the philosophy of 
10  Hayden White,  The  Content  of  the  Form: Narrative  Discourse  and Historical  Representation.  Johns 
Hopkins University Press: London and Baltimore, 1990. p.26. 
11  There is, of course, no reason why philosophical arguments should be suspect merely because they  
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history. It is the intention of the first part of this thesis to show that this particular 
pattern of intellectual positions within the contemporary philosophy of history have 
fowed,  albeit  in  different  ways  and  from  different  directions,  from  an  historic 
acceptance of the nomothetic assumption. 
The Structure of Part One
Part  One  of  this  thesis  consists  of  three  chapters.  These  chapters  are  separated 
thematically, but – taken together – progress chronologically through the arguments 
of some of the most infuential philosophers of the twentieth century philosophy of 
history. Chapter One aims to provide some background regarding the philosophy of 
history  in  the  first  part  of  the  twentieth  century,  emphasising  both  its  idealistic 
character and its explicitly stated nomothetic assumptions regarding science. To this 
end, close readings of the writings of J. B. Bury, Benedetto Croce, Carl Becker, Charles 
Beard, and R. G. Collingwood will be used to show how the relationship between 
history  and  science  was  discussed  –  and  thus  how  historical  epistemology  was 
conceptualised – in the first few decades of the twentieth century. This will function 
as context for the introduction of what would become the most widely discussed idea 
in twentieth century philosophy of history – the “covering law” arguments of Carl 
Hempel and Karl Popper – which we will encounter near the end of the chapter, and 
which invoke a far more explicit nomothetic assumption of their own. The primary 
aim  of  Chapter  One,  therefore,  is  to  establish  the  reality  of  the  nomothetic 
assumption as a persistent force in the philosophy of history even before the covering 
law  debate  began  in  earnest,  and  to  outline  something  of  the  explanatory 
mechanisms for history proposed by those who argued for history's autonomy.
Chapter Two examines the impact of the covering law debate in more detail, with 
are old. The problem is that the kinds of naïve empiricist arguments in question have been largely  
derived from the idealist tradition. That is, for example, from the von Rankean “let the evidence 
speak for itself” perspective, or from the Collingwoodian idea of empathy. The idealistic/empathic 
basis upon which such arguments were built – and their concomitant assumptions about science – 
are now thoroughly philosophically discredited.  This is why they are to be considered suspect. 
Some examples of the “common sense” position have already been given. Examples of the more 
archaic style of argument can be found in classic works such as: G. R. Elton, The Practice of History.  
Blackwell: Oxford, 2001. Arthur Marwick, The New Nature of History: Knowledge, Evidence, Language.  
Palgrave: Hampshire, 2001. E. H. Carr, What is History? Palgrave: Basingstoke, 2001. The continued 
reprinting and popularity of these books – all originally published in the 1960s and 70s – is itself 
suggestive of the barren nature of much well-known contemporary philosophy of history. While 
the work of more recent authors such as Aviezer Tucker, C. Behan McCullagh, and Mark Day is a 
good deal  more sophisticated,  nuanced,  and aware of subsequent developments in philosophy 
than these texts, these authors seem unlikely to attain similar levels of fame and republication.
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particular  emphasis  on  the  transformative  effect  it  had  upon  the  philosophy  of 
history. This was not the desired transformation of history into a scientifically precise 
likeness of physics, however, but the systematic discrediting of the then-widespread 
empathic understanding of how historical explanation functioned and was separate 
from the sciences. This part of the Popper/Hempel program at least, was responsible 
for a thorough re-examination of the justifications for historical knowledge. For not 
only did the covering law program make explicit what were formerly merely implicit 
nomothetic  assumptions,  it  also  forced those  philosophers  of  history who would 
resist  Popper and Hempel's conclusions into attempting to formulate a means by 
which the kind of work historians already produced could still be called knowledge. 
This chapter will seek to document this intellectual transformation by examining in 
detail the writings of two highly infuential mid-century figures who attempted just 
such  post-Hempelian  reconstructions  of  the  philosophy  of  history  –  albeit  from 
different directions. First,  Patrick Gardiner,  who was sympathetic to covering law 
arguments, and saw some conceptual integration with the sciences as necessary if  
history were to remain credible as a knowledge-generating field. And second, W. H.  
Walsh, who was among the first to concede the naivety of then-existing empathic 
ideas  about  historical  epistemology in  the  wake  of  the  covering  law  attack  and 
attempted to develop the twin concepts of  colligation and narrative as an alternative 
epistemology which could simultaneously claim both legitimacy and autonomy from 
the sciences.  The primary aim of  this  chapter  is  to  show that  despite  the radical  
conceptual revisions the philosophy of history underwent as a result of Popper and 
Hempel's challenge, the perception of a deep detachment between history and the 
sciences that had been the key feature of previous debates was merely reinforced, 
and that this reinforcement is attributable to the nomothetic assumption.
Chapter Three examines the long-term consequences of this perceived epistemic gulf 
between history and the sciences.  For,  as the previous chapter argues, one of the 
primary  reasons  for  the  existence  of  the  emerging  class  of  narrative  arguments 
regarding the nature of historical explanations in the mid-to-late twentieth century 
was the  fact  that  they promised an  alternative to  the  scientific  pretensions  of  the 
covering lawyers. The very  idea of narrative itself  thus  represented a philosophical 
commitment,  as  well  as  an assumption about  the nature of  science.  And this,  as  
Chapter Three will argue, is perhaps the  only common thread we can find among 
philosophers of history who have favoured the term. Indeed, it almost appears as if 
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the decision to use the term was made before any serious thought as to how it was to 
be defined. This chapter examines several of the most infuential twentieth century 
attempts to define what a narrative philosophy of history would look like, and how it 
would conceive of its central idea – those of William Dray, W. B. Gallie, Arthur Danto, 
Louis  Mink,  and Hayden White.  Each of  these authors is  examined with specific 
reference  to  their  oppositional  definition  of  the  term  “narrative,”  and  their 
corresponding conceptions of the relationship – or lack thereof – between science and 
history.  The  primary  aim  of  this  chapter,  therefore,  is  not  only  to  show  that 
narrativism arose out of a desire to avoid the covering law vision for history, but also 
to  demonstrate  that  its  development  has  been  almost  entirely  predicated  on  an 
opposition  to  science  arising  from  the  nomothetic  assumption.  To  try  to  define 
narrative largely by what it is not, however, has not proved good enough. Thus, the 
primary  aim of  this  chapter  is  to  show that  this  lack  of  any  deep  philosophical  
foundation for the term ultimately led to its confation with its colloquial meaning of 
“story.” In this sense, it might be argued that even the contemporary conclusions of 
the  postmodern  literary-narrativists  are  ultimately  based  upon  a  foundation 
predicated upon the nomothetic assumption.
Taken together then, these three chapters seek to demonstrate two key points. First,  
that  there  has  been  a  persistent  nomothetic  assumption  throughout  modern 
philosophy of history – explicit enough to be clearly detectable in the writings of 
historians  and philosophers  even today,  yet  sufficiently  sublimated as  to  survive 
even major conceptual upheavals in the discipline. And second, that this nomothetic 
assumption has exercised considerable infuence with respect to how the philosophy 
of history has been conducted, and how the historical discipline as a whole sees itself. 
But even if these conclusions are accepted, it might subsequently be asked: why does 
it  matter?  It  matters  because,  as  a  part  of  the  rhetorical  framework  by  which 
arguments regarding the status of historical knowledge have been prosecuted, the 
nomothetic assumption has contributed – consciously or not – to the modern image 
of history as an autonomous and epistemologically distinct  branch of  knowledge. 
History is  not  a  part  of  science,  it  is  usually  assumed,  because  it  clearly  fails  to 
conform  to  even  the  most  liberalised  conceptions  of  the  scientific  ideal.  That  is, 
history  does  not  seem  to  have  any  close  connection  to  the  production  and/or 
deployment of laws, nor does it exclusively seek generalisation. Nor has any attempt 
at the remaking of history into such a nomothetic – or even merely generalising – 
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discipline ever succeeded beyond the most limited of scopes. What is history, then? 
History, the reply seems to be, is... well... history. As Chapter Three argues, it might be 
claimed that history constructs narratives, but this means little if the most widely 
agreed upon characteristic of a narrative is simply that it isn't a law. Put simply, the 
nomothetic assumption has been a powerful force in the definition of history – no 
matter which side of  the debate one sympathises with.  And the infuence of  this  
argument persists to this day. So, again, why does this matter? It matters because, as 
a description of the theory and practice of science, the nomothetic assumption is deeply  
flawed.  If  we can successfully demonstrate this,  it  follows that a good deal of the 
legitimacy  and  contemporary  relevance  of  these  intellectual  positions  within  the 
philosophy of history would be called into question. With this in mind, Part Two of 
this  thesis  will  concern  itself  with  offering  just  such  a  refutation,  as  well  as  an 
assessment of just what a dissolution of the nomothetic assumption might portend 
for the relationship between history and the sciences.
Part Two – Taking Narrative Seriously
To point  out  that  the  nomothetic  assumption has  made the notion of  a  scientific 
treatment of narrative – and thus a potential scientific basis for historical explanation 
– almost unthinkable is,  of  course,  not the same as actually claiming that such a 
scientific vision of narrative is possible and that such a vision can be applied to the 
study of historical explanations. Having argued for the former in Part One, Part Two 
will take up the latter. In doing so, we will seek to demonstrate not only that there is 
such a scientific vision of narrative, but also that it is able to be driven into epistemic 
bedrock at least as secure as that of the traditional nomothetic model, and that it can 
be meaningfully applied to the kinds of questions those who study human history 
ask and the explanations they are inclined to offer. In order to accomplish this, three 
main claims will have to be established. First, it will have to be demonstrated that the 
nomothetic  assumption regarding  science  is  false.  That  is,  while  the  nomothetic-
deductive model  is  highly successful  in certain areas of  science,  it  does not fully  
encompass  all  explanations  legitimately  offered  under  the  aegis  of  the  sciences. 
Scientists, after all, often require answers to historical questions too. Therefore, as a 
model it needs to be extended or otherwise augmented in some way. Part Two will  
demonstrate  that  the  best  way  to  do  this  –  and  the  solution  offered  by  many 
practising  scientists  and philosophers  of  science  themselves  –  is  to  introduce  the 
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concept of narrative into science. Second, we will also have to demonstrate that the 
concept  of  scientific  narrative  we  would  wish  to  defend  is  not  vulnerable  to 
accusations of being a post hoc rationalisation or merely a promissory note for a real 
explanation to follow at  some later date.  For if  this is  not  done, we have merely 
exchanged the shallow concept of  narrative already evident  in  the philosophy of 
history for another that is superficially scientific, but ultimately equally shallow. As 
we shall see, this problem can be solved by splitting the difference between the two 
approaches  seen in Part  One.  By defining narrative in terms of  existing scientific 
epistemology, we avoid the error of earlier philosophers who believed it necessary to 
make  narrative  (and  thus  history)  stand  utterly apart  from  the  sciences,  while 
simultaneously providing the tools for their integration. In other words, the concept 
of  narrative  will  be  shown  to  make  sense  in  the  terms  of  already  existing  (i.e.,  
nomothetic) philosophy of science, and thus able to be tied to the deepest and most 
successful epistemological insights available to philosophy. And third, we must show 
that this model of scientific narrative is able to be applied to the study of human 
history – thus providing a principled scientific basis for its most basic explanatory 
form, and putting an end to its rather bizarre claims of epistemological uniqueness.
In order to support these claims, Part Two will examine those historically focused 
areas  of  science  that  have  not  been  able  to  simply  pull  up  the  metaphorical 
drawbridge and proclaim themselves guardians of a separate epistemology. Indeed, 
the study of examples drawn from such areas will prove instructive for precisely this 
reason. Part One of this thesis will argue that the philosophers of history who tried to 
develop  narrative  into  an  epistemology for  history  were  able  to  evade  the  most 
difficult questions about the necessity and verifiability of narratives by claiming that 
they  represented  a  different  kind  of  knowledge  in  which  such  questions  were 
somehow churlish. In this sense, the claim of separatism became little more than the 
licence  historians granted themselves to adhere to lower standards.  Part  Two,  by 
contrast, will point out that disciplines such as evolutionary biology, paleontology, 
and  geology  could  afford  no  such  luxury.  Whatever  concepts  of  narrative 
philosophers of such disciplines developed, they could not use claims of epistemic 
uniqueness in order to explain away the more difficult questions asked of them by 
philosophers of science. Because of this, the concept of narrative has been far more 
fully  and  rigorously  developed  in  the  philosophy of  science than  by  any  critical 
theorist or literary-narrativist philosopher of history. This thesis therefore intends to 
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examine the concept of narrative explanation offered by the historical sciences – our 
main example will be drawn from paleontology and evolutionary biology – in order 
to ascertain whether or not it  might be successfully generalised and subsequently 
applied to human history. 
To  accomplish  their  own  explanatory  goals,  it  should  be  noted,  narrative 
philosophers of science were required to be clear about how they understood the 
term “narrative.” And, if we are to make use of their work in this thesis, we must do 
the same. First and foremost, we need to divest ourselves of the glib confation of  
narrative  with  “fiction”  and/or  “story.”  As  Haskell  Fain  rather  condescendingly 
wrote in a 1970 paper:
Important facts of the titmouse life cycle can be arranged as a tale of Tilly the  
Titmouse. Though naturalists may make up such instructional stories for children, 
no serious student of natural history could take them seriously. Perhaps the time 
has come for serious students of human history to put away childish things.12
In order to avoid our vision of narrative being so blithely (and wrongly) dismissed, 
we  must  give  the  term  “narrative”  a  more  precise  meaning  which  avoids  such 
associations. This is not done in order to close off other potential meanings of the 
term or to evade responsibility, but instead to provide a more precise sense of the 
term for certain purposes. This is not unlike the defining of a metric “cup” as 250 
millilitres.  By doing this,  we allow for  a  degree  of  transpersonal  disambiguation 
when attempting precise work. We do not, however, immediately insist that the term 
“cup”  be  subsequently  denied  to  any  vessel  of  any  other  size  –  we  merely 
acknowledge that, when the stakes are low, a certain looseness of language can be 
permitted without harm. Similarly, we require our sense of narrative to not only be 
distinct from that of literary-narrativists like Hayden White, but also to be resistant to 
dismissal  as  “childish.”  To  this  end,  this  thesis  suggests  the  term  “epistemic-
narrative” as a foil for the already-introduced term “literary-narrative.” This term, 
while admittedly somewhat unwieldy, is nevertheless useful as it wears openly an 
emphasis on the key difference between the two positions. Where literary-narrativists 
such as Louis Mink and Hayden White have chosen to marginalise or outright deny 
the possibility of narratives functioning as actual knowledge claims and focused on 
the folk meaning of the term, the epistemic-narrativist position attempts to define 
and examine narratives as representations of actual past and present states of the 
12  Haskell Fain, 'History as Science,' History and Theory. Vol. 9, No. 2 (1970). p.154.
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world. As per the arguments of Part One then, we might argue that the philosophy of 
history has  produced a  good deal  of  literary-narrativists,  but  almost  no  epistemic-
narrativists. The historical sciences, on the other hand, have produced only epistemic-
narrativists (when they have produced narrativists at all). The task of this thesis then, 
is  to  examine  how  these  epistemic-narrativist  philosophers  of  science  have 
conceptualised narrative,  and  then  attempt  to  adapt  that  concept  to  the  peculiar 
difficulties involved in the study of human history. 
Perhaps the most important and striking aspect of epistemic-narrative philosophy of 
science is the impressive scope with which narrative is defined. Shorn of its narrow 
literary  connotations,  the  term  is  instead  defined  in  purely  temporal terms.  For 
example, David Hull – perhaps the philosopher of science who has done the most to 
develop  a  scientific  sense  of  narrative  –  defines  historical  narratives  simply  as 
“descriptions of historical entities as they persist through time,”13 and subsequently 
dedicated much of his work on narrative to trying to formalise the nature of those 
entities so narrated, ultimately concluding that such entities could be almost anything 
at  all  –  some  examples  Hull  uses  include  individual  human  beings,  Big  Ben, 
Protestantism, the United States of America, and the evolution of “sharks and bony 
fishes”14 –  provided  a  single  criteria  was  met:  they  must  be  individuals (in  the 
technical philosophical sense of the term). That is, they must be somehow unique. 
But even this stricture is fexible. For the entity in question, in Hull's view, need only 
be an individual at the level of enquiry in which the questioner is interested in it . That is, 
despite the fact that many facts about human physiology are able to be generalised, 
those facts will be of little interest to an historian seeking to write the biography of a 
single  human  being.15 Such  an  open-ended  definition  of  narrative  hints  at  the 
possibility that we might give a narrative account/explanation of almost anything in 
the physical universe. More recently, the philosopher of science Benjamin Jeffares has 
built on Hull's definition of narrative in order to introduce the possibility of causal 
interactions at multiple levels and from multiple branches of knowledge:
Narratives thus have the following character. They document the changes in state 
in a central  historical  subject.  Those changes in states will  be the result  of  the 
13  David L.  Hull,  'Central  Subjects  and Historical  Narratives,'  History  and Theory.  Vol.  14,  No.  3 
(October 1975). p.254.
14  Ibid., pp.253-274.
15  For instance, all human beings have white blood cells – yet knowing this general fact is not likely  
to  be  of  much  use  in  explaining  the  actions  of  Mikhail  Gorbachev  in  pursuing  his  “Sinatra 
Doctrine.” Whether or not the subject of a narrative is an individual depends, in other words, on 
the questions we wish to ask.
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operation  of  particular  processes.  We  may  well  speculate  that  processes  are 
operating  in  tandem  rather  than  sequentially.  These  processes  might  work  at 
different levels and invoke causes from quite different domains. Volcanism and 
erosion  are  two  rather  different  processes,  and  in  a  narrative  recounting  the 
formation of a volcanic island, we may well invoke both processes. Each process 
may well be linked to the final state of the island in its own way.16
In terms of actually formulating and expressing knowledge claims about historical 
entities and their persistence over time, the philosopher of history Arthur Danto has  
given  us  a  similarly  wide-ranging  definition  with  what  he  calls  the  “narrative 
sentence.”  These  sentences  are  devices  for  expressing  a  temporal  relationship 
between  multiple  events/objects  such  as  to  bind  them into  a  single  claim.  Such 
sentences, Danto wrote, “refer to at least two time-separated events though they only 
describe (are only  about) the earliest event to which they refer.”17 We will meet this 
concept again in Chapter Three, but for now it will suffice merely to point out that, 
once again, we might construct one of Danto's narrative sentences about almost any 
single event/object conceivable. Exactly this kind of open definition of narrative lies 
at the heart of the epistemic-narrative approach to science. The question then remains 
– given the fexibility of the term – why  shouldn't this definition be applied to the 
events/objects of human history as well?
Surprisingly, the question of whether or not such a broad temporal view of narrative 
can be applied to human history often does not get any answer at all, let alone a 
detailed  one.  Indeed,  due  to  the  nomothetic  assumption  biasing  a  generation  of 
philosophers  of  history  against  the  possibility  of  a  non-nomothetic  science,  it  is 
frequently  ignored  almost  entirely.  The  philosopher  Mark  Day,  in  his  otherwise 
excellent  2008 book  The  Philosophy of  History  –  itself  designed as  a  handbook for 
students studying the subject  –  makes this particular disconnect clear. In a chapter 
devoted to  narrative in  history,  Day argues  that  there are two ways in  which to 
understand narrative in history – the “thin” sense,  and the “thicker.” The former 
understanding, Day writes, “is that a narrative is any report of two or more events  
with some temporal ordering between them.” According to this view:
...  narratives are found in physics (concerning the development of the universe 
over the first minute), biology, geology, as well as in a variety of reports about 
human  activity  and  behaviour...  Narrative  is  unavoidable  in  any  subject  that 
16  Benjamin  Jeffares,  Testing  Times:  Confirmation  in  the  Historical  Sciences.  PhD  Thesis,  Australian 
National University, 2008. pp.30-31.
17  Arthur C.  Danto,  Narration and Knowledge (including the Integral  Text of  Analytical  Philosophy of  
History). Columbia University Press: New York, 2007. p.143. (emphasis in original)
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studies different events at different times.18
However, Day then categorically dismisses this “thin” approach, writing that “nothing 
of substance, either critical or positive, follows from that observation.” And because 
of  this,  he  writes,  a  “consequent  demand  that  narrative  be  moved  to  the 
philosophical  margins...  is  prominent  in  recent  comments  by philosophers  of  the 
analytic tradition.” Within a single paragraph, Day has effectively opened and then 
closed  discussion  of  any  possible  scientific  sense  of  the  term  narrative.  Day 
immediately goes on to argue – citing, among others, W. B. Gallie, Louis Mink, and 
Hayden White – that there is another “thicker” understanding of narrative, which is 
built upon a more literary understanding of the term. This literary-narrativist sense 
of narrative is apparently legitimate in a way the “thin” sense is not, however, as Day 
goes on to discuss it  for a further sixteen pages!19 Nor is he alone.  One can find 
similar  dismissals  of  any  possibility  of  bringing  a  scientific  view of  narrative  to 
history  in  much contemporary  philosophy of  history.  In  the  case  of  the  literary-
narrativists, this is unsurprising. What is more surprising is that the same tendency is 
also evident in the work of contemporary philosophers of history who seek to resist 
the  literary-narrativist  arguments  regarding  history's  proximity  to  fiction  and 
reconcile the seeming contradiction between an autonomous history and scientific 
epistemology.  This  is  what  is  meant  by  the  nomothetic  assumption  cutting  such 
philosophers  of  history  off  from  precisely  those  arguments  which  would  best 
accomplish their purpose.
For example, Aviezer Tucker (whom Day cites as one of those philosophers calling 
for narrative to be marginalised if the philosophy of history is to be meaningfully 
connected to the sciences),  argues for a re-conceptualisation of  explanation in the 
philosophy of history in terms of Bayesian statistical analysis.20 This, he argues, is 
necessary in order to give historical explanation legitimacy. Indeed, one of the key 
advantages of  his  general  approach,  Tucker claims,  is  that  it  “renders the debate 
about narrative superfuous.”21 Why then are those philosophers of history who seek 
an  epistemic  legitimacy  for  history  that  philosophers  like  White  have  long 
abandoned so keen to expunge the idea of narrative from their work? This thesis will  
18  Mark Day, The Philosophy of History. Continuum: London & New York, 2008. p.168.
19  Ibid., pp.168-184. 
20  See  the  entire  third  chapter  of:  Aviezer  Tucker,  Our  Knowledge  of  the  Past:  A  Philosophy  of  
Historiography. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004. pp.92-140.
21  Aviezer Tucker, 'The Future of the Philosophy of Historiography,' History and Theory. Vol. 40, No. 1 
(February 2001). p.51.
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suggest that there is simply no principled reason to do so, and that all such attempts 
must ultimately stem from the stubborn persistence of the nomothetic assumption. 
For, as Part One will show, the perception of narrative as somehow oppositional to 
science has been the primary attraction of the concept for a great many philosophers 
of history keen to distinguish history from the sciences. Conversely, it appears that 
the beliefs regarding narrative of those who would seek a modern rehabilitation of 
the concept of scientific history are effectively a mirror image of the same prejudice. 
Either  way,  the  perception  that  narrative  is,  and  must  remain,  an  inherently 
unscientific concept represents an effectively unchallenged axiomatic assumption in 
almost all contemporary philosophy of history. This assumption must be refuted and 
the realisation that narrative is a fully scientific concept which can be directly applied 
to historical explanation established in its place. It is the contention of this thesis that 
the best way to accomplish this is to replace the ill-defined literary sense of narrative 
pervasive in history with the kind of broad scientific sense of  the term hinted at 
above – using the broad applicability of the term as the means by which we will  
integrate  history  with  the  sciences.  We will  thus  directly  and  squarely  challenge 
Day's glib assertion that “nothing of substance, either critical or positive” follows 
from the conception of narrative as “any report  of two or more events with some 
temporal ordering between them.” 
How then do we use this this exclusively temporal “thin” sense of  the term narrative 
in order to give substance to the three claims stated earlier – that the nomothetic 
assumption is false; that narrative is a  necessary feature of science and not merely a 
placeholder for future (i.e., better) explanations; and that such a model of narrative is 
applicable  to  explanations  in  human  history?  We  must  first  begin  with  an 
acknowledgement  of  the  semantic difficulties  inherent  in  crossing  the  perceived 
boundary between history and science. It is something of a cliché to point out that  
some languages other than English – syntactically at least – count history as among 
the sciences.22 This assertion accomplishes nothing, however, as it offers no further 
account of how the epistemological disconnect between the substantive claims of the 
philosophy of history and the philosophy of almost everything else can be bridged. It 
is  effectively the equivalent of  claiming that two different objects might be made 
identical simply by giving them the same name. Something similar might also be 
22  For example, the German term Wissenschaft, which is often used to describe any field which uses 
systematic  methods  of  research  and thus  makes  no hard and fast  distinction  between  human 
history and any other science.
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said, however, about the sciences. For the question “what is science” – as opposed to 
the question we are concerned with, “how does science explain?” – is a difficult one, 
and lies largely outside the scope of this thesis. We will have to content ourselves 
with  merely  establishing  a  clear  correspondence between  disciplines  that  are 
uncontroversially  considered  scientific  and  human  history.  In  this  thesis,  the 
successful  establishment  of  such a correspondence will  be taken as evidence that 
human history is at least as scientific as the discipline it is being compared with. 23 We 
will be using, in other words, an argument by analogy. Paleontology, for example, is  
considered scientific. If there are explanations in paleontology which use a model of  
epistemic-narrative to do their explanatory work, and it can be shown that the same 
model  of  epistemic-narrative  can  perform  similar  explanatory  work  in  human 
history, then human history must therefore be at least as scientific as paleontology.
With this in mind, this thesis will justify the claim that the nomothetic assumption is 
false by demonstrating that there are branches of science that have long found the 
nomothetic model of explanation insufficient for their purposes. Indeed, from even a 
cursory  examination  of  this  literature,  we  can  see  a  clear  narrative  emphasis 
emerging almost immediately – as well as comparisons with human history. From 
the mere  existence of  this debate we can reasonably conclude that the nomothetic 
model alone was simply not enough to meet the needs of certain branches of science, 
and that this fact – despite the condescension of philosophers of science – has  not 
proved  sufficient  to  have  these  disciplines  ruled  unscientific.  Thus  we  might 
reasonably conclude that the nomothetic model does not exhaust all possibilities of 
scientific explanation. If we wish to move from mere resemblance to a demonstration 
that history really  is scientific,  however,  we must  examine  how historical  sciences 
have  tackled  the  problem  of  explanation.  While  the  kinds  of  solutions  historical 
sciences have offered have often tended toward the parochial, we can nonetheless see 
a more detailed scientific conception of narrative emerge with enough areas of broad 
coherence to suggest  the possibility of a  generalisable model.  From this  it  can be 
argued that narrative is a concept worth taking seriously in a scientific sense and can 
function as a viable complement to nomothetic explanation. 
The circumscribed intent of such intra-disciplinary models of narrative explanation, 
23  This does not,  of course, counter  those who would argue that not only is human history not  
science, neither are geology, paleontology, evolutionary biology, etc. But those who would make 
such  an  argument  are  in  very  deep  waters  indeed,  having  gone  well  beyond  questions  of 
explanation and into questions of definition which are far outside the scope of this thesis. 
27
however, potentially opens the way for charges that scientific models of narrative are 
–  like  their  counterparts  in  the  philosophy  of  history  –  effectively  post  hoc 
conveniences,  designed  to  descriptively  legitimise  certain  practices,  but  not  to 
actually  explain anything. Such charges could not go as far in the sciences as they 
have  in  history  –  where  they  have  ended  with  the  accusation  that  history  is 
essentially fiction – as  the sciences in question cannot and do not begin with the 
presupposition that narrative is a purely literary device. But this is a difference of 
degree  rather  than  kind.  Thus,  for  the  general  model  of  narrative  explanation 
advanced in this thesis to stand, the post hoc rationalisation class of arguments must 
be refuted.  To this  end,  we must  examine not  only  whether parochial  models  of 
narrative explanation can be meaningfully  generalised,  but  whether the resulting  
general model can be given a deep scientific structure which would show it to be at  
least as necessary a mode of explanation as the nomothetic model. If this can be done, 
then we will have finally arrived at a juncture where we might legitimately ask: if 
this definition covers such deeply varied subject matter as the birth of the universe, 
the formation of geologic features, and the evolution of organisms, why should it not 
be applied to human history as well?
Fortunately, contemporary philosophy of science has begun work on the problem of 
producing a generalised model of epistemic-narrative. While it  is  still  early days, 
there are signs of a new seriousness emerging regarding narrative in the philosophy 
of science. Philosophers from disciplines such as archaeology, biology, geology, and 
pure philosophy have largely converged on a common language regarding narrative, 
and have built  on each other's work. A unified narrative philosophy of science is 
taking shape, with much of the more recent work focusing on precisely the kind of 
firm epistemic grounding needed in order to secure narrative as something more 
than  mere  convenience.  The  legacy  of  the  nomothetic  assumption  has,  however, 
acted to effectively prevent philosophers of history – to say nothing of philosophical 
historians – from taking an active and co-equal role in this discussion. In fact, most 
historians and students of history in the early twenty-first century remain largely 
unaware that such genuinely new work is even being done in historical/narrative 
theory  –  let  alone  its  potential  relevance  for  their  discipline.  As  showing  this  
perceived barrier between history and science to be illusory is the primary aim of this 
thesis, we will therefore examine several key lines of argument from the philosophy 
of  science  which  have  attempted  to  place  narrative  explanation  in  the  historical 
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sciences on a much firmer footing, while demonstrating for each of these arguments 
that the insights they generate are as applicable to human history as they are to the 
sciences.  Moreover,  it  will  also  be  shown  that  these  arguments,  taken  together, 
constitute  an  essentially  complete model  of  scientific  narrative  explanation  – 
providing  not  only  a  way  to  provide  a  principled  link  between  narrative  and 
nomothetic explanation, but also arguing that a narrative dimension to explanation is 
a necessary feature of the universe as we understand it. The ultimate conclusion of 
this thesis then, can only be that if explanations as currently understood in human 
history obey a model of  explanation that can be shown to be both valid in other 
accepted  branches  of  science,  and  conceptually  integrated  into  our  very  best 
understanding of the the philosophy of science, then human history is, for all intents 
and purposes, a science.
The first task a general model of narrative explanation must attend to is to offer some 
rebuttal  to  the  objection  that  historical  studies  of  any kind  are  dramatically,  and 
perhaps fatally handicapped – at least scientifically speaking – by a lack of direct 
access to the events/objects they seek to study. Therefore, even if narrative were to be 
a  fully-fedged  explanatory  model,  the  kinds  of  studies  which  would 
disproportionately make use of it still could not be considered of equal standing with 
the nomothetic  sciences.  We will  refer  to  this  as  the argument from “observation 
poverty.”24 On the surface, this objection does not seem relevant to human history in 
particular – as one might merely point out that in this respect the historian with her 
documents is in a far better position than the paleontologist attempting to infer the 
properties  of  now-extinct  organisms  from  a  handful  of  fossilised  remains.  To 
properly eliminate this objection in a general model of narrative, however, such a glib 
search for counterexamples will not be sufficient. Fortunately, it can be convincingly 
argued from a purely philosophical viewpoint that observation poverty is not any 
more  weighted  against  historical  disciplines  than  any  other.  For  whatever 
disadvantage the historian suffers with respect to temporal distance from the objects 
of their interest is mirrored in the difference in scale between, for example, particle 
physicists  and  the  objects  of  their  interest.  One  can  easily  imagine,  for  instance, 
situations in which the temporal separation faced by the historian is less obfuscatory 
than the  spatial distance  faced  by  the  particle  physicist.  That  is,  an archaeologist 
24  One might also use the term “Experimental Poverty.” “Observation Poverty” will be preferred in 
this thesis for the simple reason that – as experimental results must be observed in order to be of 
any use – framing in terms of observation effectively covers both observation and experiment with 
a single expression.
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inferring the existence of an ancient city seems on much firmer epistemic ground 
than  a  physicist  attempting  to  “observe”  subatomic  particles.  In  light  of  such 
arguments,  the  claim  that  history  is  particularly disadvantaged  by  observation 
poverty begins to seem like special pleading. The more appropriate way to talk about 
observation of any kind then, is in terms of the interactions and interchanges required 
in order to carry information from the source to the observer.25 This is not only a 
much  more  consistent  and  informative  way  to  conceptualise  observation  as  a 
concept,  but  has  the  advantage  of  being  completely  agnostic  when  it  comes  to 
historical/narrative versus non-historical/nomothetic enquiry. 
Secondly, a principled model of narrative that hopes to be considered scientific must 
be able to claim some non-arbitrary connection to the core philosophy of science. 
Otherwise,  we  are  effectively  permitting  separate,  incommensurable  bodies  of 
knowledge  to  call  themselves  scientific,  while  having  no  principled  way  for 
explanations in any one area to be used – or even conceptualised – in any other. In 
other  words,  we  permit  precisely  that  fracturing  of  knowledge  we  are  trying to 
avoid.  For  without  bringing  narrative  into  some  sort  of  harmony  with  existing 
philosophy of science, we potentially allow, for example, evolutionary biology to be 
called a science, yet be – philosophically speaking – totally epistemically unconnected 
to any other area, even those other areas of biology which are more amenable to  
traditional nomothetic understanding. We would, in other words, be replacing one 
disconnect with many. This is obviously counterproductive. The way to avoid this 
then, is to define a narrative – in the broad epistemic sense discussed above – in basic 
terms compatible with the existing nomothetic-deductive model. We will refer to this 
argument  in  this  thesis  as  the  “nomothetic  compatibility  requirement”  or  simply 
“nomothetic  compatibilism.”  This  will  provide  the  necessary  connection  to 
philosophy of science, while simultaneously preventing a repeat of the mistake many 
philosophers of  history have made in trying to make narrative stand utterly and 
totally alone. In doing this, however, we cannot go too far in the other direction and 
attempt to reduce narrative to a special case of the nomothetic – or it would have no 
reason to exist at all. Instead, we must define it in a way that is complementary and co-
equal. 
Philosophically speaking, this thesis will argue that this can be accomplished simply 
25  Peter Kosso, Knowing the Past: Philosophical Issues of History and Archaeology. Humanity Books: New 
York, 2001. pp.43-45.
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by  inverting  the  direction  of  reasoning  of  the  traditional  nomothetic-deductive 
model.  That is,  instead of  taking those things that a population of  events/objects 
have in common and extrapolating from them a unifying law or principle shared by 
all members of that population, we proceed in the opposite direction and apply all 
relevant laws and principles to a single event/object. This, it will be shown, produces 
a definition of narrative that retains the wide applicability and fexibility hinted at 
above, neatly accommodates the definitions of narrative offered by Hull and Jeffares, 
and – most importantly – maintains a principled connection with existing philosophy 
of science. Moreover, this definitional move not only distinguishes the narrative from 
the nomothetic in terms of the direction of reasoning, it provides a clear delineation 
as to when each is appropriate. For a necessary consequence of this view is that a 
narrative can only be about an individual of some kind. Therefore, if the event/object 
we are interested in is unique (in the sense in which we are interested in it) then it  
follows that narrative will be the appropriate method for its explanation. And that 
explanation will take the basic form of an account of how multiple causal factors 
have  interacted  upon  that  single  event/object  over  time.  From  this,  it  becomes 
possible to show that explanations in human history obey precisely this basic form at 
least  as  closely  as  any  other  historical  science,  provided  we  account  for  the 
disproportionate propensity of human history to cite other events/objects – rather 
than  laws  and  theories  –  as  causal  factors  in  their  explanations.  This  is  not  an 
insurmountable obstacle however, and we shall argue that it can be dealt with if we 
accept that our chains of narrative reasoning will almost never – even in the most 
ideal cases – be only one level deep.
A more pressing problem is that of confirmation. For if we invert the direction of  
reasoning of the nomothetic model we are immediately presented with a problem of 
verifiability. That is,  if  we reason from effects back to causes, and that cause was 
either inherently or functionally unique, then how can we be sure we are even close 
to correct in our inference of it? Especially given that the uniqueness required by the 
narrative  model  prevents  the  use  of  experimental  duplication?  In  the  traditional 
vision of science, this is often where the prediction of future instances is invoked – 
yet this option is of limited use to the historical sciences, as the event/object in which 
we are interested has already taken place or otherwise already exists. We might, of 
course, speculate as to future transformations – or even the disappearance – of our 
central subject, and in this sense we are making prospective predictions, but this is a 
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comparatively  rare  way  for  historians  to  work.  Certainly,  there  are  classes  of 
predictions that focus entirely upon past events. Evolution by natural selection, for 
example, cannot predict the exact body plans of future organisms. Yet it can be said 
that  a  key  prediction  of  evolution  is  that,  for  example,  no  fossilised  remains  of 
organisms exhibiting a high degree of organisational complexity ought to be found in 
extremely old Cambrian-era rocks. This is a kind of prediction that works in a time-
agnostic manner – as predicting that no such fossils exist is functionally equivalent to 
predicting  that  they  will  never  be  found  –  and  is  far  friendlier  to  historical 
enterprises. This style of prediction has been called “negative prediction.”26 In this 
sense, “prediction poverty” – like observation poverty – is not the fatal objection to a 
science of history that many of its advocates have imagined it to be. Nevertheless, we 
must still offer a principled reason why prediction appears to function quite differently 
in the narrative domain than in the nomothetic – otherwise we once again become 
vulnerable to charges of engineering a post hoc rationalisation to hide a basic failure 
of historical study. Therefore, any general model of narrative explanation that hopes 
to  be  called  scientific  must  not  only  be able  to  provide  a  non-arbitrary logic  for 
confirmation and disconfirmation of narrative claims, but also be able to account for 
this basic discrepancy. For if we have no reliable mechanism for telling a true claim 
from a false one then any general theory of narrative, no matter how conceptually 
sound, is useless.27 This is of particular importance for history, where the charge that 
narratives  are  entirely  arbitrary  constructions  of  the  historian/author  which  can 
never be checked against reality (this failure usually being attributed to observation 
poverty) has become a central feature of its contemporary philosophy. To this end, it 
will  be  shown  that  a  viable  solution  to  this  problem  fows  elegantly  from  one 
fundamental observation about the operation of causation: its asymmetry. 
Simply put, “asymmetry of causation” is a term by which we might express a single 
and seemingly deep feature  of  causality:  a  single  cause  will  almost  always  have 
multiple effects, yet the reverse is hardly ever true. That is, the single cause that is the 
striking of a match will have multiple effects – smoke, fame, heat, and so on – but 
multiple  causes  do  not  often  exhibit  a  single  effect.  While  seemingly  a  trite  
observation, from this asymmetry a logic of confirmation can be derived for unique,  
26  T. A.  Goudge, 'Causal Explanations in Natural History.'  The British Journal  for the Philosophy of  
Science. Vol. 9, No. 35 (November 1958). pp.201-202.
27  Note that having a reliable mechanism for counting evidence for or against a narrative claim is not 
the same as actually having evidence for or against that claim. There are, for instance, some formally 
valid narrative claims for which there is simply insufficient evidence. This is a distinctly different  
problem from possessing evidence and not having a consistent logic for using it.
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past causes by noting that we need not observe/recover every single effect in order to 
be able to infer their cause. That is, we do not need to capture every particle of smoke 
and ash in order to know that a match was struck. As we shall see, this can not only 
provide a principled justification for making inferences from incomplete evidence – 
one  the  hallmarks  of  any  historical  science  –  it  also  provides  a  mechanism  for 
discriminating  between  competing  narrative  explanations.  This  is  because  the 
asymmetry of causation entitles us to expect that there will almost  always be more 
effects than causes, and thus virtually assures us of a wealth of evidential material 
with which to work.28 Therefore we simply need to search for an effect among this 
constellation consistent with a subset (or even only one) of the available hypotheses 
regarding the event/object of the past in which we are interested. If it is found, then  
we have generated a reason to accept only those hypotheses that involve the presence 
of  that  effect.  This  mechanism we will  refer to  in this  thesis  as  “confirmation by 
consequences.” This confirmation logic will not only be shown to have the advantage 
of accurately describing the kind of reasoning historical scientists undertake, it will 
also be demonstrated that it effectively ties the differences between the narrative and 
the nomothetic to a fundamental feature of causation. And this is exactly what is 
required if we are to plausibly claim that the narrative method is a necessary mode of 
explanation,  rather  than  merely  a  convenient  one.  This  thesis  will  also  argue, 
moreover, that this logic – like the “accounting claim” rejoinder to the argument from 
observation poverty  –  has  the additional  advantage of  being completely agnostic 
regarding any perceived boundary between human history and the sciences. That is, 
it applies equally well whether we are reasoning about the possibility of a meteor 
causing the extinction of the dinosaurs, or the role of economic factors in the fall of  
the Roman Republic. Thus we will again be driven to conclude that there is nothing 
here  which  excludes  human  history  from being  considered  one  of  the  historical 
sciences.
The Structure of Part Two
Part  Two  of  this  thesis  consists  of  three  chapters.  These  chapters  are  separated 
thematically, but – considered together – move roughly chronologically through the 
emergence and development of an epistemic narrativism by both philosophers of 
science  and  practising  scientists.  The  primary  aim  of  Chapter  Four  is  to  give 
28  With more becoming available as improved technology develops the ability to detect them.
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substance to our first claim of Part Two: that the nomothetic model of explanation 
alone is inadequate to describe the operation of disciplines such as biology, geology, 
and paleontology – despite their relatively uncontroversial acceptance as scientific. 
To this end, Chapter Four will examine some of the historical  tensions between the 
theory and practice  of  both the biological  and the earth sciences and nomothetic 
orthodoxy in the philosophy of science. The earliest geologists and earth scientists, 
for example, finding little or no guidance in the philosophy of science, often turned 
to  history to  help  give  theoretical  shape  to  their  work.  This  was  not  considered 
problematic for the philosophy of science, however, especially in the wake of Newton 
and other  nomothetic  triumphs of  the  seventeenth  and eighteenth  centuries.  The 
troubled  relationship  between  such  historical  sciences  and  nomothetic  orthodoxy 
only became impossible to ignore with the nineteenth century publication of both 
Charles Lyell's Principles of Geology,29 and Charles Darwin's On the Origin Of Species by  
Means of Natural Selection.30 These works were problematic for the nomothetic model 
given that they were both enormously successful in terms of explanatory power, yet 
neither seemed to have discovered or deployed any firm nomothetic laws. Because of 
this, both men drew a good deal of criticism from philosophers of science, much of it 
rooted  in  the  nomothetic  assumption.  This  philosophical  condescension  was  not 
limited to the nineteenth century, however, as hostility to these kinds of sciences – 
particularly  biology  –  can  still  be  found  among  contemporary  philosophers  of 
science. To this end, Chapter Four will go on to examine some of the most infuential  
modern  criticisms of the scientific status of biology – specifically those offered by 
Karl Popper and Mario Bunge – as well as the defences offered by such philosophers 
of biology as Michael Ruse and David Hull.  All of this, Chapter Four will argue, 
represents compelling evidence that the insistence on a single nomothetic model for 
all  scientific explanation could not capture the kind of science disciplines such as 
geology and biology were pursuing. For although one could certainly see a clear role 
for laws in such disciplines, laws alone were not enough to fully conceptualise the 
kind of work being done in these fields. Chapter Four then, will show the inadequacy 
of a strict nomothetic formalism even within the sciences themselves.
Chapter Five's primary aim will be to give substance to the second of our earlier 
29  Lyell's work was published in three volumes between 1830 and 1833. See: Charles Lyell, Principles 
of Geology: Being an Attempt to Explain the Former Changes of the Earth's Surface, by Reference to Causes  
Now in Operation. John Murray: London, 1830-1833.
30  Charles Darwin, On The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured  
Races in the Struggle for Life. John Murray: London, 1859.
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claims: that those scientific disciplines the explanations of which do not conform to 
the nomothetic model have often found narrative useful as an explanatory concept – 
and that such scientific conceptions of narrative have therefore already become a part 
of mainstream scientific explanation, despite a widespread lack of recognition from 
philosophers of science. In order to establish this claim, this chapter will examine in 
some detail one of the first serious attempts to offer a narrative solution to the bind in 
which  the  nomothetic-deductive  model  had  placed  the  historical  sciences.  This 
model was offered as an attempt to capture the form of explanation in evolutionary 
biology, and was the work of one T. A. Goudge. Goudge's example will be instructive 
here because, unlike history, historical scientists could not simply opt out of scientific 
epistemology by fiat. Thus it was essential that any model of narrative used in the 
historical  sciences  be  somehow  scientifically  defensible.  To  test  the  success  of 
Goudge's  model  at  maintaining this  testability while  also claiming to proceed by 
narrative  rather  than  general  law,  Chapter  Five  will  undertake  an  extended 
examination of the applied example offered by Goudge – the evolution of the first 
genuinely limbed creatures (tetrapods) during the Devonian era.31 This case study 
will be examined with particular reference to both the narrative form of the various 
potential explanations and their ability to be confirmed or disconfirmed by empirical 
means.  This  will  be  accomplished  by  seeing  how  these  mid-twentieth  century 
explanations of tetrapod evolution have  actually fared in light of the new evidence 
that has become available in subsequent years. From this it will be argued that the 
concept of narrative can indeed perform useful explanatory work in the historical 
sciences and is able to be made answerable to evidence. However, narrative – even in 
the comparatively advanced form in which Goudge offered it – remained vulnerable 
to  charges of  being a  post  hoc rationalisation,  or  some kind of  placeholder for  an 
actual explanation. Chapter Five then, will demonstrate that, despite narrative being 
a useful practical concept in the historically focused sciences, mid-twentieth century 
narrative theorists such as Goudge could not make narrative respectable by showing 
it to be a necessary mode of explanation linked to some fundamental property of the 
world. 
Chapter  Six  will  seek to  provide  the  philosophical  foundations  missing from the 
work of  Goudge,  and thus  give  substance  to  the  third  claim of  Part  Two –  that 
narrative is a necessary and fundamental mode of explanation, able to be linked to 
31  The Devonian period is a division of the Paleozoic era, which spans approximately 57 million 
years, from ~416 million years ago to ~359 million years ago.
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both existing nomothetic models and to our deepest insights regarding the nature of 
causation. To establish this, this chapter will examine in detail how the philosophy of  
science  has  acted  to  address  each  of  the  potential  hindrances  hinted  at  above  –  
observation  poverty,  the  nomothetic  compatibility  requirement,  and  a  principled 
logic of confirmation by consequences.  As it  so happens, some of the most recent 
work done in the philosophy of the non-nomothetic historical sciences has focused 
on  removing  just  such  barriers  and  thus  generalising  narrative  as  a  form  of 
explanation. In this sense at least, Chapter Six will not be required to reinvent the 
wheel. Therefore, in addition to detailing the arguments which establish narrative as 
a  fully  co-equal  mode of  explanation Chapter  Six  will  also  examine whether  the 
requirements that these philosophical arguments introduce can be met in the practice 
of human history. With respect to observation poverty, we will examine the work of 
the  philosopher  of  science  Peter  Kosso,  whose  reorientation  of  the  terms  of  the 
observation  poverty  argument  from  a  crude  “observable”/“unobservable” 
dichotomy to a more nuanced system of “observation, all things considered” through 
what he calls “accounting claims” effectively refutes this class of arguments. With 
respect to the requirement for “nomothetic compatibilism” referred to earlier, we will  
examine the work of the philosopher of biology David Hull. Hull's argument that the 
narrative form is essentially the nomothetic-deductive model inverted – creating a  
“particular-circumstance” model – provides a way to connect the broad, inclusive 
definition of narrative seen earlier to the existing structures of science. This inversion 
introduces  the  idea  of  a  narrative  as  a  “central  subject”  which  is  explained  by 
detailing all of the relevant law-governed processes which have interacted over time 
to produce/transform/destroy that subject. Such a definition is, however, difficult to 
reconcile with the practice of history simply because explanations in history do not 
always explain their central subjects in terms of laws and processes, instead offering  
singular events/objects in explanation of  other singular events/objects.  In order to 
justify  our  claim  that  Hull's  model  can  be  applied  to  human  history,  therefore,  
Chapter Six will argue that narrative explanations can be nested. That is, we can use 
narrative explanations as components of other narrative explanations. With respect to 
the final requirement for narratives to be made to submit to empirical confirmation 
or  disconfirmation,  this  chapter  will  examine  the  work  of  the  philosopher  Carol 
Cleland. Cleland has convincingly argued (building on the work of David Lewis) 
that  there  is  a  basic  asymmetry  in  the  operation  of  causation  which  forces  very 
different  –  albeit  complementary  and  reconcilable  –  methods  and  forms  upon 
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empirical  knowledge-generating  disciplines  depending  on  which  side  of  this 
asymmetry they are working on. This, it will be shown, provides a justification for 
the lack of future prediction in the historical sciences, as well as providing a way in 
which  to  discriminate  objectively  between  narrative  theories.  Ultimately  then, 
Chapter Six will argue that if a narrative account satisfies inspection in these three 
areas, it can legitimately be called scientific. Moreover, it can be called such without 
apology, for the narrative form in which it is cast is not merely arbitrary or a result of 
incomplete information but a necessary form, imposed upon historical studies by the 
nature of science and the operation of causation. 
The overarching theme of this thesis, considered as a whole, is that there is not only 
one fundamental model of scientific explanation,  but two – the narrative and the 
nomothetic. The two are co-equal, and the form of each is dictated by whichever side 
of  the  asymmetry of  causation a  desired subject  lies.  All  branches  of  science  can 
potentially make use of both modes of explanation, but – depending on their chosen 
subject matter – will usually favour one explanatory mode over the other. From this it 
can be concluded that history is – along with archaeology, paleontology, geology, and 
any number of others – simply one of those branches whose subject matter heavily 
favours  the narrative mode.  Ultimately then,  the solution to the problem of how 
historical knowledge is related to that of the sciences can be solved not by attempting 
to expunge narrative from all historical work, but by finally taking it  seriously as an 
epistemic concept. More importantly, adopting such a view of history will effectively 
dissolve many of those vexing dilemmas which have dominated discussion in the 
philosophy of history for more than a century. For the failure of historical knowledge 
to  conform to a nomothetic  model  of  explanation could no longer be  considered 
credible evidence of the unscientific nature of that knowledge. Nor could it be taken 
as evidence of a methodological failure that might only be remedied by a radical  
transformation of historical practice. And so we might finally rid ourselves of the 
need to maintain the polite fiction of separate epistemic realms. Similarly, it could no 
longer be argued that  narrative itself  is  a  post  hoc rationalisation,  designed as  an 
attempt to legitimise the historical status quo. For a deep understanding of narrative 
and how it fows from our best understanding of the operation of the universe must 
show instead that narrative  explanation is  a  necessary refection of  the nature  of 
causation. And all that is required to make possible such a rapprochement between 
history and the sciences is the abandonment of the thoroughgoing and persistent 
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nomothetic  assumption  which  has  tainted  the  philosophy  of  history  since  the 
nineteenth century. This seems, to put it mildly, a small price to pay. The nomothetic  
assumption has contributed little more than an inferiority complex and identity crisis 
to the philosophy of history for quite some time now. Historians and the discipline of 
history  in  general,  as  this  thesis  intends  to  demonstrate,  would be  far  better  off 
without it.
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Part One
“Ask Any Scientician”:
The Nomothetic Assumption in Twentieth 
Century Philosophy of History

Chapter One
“Introducing the Nomothetic Assumption”
While generalisations  regarding entire  academic fields  are  notoriously  difficult  to 
make,  and  therefore  rightly  regarded  with  suspicion,  the  fact  is  that  this  thesis 
proceeds on the basis of just such a generalisation. That is, the success or failure of 
the arguments presented here will depend upon our basic assertion that there has 
been  –  among  historians  and  philosophers  of  history  at  least  –  a  systemic  and 
persistent  identification  of  the  entirety of  science  with  the  law-seeking  deductive 
methods used by some of its sub-disciplines (i.e., physics). This is the meaning of the 
shorthand term “nomothetic assumption,” as coined in the Introduction. Given the 
foundational nature of this claim, it is imperative that it be adequately justified. To 
this end,  Part One will primarily concern itself with an examination of the work of 
some of the most infuential twentieth century philosophers of history in an attempt 
to ascertain the extent to which they were promulgators (consciously or otherwise) of 
the nomothetic assumption. Chapter One begins to tackle this overarching task by 
examining the work of  J.  B.  Bury, G. M. Trevelyan, R. G. Collingwood, Benedetto 
Croce, Charles Beard, and Carl Becker – all of whom were active from the turn of the 
twentieth century up until the transformative arrival of the covering law theories of 
Karl Popper and Carl Hempel.32 More than merely a chronology, however, Chapter 
One will seek to use these examples in service of two key arguments. First, we will  
demonstrate the reality of the nomothetic assumption among these prominent and 
infuential philosophers of history even before the arrival of Popper and Hempel. 
This will be achieved through an examination of their relevant writings on the nature 
of history and its relationship to the sciences. This approach will have the additional 
benefit  of  allowing  us  to  simultaneously  examine  the  effect  the  nomothetic 
assumption has had on these philosophers with respect to their ultimate assessments 
of the relationship between history and the sciences. The second aim of this chapter,  
however, is more subtle. For if these philosophers were convinced that history could 
not  be  scientific  as  it  did  not  proceed  in  accordance  with  nomothetic-deductive 
32  This debate, of course, has a history extending much further back than the twentieth century. In 
fact,  the  question of  both the proper  form of  scientific knowledge and the  status  of historical  
knowledge relative to that form extend well back into the nineteenth century and even beyond. 
Nevertheless, this thesis – given that it is primarily concerned with the narrativist response to the 
covering law thesis in the mid-twentieth century – has chosen to limit its scope to the twentieth  
century. While ultimately 1900 is an arbitrary division, of course, it has been chosen in order to 
allow  a  period  long  enough  to  demonstrate  both  the  existence  of  a  pervasive  nomothetic 
assumption before Popper and Hempel, and the idealist character of historical thought that Popper 
and Hempel were primarily concerned with eliminating (and thus provide the proper context for 
their covering law theories) – yet short enough to be covered within the available space.
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methods, the question remains: having said what history wasn't, did they also have 
anything to say about what history  was? Chapter One, therefore, will also seek to 
outline something of the perceived character of historical knowledge – often gathered 
under the term “idealism” – among philosophers of history prior to the arrival of 
covering law theory. But this idealism, too, it will be shown, is deeply infuenced by 
the  nomothetic  assumption.  For  the  presumption  of  a  stark  difference  in  kind 
between history and science, underwritten by the nomothetic assumption, was one of  
the  underpinnings  of  the  idealist  approach,  which  emphasised  both  the  total 
epistemic autonomy of history and the primacy of “re-thinking” human thought as a 
method for gaining historical knowledge. Thus, as such idealistic views seemingly 
represented a majority view among elite philosophers of history at that time, Chapter 
One  will  seek  to  demonstrate  a  link  between  the  idealistic  vision  of  historical 
knowledge and the nomothetic assumption. 
The Nomothetic Assumption in Action, or: The Misunderstanding of J. B. Bury
During his inaugural address as Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge 
University  in  1903,33 the  historian  J.  B.  Bury  made  his  now  famous  claim  that, 
“though she may supply material for literary art or philosophical speculation, she 
[history] is herself simply a science, no less and no more.”34 One of the most enduring 
sound-bites in the twentieth century philosophy of history, mention of this statement 
is likely to be found somewhere in any text – introductory or otherwise – published 
on historical theory since. And while the relevance of this statement today has been 
rendered somewhat obscure by age and inattention, at the time it was published it 
became  the  pithy,  quotable  centre  of  a  renewed  debate  concerning  the  status  of 
historical knowledge relative to the natural sciences which would occupy much of 
the attention of philosophers of history for almost the entire first half of the century, 
until  its  enfant  terrible status  relative  to  idealist  orthodoxy  was  usurped  by  the 
publication of Carl Hempel's 1942 paper 'The Function of General Laws in History.'35 
And yet, while oft-quoted, Bury's statement is only rarely given adequate context. 
Indeed, modern historical handbooks and philosophy of history texts often refer to 
Bury only briefy, and usually as a springboard to the discussion of others who spoke 
33  J.  B.  Bury,  'The  Science  of  History,'  in  Harold  Temperley  (ed),  Selected  Essays  of  J.  B.  Bury.  
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1930. pp.3-22.
34  Ibid., p.22.
35  Carl G. Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History,' The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 39, No. 2 
(15 January 1942). pp.35-48.
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against him,36 or as an example of obvious and egregious error.37 In the interest of 
fairness then,  let  us examine J.  B.  Bury's  famous statement and the reaction to it 
among  the  historical  community  at  the  time  with  a  little  more  depth  than  is 
customary. What did Bury mean by it, and can it be so easily dismissed? 
Speaking  in  the  context  of  this  thesis  as  a  whole,  we  shall  see  that  such  an 
examination  will  prove  instructive  if  only  because  it  reveals  Bury  himself  to  be 
something  of  a  prophet  who  –  despite  his  status  as  a  perennial  footnote  in 
philosophy  of  history  textbooks  and  a  frequent  target  of  condescension  by  their 
authors – effectively anticipated the conceptual basis of a modern scientific approach 
to history. Indeed, Bury himself was seemingly one of the very few philosophers of 
history in the twentieth (or indeed any other) century who was able to conceive of  
science in anything other than strict nomothetic terms. In this sense, despite Bury's 
failure to provide any comprehensive philosophical framework for his statement, his 
intellectual vision for history – that if history were to talk in terms of cause and effect, 
then it  must  ultimately  be answerable to  the scientific –  proved ultimately  to be 
broadly correct. And, as this thesis progresses, we shall see how just such a vision of 
a scientific history can be constructed. While it might seem perverse to lead off a 
chapter designed to demonstrate the reality of a pervasive nomothetic assumption by 
citing what is effectively a counter-example, Bury's case is included here not only to 
provide a certain metaphorical symmetry to this thesis, but also as it allows us to 
open  this  chapter  with  an  excellent  example  not  only  of  the  existence of  the 
nomothetic  assumption,  but  also  of  its  insidious  ability  to  twist  and  distort  any 
debate regarding the relationship between history and the sciences. The nomothetic 
assumptions at issue, however, are not Bury's, but those of his detractors. For, as we 
shall see, the reactions to Bury's statement among prominent philosophers of history 
seemed  to  be  based  less  on  what  Bury  himself  thought  and  said,  but  on  the 
associations his accusers read into the word “science.” Bury's own arguments, even 
as thin as they were, were barely considered.
Perhaps  the  most  revealing single  point  of  Bury's  address  was his  assertion  that 
36  For example: Richard J.  Evans,  In Defence of  History.  Granta Books: London, 1997. p.23. Bury's 
speech is mentioned here in only a single paragraph, and then primarily only in order to provide a 
force for Trevelyan to push against in subsequent pages.
37  For example: Arthur Marwick, The New Nature of History: Knowledge, Evidence, Language. Palgrave: 
Hampshire, 2001. p.82. Here Marwick writes of Bury's famed pronouncement: “This kind of naïve 
rhetoric is as dated as that of Burckhardt, and my strong warning to all readers is to distrust any 
work on historical epistemology written in this vein.”
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history had already been “enthroned and ensphered among the sciences,” but that the 
“particular  nature of  her  infuence,  her  time-honoured association with literature, 
and other circumstances, have acted as a sort of vague cloud, half concealing from 
men's  eyes  her  new  position  in  the  heavens.”  More  significant,  at  least  for  the 
purposes of this thesis, is the perceived engine of this transformation – which, for 
Bury,  was  strictly  methodological.  Arguing  that,  “the  proposition  that  before  the 
beginning of the last century the study of history was not scientific may be sustained 
in spite of a few exceptions,” Bury asserts that despite the erudition and industry of 
pre-nineteenth century historians, “the systematised  method which distinguishes a 
science” was beyond their  vision,  and that  –  thanks to  German scholars  such  as 
Barthold Niebuhr and Leopold von Ranke – mere “erudition has been supplemented 
by scientific method.”38 So,  for Bury then,  a science was defined by exactitude of 
method, and thus history could be called a science, due to the widespread adoption 
of “systematic and minute” techniques of source analysis – a “microscopic criticism, 
now recognised as indispensable.”39 And with this  improvement in method,  Bury 
argued, came the more stringent standards of evidence appropriate to a science:
All  truths  (to  modify  a  saying  of  Plato)  require  the  most  exact  methods;  and 
closely connected with the introduction of a new method was the elevation of the 
standard of truth. The idea of a scrupulously exact conformity to facts was fixed, 
refined, and canonised; and the critical method was one of the means to secure it.40
This then, is what Bury meant by “science” in his 1903 address. Although there is 
evidence of far more sophisticated thinking on the subject by the time of his 1909 
paper entitled 'Darwinism and History,41 there is no evidence in his inaugural address 
of  any  use  of  the  term  “science”  beyond  this  simple  methodological  statement 
emphasising rigour in the handling of sources and their interpretation.42 Moreover, in 
arguing that this was the sense in which history might be thought of as scientific, it  
should also be noted that Bury made specific reference to nineteenth century German 
38  Bury, 'The Science of History,' p.5. 
39  Ibid., p.6.
40  Ibid.
41  J.  B.  Bury,  'Darwinism  and  History,'  in  Harold  Temperley  (ed),  Selected  Essays  of  J.  B.  Bury.  
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1930. pp.23-42.
42  Such a definition was not uncommon at this time.  Other contemporary scholars talked of the 
science of history in this sense. See, for example: Charles-Victor Langlois and Charles Seignobos,  
Introduction aux Etudes Historiques (Introduction to the Study of History). Duckworth & Co.: London, 
1898. pp.63-65. A similar use of the term “science” is  to be found in the work of Leopold von 
Ranke. See: Leopold von Ranke, The Theory and Practice of History. Georg G. Iggers & Konrad von 
Moltke (editors and trans). Bobs-Merrill Company: Indianapolis & New York, 1973. Of particular 
interest  in  this  volume  is:  Leopold  von  Ranke,  'On  the  Character  of  Historical  Science  (A 
Manuscript of the 1830s),' in Leopold von Ranke, The Theory and Practice of History. Georg G. Iggers 
& Konrad von Moltke (editors and trans). Bobs-Merrill Company: Indianapolis & New York, 1973. 
p.33.
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scholars such as Barthold Niebuhr and Leopold von Ranke. Indeed, Bury directly 
attributed  the  methodological  advance  to  the  “scientific  movement”  in 
historiography with which these scholars were associated. “We owe the change to 
Germany,” he claimed.43 Thus, he was – in 1903 at least – aligning himself with the 
nineteenth  century  historicist  movement  which,  while  it  had  co-opted  the  term 
“science” as a synonym for “rigorous” or “accurate,” could not lay any more serious 
claim to the term.
The reaction to Bury's address was immediate and still shapes perceptions of Bury 
even today.44 The most notable and enduring contemporary reaction was that of G. 
M. Trevelyan, whose article attempting to refute Bury, “The Latest View of History,” 
was  published  in  the  Independent  Review  in  1903,  and  was  later  reworked  and 
appeared  as  the  titular  essay in  a  collection  entitled  Clio,  a  Muse.45 In  this  essay, 
Trevelyan lamented the transformation of history from being “a part of our [English] 
national  literature,  written by persons  moving at  large in  the world  of  letters  or 
politics,”  to  being  “proclaimed  a  'science'  for  specialists,  not  'literature'  for  the 
common reader  of  books.”46 In  short,  Trevelyan believed  that  blame for  the drift 
away from more popular history that had accompanied the professionalisation of the 
discipline was to be laid at the feet of those who would declare history a science –  
particularly  Bury,  whom Trevelyan  believed  had  been  seduced  by  the  Germanic 
“scientific” school, which sought to reduce history to the lifeless collection of facts:
And  who  is  the  mother  country  to  Anglo-Saxon  historians?  Some  reply 
“Germany,”  but  others  of  us  prefer  to  answer  “England.”  The  methods  and 
limitations of German learning presumably suit the Germans, but are certain to 
prove a strait-waistcoat to English limbs and faculties.47
On this much, Trevelyan was on firm enough ground, for it is clear that (in 1903 at 
least)  Bury  greatly  admired  the  nineteenth  century  German  school  of  so-called 
“scientific” historiography, and had – on the surface of it – claimed that history was,  
in fact, a science. Trevelyan however, went much further than objecting to “scientific” 
history for being merely inaccessible. He instead sought to base the substance of his 
43  Bury, 'The Science of History,' p.5.
44  Doris S.  Goldstein,  'J.  B.  Bury's Philosophy of History:  A  Reappraisal,'  The American Historical  
Review. Vol. 82, No. 4. (October 1977). pp.896-919.
45  G. M. Trevelyan, 'Clio, A Muse,' in G. M. Trevelyan,  Clio,  A Muse and Other Essays.  Longman's 
Green & Co.: London, 1968. pp.140-176. It is to this version that this text will refer, although it 
should be noted that Trevelyan removed all direct references to Bury in this version. The substance 
of his arguments however, were unchanged.
46  Ibid., p.140.
47  Ibid., p.142.
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attack on a definitional issue – arguing that the very use of the term “science” itself 
was inappropriate in the context of history. And it is here that Trevelyan's nomothetic 
assumptions begin to emerge:
The idea that the facts of history are of value as part of an exact science confined to 
specialists  is  due to  a  misapplication of  the  analogy of  physical  science...  The 
functions of physical science are mainly two: direct utility in practical fields; and in 
more intellectual fields the deduction of laws of “cause and effect.” Now history 
can perform neither of these functions.48
This then, is what “science” meant to Trevelyan, and appears – by extension – to be 
the view that he tacitly assumes Bury (and others like him) share. With respect to this 
notion of laws, Trevelyan had more to say:
... history cannot, like physical science, deduce causal laws of general application. 
All attempts have failed to discover laws of “cause and effect” which are certain to 
repeat themselves in the institutions and affairs of men. The law of gravitation 
may be scientifically proved because it is universal and simple. But the historical 
law that starvation brings on revolt is not proved; indeed the opposite statement, 
that starvation leads to abject submission, is equally true in the light of past events. 
You cannot so completely isolate any historical event from its circumstances as to 
be able to deduce from it a law of general application.49
What Trevelyan is arguing then, is that the subject matter of history is too rich and 
complex to be able to be interpreted through the scientific lens, which – due to the 
nomothetic  assumption  –  Trevelyan  believed  consisted  entirely of  isolating  the 
fundamental  and  universal  laws  which  underwrote  its  operation.  And  because 
history directed toward such a task had singularly failed to convincingly identify any 
such laws – despite numerous attempts during the nineteenth century50 – Trevelyan 
took this  as  evidence  that  the  subject  matter  of  history was inherently  hostile  to 
scientific  treatment.  Whatever  history  was,  in  other  words,  it  simply  couldn't be 
science.  The  proper  philosophical  project,  therefore,  was  to  work  out  a  way  to 
conceptualise history  apart from the sciences. While Trevelyan's line of argument is 
48  Ibid., p.143.
49  Ibid., p.144.
50  Perhaps the most notable of these attempts was that of Henry Thomas Buckle, whose A History of  
Civilization  in  England,  was a  multi-volume work intended to  identify  the  general  laws which 
governed the course of nations.  The first volume was published in 1857 and functioned as an 
introduction to Buckle's methods and the laws he believed he had identified. See: Henry Thomas 
Buckle,  Introduction  to  the  History  of  Civilization  in  England.  London:  Routledge,  1904.  Another 
famed attempt to apply  the  nomothetic  model  to  human history  was that  of  Auguste  Comte, 
whose six volume Cours de Philosophie Positive (Course in Positive Philosophy) was published between 
1830 and 1842. Volumes Four and Five of this work in particular emphasised the application of the 
methods of physics and astronomy to the social sciences, including history. See: Auguste Comte,  
The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte. 3rd Edition. Harriet Martineau (trans). Kegan Paul: London, 
1893. 
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logically  compelling,  it  should  be  noted  that  it  relies  upon  the  nomothetic 
assumption in order to maintain coherence.  For  if  the nomothetic-deductive form 
were discovered  not to be the only possible  shape for  science,  then the failure of 
history to adequately mimic it would no longer function as a conclusive argument 
for  history's  non-scientific  nature.  It  worth emphasising again that,  as  mentioned 
earlier, Bury himself said  nothing  at all about seeking laws of history. Nor, for that 
matter,  did  the  German  “scientific”  historicists  such  as  Leopold  von  Ranke  or 
Barthold Neibuhr whom Bury had claimed to admire. 
Nor was Trevelyan alone in reasoning this way. Perhaps the most significant later 
example of the distorting power of the nomothetic assumption is that offered by the 
English  historian  R.  G.  Collingwood.  In  his  1946  book,  The  Idea  of  History,  
Collingwood argued that Bury was “a positivist in historical theory,” although “a 
perplexed and inconsistent one.”51 Collingwood attempted to substantiate this claim 
by examining a supposed shift in Bury's reasoning between 1900 and 1903. In 1900, 
Collingwood argues, one finds Bury adhering to the “strict formulae of positivism.” 
To this end, he cites a 1900 paper by Bury – 'Causes of the Survival of the Roman 
Empire in the East,'52 in which,  he argues, “the survival  of  the Eastern Empire is 
regarded as an event of a certain general kind, and the problem is to find causes of 
certain general kinds to account for it.”53 This, for Collingwood is pure nomothetic 
positivism: “the treatment of an event not as unique but as an instance of a certain 
type, and the explanation of it by discovering a cause applicable not to it alone but to 
every  event  of  the  same  general  kind.”54 Thus,  as  for  Trevelyan,  we  see  a  clear 
statement  of  science  as  a  purely  generalising  enterprise  modelled  after  natural 
sciences such as physics and astronomy – the nomothetic assumption. Collingwood 
further cements this association with science by explicitly defining positivism in The 
Idea of History as “philosophy acting in the service of natural science, as in the Middle 
Ages  philosophy  acted  in  the  service  of  theology.”55 And  nineteenth  century 
positivists, maintained Collingwood, had formed their own “superficial” notion of 
what natural science meant:
51  R. G. Collingwood,  The Idea of History.  Revised Edition. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994. 
p.147.
52  J. B. Bury, 'Causes of the Survival of the Roman Empire in the East,' in Harold Temperley (ed), 
Selected Essays of J. B. Bury. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1930. pp.231-242.
53  R.  G.  Collingwood,  'Review  of  Harold  Temperley  (ed),  Selected  Essays  of  J.  B.  Bury,'  English 
Historical Review, No. 46, No. 183 (July 1931). p.462.
54  Collingwood, The Idea of History. p.148.
55  Ibid., p.126.
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They thought it consisted of two things: first, ascertaining facts; secondly, framing 
laws. The facts were immediately ascertained by sensuous perception. The laws 
were  framed  through  generalising  from  these  facts  by  induction.  Under  this 
infuence a new kind of  historiography arose,  which may be called positivistic 
historiography.56
From this it would seem that, in branding such a view “superficial,” Collingwood 
himself was aware, as Trevelyan apparently was not, of the limitations of a narrowly 
nomothetic  view of science.  Unfortunately,  his  subsequent  argument,  by claiming 
that  just  such  a  view  was  widespread  among  nineteenth  century  historians, 
essentially  reproduces  Trevelyan's  error.  In  addition  to  this,  the  assumption  of 
ideological  uniformity  also  allowed  Collingwood  to  gather  under  the  banner  of 
nomothetic  positivism all of those historians who adhered to the ostensibly strict 
empiricism  toward  sources  that  became  popular  in  the  wake  of  aforementioned 
German scholars such as Niebuhr and Ranke and which was often (glibly) called 
“scientific history.” For while Collingwood states that, “throwing themselves with 
enthusiasm into the first part of the positivist programme, historians set to work to 
ascertain  all  the  facts  they  could,”  he  also  asserts  that  the  motivation for  said 
enthusiasm  was  “obedience  to  the  spirit  of  positivism  according  to  which  the 
ascertaining of facts was only the first stage of a process whose second stage was the 
discovery of laws.”57 Thus, according to Collingwood, all those historians who had 
aligned themselves with the increased focus on historical evidence and the critical 
analysis  thereof,  were engaged –  whether they knew it  or  not  –  in some greater  
nomothetic endeavour to provide raw material for the discovery of the “laws” of 
history.  This rather tortured logic provided Collingwood with a rationale by which 
he might still claim a nomothetic motivation for an author, even if their texts offered no  
direct evidence for such. In this way, Collingwood tried to justify his argument for a 
“general  tendency”  toward  positivism  in  the  nineteenth  century.58 This  is  the 
distorting power of the nomothetic assumption in full fight, effectively distorting 
new perspectives (such as Bury's) so as to fit within a pre-conceived dichotomy. 
Having  thus  accused  the  J.  B.  Bury  of  1900  of  being  a  doctrinaire  nomothetic 
positivist seeking to transform history into the likeness of physics, Collingwood then 
interpreted  Bury's  lack of  advocacy  for  any  such  program  in  his  1903  address  – 
despite declaring history to be “a science, no less and no more” – as evidence for his 
56  Ibid., pp.126-127.
57  Ibid., p.127.
58  Ibid., p.126.
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being “perplexed and inconsistent.” For by the time of the  1903 inaugural address, 
Collingwood writes, Bury had “begun to revolt” against the positivist requirement 
that  history  must  have  general  laws  extracted  from it  in  order  to  be  scientific  – 
despite this being a position he had supposedly espoused in 1900:
In that [1903] lecture he proclaimed that historical thought as we now understand 
it is a new thing in the world, barely a century old: not at all the same thing as  
natural science, but having a special character of its own, offering to mankind a 
new view of the world and a new armoury of intellectual weapons...  Here the 
uniqueness of historical thought is clearly seen and impressively stated; but when 
Bury goes on to ask what this new thing is, he replies: 'History is simply a science, 
no less and no more.' The lecture exhibits a mind torn between two conceptions: 
one, obscure but powerful, of the difference between history and science, the other,  
clear and paralysing, of their indistinguishable identity. Bury has made a violent 
effort to free himself from this latter conception, and failed.59
Placed in context then, we can begin to see that whatever the actual state of Bury's 
thought might have been at the time of his inaugural address was largely irrelevant. 
What is significant is Collingwood's implied claim that an acknowledgement of the 
“special character” of historical knowledge and an assertion that history is “simply a 
science” must be mutually exclusive. Indeed, as has been shown above, Collingwood 
seemed to take for granted that the mere assertion that history is a science necessarily 
implied  an  acceptance  of  positivist  philosophy  and  the  generalising  nomothetic 
approach it required. A similar binary, as has also been seen, can be read from G. M. 
Trevelyan's reaction to Bury's address. All of which, of course, raises the question: 
were Trevelyan and Collingwood correct? Was J. B.  Bury an advocate of a purely 
nomothetic  view  of  science,  and  was  his  assertion  that  history  is  a  science  an 
expression  of  this  theoretical  alignment?  The  answer  is:  almost  certainly  not.  
Trevelyan offers no real evidence for his tacit insinuation that Bury was a positivist. 
And Collingwood cites only the aforementioned 1900 article 'Causes of the Survival 
of  the  Roman  Empire  in  the  East'  as  positive  evidence  for  his  claim. Yet  an 
examination of this article reveals that Bury was  not attempting to draw generally 
applicable law-like conclusions from the example of the Roman Empire. Rather, the 
Eastern and Western Roman Empires are compared and contrasted in order to use 
the  Western  Empire  as  evidence  to  illustrate  and  support  his  specific  argument 
regarding the  Eastern.  At  no point  are  any nomothetic-style  extrapolations  being 
made  regarding  “empires”  in  any  general  sense.60 And  without  any  firmly 
established  positivist  background,  it  can  no  longer  be  argued  that  Bury's  1903 
59  Ibid., p.148.
60  Bury, 'Causes of the Survival of the Roman Empire in the East,' pp.231-242.
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inaugural was the mental  watershed Collingwood claimed it  to be.  For if  he had 
never been a nomothetic positivist, how could he “revolt” against it?
How then,  did Bury mean for the term “science” to be understood? Or, put another 
way, what has been lost by using the nomothetic assumption in order to issue his 
dismissal? We can begin to answer this by remembering that, in sympathy with the 
German  historicist  scholars  he  so  admired,  his  use  of  the  term  appeared  to  be 
methodological rather than  nomothetic. Such a use of the term “science” has its own 
deficiencies,  however,  and  is  frequently  highly  misleading.  For  many  nineteenth 
century historians and philosophers of history who glibly used the term to describe 
their  view  of  historical  practice  also  retained  many  religious  and  metaphysical 
convictions  that  were  incompatible  with  any  sense  of  science.  As  noted  in  the 
Introduction, using the  name is not enough. Even allowing for this, however, Bury 
remains a noteworthy example. This is because Bury's alignment with this nineteenth 
century trend toward calling historiography “scientific” was tangential at best. His 
own conception of  the relationship between history and science was a good deal 
more substantial.  In a later article,  entitled 'Darwinism and History,'  published in 
1909, Bury offered a more detailed account of his understanding of what it meant for 
a discipline to be scientific:
The conception of the history of man as a causal development meant the elevation 
of historical inquiry to the dignity of a science. Just as the study of bees cannot 
become scientific so long as the student's interest in them is only to procure honey 
or to derive moral lessons from the labours of “the little busy bee,” so the history 
of human societies cannot become the object of pure scientific investigation so long 
as man estimates its value in pragmatical scales. Nor can it become a science until  
it is conceived as lying entirely within a sphere in which the law of cause and 
effect has unreserved and unrestricted dominion.61
While such an appeal to the sovereignty of a “law” of cause and effect might seem an 
endorsement of a nomothetic viewpoint, it was not. Bury was merely arguing that a 
prerequisite for the scientific study of history must be a commitment to natural – as 
opposed to supernatural or otherwise metaphysical – explanations. While one might 
still argue for a supernatural “ultimate” cause if one so wished, historical explanation 
–  if  it  wished  to  be  scientific  –  had  to  proceed  on  the  basis  of  more  proximate  
causation. While a similar argument underpinned the work of nineteenth century 
positivists like Henry Thomas Buckle and Auguste Comte, such an argument  alone 
does not speak to the central nomothetic positivist concern – does the study of a 
61  Bury, 'Darwinism and History,' pp.26-27.
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history  so  conceived  reveal  higher  level  regularities  or  causal  “laws”?  Bury 
concluded, without ambiguity, that it did not. More importantly, he made it clear that 
the discovery of such laws was not strictly necessary for science either:
The truth is that Darwinism itself offers the best illustration of the insufficiency of 
general  laws  to  account  for  historical  development.  The  part  played  by 
coincidence,  and  the  part  played  by  individuals  –  limited  by,  and  related  to, 
general social conditions – render it impossible to deduce the course of the past 
history  of  man  or  to  predict  the  future.  But  it  is  the  same  with  organic 
development. Darwin (or any other zoologist) could not deduce the actual course 
of evolution from general principles. Given an organism and its environment, he 
could not show that it must evolve into a more complex organism of a definite, 
predetermined  type;  knowing  what  it  has  evolved  into,  he  could  attempt  to 
discover and assign the determining causes. General principles do not account for 
a particular sequence; they embody necessary conditions; but there is a chapter of 
accidents too. It is the same in the case of history.62
In  other  words,  the  contingency  of  historical  explanations  (i.e.,  their  lack  of  any 
generality or  law-like quality) could not be correlated to any scientific status they 
might claim. Bury's subsequent work on contingency – particularly his famous 1916 
essay 'Cleopatra's Nose' – took this line of argument as axiomatic.63 In these writings, 
Bury argued that history was too complex for a nomothetic approach – too many 
interacting chains of causation were interacting at any given moment to allow high 
level  general  truths  to  be  isolated.  This  complexity  of  interaction,  as  well  as  the 
operation of what is  called chance, were not the “intrusion of a lawless element” 
however, but the “collision of two or more independent chains of causes.”64 Thus, 
Bury argued, it was possible to talk of history as explicable – even if only in principle 
–  in  terms  of  cause  and  effect,  while  being  simultaneously beyond  the  reach  of 
generalisation in the form of uniformities and laws. Contingency then, was rationally 
explicable. As Doris S. Goldstein has argued of Bury:
His initial premise was that all historical phenomena – those which are defined as 
“accidental” as well as those which are the result of human purpose – are subject  
to the law of causation. That is, all occurrences have antecedents. It follows that 
the  causal  sequence  determining  a  chance  event  is  as  open  to  discovery  and 
explication as an event stemming from human choice and action.65
Thus it can be seen that what was on offer in the work of J. B. Bury was a relatively 
sophisticated  (in  comparison  to  the  reception  it  received)  and  nuanced  view  of 
62  Ibid., pp.38-39.
63  J. B. Bury, 'Cleopatra's Nose,' in Harold Temperley (ed),  Selected Essays of J. B. Bury.  Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1930. pp.60-69.
64  Ibid., p.61.
65  Goldstein, 'J. B. Bury's Philosophy of History: A Reappraisal,' p.900.
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science, history, and the nature of causation. His use of the term “science,” was not 
only a statement of methodological intent, but a declaration that, at least in principle,  
historical knowledge was not of a fundamentally different kind from the scientific. 
Further to this, he appears to have understood science well enough to see that there  
could be such a thing as a non-nomothetic scientific practice. Indeed, as Part Two of  
this thesis will show, his account of contingency and causation effectively presages 
the work of later philosophers of science such as David Hull. And yet, Collingwood 
and  Trevelyan  –  among  others  –  explicitly  attacked  him  as  an  advocate  of  a 
positivism oriented specifically toward the identification of laws of history. On the 
basis of this, it seems reasonable to conclude that the reaction of both Trevelyan and 
Collingwood to Bury's inaugural address can have had little to do with its content, or 
the content of any of Bury's other writings. One is left, therefore, to conclude that the 
explicit confation of the term “science” with the nomothetic-deductive method took 
place primarily in the minds of Trevelyan and Collingwood themselves. This is the 
nomothetic assumption in action. 
Idealism and Historical Autonomy
Of course Collingwood and Trevelyan were far from the only examples of this kind 
of thinking. Indeed, it might reasonably be said that the positions held by Trevelyan 
and Collingwood were effectively a majority view among philosophers of history 
during the early twentieth century.  And this  entire  school  of  historical  thought – 
known as  idealism – has come to be known for two key arguments. First, that the 
unique  non-repeatable  nature  of  any  historical  event  precluded  analysis  using 
scientific techniques. And second, that the focus of history on the realm of the human 
required  an  intuitive  re-imagining  of  the  thoughts  of  historical  actors  by  the 
historian.66 These were widespread views among philosophers of history in the first 
half of the twentieth century, and even retain some adherents to this day.67 For the 
purposes of this chapter, however, it will be enough to note that the second of these 
arguments – the necessity of a mental “re-enactment” of the thoughts of past men 
and women – was an attempted solution to the problem introduced by the first. Or, 
put  another  way,  it  is  our  intention  to  demonstrate  that  much  of  the  idealist 
movement was predicated on an opposition to science engendered by the nomothetic 
66  For a similar summary, see: John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in  
the Study of History. 3rd Edition. Longman: Harlow, 2002. p.167.
67  For  a  recent  example,  see:  Raymond  Martin,  'The  Essential  Difference  Between  History  and 
Science,' History and Theory. Vol. 36, No. 1 (February 1997). pp.1-14.
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assumption. For if the nomothetic-deductive method was perceived to be the only 
possible form for scientific knowledge, then one might either: attempt to treat history 
in a nomothetic manner (and by so doing radically transform it), or, declare it to be 
entirely independent from science and the explanatory requirements it imposed. The 
idealists  believed  they  were  compelled  by  the  failure  of  previous  nomothetic 
approaches to history to choose the latter. Their corresponding emphasis on mental 
“re-enactment”  can  therefore  be  understood as  an  attempt  to  provide  a  separate 
epistemology for the autonomous history which was the result. Historical autonomy, 
in other words, was a proposition for which a plausible epistemic justification had to 
be manufactured, rather than an epistemic system which had historical autonomy as a 
necessary consequence. 
Once again, it was Collingwood who would come to be most closely associated with 
this position, coining in  The Idea of History  the now-classic distinction between the 
“inside” and the “outside” of an event.  Events in the natural world, according to 
Collingwood, have  only an “outside.” That is,  they are purely the result of blind, 
physical causes. Hurricanes, for instance, can have physical causes but no intentions 
or motivations. The actions of human beings, however, not only have an “outside” 
dimension, in that they involve physical events that materially impact the world, but 
they also possess an “inside” – the intentions, motivations, thoughts, and feelings 
that led the actor to choose to become the cause of said events. For Collingwood, it 
was this “inside” dimension of events which was the proper focus for history:
The historian, investigating any event in the past,  makes a distinction between 
what may be called the outside and the inside of an event. By the outside of the 
event I mean everything belonging to it which can be described in terms of bodies 
and movements: the passage of Caesar... across a river called the Rubicon at one 
date, or the spilling of his blood on the foor of the senate-house at another. By the 
inside of  the event,  I  mean that  in it  which can only be described in terms of  
thought: Caesar's defiance of Republican law, or the clash of constitutional policy 
between  himself  and  his  assassins...  [The  historian's] work  may  begin  by 
discovering the outside of the event, but it can never end there...68
This, Collingwood argued, combined with the uniqueness of any historical event and 
the vanished nature of  the past  (i.e.,  observation poverty),  conspired to place the 
subject matter of history completely beyond the reach of scientific methods. So much 
so,  in  fact,  that  it  should  be  concluded  that  historical  knowledge  was  of  a 
68  Collingwood, The Idea of History. p.213.
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fundamentally different kind from that of the sciences.69 It was through these kinds of 
arguments that the idealist movement came to be associated with a staunch advocacy 
of historical autonomy. For if one accepted this reasoning, it seemed safe to conclude 
that  history  was  not  only  unable  to  be  understood  scientifically,  it  was  not 
answerable  at  all to  issues of scientific explanation.  Scientific methods were quite 
simply the wrong tools for the job at hand. Past failures to treat history scientifically – 
such as those of Buckle and Comte – could be considered evidence of this. How then 
were historians to probe the “inside” mental dimension of historical events if  the 
tools of science were inadequate? Collingwood answered this question as follows:
If  then the historian has no direct  or empirical knowledge of his facts,  and no 
transmitted or testimonial knowledge of them, what kind of knowledge has he: in 
other words, what must the historian do in order that he may know them? My 
historical review of the idea of history has resulted in the emergence of an answer 
to  this  question:  namely,  that  the  historian  must  re-enact  the  past  in  his  own 
mind.70
The method Collingwood proposed for carrying out this re-enactment was for the 
historian to “always remember that the event was an action, and that his main task is 
to think himself into this action, to discern the thought of its agent.”71 And it is this 
process that has been called “empathy” or “re-enactment.”72 Often hazily defined, 
even  by  its  advocates,  empathy  was  seen  as  an  intuitive,  quasi-mystical  process 
without  any  clear  methodological  principles.  Despite  this,  it  was  frequently 
considered to be the basic epistemology of idealism.73 And, as we shall see in Chapter 
Two, it was primarily this ill-defined concept that was the target of the covering law 
theorists – particularly Carl Hempel and Patrick Gardiner – who saw it as empirically 
unsound and potentially able to justify almost any historical interpretation at all. For 
the  purposes  of  the  current  chapter,  however,  we  will  content  ourselves  with 
pointing out that idealism was first and foremost a movement dedicated to opposing 
69  Ibid., pp.216-217
70  Ibid., p.282.
71  Ibid., p.213.
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the application of scientific epistemology to history, and only secondarily involved 
any positive assertions regarding historical epistemology. As evidence for this, we 
will show that the arguments of some of those associated with the idealist position 
almost always began with an attempt to argue that scientific epistemology could not 
adequately  address  historical  questions.  This,  it  was  claimed,  demonstrated  the 
necessity of some alternative epistemology. The exact nature of that alternative was a 
separate issue. Some, like Collingwood and his forerunner Benedetto Croce, favoured 
the intuitive, empathic approach. Others, like Charles Beard and Carl Becker, were 
less forthright, arguing for the role of the historian's imagination in the writing of 
history  but  falling  short  of  openly  advocating  empathy.  Later  still,  W.  H.  Walsh 
would abandon empathy entirely, while still claiming that his work on narrative and 
the concept of “colligation” was “an attempt to find a plausible version of the Idealist 
theory of history.”74 If  we are to look for coherence among those who have been 
called Idealists  in the pre-covering law philosophical  landscape, therefore,  it  is  in 
their arguments with respect to historical autonomy that we are most likely to be 
successful.
With  respect  to  Collingwood  himself,  this  link  has  largely  been  demonstrated 
already.  We  have  already  encountered  his  nomothetic  assumptions,  and  the 
distortions they introduced into his  assessment of  J.  B.  Bury.  Similarly,  the broad 
favour  of  Collingwood's  idealism  is  shown  in  the  “inside”  versus  “outside” 
distinction cited  above.  The only  question remaining then,  is  to  what  degree  his 
nomothetic assumption infuenced his assertions of historical autonomy. And here it 
is significant that, as Collingwood develops his argument regarding the necessity of  
empathy as a historical method, his  very first rhetorical move is to stress the utter 
hostility  of  human history  to  scientific  methods.  History,  he  argues,  cannot  have 
anything to do with the sciences without ceasing to be history. Moreover, any attempt 
to treat history with the methods of science had failed.75 This was the problem to 
which historical autonomy and a separate epistemology were the solution. But the 
methods he ascribes to science are, of course, totally nomothetic:
... the historian need not and cannot (without ceasing to be an historian) emulate 
the scientist in searching for the causes or laws of events. For science, the event is  
discovered by perceiving it, and the further search for its cause is conducted by 
assigning it to its class and determining the relation between that class and others.  
74  W. H. Walsh, 'Colligatory Concepts in History,' in Patrick Gardiner (ed), The Philosophy of History.  
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For history,  the object  to  be discovered is  not  the mere event,  but the thought 
expressed in it.76
This  is  to  assume  that  scientific  knowledge  must  be,  in  some sense,  generalised 
knowledge in order to be given the name “science.” And it is the impossibility of 
doing this in history that Collingwood cites as evidence for history's uniqueness. “If,” 
he writes, “by historical thinking, we already understand how and why Napoleon 
established  his  ascendancy  in  revolutionary  France,  nothing  is  added  to  our 
understanding of that process by the statement (however true) that similar things  
have  happened  elsewhere.”77 To  this  end,  Collingwood  attempted  to  devise  an 
epistemology  for  history  which  would  investigate  historical  actors  as  unique 
particulars. Collingwood still allowed historians to talk about causes, of course. But 
the causes he held as historically valid were not only mental, but particularistic, and 
thus (following from the nomothetic assumption) definitionally something other than 
science.78 This was the basis on which Collingwood based his historical epistemology, 
and the problem to which his “re-enactment” was an attempted solution. With this in 
mind then, let us turn to other examples of the nomothetic assumption driving the  
idealist tenet of complete historical autonomy.
The Influence of Benedetto Croce
With respect to issues of historical autonomy and empathic methods, one of the most 
infuential  figures  in  twentieth  century  idealism was  the  Italian  philosopher  and 
historian Benedetto Croce. As a philosopher, Croce was instrumental in attempting to 
provide philosophical justifications for the assertion of historical autonomy. Indeed, 
Collingwood was greatly infuenced by Croce, at  one point writing: “Croce has...  
vindicated the autonomy of history, its right to conduct its own business in its own 
way, both against philosophy and against science.”79 This seems a fair assessment, as 
even a cursory analysis of Croce's philosophy of history reveals an almost maniacal 
hostility toward the sciences: 
Those who undertake the task of creating a new history always succeed in setting 
up philological history against poetical history, or contemporary history against 
both of them, and so on. Unless, indeed, as is the case with Buckle and the many 
tiresome sociologists and positivists of the last ten years, they lament with great 
76  Ibid., p.214.
77  Ibid., p.223.
78  Ibid., pp.214-215.
79  Ibid., p.201.
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pomposity and no less lack of intelligence as to what history is that it lacks the 
capacity of observation and of experiment... boasting that they 'reduce history to 
natural science' – that is to say, by the employment of a circle, as vicious as it is  
grotesque, to a mental form which is its pale derivative.80 
Croce  went  much  further  than  merely  advocating  for  the  autonomy  of  history, 
however. He also believed historical knowledge to be the most fundamental form of 
all  knowledge,  to  which  even  the  sciences  should  be  subordinate.  For  Croce, 
philosophy  was the  history of philosophy – to truly understand something was to 
understand its  history.81 This  led  Croce to his  rather  pointed hostility toward the 
sciences and the respect they were accorded in epistemic matters. Indeed, in his 1917 
critical appraisal of the state of historiography, History: Its Theory and Practice, Croce 
wrote  that  science  was  “useless  for  true  knowledge,”82 and  that  it  was  history – 
properly understood – that was better suited to truth, as well as being of potentially 
greater practical use:
... once the indissoluble link between life and thought in history has been effected, 
the doubts that have been expressed as to the  certainty and the  utility  of history 
disappear altogether in a moment. How could that which is a present producing of 
our spirit ever be uncertain? How could that knowledge be useless which solves a 
problem that has come forth from the bosom of life?83
Further to this, Croce argued, history in any such grand sense must necessarily be 
something more than a mere appeal to documentary evidence. Central  to Croce's 
philosophy then, is a division between the raw chronicle – the events of the past as 
established via documents, and the narrative which gathers them into an explanatory 
historical account. Such accounts, Croce argued, required something more than mere 
evidence to create. The additional ingredient, he claimed, was the imagination of the 
historian.  History,  for  Croce,  was  “principally  an  act  of  thought,”  whereas  mere 
chronicle was “an act of will.”84 And this “act of thought” was recognisably empathic 
in nature:
How  could  there  be  a  history  of  philosophy  without  the  works  or  at  least 
fragments of the works of the philosophers? How could there be a history of a 
sentiment or of a custom, for example that of Christian humility or of knightly 
chivalry, without the capacity for living again, or rather without an actual living 
again of these particular states of the human soul?85
80  Benedetto Croce,  History: Its Theory and Practice.  Douglas Ainslie (trans). Russell & Russell: New 
York, 1960. p.46.
81  Ibid., pp.61-63.
82  Ibid., p.311.
83  Ibid., p.15. (emphasis in original)
84  Ibid., p.19.
85  Ibid., pp.14-15.
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Indeed, the very “condition of [history's] existence,” Croce claimed, “is that the deed 
of which the history is told must vibrate in the soul of the historian.”86 Of the exact 
nature of this vibration or “living again,” however, Croce was somewhat vague. Nor 
did he offer any practical guidance as to how the historian keen to follow him might 
cultivate such vibrations. 
And so we encounter in Croce these two central tenets of idealism – the necessity of 
empathy (in the sense of mental/spiritual re-enactment), and a hostility toward the 
sciences. And while neither was originated by Croce, it was Croce that offered them 
up to the twentieth century, in a form severely critical of their nineteenth century 
implementations.87 Both of these ideas, however, carried within them a perception of 
scientific antithesis tainted by the nomothetic assumption. While Croce's engagement 
with the actual arguments of those who espoused “scientific” history was scattershot 
and vague, only rarely rising above mere condescension, Croce did clearly perceive 
an oft-overlooked relationship between speculative histories (whether theological or 
metaphysical),  and  the  naturalistic/positivist  strain  that  succeeded  them,  and 
grouped them together under the single epithet of “universal” history:
Universal history really tries to form a picture of all the things that have happened 
to the human race, from its origins upon the earth to the present moment. Indeed, 
it claims to do this from the origin of things, or the creation, to the end of the 
world, since it would not otherwise be truly universal. Hence its tendency to fill 
the  abysses  of  prehistory  with  theological  or  naturalistic  fictions  and  to  trace 
somehow  the  future,  either  with  revelations  and  prophecies,  as  in  Christian 
universal history... or with previsions, as in the universal histories of positivism, 
democratism, and socialism.88
This is an extremely useful insight, and yet, because of it, Croce's treatment of the 
relationship  between  “universal  history”  and  his  own  conceptions  of  historical 
knowledge did not specifically address the claims of those who argued for a scientific 
history  (at  least  in  the  positivistic  sense  of  causal  laws).  Instead,  he  merely 
emphasised their connection with the grand philosophical structures of thinkers like 
86  Ibid., p.12.
87  It might be noted here that the empathic methods of Croce and Collingwood were anticipated 
somewhat by Dilthey's  concept  of  Verstehen.  Unlike Croce and Collingwood,  however,  Dilthey 
ultimately wished to somehow fully integrate this concept into the sciences, rather than holding it 
completely  separate.  He  wrote:  “Action  everywhere  presupposes  the  understanding  of  other 
persons; much of our happiness as human beings derives from being able to feel the states of mind 
of others; the entire science of philology and of history is based on the presupposition that such 
reunderstanding of what is singular can be raised to objectivity.” See: Wilhelm Dilthey, 'The Rise of 
Hermeneutics (1900),' in Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Works, Volume Four: Hermeneutics and the Study of  
History.  Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (eds). Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1996. 
p.235.
88  Croce, History: Its Theory and Practice. p.56.
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Hegel,  and  summarily  dismissed  their  claims  of  universality  as  essentially 
theological,  with  naturalism  –  rather  than  any  particular  God  or 
philosophical/metaphysical precept – as the organising principle:
Whoever  pays  attention  to  all  these  and  other  resemblances  which  we  could 
enumerate  must  conclude  that  positivism  is  to  romanticism  as  was  the 
enlightenment to the Renaissance – that is to say, it is not so much its antithesis as  
it is the logical prosecution and the exaggeration of its presuppositions. Even its 
final conversion into theology corresponds to that of romanticism. This is for the 
rest an obvious matter, for transcendency is always transcendency, whether it be 
thought of as that of a God or of reason, of nature or of matter.89
This was the extent of Croce's substantive engagement with the arguments of the 
positivists. Viewing the school of thought as a historically conditioned corruption of 
the similar systematising impulses of more Romantically aligned thinkers, such as 
Vico and Hegel, he dismissed it. And yet the manner of this dismissal is instructive. 
For, as Croce observed, a truly “universal” history must try to “form a picture of all  
the things that have happened to the human race, from its origins... to the present 
moment.” But if such a history were truly universal, then that understanding ought 
to be able to transferred into the future, allowing it to be predicted. Thus no  truly 
universal  history could be concerned  only with the past.90 As  no attempt to treat 
history nomothetically had been able to actually accomplish such a goal, it could be 
concluded that there had either not yet been any truly universal histories, or that 
such a thing was impossible. Regardless of which of these might have been the case,  
Croce argued that the  form of such a history was starkly at odds with the kinds of 
questions  that  historians  tend  to  be  concerned  with,  and  that  an  emphasis  on 
pursuing the study of history in such a manner would likely destroy history as a 
discipline.  Moreover,  Croce's  specific  identification  of  universality  –  and  more 
importantly prediction – with positivism strongly suggests that his understanding of 
science was underwritten by the nomothetic assumption.
There  is  evidence in the  Theory  and Practice  however,  that,  regardless of  what  he 
himself  thought  of  it,  Croce  considered  this  particular  nomothetic  delusion 
widespread among historians, opining that “the echo of the noise they made in the 
world has not yet ceased, and that “everywhere traces of their infuence” could be 
seen.91 This  conviction  that  positivism  in  history  was,  or  had  recently  been, 
89  Ibid., p.305.
90  Ibid., p.56. 
91  Ibid., p.297.
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widespread was a sentiment that was still being echoed, as we have already seen, by 
Collingwood in 1946.92 Regardless of the validity of this tacit claim that positivism 
was  an  all-consuming  juggernaut,  Croce's  fierce  advocacy  of  the  autonomy  and 
dignity  of  history proved highly  infuential  among other  early  twentieth century 
historians concerned at the perceived encroachment of science into their discipline. 
What  Croce's  work  did  not do  however,  was  engage  with  the  substance  of  the 
scientific  reasoning  behind  the  positivist  position.  Nor  did  it  say  much  of  the 
methods  by  which  history  ought  to  be  practised  beyond  vague  exhortations 
regarding intuition  and imagination.  Thus,  those  infuenced by him were  free  to 
substitute their own (usually inadequate) understandings of a scientific position that 
Croce had told them they were diametrically opposed to. For example, the scholar 
Charles  A.  Beard,  despite  being  more  relativistically  inclined  pragmatist  than 
Romantic idealist, was nevertheless convinced by much of Croce's rhetoric.93
Charles A. Beard
Beard,  along with  Carl  L.  Becker,  represented the  vanguard of  a  reaction  by the 
American historical  community  against  the  “scientific” conceit  of  total  objectivity 
they perceived as obsolete, yet still largely dominant, within the practice of history. 
Both men were – following Croce – exponents of a more relativistic approach that, 
instead  of  supposedly  “letting  facts  speak  for  themselves,”  emphasised  the 
constructed element of historical facts, and the role of the historian (as well as the 
time and/or culture in which they operated) in that construction. As Becker, in his 
paper 'What Are Historical Facts?,'94 argued:
What is it that leads one historian to make, out of all the possible true affirmations 
about the given event, certain affirmations and not others? Why, the purpose he 
has in his mind will determine the precise meaning which he derives from the 
event. The event itself, the facts, do not say anything, do not impose any meaning. 
It is the historian who speaks, who imposes a meaning.95
Beard, for his part in this argument,  used no less visible a medium than his 1933 
92  While  the infuence of  actual positivists  has been more realistically assessed by more modern 
scholars. See: Christopher Parker, 'English Historians and the Opposition to Positivism,' History and 
Theory. Vol. 22, No. 2 (May 1983). pp.120-145.
93  For more on the direct infuence Croce had on Beard, see: Ellen Nore,  'Charles A. Beard's Act of 
Faith: Context and Content,' The Journal of American History. Vol. 66, No. 4 (March, 1980). p.852,856.
94  This paper was delivered in 1926, but not published until 1955. See: Carl L. Becker, 'What Are 
Historical Facts?,' The Western Political Quartlerly, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 1955). pp.327-340. 
95  Becker, 'What Are Historical Facts?,' p.335.
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presidential  address  to  the  American  Historical  Association96 to  question  the 
definitions and operating assumptions of the discipline:
What  is  this  manifestation  of  omniscience  called  history?  It  is,  as  Croce  says,  
contemporary thought about the past.  History as past  actuality includes,  to be 
sure, all that has been done, said, felt, and thought by human beings on this planet 
since humanity began its long career. History as record embraces the monuments, 
documents, and symbols which provide such knowledge as we have or can find 
respecting past actuality. But it is history as thought, not as actuality, record, or 
specific knowledge, that is really meant when the term history is used in its widest 
and most general significance. It is  thought about past actuality, instructed and 
delimited  by  history  as  record  and  knowledge  –  record  and  knowledge 
authenticated by criticism and ordered with the help of the scientific method.97
While this is certainly a Crocean perspective – placing primacy as it does on human 
cognition and the role of the historian's imagination in the recovery of the past – it 
can also be seen that Beard was not as sceptical as Croce regarding the utilisation of 
what he terms “the scientific method.” Yet, later in the same address, Beard alleges 
that the “intellectual formulas borrowed from natural science” had “cramped and 
distorted the operations of history as thought.”98 
This  apparent  tension between endorsement  and condemnation of  science,  seems 
incongruous, and indeed it is. This has been remarked upon before. Hans Meyerhoff, 
for instance, in his introduction to a reproduction of Beard's address, argues that this 
“curious wavering between a criticism of scientific conceptions in history, on the one 
hand, and the final endorsement of the scientific method, on the other” is the “most  
significant contribution” of the article, and that Beard, “never reached a satisfactory 
middle ground between his polemics against the pretensions of the scientific method 
in  history  and  his  awareness  that  some  standards  of  truth  and  objectivity  are 
necessary in order to be a responsible historian.”99 Peter Novick, in his classic  That 
Noble  Dream:  The  “Objectivity  Question”  and the  American Historical  Profession,  also 
notices this tension – albeit in passing – arguing that Beard, “clung to a distinction 
between the allegedly direct and immediate observations of the natural scientist, and 
what the historian saw through a glass darkly,  privileging the former.”100 Neither 
96  Charles A. Beard, 'Written History as an Act of Faith,' The American Historical Review. Vol. 39, No. 2 
(January 1934). pp.219-231.
97  Ibid., p.219.
98  Ibid., p.222.
99  Hans Meyerhoff, 'Introduction to Charles A. Beard's 'Written History as an Act of Faith,'' in Hans 
Meyerhoff (ed), The Philosophy of History in Our Time: An Anthology. Doubleday/Anchor: New York, 
1957. p.138.
100 Peter Novick,  That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession.  
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1988. p.278.
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author, however, offers any explanation for this tension other than tacitly ascribing it 
to Beard's own confusions, whatever form they might have taken. We, on the other 
hand, are in a position to do somewhat better. For it would be more accurate to say 
that Beard's confusion was the result of a nomothetic assumption about the nature of 
science, and that the failure of Meyerhoff and Novick to realise this is due to their  
blindness to the existence of that assumption. Indeed, hints to this effect are abundant 
throughout  Beard's  presidential  address.  Immediately  after  his  assertion  that  the 
desire  to  ape  science  had  “cramped and distorted the  operations  of  history,”  for 
instance, Beard argues that this desire had taken two distinct forms – that of physics, 
and that of biology:
The first of these [the physical] rests upon what may be called, for convenience, 
the  assumption  of  causation:  everything  that  happens  in  the  world  of  human 
affairs  is  determined  by  antecedent  occurrences,  and events  of  history  are  the 
illustrations  or  data  of  laws  to  be  discovered,  laws  such  as  are  found  in 
hydraulics.101
Of this physical conceit, Beard argued that while “no historian has ever been able to  
array the fullness of history as actuality in any such deterministic order,” the mere 
assumption that it  was even possible had acted to mislead the Western historical 
community. Further to this, those historians who had concerned themselves with this 
task  had  failed  to  comprehend  the  conceptual  faws  within  it,  attributing  “any 
shortcomings in result to the inadequacy of their known data, not to the falsity of the 
assumption on which they have been operating.”102 He continued:
Undiscouraged by their inability to bring all history within a single law, such as 
the law of gravitation, they have gone on working in the belief that the Newtonian 
trick  will  be  turned  some  time,  if  the  scientific  method  is  applied  long  and 
rigorously enough and facts are heaped up high enough...103
This  then  is  the  nomothetic  assumption  once  again  espoused  –  the  definition  of 
science  as  the  identification  of  the  “laws”  which  governed  the  operation  of  the 
universe, and the accompanying implicit assumption that such laws represent  total 
explanation of the phenomena that are consequences of them. Beard's statement then, 
offers some insight into how he thought about science, although it alone does not 
amount to an explicit endorsement of the nomothetic view. All Beard is really saying 
here is that the physics model had been shown to be inappropriate  for history. This 
view of the relationship between science and history is qualified somewhat by Beards  
101 Beard, 'Written History as an Act of Faith,' p.223.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
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assessment of the second form by which he alleged history had attempted to imitate 
the natural sciences – the biological:
Growing rightly suspicious of this procedure in physico-historiography, a number 
of  historians,  still  bent on servitude to natural  science,  turned from physics  to 
biology.  The  difficulties  and  failures  involved  in  all  efforts  to  arrange  the 
occurrences of history in a neat system of historical mechanics were evident to 
them. But on the other side, the achievements of the Darwinians were impressive. 
If the totality of history could not be brought into a deterministic system without 
doing  violence  to  historical  knowledge;  perhaps  the  biological  analogy  of  the 
organism  could  be  applied...  So  under  the  biological  analogy,  history  was 
conceived as a succession of cultural organisms rising, growing, competing, and 
declining.104
This  view  has  the  advantage  of  acknowledging  the  impact  of  Darwin  on  the 
philosophy of science and tacitly recognises the resulting movement away – if only in 
practice rather than theory – from a strictly mechanistic, law-bound view of science.  
This is an acknowledgement not seen in Croce or Collingwood, and, to that extent, 
represents  a  better  awareness  (if  not  understanding)  of  the  state  of  then-current 
scientific  thought  on  Beard's  part.  Yet  this  picture,  while  recognising  the  change 
Darwin  (among  others)  had  wrought  in  scientific  practice,  fails  to  adequately 
recognise what was truly important about that change. For Beard goes on to implicate 
this  biological  approach  as  sharing  the  same  faws  by  which  he  dismissed  the 
“physical,” and thus claims to have achieved a reduction of the “Darwinian” view to 
the same crude determinism.  “The organismic theory of  history,”  he claimed,  “is 
really  the  old  determinism  of  physics  covered  with  murky  words.”  Thus  both 
approaches are essentially the same, and turn “finally upon the applicability of the 
deterministic  sequence.”105 And it  was exactly this that Beard considered the very 
definition of science when he came, later in his address, to address that issue directly:
Natural science in a strict sense, as distinguished from mere knowledge of facts,  
can  discover  system  and  law  only  when  occurrences  are  in  reality  arranged 
objectively in deterministic sequences. It can describe these sequences and draw 
from them laws, so-called. From a given number of the occurrences in any such 
sequence, science can predict what will happen when the remainder appear.106
This  then,  is  as  clear  and  unambiguous  an  illustration  of  Beard's  nomothetic 
assumption regarding science as one might find in any of his writings. In this view, 
whether one follows the physical or the biological model is of no consequence, as the 
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid., p.224.
106 Ibid.
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essential  nature/problem  of  each  is  the  same.  Both  resolve  into  a  deterministic 
assumption  of  cause  and  effect  that  (in  a  confation  similar  to  that  seen  with 
Trevelyan and Collingwood's reading of Bury) Beard translated into a nomothetic 
assumption of  the  necessity  of  law,  making  a  leap that  presumably  seemed self-
evident. So, while Beard endorsed a “scientific method” in history which (although 
he did not explicitly define it) he claimed as the “only method that can be employed 
in  obtaining  accurate  knowledge  of  historical  facts,  personalities,  situations,  and 
movements,” his identification of a nomothetic model with science as a whole caused 
him to reject the possibility of a scientific history.107 If a science of history in this sense 
were possible, he argued:
... it would, like the science of celestial mechanics, make possible the calculable 
prediction  of  the  future  in  history.  It  would  bring  the  totality  of  historical 
occurrences within a single field and reveal the unfolding future to its last end, 
including all the apparent choices made and to be made. It would be omniscience. 
The creator of it would possess the attributes ascribed by the theologians to God.108
To state such a case, Beard argued, “is to dispose of it.”109 If history could not predict 
the future – like “celestial  mechanics” – from a handful of universal,  unchanging 
laws, then it was not truly a science. All that was left of the scientific position worth 
defending then, was an ill-defined “scientific method” which was, in Beard's hands, 
largely a shorthand for the standards of evidence and source criticism held over from 
the Rankean practice of  the American historical  community.110 From this  it  seems 
reasonable to conclude that this was the source of the confusion remarked upon by 
both Meyerhoff and Novick. Because Beard defined even post-Darwinian science in 
this exclusively nomothetic  sense,  he therefore considered science and historically 
fundamentally incompatible – at least in terms of their aims, if not their methods. 
Carl L. Becker
Carl Becker, by contrast, did not treat as extensively of science as Beard did, and so 
his thinking on the subject cannot be inferred in anything like the above level of  
detail. It has been shown, however, that Becker was – like Beard – infuenced in his 
historical  relativism  by  Benedetto  Croce.111 In  addition  to  this,  there  are  hints 
107 Ibid., p.226.
108 Ibid., p.224.
109 Ibid.
110 Novick, That Noble Dream. pp.26-40.
111 While Becker, like Beard, also exhibited some of the infuences of American pragmatism, there is 
strong evidence that the basis of his historical thinking was Crocean. Indeed, Becker himself said as 
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regarding his attitude toward scientific history scattered throughout his works. For 
example, in his own presidential address to the American Historical Association in 
1931,  entitled  'Everyman  His  Own  Historian,'112 Becker  expressed  considerable 
concern at the possibility of the true nature of history being “camoufaged by the 
disfiguring  jargon  of  science.”113 This  famed  speech,  however,  was  primarily  an 
endorsement of historical relativism concerned with the reduction of history to “its 
lowest terms,” as one would reduce a mathematical fraction. This reduction Becker 
claimed to have achieved in his definition of history as “the memory of things said 
and done.”114 Focusing on the term “memory” in this definition, Becker devoted the 
bulk of his address to articulating the methods by which human cognition “creates” 
history and to the role of the present in shaping interpretations of the past. While 
these  are  classic  Crocean  idealist  concerns  carried  over  into  the  American 
pragmatist/relativist traditions, Becker had less to say in 'Everyman' about his own 
views  on  the  relationship  between history  and science,  other  than to  hint  at  his 
dissatisfaction with the “scientific history” of the previous century:
To  establish  the  facts  is  always  in  order,  and  is  indeed  the  first  duty  of  the 
historian; but to suppose that the facts, once established in all their fullness, will 
'speak for themselves' is an illusion. It was perhaps peculiarly the illusion of those 
historians  of  the  last  century  who  found  some  special  magic  in  the  word 
'scientific.'  The  scientific  historian,  it  seems,  was  one  who  set  forth  the  facts 
without injecting any extraneous meaning into them.115
So Becker's understanding of science (at least as it applied to history) appears to have 
been less concerned with the generalising impulse than Beard's, hinging instead on 
claims of objectivity – a specific conceit he ascribes to the “scientific historians” of the 
nineteenth century. Indeed, musings on the twin questions of objectivity in history 
and the nature of historical “facts” make up the bulk of Becker's refective writings 
on  the  subject.  Thus,  while  Becker  often  sought  to  contrast  the  pretensions  of 
much, in response to an invitation to name European and American works that had infuenced his 
thinking, stating “Croce's History and the Writing of History helped to shape my ideas about History, 
which I set forth in the address 'Every Man His Own Historian.'” It should also be noted that, in 
addition to this, 'Every Man' explicitly deployed Croce's idea of “living history” in service of its  
argument.  See: Chester McArthur Destler, 'The Crocean Origin of Becker's Historical Relativism,' 
History and Theory. Vol. 9, No. 3 (1970). pp.335-336.
112 Carl L. Becker, 'Everyman His Own Historian: Annual Address of the President of the American 
Historical Association, delivered at Minneapolis, December 29, 1931,'  American Historical Review.  
Vol. 37, No. 2 (January 1932). pp.221-236.  It should be noted here that some sources spell this as 
“Everyman” rather than “Every Man.” Becker appears (if those who have transcribed/reprinted 
him are to be trusted) to have used both spellings at various points in his own correspondence. The 
spellings offered here will therefore simply reproduce those in the particular source being cited.
113 Ibid., p.231.
114 Ibid., pp.221-222.
115 Ibid., p.232.
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objectivity in history with that of the natural sciences, he does not dwell at length 
upon the nature of the latter. In his early (1910) paper 'Detachment and the Writing of 
History,'116 however, in a discussion of the “synthesis” of the facts of history into a 
coherent historical account, Becker offers a hint as to his thinking on the subject:
The problem of synthesis is, indeed, not to record exactly what happened, but by 
simplification  to  convey  an  intelligible  meaning  of  what  happened....  This 
necessary  simplification  may  be  achieved,  I  suppose,  in  one  of  two ways:  by 
classification in terms of common qualities, or by grouping in terms of concrete 
relations. Comparing what is related of all kings... the historian may find that all 
kings have been crowned. This quality common to all kings is then reduced to a 
single  statement,  “all  kings  are  crowned.”  This  is  the  method  of  the  natural 
sciences, and of sociology as well. Certainly, it is a method well worth while; but, 
as we are all are agreed that history is not sociology, it cannot be the method of the 
historian.117
This then would appear to be a tacit statement of the scientific “method” as directed 
toward the articulation of generalisations and laws. Becker goes on to place such a 
vision of science in direct opposition to history:
The sociologist has simplified by combining particular facts in a generalization, 
from  which  any  one  can  deduce  again  the  particular  fact,  and  no  other.  The 
historian has simplified by selecting, from a number of particular facts,  certain 
facts which he considers most important to be known.118
“It  seems, then,” Becker concludes,  “that the great  point in historical  synthesis is 
selection.”119 This was the epistemological gap between history and the sciences into 
which Becker sought to drive his relativist wedge. For, if the historical method relies 
on selection, then that selection must be made by the historian, involving them (and 
their  personal  and  cultural  biases)  in  the  process  of  history.  This  opens  up  the 
conceptual  space  required  for  the  relativist  critique.  To  be  fair,  Becker  does  not 
completely absolve the  sciences of this same relativism, but it seems to be Becker's 
perception that the generalising method hinted at above insulates them from its full 
force, if only because of a lesser ambiguity in their subject matter.120 Thus, Becker's 
entire argument regarding the peculiar nature of history can be understood as being 
predicated upon this assumed fundamental difference between history and science – 
a difference made possible by the nomothetic assumption.
116 Carl L. Becker, 'Detachment and the Writing of History,' in Phil L. Synder (ed), Detachment and the  
Writing of History: Essays and Letters of Carl L. Becker.  Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York, 
1967. pp.3-28.
117 Ibid., p.16.
118 Ibid., pp.17-18.
119 Ibid., p.18.
120 Becker, 'What Are Historical Facts?,' pp.335-336.
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One thing that must be remembered, given the overall objectives of this thesis, is that 
the  objections  raised  by  these  idealist  authors  against  history  being  treated  as  a 
science were entirely accurate –  if  one accepted the definition of science used to derive  
them. Their error, as has been seen in the examples offered so far, was in equating 
science  in  the  narrow  nomothetic  sense  (a  model  derived  from  the  Newtonian, 
mechanistic worldview) with science as a whole. In Part Two, we will show that this 
view is dangerously myopic, and that its dissolution goes a long way to allowing the 
age-old history/science problem to finally be resolved.  Yet,  knowing of  this error 
does not diminish the weight of their arguments against the narrow target at which 
they were aimed – the study of history as oriented toward a search for the “laws of 
history.” The fact remained that all attempts to search for and isolate laws of history 
which might serve as the historical analogue of laws in physics had been  failures. 
This, combined with the belief that laws were the only permissible form of scientific 
knowledge, had instilled in the idealists a firm belief in the autonomy of history – 
whatever  epistemic mechanism they  subsequently  advocated.  In  the  wake of  the 
idealist critique then, those who would defend the essential premise of natural laws 
as being the most fundamental form that knowledge in any field could take, would 
have to either counter these idealist arguments directly, or modify their underlying 
thesis in order to accommodate them. It was the desire to do both that gave rise to 
perhaps the most controversial idea in the history of the philosophy of history – the 
“covering law” model offered by the philosophers of science Karl Popper and Carl 
Hempel. 
The Covering Law Thesis, or: Laws of History versus Laws in History
At its simplest, the primary aim of the covering law model was to defend the notion 
that there was only one legitimate mode of explanation – the scientific.  And that 
scientific  mode  of  explanation  could  likewise  take  only  one  legitimate  form  – 
deduction from nomothetic laws. Thus Popper and Hempel were  not prepared to 
allow a plurality of knowledge-producing disciplines. For them, all knowledge – or 
all  real knowledge – had to be somehow derivable from laws. This led both men to 
argue vehemently against  not  only historical  autonomy, but the autonomy of  any 
discipline  which  purported  to  generate  real  knowledge  by  means  of  some  non-
nomothetic  epistemology.  Because of  this,  they were  also motivated to attack the 
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empirically questionable epistemology of empathy which underwrote much of the 
idealist vision of historical knowledge. The covering law thesis thus represented the 
first major collision of the philosophy of science and the philosophy of history. For 
Popper and Hempel (and some subsequent philosophers such as Patrick Gardiner) 
believed that the central arguments of idealism – that the past is unrepeatable, too 
complex, or too concerned with human thought processes to be treated scientifically 
– had to be decisively rejected if history hoped to represent any kind of respectable 
knowledge.  With  “respectable”  in  this  context  being  intended  as  a  synonym for 
“scientific,” and “scientific” being a synonym for the discovery and deployment of 
general laws. And this, they argued, was really only possible in the light of a radical  
re-orientation of historical theory and practice. It is thus interesting to note that both 
the  early  idealists  and  the  covering  lawyers  shared  the  fundamental  nomothetic 
assumption that laws were the incontestable basis of science. However, where the 
idealists saw this – when coupled with history's failure to either explicitly produce 
and/or consume laws – as proof of history's autonomy, the covering lawyers saw it 
as  a  mark  of  an  immature  discipline.  Likewise,  all  subsequent  arguments  from 
complexity,  unrepeatability,  and human mental causation were seen as little more 
than post facto rationalisations advanced to avoid that conclusion. For the purposes of 
this thesis, the preceding sketch of some of the key positions of idealism and the 
nomothetic  assumptions which have underwritten them should be understood as 
providing necessary context for the arrival of covering law theory. For the discussion 
surrounding this  infuential  theory almost  immediately came to  utterly  dominate 
mid-twentieth century philosophy of history.
But this is to momentarily get ahead of ourselves. For the covering law model was, at 
least initially, an attempt to move away from the by-then indefensible idea that one 
could – through a radical re-imagining of historical method – identify the “laws” of 
which all of observed (and future) history were merely the consequences. Popper and 
Hempel instead attempted to focus on the  linkage of historical explanations as they 
were traditionally understood to other general laws of nature. This is the subtle but 
crucial distinction between laws of history and laws in history. Thus, mid-twentieth 
century covering law theory was, in a sense, designed to save the idea of laws from 
an idealist point of view that had drawn considerable intellectual justification from 
the disappointments of law-seeking positivist authors like Henry Thomas Buckle and 
Auguste  Comte.  This  idea  of  sublimating  laws  in  order  to  enable  the  wider 
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application of a nomothetic model seems to have first surfaced as part of a general  
theory of explanation in the German text of what was later to become Karl Popper's 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery,  published as  Logik der Forschung  in 1934.121 Later, in 
The Open Society and its Enemies,122 he briefy offered an explanation of the idea as it 
might relate to disciplines such as history:
To  give  a  causal  explanation of  a  certain  event  means  to  derive  deductively  a 
statement  (it  will  be  called  a  prognosis)  which  describes  that  event,  using  as 
premises of the deduction some  universal laws together with certain singular or 
specific sentences which we may call  initial conditions.... The initial conditions (or 
more precisely, the situation described by them) are usually spoken of as the cause 
of the event in question, and the prognosis (or rather, the event described by the 
prognosis) as the effect...123
Note the compatibility of this statement with the pure Newtonian view of science – 
the predominant source of (and argument for) the nomothetic-deductive model. In 
that view, for instance, the future position of any planet relative to the Earth could be 
calculated (or “explained,” in Popper's terminology) from two pieces of information: 
its present position, and the laws that describe its motion. Thus, by Popper's above 
argument, its position on Christmas Day one hundred years from now is “explained” 
by the twin facts that it was in one particular position on the day of the calculation 
and that it, as an object, obeys certain laws. This same explanation however, is also a 
prediction, given that the event it seeks to explain lies in the future. Since it was – as 
Popper himself later argued at length in  The Poverty of Historicism124 – emphatically 
not the purpose of history to attempt to predict the future, Popper's case for applying 
this model to history therefore hinged on his assertion of the essential logical unity of 
prediction, confirmation, and explanation. In other words, Popper argued, “the use 
of a theory for the purpose of predicting some specific event is just another aspect of 
its use for the purpose of explaining such an event.”125 That is to say – usage matters. 
“Whether  we  use  a  theory  for  the  purpose  of  explanation,  or  prediction,  or  of 
testing,” Popper wrote, “depends on our interest, and on what propositions we take 
as given or assumed.”126
Assuming  the  truth  of  this  premise  led  Popper  to  draw  a  three-fold  theoretical 
121 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson & Co.: London, 1959.
122 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume II: The High Tide of Prophecy – Hegel, Marx and  
the Aftermath. Revised 3rd Edition. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1952.
123 Ibid., p.262. (emphasis in original)
124 Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism. 2nd Edition. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1960.
125 Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume II. pp.262-263.
126 Ibid., p.263.
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distinction between scientific disciplines, based on what “aspect” of explanation was 
required. His primary distinction was between what he termed “historical sciences” 
and “generalising sciences.” The “generalising sciences,” he further subdivided into 
“pure” and “applied.” Pure generalising sciences, like physics, sought to use specific  
cases in order to establish universal laws. These laws could then be extended to cover 
cases  yet  unexamined.  By  contrast,  applied  generalising  sciences,  such  as 
engineering, did not seek to discover new laws, but to use existing laws for prediction 
and the control of nature. The third category – which conceivably included history – 
were the “historical sciences,” which were interested in the  explanation of specific 
events. Since historical sciences were not interested in prediction, Popper reasoned, 
and because the use of historical data to formulate laws was largely unreliable, this 
category of sciences must operate under a different relationship to general laws. 127 To 
this end, Popper argued, rather than formulate or test laws the historical sciences 
must “take them for granted.”128 In other words, while the form of explanation in the 
historical sciences still depends upon general laws that can link the general to the 
specific, these are not required to be stated  explicitly.  Instead, the laws lie  implicit 
behind  the  statements,  functioning  as  unseen  epistemological  guarantors  of  the 
claims  being  made.  This  can  be  allowed,  Popper  argued,  because  the  historical 
sciences are typically limited to the explanation of single specific events. Without any 
intent to link multiple specific events together through generalisation, there is simply 
no need for the underlying laws to be brought into the foreground. This addresses the 
idealist  argument that  history could not be made scientific because history is  the 
study of the unique particular,  and science the general.  That might be so,  argues 
Popper, but that alone does not represent evidence that history is somehow inherently 
unscientific or otherwise beyond the reach of “laws of nature.”129 
From  this  we  can  see  that  while  Popper  retained  his  positivist  conviction  that 
explanation in terms of general laws of nature are the only properly legitimate form 
of knowledge, he conceded the point that the reduction of knowledge in all areas of 
enquiry to a handful of laws  specific to that discipline was not always possible. Yet, 
Popper argues, universal laws of some kind are still involved at some point. Thus, key 
idealist  criticisms  regarding  previous  failures  of  the  nomothetic  method  are 
answered, and the assumption of a purely nomothetic science preserved. Overall, 
127 Ibid., pp.263-264.
128 Ibid., p.262. See also p.264. of the same work: “... as a rule, if we are interested in specific events  
and their explanation, we take for granted all the many universal laws which we need.”
129 Ibid., pp.264-265.
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this is an analysis that is very difficult to fault. Certainly, it avoids the undesirable 
requirement  for  the  separation  of  knowledge-generating  disciplines  into 
incommensurable  epistemic  domains.  It  is  not  clear,  however,  that  Popper's 
concession actually solves any real problems of historical explanation. To know that, at 
some level, we must encounter laws of nature which can underwrite and legitimise 
our historical explanations is likely to be of little help in many practical questions of  
historical  explanation.  For  that  level  might  be  a  great  distance  (theoretically 
speaking) from our area of  interest,  thus making it  very difficult  to leverage.  We 
might be absolutely certain that the laws of quantum mechanics lie at the root of the 
attempted  coup  d'etat  in  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  August  of  1991  and  so  could 
legitimately be called its cause. But merely stating this (i.e., taking the laws involved 
for granted) does not explain the event. 
Carl Hempel's formulation of the covering law theory, however, was a good deal less 
forgiving.  The same basic ideas we encounter in Popper are present  in Hempel's 
work, but are much more fully developed. More importantly, they are formulated 
with specific reference to human history (as opposed to Popper's much more general 
“historical  sciences”).  From  the  opening  lines  of  his  infuential  1942  paper  'The 
Function of General Laws in History,'130 Hempel made quite clear his viewpoint on 
both science and the claim of idealistic history to exist outside of it:
It is a rather widely held opinion that history, in contradistinction to the so-called 
physical sciences, is concerned with the description of particular events of the past  
rather than with the search for general laws which might govern those events. As 
a characterization of  the type of  problem in which some historians are mainly 
interested, this view probably cannot be denied; as a statement of the theoretical 
function  of  general  laws  in  scientific  historical  research,  it  is  certainly 
unacceptable.131
Immediately obvious in Hempel's paper then, are concerns similar to those seen in 
Popper's work. Both authors, for example, appear to be less concerned with directly 
countering the argument for the particularity of history than with countering those 
who would deploy that particularity as an argument against the positivist doctrinal 
assertion of the logical unity of explanation under a single (nomothetic) model. As 
William Dray has argued in his own considerations of covering law theory: “it is 
generally part of the purpose of advocates of the [nomothetic] model to vindicate the 
130 Carl G. Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History,' The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 39, No. 2 
(15 January 1942). pp.35-48.
131 Ibid., p.35.
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'scientific'  character  of  history  –  or,  perhaps  more  accurately,  to  forestall  the 
conclusion that history may operate successfully with procedures and criteria of its 
own.”132 This is also made clear by Hempel's subsequent assertion that general laws 
have  “analogous  functions”  in  both  history  and  natural  science,  as  well  as 
constituting ”the common basis of various procedures which are often considered as 
characteristic of the social in contradistinction to the natural sciences.”133 Indeed, later 
in the same article, he states:
We have tried to show that in history no less than in any other branch of empirical 
inquiry, scientific explanation can be achieved only by means of suitable general 
hypotheses, or by theories, which are bodies of systematically related hypotheses. 
This thesis is clearly in contrast with the familiar view that genuine explanation in 
history is obtained by a method which characteristically distinguishes the social 
from the natural sciences, namely, the method of empathetic understanding...134
Contained within this claim, however, is the assertion that explanation in any field 
had to reduce  to laws in some way in order  to  be called scientific –  or  even an 
explanation.  Clearly  Hempel  was,  like  Popper,  deeply  committed  not  only  to  the 
scientific  character  of  all  explanation  (and  therefore  knowledge),  but  also  to  an 
assumption  of  the  purely  nomothetic  character of that  knowledge.  As  Hempel 
remarked in a later defence of his ideas:
... the nature of understanding, in the sense in which explanation is meant to give 
us an understanding of empirical phenomena, is basically the same in all areas of 
scientific  inquiry...  the  deductive  and  probabilistic  model  of  nomological 
explanation accommodate vastly more than just the explanatory arguments of, say, 
classical  mechanics:  in  particular,  they  accord  well  also  with  the  character  of 
explanations that deal with the infuence of rational deliberation, of conscious and 
subconscious motives, and of ideas and ideals on the shaping of historical events.  
In  so  doing,  our  schemata  exhibit,  I  think,  one  important  aspect  of  the 
methodological unity of all empirical science.135
In this light, the ideological commitments of both authors seem clear. Both Hempel 
and Popper were defending the argument that all disciplines permitting of any sort 
of  empirical  treatment  should  be  reducible  to  scientific  explanation.  This  is  the 
“methodological unity” Hempel speaks of. All other forms of explanation – whether 
empathic, theological, intuitionist, or derived from any other epistemological system 
– were mere sophistry. More importantly, both authors very explicitly defined the 
132 William Dray, Laws and Explanation in History. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1957. p.4.
133 Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History,' p.35.
134 Ibid., p.44. (emphasis in original)
135 Carl G. Hempel, 'Explanation in Science and in History,' in Ronald H. Nash (ed), Ideas in History,  
Volume II: The Critical Philosophy of History. E. P. Dutton & Co.: New York, 1969. p.106.
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character of that scientific discourse in exclusively nomothetic terms. Indeed, their 
nomothetic assumptions were less the tacit expression of received wisdom (as seen in 
the authors already examined) than consciously adopted and staunchly defended 
positions. From this it follows that, in order to uphold this “methodological unity” 
argument, both authors were required to find a way to logically tie universal laws to 
history,  or  else  their  positions  would  become  untenable.136 Therefore,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  the  bulk  of  both  Popper  and  Hempel's  work  on  the  subject  of 
historical  explanation  was  directed  towards  the  searching  out  and  justifying  of 
examples in which such explanations could be seen as fowing from general laws. 
With this  in  mind,  Hempel  argued for  the  role  of  general  law in  explanation  as 
follows:
The main function of general laws in the natural sciences is to connect events in  
patterns  which  are  usually  referred  to  as  explanation  and  prediction....  The 
explanation of the occurrence of an event of some specific kind E at a certain place 
and  time  consists,  as  it  is  usually  expressed,  in  indicating  the  causes  or 
determining factors of E. Now the assertion that a set of events – say, of the kinds 
C1, C2,..., Cn – have caused the event to be explained, amounts to the statement 
that, according to general laws, a set of events of the kinds mentioned is regularly 
accompanied by an event of kind E. Thus, the scientific explanation of the event in 
question consists of
(1) a set of statements asserting the occurrence of certain events C1,... Cn at 
certain times and places,
(2) a set of universal hypotheses, such that
(a)  the  statements  of  both  groups  are  reasonably  well  confirmed  by  
empirical evidence,
(b) from the two groups of statements the sentence asserting the occurrence 
of event E can be logically deduced.
In  a  physical  explanation,  group  (1)  would  describe  the  initial  and  boundary 
conditions for the occurrence of the final event; generally, we shall say that group 
(1) states the determining conditions for the event to be explained, while group (2) 
contains the general laws on which the explanation is based...137
This  is  a  vision  of  explanation  in  which  explicit logical  links  to  “universal 
hypotheses” are  required in order to consider anything explained at all. Hempel, in 
other words, was considerably less willing than Popper to let laws be simply taken 
136 Note however, that this did not mean a commitment to finding specifically historical laws. This is 
the difference between laws  of  history and laws  in history.  Indeed,  Hempel  explicitly declared 
agnosticism with respect to this notion: “The considerations developed in this paper are entirely 
neutral  with  respect  to  the  problem  of  “specifically  historical  laws”:  they  do  not  presuppose  a 
particular way of distinguishing historical from sociological and other laws, nor do they imply or 
deny the assumption that empirical laws can be found which are historical in some specific sense, 
and which are well confirmed by empirical evidence.” See: Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws 
in History,' p.47. (emphasis in original). Popper also made this point: “This view of history makes it 
clear why so many students of history and its method insist that it is the particular event that  
interests them, and not any so-called universal historical laws. For from our point of view, there 
can be no historical laws.” See: Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume II. p.264.
137 Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History,' pp.35-36. (emphasis in original)
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for granted. Consider Hempel's example of the fracturing of a car radiator in cold 
weather.  In  order  to  “explain”  this  (in  the  technical  sense  of  the  term),  Hempel 
argued, one needed to state the initial and boundary conditions (group 1) – the car 
was left exposed overnight, the radiator was made of iron, the ranges of temperature  
fuctuation for the time period concerned, and so on. To these conditions, the relevant 
general laws must be added – water freezes when temperatures drop below zero 
degrees (at sea level), water expands when it freezes, etc. The evaluation of the initial  
“group  (1)”  conditions  against  the  general  laws  of  “group  (2)”  then  allows  the 
deduction of the logical necessity of a fractured radiator. This is Hempel's generalised 
form of scientific explanation.138
While both Popper and Hempel offered their law-based models of explanation in a  
way they believed was sufficiently generalised to consistently cover history as well as 
science,  there  was  no  doubt  that  it  set  the  bar  of  what  constituted  a  legitimate 
explanation extremely high. Certainly, disciplines like physics and chemistry might 
recognise themselves in covering law theory – but could such a model adequately 
cover actual historical explanations? Moreover, if such a model of science could really 
count  history  as  among  its  own  (without  compromising  its  nomothetic 
commitments), then why had historical explanation not already taken such a form by 
the  twentieth  century?  This  was  especially  perplexing  given  the  power  the 
nomothetic method had already displayed in other disciplines. Hempel believed the 
answer  to  this  question  lay  in  the  sheer  complexity  of  interactions  historical 
explanations would be required to account for:
What is sometimes called the  complete description of an individual event (such as 
the  earthquake  of  San Francisco  in  1906  or  the  assassination  of  Julius  Caesar) 
would require a statement of all the properties exhibited by the spatial region or 
the individual object  involved, for the period of time occupied by the event in 
question.  Such  a  task  can  never  be  completely  accomplished....  A fortiori,  it  is 
impossible to give a  complete explanation of an individual event in the sense of 
accounting for  all its characteristics by means of universal hypotheses, although 
the explanation of what happened at a specified place and time may gradually be 
made more and more specific and comprehensive.... But there is no difference, in 
this respect, between history and the natural sciences: both can give an account of  
their subject-matter only in terms of general concepts, and history can “grasp the 
unique individuality” of its objects of study no more and no less than can physics 
or chemistry.139
But  even  in  the  face  of  this  complexity  and  the  obvious  difficulties  of  practical 
138 Ibid., p.36.
139 Ibid., p.37. (emphasis in original)
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application, Hempel remained unwilling to allow laws to be taken “for granted,” as 
Popper had. For Hempel, any explanations which did not adhere to the strict terms 
of his nomothetic-deductive model were to be considered “explanation sketches,” 
which consisted of “a more or less vague indication of the laws and initial conditions 
considered as relevant,” which “needs 'filling out' in order to turn into a full-fedged 
explanation.”140 That is,  no explanation could be given – or even merely  sketched – 
without some sense being given of how the linkage between general law and specific 
case  might  be accomplished.  With respect  to the practical  difficulties  of  applying 
such a thoroughly nomothetic model to history, Popper was also forced to concede a 
similar point:
And our view explains why, in history, we are confronted, much more than in the 
generalizing  sciences,  with  the  problem  of  its  'infinite  subject  matter.'  For  the 
theories  or  universal  laws of  generalizing science introduce unity as  well  as  a 
'point of view'; they create, for every generalizing science, its problems, and its 
centres  of  interest  as  well  as  of  research,  of  logical  construction,  and  of 
presentation. But in history we have no such unifying theories; or, rather, the host 
of trivial universal laws we use are taken for granted; they are practically without 
interest, and totally unable to bring order to the subject matter.141
In other words, a greater deal of precision becomes possible as the constraints of time 
and space are narrowed. Since history frequently deals in such large swathes of both, 
however, it is necessarily less precise than, say, physics. But the underlying form of 
knowledge with which both history and science must work is identical.  This is  a 
positivistic  view of the relationship between history and science  in stark contrast 
with  the  understanding  of,  for  instance,  Beard,  who  believed  that  if  a  scientific 
treatment of history were possible, it would allow “the calculable prediction of the 
future in history” and thus amount to “omniscience.”142 Both Popper and Hempel 
were  saying  that  this  was  clearly  not  the  case.  But  while  there  may not  be  any 
universal laws  of history, they cautioned, there were certainly laws  in history. The 
linkage  between  those  laws  and  the  events  of  history  in  which  historians  were 
interested might be long and difficult, but it was there. And for Popper and Hempel, 
that was enough. 
The  essential  Popper/Hempel  thesis  was  an  important  advance  over  the  naïve 
nomothetic  positivism so reviled by Collingwood and other idealists in two main 
ways.  First,  because it  removed the requirement for historians who wished to be 
140 Ibid., p.42.
141 Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume II. p.264.
142 Beard, 'Written History as an Act of Faith,' p.224.
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“scientific”  to  generate  specifically  historical laws.  And second,  because  it  allowed 
history  the  freedom  to  investigate  and  attempt  to  explain  the  specific  and  the 
particular,  which  had  been  denied  to  it  under  the  nineteenth  century  vision  of 
positivism advocated by historical law-seekers like Comte and Buckle. Under their 
view of “scientific history,” the particular was only of interest as evidence in support 
of the historical laws which were the  actual aim of the enterprise. All  attempts to 
actually pursue history in such a manner had, however, failed. Popper and Hempel's  
major achievement was to provide a plausible reason for this failure while preserving 
not  only  the  nomothetic  model  of  explanation  itself,  but  also  its  purported 
universality. Despite such advantages, however, this updated covering law thesis still 
suffered from serious faws which prevented it from finding widespread acceptance. 
Problems With The Covering Law Thesis
Notwithstanding the fact that the covering law thesis appears to beg the question by 
assuming the methodological unity of science in order to prove it, perhaps the most  
substantial objection to the theory (at least as it applies to history) is the profound 
disconnect between its explanatory requirements and actual historical explanation. 
As Alan Donagan has argued:
The  most  striking  fact  about  the  Popper-Hempel  theory  is  that  few  of  the 
innumerable  historical  explanations  found  in  the  writings  of  historians  even 
appear to accord with it. The reason why they do not is that few of them are put 
forward as resting on covering laws, whether explicit or implicit... In short, if the 
covering law thesis be true, then no historian has yet succeeded in providing a 
genuine historical explanation.143
Of course it is entirely possible that all attempts at historical explanation up until  
Hempel's time really could have been worthless – if  only for not having yet  had 
covering law theory to show them the error of their ways.144 But the objection goes 
further  than  this.  For  even  if  one  accepts  covering  law  theory,  the  kinds  of 
events/objects that the historian wants to explain (and the available sources from 
which  they  attempt  to  do  so)  would  seem to  actively  resist analysis  in  terms  of 
covering laws. That is to say, when one is concerned with the explanation of high-
143 Alan Donagan, 'Historical Explanation: The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered,'  History and 
Theory. Vol. 4. No. 1 (1964). p.14.
144 Indeed, dismissing the covering law theory purely on these grounds would seem somewhat akin 
to  dismissing  chemistry  because  accepting  it  would  mean accepting  that  no  alchemist has  yet 
succeeded in providing a genuine chemical  explanation.  A similar point is  made in:  Donagan, 
'Historical Explanation: The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered,' p.17.
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level  phenomena  (as  history  typically  is)  the  formulation  of  truly  general  laws 
and/or  universal  hypotheses  would  appear  to  be  prohibitively  difficult,  if  not 
impossible.  For instance,  Hempel himself  offered one example of  an account that 
explicitly laid out the universal hypotheses on which it proceeded – that of Economic  
Behaviour, by Donald W. McConnell, et. al. These “laws,” were:
People who have jobs do not like to lose them; those who are habituated to certain 
skills do not welcome change; those who have become accustomed to a certain 
kind of power do not like to relinquish their control – if anything, they want to 
develop greater power and correspondingly greater prestige...145
But, as Donagan has noted, none of these laws/hypotheses are truly universal. One 
might welcome the loss of a job one hates, for instance, or embrace change in the 
form of technology that makes a tedious task less so, and so on. It is not difficult to 
imagine any number of caveats to these statements, any and all of which might call 
into  question  their  claim to  universality.  And  all attempts  to  explicitly  formulate 
“laws” as the basis of a historical explanation, Donagan argued, were vulnerable in 
the same way.146 To suggest that statements like those above are sufficiently robust to 
act  as  covering  laws  is  to  radically  overstate  their  ability  to  act  as  the  kind  of 
epistemological  guarantees  that  Popper  and  Hempel  were  seeking.  For,  if  such 
statements  are  not  universally  true  at  all  places  and times,  then the  event  being 
explained is  no longer an  inescapable  logical  consequence of the initial  conditions. 
This introduces an element of probability, undermining the claim of the resolving 
statement to be called a “law.” Let us illustrate this with a brief thought experiment.
If we allow probabilistic explanations to pass as “laws” in a covering law model of  
explanation, then the relevant “law” which explains why one is vastly more likely to 
draw a white marble than black from a barrel containing 999 white marbles and only 
a single black one can no longer conclusively rule out either possibility. While it would 
certainly be reasonable to  assume that any random marble drawn will  be white, 
ultimately  the  colour  of  the  marble  that  will  be  drawn cannot  be  unambiguously 
deduced from the combination of the initial conditions and the relevant principles of 
statistics.  The  outcome,  despite  taking  place  in  a  very  well-defined  system with 
almost  no  conceptual  ambiguity,  cannot  be  predicted  in  advance.  And  thus,  by 
Popper and Hempel's own insistence on symmetry, neither can it be explained. While 
145 D. W. McConnell, et. al., Economic Behaviour. Houghton Miffin Company: New York, 1939. pp.894-
95.
146 Donagan, 'Historical Explanation: The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered,' pp.14-15.
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this  might  appear  to  be  an  objection  motivated  purely  by  pedantry  given  the 
overwhelming likelihood of  choosing a white marble,  it  should be noted that the 
difficulty  of  determination becomes more  pronounced as  the  proportion of  black 
marbles (relative to white) increases.147 This  represents a significant erosion of the 
claim that a strictly nomothetic model of science can function as an epistemological 
model for all areas of knowledge. This is because it is the showing of an outcome to 
be necessary that enables laws to be the arbiters of explanation in the first place. If a 
single  probabilistic  (or  otherwise  circumscribed)  law can potentially  explain both 
outcomes of a binary, then that power of necessity is lost.  And with it  is  lost the 
reason for insisting on universal general laws in the first place. We are left with only 
tendencies and likelihoods. There is nothing wrong with this, of course. Much useful 
work can be done with such tools. But it is the demonstration of necessity that a truly 
universal law allows which gives covering laws their power. 
Hempel was certainly aware of this objection and the problem it presented to his  
reasoning.  Indeed,  he  recognised  as  much  in  'The  Function  of  General  Laws  in 
History,' stating that, “if Tommy comes down with the measles two weeks after his 
brother, and if he has not been in the company of other persons having the measles, 
we  accept  the  explanation  that  he  caught  the  disease  from  his  brother.”148 This 
example,  like  so  many in  science  and history alike,  affords  little  opportunity  for 
explanation using general laws, as – like the marble example – the conclusion cannot 
be made inescapable from the initial conditions using only such laws. Despite being 
guided  by  a  great  deal  of  reliable  knowledge  of  the  measles  virus  and  its 
propagation, the problem as stated is still probabilistic. While it really is highly likely 
that Tommy caught the virus from his brother, it is at least possible that he could have 
contracted a different strain blown in from the street.  It  was the ease with which 
counter-examples like this could be formulated which later drove Hempel to attempt 
to formally accommodate probabilistic reasoning into his schema. He attempted this 
by  weakening  his  assertion  that  all explanations  must  satisfy  the  deductive  and 
nomothetic demands of pure covering law theory. He postulated instead a weaker 
inductive/probabilistic mode of explanation, which softened the definition of “law” 
to allow conclusions  reached on the balance  of  probabilities.149 This  modification, 
147 Ibid., pp.6-7.
148 Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History,' p.41.
149 Carl G. Hempel,  'Deductive-Nomological vs.  Statistical Explanation,' in H. Feigl & G. Maxwell 
(eds), Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 3. 
University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1962. pp.98-169.
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however,  did  not  satisfy  the  technical  demands  of  the  deductive  model.  Thus, 
Hempel effectively renounced his vision of a  single mode of scientific explanation, 
applicable in all areas of knowledge, and in its place offered a binary model:  the 
strong deductive/nomological  model,  and the weaker inductive/probabilistic.  All 
scientific  explanations,  however,  were  still  thought  to  fall  into  one  of  these  two 
classes.150
Such  objections  fow  from  the  attempt  to  pass  non-universal  assumptions  as 
universal laws. But what of the historical accounts that do not (or cannot) explicitly 
state  their  “laws”?  What  of  the  surely  greater  number  of  works  that,  as  Popper 
phrased it,  take for granted the “host  of trivial universal laws” upon which their 
explanations depend?151 The temptation, if one could not hope to explicitly formulate 
the laws upon which an explanation depended, would be to argue that the more 
fundamental laws of other sciences were doing the heavy lifting here. This is the form 
of argument Hempel employed in his  example of  the frozen car radiator.  In that 
example, basic laws of physics and chemistry were what underwrote his (historical) 
explanation of why a car radiator had frozen. Karl Popper offered another example:
... these laws may be so trivial, so much part of our common knowledge, that we 
need not mention them and rarely notice them. If we say that the cause of the 
death of Giordano Bruno was being burnt at the stake, we do not need to mention 
the universal laws that all living things die when exposed to intense heat. But such 
a law was tacitly assumed in our causal explanation.152
While Hempel's insistence on hard linkages between known laws and explanation 
seems a good deal stronger than the tacit assumption of Popper's model, it too fails to 
address the basic issue. For while it is technically true, the deployment of laws and 
truisms like this do little to actually shape historical explanations. While one would 
certainly  not  trust  a  historical  account  that  got  basic  facts  wrong  regarding  the 
operation of the universe, it is of no real aid to the kinds of explanation historians 
tend to seek to note that, for instance, the Great Fire of London required oxygen in 
order to burn. Historians tend to be looking for explanation on a different level from 
this, and while these kinds of laws certainly are, just as Popper and Hempel have 
said, tacitly involved in any given description of the world (whether historical or not) 
one does not arrive at an explanation of the cause, or the effects, of the Great Fire by 
150 Carl G. Hempel, 'Explanation and Prediction,' in Bernard Baumrin (ed), Philosophy of Science: The 
Delaware Seminar. Vol. 1. (1962-63) Interscience: New York, 1963. pp.113-116.
151 Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume II. p.264.
152 Popper, The Poverty of Historicism. p.145.
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stacking  only statements like this to the rafters.  As Donagan has said of Popper's 
above example: “you cannot in such a way explain why Giordano Bruno was sent to 
the  stake,  or  why  he  defied  his  persecutors.”153 Indeed,  many  very  different 
explanations of such questions could be formulated on the  same set of underlying 
laws. Legitimate historians and Holocaust deniers alike are unlikely to disagree on 
the kinds of details that Popper and Hempel are talking about, yet their respective 
accounts  could  hardly  be  more  different.  Doubtless  a  complete understanding  of 
human beings as a fully deterministic system might allow one to use fundamental 
general laws to fully describe the kinds of objects and events with which historians 
are concerned. Yet, even if one possessed such knowledge, the path of explanation 
from underlying laws of physics to the actions of Napoleon is a long and difficult one 
– in both conceptual  and logistical  terms – and one that there is  little  reason for 
historians  to  take.  Chemistry  might  be  completely explained by  the  interaction  of 
matter according to the laws of physics, but this does not mean that chemists are 
required to  be  physicists  too,  or  that  the  principles  of  chemistry  are  not  a  valid 
shorthand for describing chemical systems at a higher level than their underlying 
physics. After all, one need not be cognisant of every atom in a solution in order to  
say something about  it  as  a  chemist.  And so  it  is  with history.  Thus we can add 
Hempel's  version of  covering law theory to  our earlier  assessment  of  Popper's  – 
likely true, but ultimately useless. 
Certainly, Popper and Hempel were aware of the problems involved in postulating a 
system of  explanation  that  relied  so  heavily  on the  universality  of  the  statement 
which linked initial conditions with explanation. Hempel himself acknowledged this, 
conceding in 'The Function of General Laws in History' that it would “often be very 
difficult to formulate the underlying assumptions explicitly with sufficient precision 
and at the same time in such a way that they are in agreement with all the relevant 
empirical evidence available.”154 Yet, despite this, the covering law theory as Popper 
and  Hempel  advanced  it  remained  strictly  predicated  on  the  universality  of  the 
covering laws. Hempel stated it thus: “in no other way than by reference to empirical 
laws  [i.e.,  strictly  universal  statements]  can  the  assertion  of  a  causal  connection 
153 Donagan, 'Historical Explanation: The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered,' p.15.
154 Hempel,  'The Function of General Laws in History,'  p.40. Of this statement, Alan Donagan has 
said: “I should add only: it is always difficult, and it has never been done.” See: Donagan, 'Historical 
Explanation: The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered,' p.14. (emphasis in original).  Despite this 
acknowledgement, Hempel did not seem to consider this objection fatal to his theory, retaining the 
idea of  covering laws even in  his much later  (circa  1962)  responses  to  criticism.  See:  Hempel, 
'Explanation in Science and in History,' pp.79-106.
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between certain events be scientifically substantiated.”155 Popper's argument differed 
slightly from Hempel's, factoring in his celebrated notion of “falsifiability” as well as 
allowing for probabilistic explanation,156 but was ultimately of the same form.
The Impact of the Nomothetic Assumption, or: Universality is the Problem
If it is the case that explicitly defined covering laws can almost never be formulated 
in such a way as to  exclude all  exceptions – and thus cannot lay claim to being 
universal laws at all. And if it is also true that implicit laws of the kind which can be 
meaningfully  said  to  be  universal  can  only  partially  determine  the  kinds  of 
explanatory outcomes historians are interested in, then it would seem that the central 
problem for  covering  law  theory  in  either  case  lies  in  its  insistence  on  its  own 
universality.  And  that  universality,  as  deployed  by  Popper  and  Hempel,  was 
inseparable  from  the  idea  of  laws.  From  this  it  follows  that  the  real  source  of 
weakness  in  covering  law  theory  is  not  to  be  found  in  its  argument  for  the 
methodological unity of explanation, but in the fact that that unity was predicated on 
a nomothetically conceived science. For not only do all of the objections detailed so far 
evaporate if one drops the insistence that scientific explanations must be reducible to 
universal general laws, but the central argument that Popper and Hempel conceived 
their models as a defence of (that of the unity of all knowledge under a scientific 
aegis) is unaffected. In fact, dropping the emphasis on laws – the supposed primacy 
of which, it should be noted, both authors considered self-evident and thus never 
bothered to fully justify – means that even the probabilistic accommodation Hempel 
made to the strong version of his theory could no longer be seen as an admission of 
its weakness, but rather an acknowledgement of an ability to also define science as a 
model-making discipline capable of proceeding at multiple levels of enquiry. This 
removes the need to slavishly pursue justification in either  self-specified “general 
laws” (which are riddled with caveats and thus subject to dispute), or by recourse to 
the more fundamental laws of other disciplines (which are broad enough to satisfy 
the  requirement  for  universality,  but  can  only  ever  partially  justify  the  kind  of 
explanations being sought). It might reasonably be concluded, therefore, that the root 
of the problem is the covering law insistence on defining  science in a nomothetic 
manner, rather than history. 
155 Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History,' p.37. (emphasis added)
156 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. p.374. 
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It must be remembered that Popper and Hempel were philosophers of science rather 
than  history  (although  they  themselves  would  perhaps  not  have  accepted  the 
distinction), and were therefore on the “other side” of the debate. Thus, their error  
was the error of Trevelyan, Collingwood, Croce,  Beard, and Becker but in  reverse. 
Where those idealist philosophers of history built their positions around a hostility to 
a science the nomothetic assumption had caused them to misunderstand, Popper and 
Hempel based their covering law theory (at least as far as it applied to history) on a 
misunderstanding of the kinds of explanation that historians actually seek. Because of 
this, both men seriously overstated the ability of nomothetic science to speak to such 
explanations.  Regardless of this,  the authors examined in this chapter all  have in 
common that they rigidly define science in terms of  laws.  This nomothetic outlook 
conditions  their  conclusions,  and  is  the  source  of  the  supposed  incompatibility 
between history and the sciences. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the 
nomothetic assumption was not merely widespread, but an essentially unquestioned 
axiomatic  premise  upon  which  both idealists  and  covering  lawyers  based  their 
respective  arguments.  We have also  seen,  in  the  example  of  J.  B.  Bury,  just  how 
powerful a distorting effect the nomothetic assumption could have on discussions 
regarding  the  relationship  between  history  and  science.  In  that  case,  it  will  be 
recalled, the nomothetic assumptions of Trevelyan and Collingwood so thoroughly 
coloured their  reading  of  Bury  that  they  ascribed positivistic  motives  to  him for 
which  there  was  little  evidence.  With  such  an  assumption  being  exceedingly 
widespread throughout early twentieth century philosophy of history, it is therefore 
not difficult to see how any genuinely new thought on the subject could be similarly 
distorted – forced into the Procrustean beds of “nomothetic positivist” or “empathic 
idealist.”  In  such a way the positivist/idealist  distinction became essentially self-
fulfilling. And lastly, we have seen something of the idealist position – particularly its  
strong  commitment  to  historical  autonomy  and  its  emphasis  on  mental  “re-
enactment” and “empathy” as epistemological methods. 
This introduction to the idealist position, apart from having functioned as important 
context for the arrival of covering law theory, will become more important in the 
following  chapter.  For  while  this  chapter  has  focused  on  idealist  arguments  for 
historical autonomy and their predication upon nomothetic assumptions regarding 
science, the other key argument associated with idealism – the empathic process by 
which  they  imagined  history  could  underwrite  its  knowledge claims  –  has  been 
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introduced  to  seemingly  little  purpose.  The  following  chapter  will  take  up  this 
argument in order to show that, however unconvincing the primary arguments of the 
covering lawyers proved to be, they were at  least successful in holding this quasi-
mystical attempt at epistemology to account. This is perhaps the single most notable 
outcome of the covering law debate, for it motivated those philosophers of history 
who would dispute  Popper  and Hempel's  assertions  (and thus  attempt to  retain 
historical autonomy) to renounce naïve idealism and instead offer more formal and 
empirically defensible models of historical explanation. And it was as a result of this 
pressure to replace naïve empathic idealism that the idea of narrative first began to 
emerge.157 We will  examine  this  intellectual  transformation  in  more  detail  in  the 
following chapter.
157 William H. Dray, Philosophy of History. Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964. pp.18-20.
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Chapter Two
“The Death of Empathy”
Having now provided some sense of the basic positions at issue in early to mid-
twentieth  century  philosophy  of  history,  we  are  now  in  a  position  to  begin  to 
examine the debate in more detail. To this end, Chapter Two will examine some of 
the details of the collision between covering law theory and empathic idealism. This  
will be done by means of a close reading of two paradigmatic examples, one from 
each side of this divide. First, Patrick Gardiner, a mid-twentieth century philosopher 
of history who was somewhat sympathetic to the covering law position. Gardiner 
has been chosen for inclusion here  as his  critique of  the idealist  epistemology of  
empathic  mental  re-enactment was among the most thorough ever  offered in the 
context  of  covering law theory.  In  contrast  to  this,  his  attempt to  actually  replace 
idealist  empathy with a modification of  covering law theory is  instructive for  its 
unconvincing and rather contrived character. Secondly, we will examine the work of 
W. H. Walsh, who rejected any attempt to bring science to history, seeking instead to 
reform  idealism  by  rejecting  the  mental  re-enactment  with  which  it  had  been 
associated and substituting his own concept of colligation in its place. Walsh believed 
this concept not only better captured the actual form of historical explanations, but 
was empirically defensible in a way empathy was not. Thus Walsh, like Gardiner,  
was attempting to replace the fawed idealist  notion of empathy.  But because the 
replacement Walsh had in mind was decidedly non-nomothetic, Walsh was able to 
see himself as formulating “a plausible version of the Idealist theory of history.”158 
For  this  reason,  Walsh  saw  himself  as  retaining  and  strengthening  the  idealist 
commitment to historical autonomy from the sciences. This is in stark contrast with 
Gardiner, who saw himself as exporting a single consistent mode of explanation from 
science into history. Walsh has been chosen for inclusion here because of the clarity of 
the connection between his own conclusions and the naïve idealism they sought to 
replace.  Walsh's  example  is  also  instructive  in  that  it  lays  valuable  rhetorical 
groundwork for the emerging narrative school of historical philosophy that will be 
the subject of Chapter Three. 
Speaking more broadly,  this  chapter  will  argue that  the covering law attack as a 
whole met with, at best, mixed success. Certainly, it was manifestly unsuccessful in 
158 W. H. Walsh, 'Colligatory Concepts in History,' in Patrick Gardiner (ed), The Philosophy of History.  
Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1974. p.134.
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its attempts to reinvent history as an applied nomothetic science. This is hardly a 
controversial claim, however,  as one need only note that while historical  theory is 
very different today, both historical practice and the kinds of questions which interest 
historians  have  changed  very  little  since  Popper  and  Hempel's  critiques.  Our 
examination  of  Gardiner  will  reinforce  this  point  by  showing  that  the  tensions 
between the kinds of explanations historians want and any variant of the nomothetic-
deductive model were simply too great to adequately reconcile. Covering law theory 
was more successful, however, in forcing a re-evaluation of how history saw itself.  
That is, while a majority of historians and philosophers of history still resisted being 
integrated into or otherwise made subject to the sciences, the scientifically inspired 
assessment of how idealist notions of empathy might do epistemological work (or, 
more precisely,  not do such work) forced from them greater efforts at constructing 
separate  systems to  formalise  historical  knowledge.  This  was the  catalyst  for  the 
development of narrativism, beginning with Walsh's first halting use of the term as 
an adjunct to his concept of colligation. Chapter Two will also further the project of 
Part One as a whole by demonstrating that, despite their position on opposite sides 
of a theoretical gulf,  both Gardiner and Walsh held strong nomothetic assumptions 
which  deeply  infuenced  their  respective  arguments  about  the  nature  of  history. 
These assumptions, it will be shown, not only enforced a perceived need for  some 
way  (however  contrived)  to  divide  history  and  the  sciences,  but  were  also 
instrumental in the rhetorical closing off of potentially fruitful avenues of argument. 
The end result was, despite the discrediting of naïve idealism and the widespread 
recognition that the historical  and scientific worlds were not incommensurable,  a 
strong sense that history and science remained deeply and fundamentally divided. 
This  tendency  would  go  on  to  infect  almost  all  subsequent  twentieth  century 
philosophy of history, and remains common to this day. 
The Importance of Empathy for the Covering Law Program
As hinted at in the previous chapter, one of the key dissatisfactions of the covering 
law theorists with historical theory was its reliance on concepts of empathy. This was, 
for instance, one of Carl Hempel's major concerns:
Accounts  of  this  type  are  based  on  metaphors  rather  than  laws;  they  convey 
pictorial and emotional appeals instead of insight into factual connections; they 
substitute vague analogies and intuitive “plausibility” for deduction from testable 
85
statements and are therefore unacceptable as scientific explanations.159
Therefore, for Hempel at least, the inadequacy of existing historical epistemology as 
a  whole  was  deeply  linked  to  his  case  for  history's  failure  as  an  explanatory 
discipline.  More  importantly,  due  to  the  bipartisan  nature  of  the  nomothetic 
assumption,  those  who  sought  to  resist Hempel's  conclusions  had  nevertheless 
accepted  that  laws  were  the  only  legitimate  form  of  scientific  explanation.  Also 
convinced that history could not proceed nomothetically, they were thus effectively 
forced to defend historical autonomy from science. To do this, however, they would 
have to come up with something better than the “metaphors,” “emotional appeals,” 
“vague analogies,” and other “intuitive” methods which had previously been used to 
justify  historians  continuing  to  offer  the  kinds  of  explanations  which  seemed 
appropriate to them. And that something would be required, if it were to adequately 
model existing historical practice, to eschew any direct reference to nomothetic laws, 
and thus – via the nomothetic assumption – stand completely apart from the sciences. 
Whatever the merits of the positive arguments of the covering lawyers regarding 
applying nomothetic forms to the study of history, therefore, the criticism of their 
negative  arguments  regarding  the  inadequacy  of  existing  historical  epistemology 
absolutely had to be met in order to preserve historical autonomy. 
Patrick Gardiner and the Assault on Idealism
What were these  arguments  against  the empathic  dimension of  idealism exactly? 
Popper and Hempel themselves had comparatively little to say on the matter. The 
task of mounting a more comprehensive critique would therefore be taken up by 
sympathetic philosophers of  history rather than science. To this end, let us not only 
examine  Patrick  Gardiner's  arguments  against  empathic  idealism,  but  also  his 
proposed  solution  to  the  problem it  represented.  As  we  shall  see,  Gardiner  was 
devastating with respect to the former, but less so with respect to the latter. And this 
failure,  it  will  be  demonstrated,  is  almost  entirely  attributable  to  the  nomothetic 
assumption. It is important to note at the outset, however, that Gardiner's criticisms 
of  idealism  were  almost  exclusively  based  on  the  kinds  of  purely  empirical 
arguments (i.e., purged of metaphysics) favoured by the covering lawyers. Gardiner, 
for instance, had the following to say about Collingwood's idea of empathy as the 
159 Carl G. Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History,' The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 39, No. 2 
(15 January 1942). p.38.
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“revival” of the thoughts of past historical actors in the mind of the historian:
... even if it were legitimate to regard thoughts and intentions in this way... how, on 
such an hypothesis,  does the historian know that the “revived” thought  is  the 
thought the agent in fact had when he performed his action? How does he know 
that what he calls a “revival” is really a revival? Suppose that two historians both 
claim to have revived the thoughts and plans of Napoleon on the eve of Austerlitz, 
and suppose that their accounts diverge. What criteria exist for deciding which is 
correct?160
The point Gardiner is making here is that a certain slipperiness is introduced into 
historical  explanations  when  one  attempts  to  justify  them  in  this  manner.  More 
importantly,  such slipperiness was almost  entirely a function of the empathic  form 
rather than the quality of the actual account. For however one might wish to resolve 
such a question of competing mental re-enactments, Gardiner argued, any broadly 
acceptable  decision  would likely  be  the  result  of  an  examination  of  other,  mind-
external,  evidence relevant to the question. Yet, the problem persists. How can the 
idealist be sure that the past events/objects which are the cause of the evidence in 
question  produced  those particular  thoughts  within  Napoleon's  mind?  What 
procedure could be used to check any particular “revival” against such evidence? If 
such an empathic process really is the epistemic mechanism by which history is to be 
properly understood (as Croce or Collingwood might have it) then the only way to 
check such a revivalist  account would be with  another such account.  But here we 
encounter an infinite regress which renders both the mechanism absurd, and a strong 
connection with evidence impossible. But if empathy is the epistemology of history, 
such  revivals  are  absolutely  necessary,  because  without  them  the  result  is 
definitionally not history. Yet it would seem that such revivals are forever beyond the 
reach of meaningful empirical confirmation. The two realms cannot be meaningfully 
connected. This approach to the philosophy of history would thus seem to demand 
the attainment of the unattainable.161 
Moreover, since such idealist philosophies had been predicated on the “mental” or 
“imaginative” dimension of history (a characteristic that science supposedly did not 
possess and that laws could not capture), the empathic argument  itself became the 
primary support  for  the argument that  history was a distinct  epistemology apart 
from  the  sciences.  If  empathy  were  discredited,  therefore,  then  that  epistemic 
160 Patrick Gardiner, 'The "Objects" of Historical Knowledge,' Philosophy, Vol. 27, No. 102 (July 1952). 
p.214.
161 Ibid., pp.218-220.
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separation  would  be  called  into  question.  This  provided  the  means  by  which 
Gardiner and others sympathetic to covering law theory could claim that a single 
(nomothetic) model of explanation applied everywhere:
...  Collingwood's  method  of  representing  historical  inquiry  as  a  passage  from 
external behaviour to internal thoughts was unsatisfactory because it led him to 
the  conclusion  that  historical  knowledge  consists  in  the  historian's  becoming 
acquainted with entities or agencies subsisting behind, or “inside” the activities of 
others;  and I have given reasons for believing that this conclusion is mistaken. 
And with  its  rejection  we  can  dismiss  the  idea  that  such  knowledge  must  be 
sharply  differentiated from that  involved  in  other  branches  of  enquiry  on  the 
grounds that  it  is  “non-inductive” in character  and peculiar  in its  “objects”  or 
“material.”162
Gardiner  continued  to  maintain,  however,  that  a  meaningful  distinction  between 
“branches of enquiry” could still be made. Indeed, he footnoted the final sentence of 
the above quote with; “I do not want to suggest that no line can be drawn but only 
that the line has been drawn in the wrong place and in the wrong way.” 163 Gardiner's 
own arguments regarding where and how such a line should be drawn were outlined 
in his 1952 book The Nature of Historical Explanation, to which we must now turn.164
The Nature  of  Historical  Explanation was,  at  least  in part,  an attempt at  building a 
bridge between the covering lawyers and those that Maurice Mandelbaum has called 
the “reactionists.”165 In it, Gardiner attempted to preserve the best of both worlds. He 
attempted  to  import  something  of  the  nomothetic  model  (and  the  legitimacy  it 
carried with it) into historical explanation, while also preserving the autonomy of 
history,  thus  shielding  history  from  the  more  awkward  questions  asked  by 
philosophers of science. In this sense, Gardiner, while not a staunch Hempelian, was 
a  good  deal  more  sympathetic  to  the  covering  law  position  than  many  of  his 
contemporaries.  While  his  success  at  attempting  to  remake  history  was  sharply 
limited by his own acceptance of a nomothetic form as being the only legitimate form 
of explanation, The Nature of Historical Explanation nevertheless represented one of the 
first  serious attempts  to assess the relationship between history and science from 
outside of the received wisdom of either the old idealism or the new covering law 
positivism.  And his  primary  concession  to  the  covering  law position  was  in  his 
162 Ibid., p.219.
163 Ibid. (emphasis in original)
164 Patrick Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation. Oxford University Press: London, 1952.
165 This group consisted of those philosophers of history who, in defence of historical autonomy,  
offered alternative models  of  explanation in  response to the covering law attack.  See:  Maurice 
Mandelbaum, 'Historical Explanation: The Problem of “Covering Laws”,' History and Theory. Vol. 1, 
No. 3 (1961). p.229.
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complete rejection of  empathy as an epistemological  device.  As we have already 
seen,  Gardiner's  primary  problem  with  idealism  was  its  insistence  on  a  mental 
dimension  to  historical  explanation  that,  in  his  view,  could  not  be  satisfactorily 
connected with evidence. Further to this, Gardiner also argued that this key idealist 
assertion  was  inextricably  linked to  the  other  pillar  of  idealism identified  in  the 
previous chapter – the strict separation of history and the sciences. These two ideas, 
Gardiner argued, could not be so easily separated:
The foundation of these views lies in the theory that the subject-matter of history 
is  different  in  kind from the  subject-matter  of  those  studies  loosely  called  the 
'natural  sciences.'  History is  a  different 'mode of experience,'  and the historian 
must  in  consequence  approach  it  with  methods  entirely  different  from  the  
methods of the natural scientist... To understand history and the writing of it the 
scientific  conception  of  knowledge  must  be  discarded,  and  a  distinct  type  of 
knowledge must be recognised: this type of knowledge has been variously named 
–  it  is  termed  sometimes  'insight,'  sometimes  'intuition'  or  'empathy,'  and 
sometimes 'recreating past experience'...166
In order to demonstrate this, Gardiner makes an interesting philosophical move. As 
hinted  at  in  Chapter  One,  the  early  twentieth  century  idealists  had  traditionally 
begun their chains of reasoning from history's seeming hostility to scientific methods 
(which were, of course, assumed to be exclusively nomothetic). From this, they had 
attempted  to  try  to  identify  something  that  was  supposedly unique  to  history  – 
usually human thought – and build a unique epistemology around it. In other words, 
empathic re-enactment was seen not as the explicit basis on which the separation of 
history and the sciences was being advanced, but as a  solution to the problem which  
historical  autonomy  represented.  Gardiner,  however,  set  out  to  argue  that  this  was 
largely  illusory.  All  of  the  major  idealist  supporting  arguments  for  historical 
autonomy,  he  claimed,  were  utterly  untenable  without  some  kind  of  prior 
commitment  to  an  empathic  model  of  historical  explanation.  By  arguing  in  this 
fashion, Gardiner sought to demonstrate that it was empathy which was the single 
most  fundamental  error  of  idealist  epistemology.  And  so  it  was  empathy  which 
would need to be purged in order to allow a better model of historical explanation to 
be  developed,  whether  covering  law based  or  otherwise.  This  then,  is  where  he 
directed his attack. He writes:
The four propositions often put forward in support of the theory that history is an 
autonomous  branch  of  study,  irreducible  in  principle  to  any  other,  are  the 
following:
166 Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation. pp.28-29.
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A. Historical events are past events and hence cannot be known in the  
manner in which present events are known.
B. Historical events are unique and unclassifiable.
C. History describes the actions, statements, and thoughts of human beings, 
not the behaviour of 'dead matter' with which science is concerned.
D. Historical events have an irreducible richness and complexity.167
Of the first point – that historical events are removed from direct assessment and 
thus cannot  be “known” in  the  same fashion as  the truths of  science  –  Gardiner  
argues that this  only holds if one considers “true knowledge” to be “knowledge by 
acquaintance.”168 Yet this would seem to be a very strictly limited sense of the term 
“knowledge,” and far too stringent a predicate for a single theory of explanation. For 
if  what is  known can only be  based on  direct acquaintance,  then inference about 
anything past could be called into question. In other words, this is not an objection 
unique to  the discipline of human history.  If  the historian cannot  be said to have 
justified an account of a past event without being able to make reference to their own 
direct  experience  of that event, then neither can the geologist justify, for example, an 
account  of  tectonic  upheaval  in  the  distant  past.169 Both  events  belong  to  the 
unreachable past, all of the relevant “experience” of which has already taken place  
and passed away. Yet geological inference is not considered problematic in this same 
fashion. And, to add insult to injury, geology is hardly conducive to an empathic 
approach. How then is geology to proceed, let alone history? 
For the historical example – presumably involving human thoughts and intentions – 
this would appear to be exactly the kind of problem that re-enactment can solve, 
because it  claims to reassemble the past  in  the mind of  the historian here in the  
present.  This  theoretically  places  historical  knowledge within the  realm of  actual 
experience, thus giving it empirical validity. Yet, as we have already seen Gardiner 
argue, such an account cannot be meaningfully correlated with mind-independent 
evidence. Therefore, the problem is only  apparently solved by the use of empathy. 
Moreover,  even if  empathy  could solve  the  problem of  historical  inference  in  the 
study of human history, it is not a method open to those sciences which study the 
distant  past.  And  yet  there  are  scientific  claims  about  the  past  which  we  feel  
comfortable calling “knowledge.” How are they justified? Gardiner's ultimate point, 
however, is not merely that knowledge about the past can be established adequately 
167 Ibid., p.34.
168 Ibid., p.35. 
169 Ibid., pp.39-40.
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in other fields where there is no possibility of re-enactment, but that without any way 
to connect re-enacted historical accounts with evidence, historians must ultimately 
appeal to mind-independent evidence in a similar manner to those other fields.170 
Which,  in  turn,  renders  re-enactment  utterly  superfuous.  For  instance,  Gardiner 
offers  a  thought  experiment  whereby  he  attempts  to  convince  a  hypothetical 
interrogator of the reality of a trip to “the pillar-box this morning to post a letter.”:
I may say that I have a distinct memory of having done so; I may point to the fact 
that the letter is no longer in my room; I may even produce a witness who affirms 
that he saw me drop the letter into the pillar-box. By such methods I can produce 
credentials to substantiate my claim to knowledge of a particular portion of my 
biography. And a point will come when my questioner will be forced to admit that 
I have succeeded in establishing my claim. What he will not do is to demand the 
logically impossible, namely, ask me to point to some event in the past with which 
I am acquainted when I say that I know that I posted the letter this morning. Thus, 
to say that we know that such-and-such an event occurred in the past is, in a way, 
to stake a claim, the claim that, if asked to produce conclusive reasons to justify 
our statement, we shall be able to do so.171
In this way, Gardiner argues that idealist empathy does not offer a solution to the 
problem  of  the  unreachable  nature  of  the  past.  Reasoning  about  the  past  is,  in 
practice, instead conducted by appeals to evidence. The real work of the philosophy 
of  history  then,  is  to  conceptualise  how to  move from causes  in  the  past  to  the 
evidence available in the present. To this, we might only add that the acknowledged 
historical  sciences  –  including  evolutionary  biology,  paleontology  and  geology  – 
pursue justification for their claims in exactly the same way, and that demonstrating 
this will be the work of Part Two. Therefore, an appeal to the unreachable nature of 
the  past  alone is  not  sufficient  to  decisively  separate  history  and  science.  The 
difference  only  appears stark  when  the  given  examples  are  stark  –  such  as  the 
thoughts and intentions of an historical actor contrasted with problems of physical 
bodies in motion. Thus, for Gardiner, it is an appeal to “bogus mysticism” about the 
past  that  is  being  tacitly  invoked  to  justify  the  separation,  rather  than  being  a 
necessary consequence of it.172
Gardiner  summarises the second position – that  historical  events  are unique and 
unclassifiable – as follows:
History is  about  what  happened on  particular  occasions.  It  is  not  about  what 
170 Ibid., p.50.
171 Ibid., p.37.
172 Ibid., p.40.
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usually happens or what always happens under certain circumstances; for this we 
go to science... The historian concentrates upon the event in its unique individuality, 
regarding it,  not  as  an instance  of  a  type,  not  as  a  member of  a  class,  but  as 
something which is to be viewed for and in itself.173
This, he continues, is “broadly correct,” yet had been used to yield conclusions that 
were  “less  defensible.”174 First,  Gardiner  points  out  that  such  particularism  –  if 
applied naïvely – would preclude  any generalisation regarding the past. Yet this is 
clearly not the case in historical practice, as historians routinely talk of quite general 
concepts such as nations and revolutions. Clearly then, we cannot simply issue a 
blanket ban on generalisation and still hope to have much of history left intact. This  
point  will  become important  in  our  later  discussion  of  Walsh.  The  more  serious 
problem,  Gardiner  argues,  is  that  such  a  particularism  tacitly  supposes  that 
“uniqueness” is a quality certain events/objects possess  but which the methods and 
concepts of science cannot apprehend. It is supposed, however, that idealist historians do 
have access to a method by which that uniqueness can be captured and expressed. 
And so we are returned to the world of empathy and intuition. By way of example, 
Gardiner argued the following of Croce:
Croce... in emphasising the unique element in historical judgement, seems to mean 
more  than just  this  when  he  speaks  of  history  as  'the  narration  of  individual 
reality' and contrasts it with the natural sciences. And it is made clearer, I think, 
what  this  'more'  is,  when  we  find  him  saying  that  history  is  concerned  with 
'representations'  which  are  'individual,'  and,  again,  that  the  intuitive  faculty 
essential to historical research is bound up with... 'living again' past events.175
In other words, the term 'unique' is being reserved specifically for that which can be 
intuited. Thus, the supposedly special epistemological status of history is not being 
forced upon it by the special requirements of its unique subject matter, but the other 
way  around.176 It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  Gardiner  is  not  entirely 
unconvinced  by  the  uniqueness  argument  in  general,  but  only  by  the  specific 
assertion that uniqueness is the criterion which eliminates the possibility of science 
from history and thus (by default) establishes the idealist view of history:
...  the  point  at  issue  is  whether  our  recognizing  that  the  historian's  job  is  to  
describe and explain what happened upon specified occasions also involves our 
believing  that  historical  events  possess  some  absolute  uniqueness  which 
necessitates their being known and explained in an especial way.177
173 Ibid. (emphasis in original)
174 Ibid., p.41.
175 Ibid., p.42.
176 Ibid., pp.43-44.
177 Ibid., p.42.
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Of  the  third  point  –  that  history  is  fundamentally  concerned  with  the  “actions, 
statements, and thoughts of human beings, not the 'dead matter' with which science 
is concerned – Gardiner invokes Collingwood's familiar “inside-outside” division.178 
And, once again, Gardiner argues that this distinction is set up by Collingwood in 
order to validate his idealist ideas of empathy, rather than to show empathy to be a 
necessary  consequence  of  it.  Gardiner  is  not  unsympathetic  to  the  basic  idea  of 
Collingwood's division, however, stating that, “we must agree that the distinction 
formulated in the above terms between history and science holds good in so far as 
we do not explain the movement of a 'piece of matter' by referring to its intention, 
whereas we may explain a human action by making such a reference.”179 Yet, he is 
not  convinced  that  this  argument  necessitates  the  further  step  of  adopting  the 
empathic model of historical explanation:
... the introduction of a spatial metaphor gives the impression that what are called 
the 'insides' of events are queer objects, invisible engines that make the wheels go 
round. And it is only too easy to move from this to the supposition that, in order to 
'know'  the  insides  of  historical  events  (where  'knowing'  is  knowing  by 
acquaintance) some peculiar technique for looking at these is required...180
With respect  to  these  three  classical  arguments  for  historical  autonomy,  Gardiner 
argued  that  none  of  them  successfully  demonstrated  the  necessity  of  the 
idealist/intuitionist  viewpoint,  and  thus  were  not  reliable  evidence  for that 
viewpoint. This is not to say they do not have their merits. Indeed, as we have seen, 
Gardiner was somewhat sympathetic to all three of these arguments for autonomy, 
but believed they needed to be justified  independently of their idealist contexts. His 
intent was to show that the boundaries of history and science as they had previously 
been  drawn  tacitly  invoked  empathy,  and  were  (to  that  extent)  illegitimate.  Yet, 
throughout  The  Nature  of  Historical  Explanation,  Gardiner  was  also  careful  to 
repeatedly  point  out  that  he  considered  some division  of  history  and  science 
legitimate.  Which  raises  the  question:  given  Gardiner's  potent  criticisms  of  the 
divisions established by the idealists, on what basis could this be done? The answer, 
for Gardiner, lay in the nature of science itself. 
This commitment to separating history and science must be borne in mind, as we 
turn to the last of Gardiner's pillars of the idealist argument for historical autonomy – 
178 R. G. Collingwood,  The Idea of History.  Revised Edition. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994. 
p.213.
179 Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation. p.47.
180 Ibid., pp.47-48.
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the contention that  historical  events  have an irreducible  richness  and complexity.  
Gardiner's approach to this issue differs from that of the previous three arguments, 
however, for it is here that he makes explicit his own arguments for the placement of 
a boundary between history and science. History, he concedes, does often present  
philosophers with “huge chunks of fact  that obstinately refuse to fit into the tidy 
compartments  of  a  scientific  system.”  In  fact,  he  continues,  the  potential  subject 
matter from which history might be fashioned “spills over,  and swamps us in its 
variety and its richness; confuses us with its queer habit of being highly general and 
minutely  particular  at  one  and  the  same  time.”181 Gardiner's  issue  with  this 
argument, therefore, is not strictly empirical or definitional – as was the case with the 
previous three. Instead, Gardiner rejects this argument because it suggests that there 
is “something 'wrong' with history” for having this quality.182 That is to say, Gardiner 
objects  to  the assertion that the inability  to  generalise  about history in a manner 
recognisably scientific represents a problem in need of correction. Instead, he argues, 
the problem is one of purpose:
If 'wrong' is persuasively defined to mean 'lacking the structure of a developed 
science' then we must agree that there is something wrong with it. But why should 
history possess such a structure? We have seen already that the historian is not 
interested in  formulating  general  hypotheses  or  in  making  predictions;  he  is 
interested  principally  in  finding  out  what  happened  and  in  describing  what 
happened in all its detail...183
In other words, Gardiner is defending history from the charge that it is a second-class 
epistemological citizen, by instead claiming that history has different intentions which 
it makes sense to realise by different  means. This represents a softening of the rigid 
idealist separation between disciplines, but not its dissolution. Which is fine, except 
that Gardiner's defence has the unfortunate consequence of implying that “finding 
out what happened” and “describing what happened in all its detail” are purposes 
that  scientists  cannot  have.  Thus,  by  expanding  the  freedom  of  movement  for 
historians, Gardiner has inadvertently contracted it  for scientists (if one insists on 
considering  them fundamentally  separate  fields).  Moreover,  it  seems  abundantly 
clear that the “tidy compartments” of scientific systematisation Gardiner has in mind 
are  strictly  nomothetic.  For  example,  in  the  opening  pages  of  the  The  Nature  of  
Historical Explanation, he clearly states:
181 Ibid., p.51.
182 Ibid., p.52.
183 Ibid., p.54. (emphasis in original)
94
The  progress  of  science  has  been  a  constant  movement  in  the  direction  of 
subsuming known laws under laws of higher generality and of a consequently 
wider application. Thus explanation, both in science and common life, implies the 
formulation of laws or generalizations.184
A statement such as this would appear to make very clear the meaning of Gardiner's 
somewhat more modestly worded subsequent assertions. For instance, he later states  
that the “crux of the distinction between the historian and the scientist” is that “the 
scientist frames hypotheses of precision and wide generality by a continual refining 
away of irrelevant factors.” But this is merely the nomothetic model in somewhat 
softer words. The historian's aim, on the other hand, is “to talk about what happened 
on  particular  occasions  in  all  its  variety,  all  its  richness.”185 Similarly  vague 
invocations  of  a  supposedly  self-evident  difference  between  “general”  and 
“particular” would subsequently come to be a feature of almost all twentieth century 
philosophy  of  history  which  had  among  its  aims  the  preservation  of  historical 
autonomy. The vacuity of this dichotomy thus became the verbal swamp in which a 
lack  of  rigour  could  hide  (which  was  arguably  precisely  the  service  terms  like 
“intuition” and “empathy” had provided for idealists like Croce and Collingwood). 
But this difference in approach is only apparent, for if we engage in close readings of 
philosophers who invoked this kind of separation, we can find reliable evidence of 
nomothetic commitments underlying their vague uses of the term “general.” Indeed, 
this  is  precisely  what  is  meant  by  the  term  “vestigial”  nomothetic  assumption. 
Ultimately then, “general” would come to stand in for “nomothetic.” This was done 
in order to preserve a world philosophers of history understood – one in which they 
had as little to do with the sciences as possible. We will encounter this development 
at greater length in Chapter Three.
Therefore, while Gardiner was an extremely important figure in engineering a break 
with idealism and in outlining the desiderata of a post-idealist model of historical 
explanation, his insight could only carry him so far. The primary achievement of The 
Nature of Historical Explanation was to recast historical autonomy as a consequence of 
explanatory  purpose rather  than  as  a  necessary  consequence  of  history's  subject 
matter.  This  in  itself  was  no  mean  feat!  Gardiner  had  essentially  succeeded  in 
unifying the worlds of history and science – making clear that it was only the way in 
which they were discussed that  separated them, and not  some metaphysical  and 
184 Ibid., pp.4-5.
185 Ibid., p.60.
95
epistemic  chasm.  Gardiner's  emphasis  on  a  purely  nomothetic  model  of  science, 
however, still sanctioned a de facto separation:
To  conclude,  we  may,  if  we  choose,  say  that  the  subject-matter  of  history  is 
different from that of science. But we must be careful. We must not take this to 
mean that the historian is dealing with queer entities, lying about the world or 
salvaged from the deep-sea forests of the past. The world is one: the ways we use 
to talk about it, various. And the fact that in some cases we decide to describe it in 
one way rather than another is contingent upon our purposes.186
And  so,  we  can  see  in  Gardiner  a  clear  example  of  exactly  how  the  entire 
argumentative  structure  of  the  philosophy  of  history  was  shifting  in  the  mid-
twentieth century in response to covering law theory. And yet we can  also  see in 
Gardiner a clear example of how the nomothetic assumption survived this shift and 
continued to exercise a profound impact on how history's relationship to the outside 
world  of  knowledge  was  conceptualised.  Where  Gardiner  might  have  helped  to 
make history more epistemologically respectable by at least bringing the content of 
history and the content of science into the same world (an improvement over the 
largely 'non-overlapping magisteria'187 of Collingwood and Croce, at least), he had 
also reaffirmed the autonomy of history on the basis of its incompatibility with the 
nomothetic  assumption.  This  is  the  reason  we  have  examined  Gardiner  at  such 
length  here.  His  work  represents  a  paradigm  case  of  how  the  grammar,  but  not 
necessarily the  conclusions, of the philosophy of history were changing in the mid-
twentieth century. All of the subsequent philosophy of history with which we shall  
subsequently deal, regardless of the conclusions reached, has prosecuted the debate 
on those terms Gardiner had laid out. These terms were: the primacy of empirical  
means of  confirmation (rather  than confirmation by imaginative  means),  and the 
banishment of any claim that historical knowledge was rooted in some wholly other 
realm of mind and thought. In short, the old idealist arguments had been decisively 
marginalised  and  the  way  for  narrativism  paved,  yet  some  form  of  separation 
between history and science was still effectively received wisdom.
Making History Look Nomothetic
Before closing the book on Gardiner, however, it will prove instructive to examine his 
own attempt at a model of historical explanation. For when one considers Gardiner's 
186 Ibid., p.61.
187 This is a phrase borrowed from Stephen Jay Gould. See: Stephen Jay Gould, 'Nonoverlapping 
Magisteria,' Natural History. 106 (March 1997). pp.16-22.
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positive contribution to the problem of historical explanation (which he himself had 
helped to  frame through his  dissolution of  idealist  empathy),  the  nomothetically 
inspired character of his separation between history and science becomes even more 
apparent. For, as we have already seen, Gardiner accepted the legitimacy of the most 
basic thesis of the covering lawyers – that general laws must lie at the root of all 
claims  that  might  meaningfully  be  called  “knowledge.”  This,  coupled  with  his 
assertions that the old idealist arguments that sought to keep science out of history 
were inexcusably weak, meant that he was required to explain (or explain away) the 
seeming inability of history to work profitably with the language of laws. Moreover,  
whatever replacement for  empathy he might devise should ideally retain at  least 
something of  the  nomothetic  form.  Gardiner  sought  to  harmonise  these  goals  by 
arguing  that  while  historical  method  “as  a  whole  is  intelligible  on  the  above 
[covering  law/regularity]  interpretation,”  it  was  necessary  that  “important 
differentiating  characteristics”  of  historical  explanation  be  kept  in  mind.188 The 
primary differentiating characteristic Gardiner had in mind, however, was history's 
frequent concern with assessing the motivations and intentions of historical actors – 
precisely the problem empathy had purported to be a solution to. Gardiner's solution 
was to postulate a second mode of explanation which would exist alongside covering 
law orthodoxy, but still  reproduce its basic form. This mode was to be concerned 
exclusively with this problem of “mental causation,” thus replacing implicit appeals 
to empathy with a recognisably nomothetic structure. Gardiner argued for this as 
follows:
Historians do not... confine themselves to giving explanations of human actions 
which  refer  to  various  types  of  what  might  be  called  'physical'  or  'publicly 
observable'  events,  such  as,  for  example,  the  actions  of  other  human  beings, 
earthquakes, cold winters, the publication of proclamations, and so forth. When 
they  do  give  explanations  of  this  kind  we  have  argued  that  their  procedure 
presupposes the assumption of causal laws... But in history, as well as in ordinary 
life,  explanations  are  also  given  that  seem  to  be  different:  we  come  across 
statements of the form 'x did  y in order to achieve  z',  'x intended to achieve  z, 
therefore he did y', 'x did y because he desired z'... Historians, in fact, in many of 
their  explanations of  human conduct  make reference to  the intentions,  desires, 
thoughts, plans, and policies of the people in whom they are interested.189
The mechanism Gardiner offered in an attempt to solve this problem of “intentions, 
desires, thoughts, plans, and policies” was designed to harmonise all of his beliefs 
regarding historical explanation. To do this, he sought to exploit the seemingly very 
188 Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation. p.65.
189 Ibid., p.114. (emphasis in original)
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different ways in which scientists and historians used the term “cause.” For rather 
than maintaining that “words like 'intentions' or 'aims' function as names of causal 
processes or events,” in the same sense as the covering lawyer might speak of a stone 
causing a window to shatter and then seeking to explain that process with reference 
to general laws of motion, Gardiner argued instead for an interpretation of mental 
causation which used the term “cause” in a very different sense. “I want to suggest,” 
he writes, “that to say that man's actions are guided by such-and-such an intention is 
to make a statement of varying degrees of complexity about him (not about him plus 
the intentions or aims which infuence, affect, or 'act upon' him).” This has the effect 
of making the character of the agent in question do the explanatory work in cases of 
mental causation that laws are required to do in cases of natural causation. It sets the 
actions  of  an  agent  within  “a  pattern,  the  pattern  of  his  normal  behaviour.”190 
Superficially, this makes a good deal of sense. It neatly preserves the idealist notion 
of history as a realm comprised of human thought and action by sidestepping the 
primary consequence of the universality of covering law theory: the requirement to 
explain the actions of a human being in terms of general laws somehow external to 
them. 
In Gardiner's model, instead of explaining human behaviour with reference to the 
laws of physics (or specially formulated laws of history), we explain it by reference to 
other examples of human behaviour. The actions of, for example, Sir Walter Raleigh in 
supposedly throwing his coat over a puddle so that Queen Elizabeth might cross 
without getting her feet wet might be explained with reference to examples of his 
other actions – perhaps his sense of patriotism, or his attitude towards women, or 
both. This would allow us to get a sense of his character. Raleigh acted the way he  
did, we might claim, because he was that sort of person. Such explanations have two 
important  advantages  for  Gardiner.  First,  they can  be  settled  with  mind-external 
evidence rather than requiring recourse to empathy. That is, we can point to evidence 
of Raleigh's other  actions/behaviour throughout his  life,  and reason that the best 
explanation for these groups of evidence is the possession of a certain disposition. 
And second, they allow for a much closer agreement between covering law theory 
and historical practice. For historians are clearly far more likely to want to talk of an 
historical actor in dispositional terms than in terms of psychological generalities or 
neuron firings.191 Gardiner was therefore of the opinion that his dispositional mode of 
190 Ibid., pp.123-125. (emphasis in original)
191 For more on this point, see: William Dray,  Laws and Explanations in History.  Oxford University 
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explanation could bring something of the structure of laws to human history, as the 
singular  actions  and  decisions  of  individuals  were  still  being  explained  (that  is, 
deduced) from more general statements regarding that individual's overall  life and 
behaviour. This was, in other words, the nomothetic-deductive method at the scale of 
the  individual,  carefully  slotted  into  the  space  empathy  had  left  behind  and 
disturbing  the  existing  theory,  practice  and  –  most  importantly  –  boundaries  of 
history as little as possible. 
However, while dispositional explanations seen in this way might seem to have a 
certain “law-like” quality, claiming as they do to explain actions based on patterns of  
“normal  behaviour,”  there  can  be  no  evading  the  fact  that  they  represent  a 
modification to a theory which claimed that no modifications from it were possible. 
Gardiner  might  argue  for  mental  causation  as  a  necessary  exception  to  that 
universality, but this, as William Dray has countered, “invites the question: 'If one, 
why not many such logical differences, provided that recognition of them is forced 
upon  us  by  a  consideration  of  the  way  historians'  explanations  go?'”192 In  other 
words,  the  covering law approach was  predicated on the  universality  of  a  single, 
nomothetic, form for all knowledge and explanation. Modifications of it, therefore, 
could only constitute evidence for its overall weakness. In addition to this, the use of 
personal disposition as a substitute for general laws of nature is not only theoretically 
dubious, but empirically unconvincing. For the kinds of historical problems it can 
solve are comparatively few when compared to those that remain. While it makes 
sense when applied to the personal actions of historical actors, it offers no help to the 
historian pursuing problems and explanations that  can only be made sense of  at  
higher levels. For example, there are no known laws which can be used to explain the 
behaviour  of  corporations,  or  social/economic  classes  of  people,  or  nations  as  a 
whole. Yet Gardiner's dispositional analysis does not offer an alternative means to 
talk about such entities. Certainly, one might speak of the “desires” of the working 
classes, or the “intentions” of the Dutch East India Company, but it is far from self-
evident that these kinds of dispositions actually exist in any sense other than a kind 
of crude shorthand. If such entities could be said to have dispositions at all,  they 
would  likely  have  to  be  defined (if  one  insisted  on  dispositional  traits  as  being 
fundamental to historical knowledge) as some kind of aggregate of the individuals 
which make up that entity.
Press: London, 1957. pp.18-19.
192 Ibid., p.16.
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Which, to be fair, did seem to be Gardiner's intent. His work is replete with examples 
of  political  history  centred  around  the  actions  of  individuals,  often  using  classic 
examples such as Napoleon,193 Cardinal Richelieu,194 and Julius Caesar195 to illustrate 
key points. And, when confined to such circumscribed examples, it must be said that 
his dispositional explanation makes some sense. But there is little explanatory help in 
The Nature of Historical Explanation for the social historian, or the economic historian, 
or indeed any branch of historical enquiry sufficiently distant from both covering 
laws  and  the  motives  of  historical  individuals.  Gardiner  readily  concedes  the 
difficulty  of  high  level  history,  stating  that  “historical  explanation  is  often  an 
extremely complicated affair.”196 But he offers no solution other than to restate his 
conviction that regularities must underlie any model of explanation:
There is thus a 'slide' from explanation as it occurs in science to explanation as it 
occurs in history. We can, if we wish, say that the difference is only one of degree, 
but we must be careful. We can say this if what we mean to emphasize is the fact 
that historical explanation presupposes regularity, that it involves a knowledge of 
how things and people in general behave which can be, and at times is,  made 
more explicit...197
Which  leads  us  to  the  most  basic  problem  with  Gardiner's  analysis  of  mental 
causation – its attempt to bend the nomothetic form of covering law theory to fit 
historical  practice.  While  it  would  be  implausible  to  claim  that  Gardiner  was  a  
covering  law  theorist  on  the  level  of  Popper  and  Hempel  themselves,  it  seems  
reasonable to conclude that his arguments were predicated on the assumption that 
the basic form and claim to universal applicability of the covering law model were 
legitimate. As Dray has observed, his “modifications of the model, like those allowed 
by Popper and Hempel,  are all designed to show that,  even in the most unlikely 
cases, the real force or point of the explanations which historians offer is  only to be 
brought out by emphasizing their resemblance to the covering law ideal.”198 In other 
words, it wasn't enough for Gardiner to point out that meaningful analysis of human 
actions  could,  in  appropriate  circumstances,  be  conducted  with  reference  to  the 
disposition of those involved. His own nomothetic assumptions required him to make 
the  form of  such an  analysis  appear  “law-like,”  because  it  was  only through the 
193 Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation. pp.121-122.
194 Ibid., pp.122-123.
195 Ibid., p.135.
196 Ibid., p.98.
197 Ibid., p.99.
198 Dray, Laws and Explanations in History. pp.17-18. (emphasis added)
100
engineering of such a similarity that they could be made legitimate as explanations.  
Gardiner  himself  makes  this  abundantly  clear,  writing  at  one  point  that  the 
statements  which  make  up  historical  explanations  must “be  seen  to  satisfy  the 
antecedent of a general hypothetical,” for if they do not do this, “the force of the  
'because'”  cannot  then be  accounted for,  and nothing is  explained.199 Yet,  he  also 
claims that:
A postulated historical explanation is not, as a rule, justified (or challenged) by 
demonstrating that a given law implied by it does (or does not) hold; far less by 
showing  such  a  law  to  follow (or  not  to  follow)  from  an  accepted  theory  or 
hypothesis, or to be confirmed (or falsified) by experiment; nor, again, by pointing 
out that the case under consideration does (or does not) satisfy in the required 
respects the conditions exactly specified in the formulation of the law.200
So how then are historical claims justified? Gardiner asserts on the one hand that 
they must be backed by general truths, and with the other hand rules out all major 
known ways of doing this. And in their place stands only the comparatively fimsy 
edifice  of  mental  causation  by  disposition.  Certainly  disposition  is  a  reasonable 
enough  explanatory  mechanism,  but  one  should  ask:  does  an  analysis  of  the 
disposition  of  an historical  actor  really carry  an  epistemic  force analogous to,  for 
example, the ability of Newton's second law of motion to justify a claim about the 
path  of  a  projectile?  This  seems  to  be  more  than merely  a  difference  of  degree.  
Consider the case of the exception, for example. In Gardiner's model how can the 
“out of character” action be explained? We might explain it by the intrusion of an 
external event/object – perhaps the effect of madness or disease – but this fits neither 
the pure covering law theory nor its softened dispositional form. Diseases might be 
well understood biologically and able to be connected to laws, but it is unlikely that 
our understanding of those laws will be good enough to account for its transmission 
to  that person at  that time.  Similarly,  how can  we account  for  motives  that  were 
apparently sublimated in a particular group or a particular era? As W. H. Walsh has 
argued (although not in specific reply to Gardiner), intention is a slippery concept 
indeed:
Thus  the  idea  of  Great  Britain's  having  an  imperial  mission,  though explicitly 
advocated by only a small minority of persons in the country at the time, came 
towards the end of the Victorian era to exercise a most important infuence on the 
conduct of British foreign policy, and no account of that policy could afford to 
leave it unmentioned. There was, in fact, a recognisable imperialist phase in British 
199 Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation. pp.97-98.
200 Ibid., p.96.
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political  history,  even  though  the  policy  of  imperialism  was  not  consciously 
accepted or deliberately pursued by the majority of those in power at the time.201
If such statements are reasonable to make in Gardiner's model, then they must, in 
some way, be the “antecedent of a general hypothetical.” Yet neither covering law 
theory nor Gardiner's dispositional modification of it can adequately cover this kind 
of  example.  If  one  is  committed  to  justifying  knowledge  only in  recognisably 
nomothetic  ways,  how  are  statements  like  Walsh's  to  be  justified?  Are  we  now 
obliged  to  postulate  another “logical  difference”  between  classes  of  covering  law 
explanations in order to account for this new class of explanations? At this point, the 
difficulty  of  maintaining  even  a  superficial  resemblance  to  covering  laws  for  all 
possible  historical  knowledge claims  becomes  plainly  apparent.202 And while  this 
discussion could easily be continued at far greater length, for the purposes of this 
thesis it will suffice to note that  all  of these epistemic contortions become trivial if  one  
merely  relinquishes  covering  law  theory  as  the  definitive  model  of  all  explanation .  As 
William Dray noted of Gardiner in this respect:
The Humean assumption that nothing but 'regularity' can justify a 'because' is thus 
made from the beginning, and it is too strong to be shaken by information about 
the way historical arguments actually go. Gardiner does introduce the notion of 
'judgement';  but  he  cannot  bring  himself  entirely  to  abandon  the  view  that 
judgement  of  a  particular  case  is  disreputable  without  the  logical  support of 
covering empirical laws... If the historian does not use a precise 'rule', then a vague 
one must be found; if no universal law is available, then a qualified one must have 
been assumed. The alternative which is too much to accept is that, in any ordinary 
sense of the word, the historian may use no law at all.203
In other words, if this was the best defence of the relevance of covering laws for 
history that could be mounted, then it is perhaps unsurprising that the idea that “the 
historian may use  no law at  all,”  went  on  to  become a  major  theme in  the  post-
Hempelian  philosophy  of  history.  For  it  was  clear  that  even  Gardiner's  spirited 
attempt to modify covering law theory to take account of historical practice was still  
far  too  restrictive  to  be  a  workable  method  of  historical  explanation.  And  yet,  
Gardiner had been instrumental in thoroughly dissecting and dismantling the old 
idealist intuitionist arguments that had been deployed against nomothetic positivism 
since the nineteenth century. Those ideas too, could no longer stand. In cognisance of 
this, attempts at providing models of historical explanation began to surface which 
201 W. H. Walsh,  An Introduction to the Philosophy of History.  Revised 3rd Edition. Hutchinson & Co.: 
London, 1967. p.61.
202 Ibid., pp.59-60.
203 Dray, Laws and Explanations in History. p.57. (emphasis in original)
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attempted  to  find  a  way  between  these  extremes.  The  explanatory  device  these 
attempts  would  ultimately  converge  upon was  that  of  narrative.  Using  this  idea, 
philosophers  of  history  sought  to  offer  modes  of  historical  explanation  which 
avoided  the  pitfalls  of  naïve  empathic  idealism  and  focused  instead  on  purely 
empirical  means  for  justifying  historical  explanations,  yet  also  eschewed  any 
connection  with  the  sciences  because  of  the  explicit  commitment  to  laws  such  a 
connection was assumed to require. There were, they asserted, at least two modes of 
explanation – the nomothetic and the narrative. But only one of them was scientific. 
And, unfortunately, it was the other which was appropriate for history. Thus, in the 
process of developing narrative as an epistemological device, the baby was thrown 
out with the bathwater. For, in accepting what now seemed obvious – that covering 
law theory was functionally inadequate for justifying historical explanations – these 
narrativists came (via the nomothetic assumption) to the conclusion that history was 
not, and could never be, scientific in any meaningful sense. 
W. H. Walsh and the Idea of Colligation
One of the first post-Hempelian philosophers of history to offer a model of historical  
explanation which was consciously formulated as a model unique to history (and 
thus quite apart from scientific explanation) was W. H. Walsh. Walsh's model – which 
he called “colligation under appropriate conceptions” – first surfaced in print in a 
1942 paper entitled 'Intelligibility in History.'204 In developing this model, Walsh had 
borrowed  the  term  “colligation”  from  the  nineteenth  century  logician  and 
philosopher  of  science,  William Whewell,  who had  described  the  concept  in  the 
second volume of his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded Upon Their History,  
first published in 1840.205 But where Whewell had defined colligation as the “mental 
operation”  by  which  a  number  of  empirical  “facts”  were  brought  together  by 
“superinducing” upon them an overarching concept which unites them and allows 
them to be captured by a general law,206 Walsh deployed the idea in a manner he saw 
as  specifically  applicable  to  history.  In  Walsh's  view,  historical colligation  was 
completely independent of the nomothetic sense of the term emphasised by Whewell 
and was thus (in a leap of reason consistent with the nomothetic assumption) also 
completely independent of the sciences. 
204 W. H. Walsh, 'Intelligibility in History,' Philosophy. Vol. 17, No. 66 (April 1942). pp.128-143.
205 William Whewell, Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded Upon Their History – Volume Two. 2nd 
Edition. John W. Parker: London, 1847.
206 Ibid., pp.46-48.
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Talking about  Walsh's  idea of colligation is  made difficult  by the  fact  that  Walsh 
revisited the idea several times over the course of his career. From its first inchoate 
appearance in 1942, to what is perhaps its most detailed and thoughtful exposition in 
the 1967 paper 'Colligatory Concepts in History,'207 the concept underwent significant 
development – usually through the refinement of boundary conditions. Because of 
this, it is generally best to consider the 1967 paper as the definitive exposition. As an 
introduction to the general idea, however, the description offered in his 1951 book, 
An Introduction to the Philosophy of History, offers a concise summation.208 Generally, 
Walsh argues, when historians are asked to explain an event or period – the example 
he uses is the British general strike of 1926 – they will:
... begin by tracing connections between that event and others with which it stands 
in inner relationship (in the case in question, certain previous events in the history 
of industrial relations in Great Britain). The underlying assumption here is that 
different historical events can be regarded as going together to constitute a single 
process, a whole of which they are all parts and in which they belong together in a 
specially intimate way.  And the first aim of the historian, when he is asked to 
explain some event or other, is to see it as part of such a process, to locate it in its  
context by mentioning other events with which it is bound up.209
Such a process can be used in explaining historical periods as well as events. For 
Walsh, such descriptors as “the rise of the gentry,” “the Romantic movement,” “the 
age  of  reform,”  “the  evolution  of  Parliament,”  “the  Enlightenment,”  and  “the 
Industrial Revolution” were all examples of colligatory concepts.210 Each of these terms, 
in other words, acts as a master concept chosen for its ability to unify – and thus 
more  easily  manipulate  –  large  collections  of  historical  events  that  have  some 
relevant thematic relationship. So, where Whewell might have been seeking a general  
law that could gather  together a variety of  natural  phenomena under a common 
cause, Walsh was instead seeking for just this kind of general, but singular, concept. 
The first thing to note about such an approach is its increased emphasis on context  
rather than reduction. While colligation is not a purely contextualist theory of history, 
Walsh  does  seek  to  explain  smaller  events  by  gathering  them up  within  greater 
207 W. H. Walsh, 'Colligatory Concepts in History,' in Patrick Gardiner (ed), The Philosophy of History.  
Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1974. pp.127-144.
208 W. H. Walsh,  An Introduction to the Philosophy of History.  Revised 3rd Edition. Hutchinson & Co.: 
London, 1967.
209 Ibid., pp.24-25.
210 This  compilation  of  Walsh's  examples  taken  from:  William  H.  Dray,  'Colligation  Under 
Appropriate Conceptions,'  in William H. Dray,  On History and Philosophers of History.  E. J. Brill: 
Leiden, The Netherlands, 1989. p.38.
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events  and/or  periods,  thus  building  up  larger  historical  entities  which  could 
constitute  an  (at  least  partial)  explanation  of  their  component  events.  And these 
entities/concepts are necessarily defined as much by what they  are not as by what 
they  are.  Concepts  like  “the  Industrial  Revolution,”  for  instance,  can  mean  little 
without being understood as a revolution against something. In this way the legacy of 
medieval feudalism, for example, might become part of an explanation for the rise of 
Victorian  capitalism.  This  is  in  stark  contrast  to  the  reductionist  tendencies  of 
covering  lawyers  such  as  Hempel  and  Gardiner,  who  sought  to  show  historical 
events  as  the  expression  of  general  laws  –  a  narrow  approach  which  made  the 
explanation  of  anything  other  than  the  most  circumscribed  of  historical 
events/objects  infeasible.  The  key  difference  that  enabled  Walsh  to  claim  this 
approach  for  history  was  also  the  single  major  point  of  difference  between  his 
colligation and Gardiner's covering law theory – it simply was not part of Walsh's 
project,  as  it  was  Gardiner's,  to  bring  out  the  supposed  common  form  of  all 
knowledge. Walsh had no philosophical axe to grind, and was perfectly happy to 
describe an explanatory method for history alone. Indeed, for Walsh, colligation was a 
methodological  process  rather  than  any  fundamental  property  of  knowledge, 
historical  or  otherwise.  Where Gardiner's  attempt to define historical  explanation 
was normative and reductive,  Walsh's was descriptive and contextual  – trying to 
tackle what historians  actually  do, rather than what they  should do. The colligatory 
process, he argued, “is one which historians do use,” and therefore “any account of 
historical explanation should find a place for it.”211
Interestingly,  this  difference  of  approach  can  be  seen  more  clearly  when  one 
considers the similarities between Walsh's colligation and Gardiner's dispositional 
analysis. Consider the extended example Walsh makes of Hitler's actions in 1936:
If an historian is asked to explain a particular historical event I think he is often 
inclined to begin his explanation by saying that the event in question is to be seen 
as part  of  a  general  movement  which was going on at  the time.  Thus Hitler's  
reoccupation of  the Rhineland in 1936 might  be elucidated by reference to the 
general policy of German self-assertion and expansion which Hitler pursued from 
the time of  his accession to power.  Mention of  this policy,  and specification of 
earlier  and  later  steps  in  carrying it  out,  such as  the  repudiation  of  unilateral 
disarmament, the German withdrawal from the League of Nations, the absorption 
of Austria and the incorporation of the Sudetenland, do in fact serve to render the 
isolated action more intelligible. And they do it by enabling us to locate that action 
211 Walsh,  An Introduction to the Philosophy of History. p.62. Walsh also argues that: “we cannot help 
being struck” by historians' use of a method of enquiry which “fits the idealist better than the  
positivist theory.” See: Walsh, An Introduction to the Philosophy of History. p.59.
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in its context...212
Note that the events ostensibly being explained in this example are seen as fowing 
from  Hitler's  “general  policy  of  German  self-assertion  and  expansion.”  The 
“reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936” is being explained,  at least in part,  with 
reference to the conscious intentions of an historical actor, whose motives we might 
hope to come to some understanding of. Indeed, Walsh went even further than this, 
arguing – as Gardiner might – that mental causation was the most important factor 
within his model of historical explanation because “actions are, broadly speaking, the 
realisation of purposes, and because a single purpose or policy can find expression in 
a whole series of actions, whether carried out by one person or by several, we can say 
in an intelligible sense that some historical events are intrinsically related.”213 This 
then,  despite  the difference of  its  approach,  remains  a  view of history driven by 
conscious human purpose. One would expect, therefore, Walsh's model to be unable 
(much  like  Gardiner's  model)  to  account  for  mental  causation  which  was  not 
explicitly intentional. And indeed, in the above form, it is. But this problem, which 
had effectively ruined Gardiner's  attempt to account for historical  explanation by 
making a small concession within the form of covering law theory, presents Walsh 
with consequences far less dire. Where Gardiner had placed himself in a position 
where a single exception could potentially demolish his entire thesis, Walsh tackles 
the problem descriptively:
Certainly  historians  speak  of  general  movements  which  characterise  particular 
ages:  the  Enlightenment,  the  Romantic  movements,  the  age  of  reform  in 
nineteenth-century England, the rise of monopoly capitalism. But can it be held 
with any plausibility that these movements are in every case deliberate attempts to  
give expression to a coherent policy? Of many of them at least any such claim 
would be palpably untrue. No doubt there are some movements in history – that 
for legal reform in Great Britain in the early years of the last century would be an 
example... but they seem to be the exception rather than the rule in history.214
But this can be “admitted without sacrificing the main point of our theory,” argues 
Walsh, for while “it is absurd to look on history as a series of deliberate movements,” 
it  is  also  absurd  to  “ignore  the  truth  that  men  do  sometimes  pursue  coherent 
policies.” If one were to colligate events relevant to the concept “World War Two,” for 
example,  one  would  certainly  be  required  to  take  account  of  the  conscious  and 
deliberate  plans  of  the  Nazis  to  conquer  Europe.  Therefore,  applications  for  a 
212 Ibid., p.59.
213 Ibid., pp.59-60.
214 Ibid., p.60.
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relatively  straightforward  dispositional  model  do exist.215 It  is  a  good deal  more 
difficult,  on  the  other  hand,  to  argue  for  a  colligation  such  as  “the  Industrial 
Revolution” being the result of deliberate, individual action. Of this criticism, Walsh 
argued:
A historical process, like a man's career, is the product of chance and opposition as 
well  as  of  purpose and intention;  the various  stages  of  which it  consists  have 
accordingly only a relatively loose unity. But this is not to say that it cannot be 
properly treated as a single development. Nor is it to admit that such unity as it  
possesses is like that possessed by, say, a spell of bad weather, the later part of 
which grows mechanically out of the earlier.216
In other words,  the essential logic of the colligatory  process was the same in both 
cases.  Thus the difficulty that plagued Gardiner was robbed of much of its lethal 
force. Rather than claiming that dispositional analysis must be used in a nomothetic 
fashion to justify knowledge claims in human history, Walsh is instead offering us a 
more general way of thinking about the construction of large-scale historical concepts 
from smaller  events/objects.  The  exact  nature of  the  connections  used  in  such  a 
construction  was  of  much  less  interest  to  him  –  they  might  be  conscious, 
unconscious,  or  utterly  mechanical.  Where  Gardiner  had  attempted  to  precisely 
define the form such connections must take – either covering laws derived from the 
nomothetic  sciences  or  the  dispositional  analysis  of  his  own  design  –  Walsh's 
emphasis was instead on the overall process by which the multiple connections and 
infuences  were  brought  to  bear  upon  their  colligatory  target.217 This  is  a  very 
promising line of argument, and we will encounter something recognisably similar, 
developed into a model which can cover all historical science, in Chapter Six. 
Walsh,  like  Gardiner,  was  attempting  to  fashion  a  middle  way  between  the 
nomothetic  and  empathic  models,  having  formulated  his  idea  of  colligation,  as 
William Dray has observed, “in response to an apparent need to choose between 
positivist and idealist theories of historical understanding.”218 In practice, however, 
Walsh was a far greater friend to the idealists than the positivists, stating in his 1967 
refection on the history of colligation that its initial formulation was intended as “an 
attempt  to  find a  plausible  version  of  the  Idealist  theory  of  history.”219 And that 
plausibility, it seems, was to be obtained through a rejection of the view that empathy 
215 Ibid., pp.60-61.
216 Walsh, 'Colligatory Concepts in History,' p.135.
217 Ibid., p.128.
218 Dray, 'Colligation Under Appropriate Conceptions,' p.38.
219 Walsh, 'Colligatory Concepts in History,' p.134.
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was  the  proper  basis  for  historical  knowledge.  To  state  that  historians  “must 
penetrate behind the phenomena they study is one thing,” Walsh writes, but “to hold 
that such penetration is achieved by an intuitive act is something very different.” 220 
On this much at least, Walsh and Gardiner were in agreement. Walsh's colligation is 
therefore best  understood as  an attempt to  replace that  ailing  epistemology with 
something  more  empirically  defensible  while  still  preserving  existing  historical 
practice  and historical  autonomy. But where Gardiner was struggling to preserve 
historical  autonomy  while  simultaneously  uniting  historical  and  scientific 
explanation, Walsh ceded the latter goal entirely. Historical explanation could not be 
adequately captured with a nomothetic system, Walsh argued, no matter how much it 
might be modified. Therefore, the system Walsh chose to offer in place of empathy 
not only claimed no ties with the sciences, but desired none.
Colligation and the Beginnings of Narrative
While colligation is an interesting conceptual device for collecting historical events 
together  under a  common descriptor,  it  seems quite  clear  that  this  process  alone 
cannot constitute the entirety of historical explanation. For example, we might claim 
that (speaking in terms of  colligation) “World War Two” is a term which collects 
together  and  expresses  the  thematic  unity  of  a  large  number  of  otherwise 
disconnected battles and political divisions. But this operation alone will not tell us 
all we might wish to know about the myriad causes and effects of those battles and  
divisions. We cannot give a satisfactory explanation of the Battle of the Bulge, for  
instance, by simply stating that it was a part of World War Two. There is clearly much 
more which might be said of it. This is a serious problem which emerges when one 
tries  to  make  colligation  alone  shoulder  the  burden  of  an  entire  historical 
epistemology.  Walsh  himself  was  aware  of  this,  conceding  that  some  additional 
explanatory mechanism was needed in order to establish his claim to have devised 
an  epistemic  alternative  to  both  covering  law  theory  and  empathic  idealism. 
Colligation, he argued, “needs to be supplemented by further processes if historical 
explanation is to be complete.”221 The mechanism Walsh chose for this supplementary 
role was narrative. And so it is at this point that Walsh's credentials as being among 
the first of the post-Hempelian narrativist philosophers of history begins to emerge. 
Although Walsh (like many who followed him) never properly defined the term, it is  
220 Walsh, An Introduction to the Philosophy of History. p.57.
221 Ibid., pp.62-63.
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clear  from his  usage that  he intended narrative to  be an explanatory mechanism 
which focused on historical  evidence, rather than presuming to “re-experience” the 
“inner” thoughts and subjective experiences of historical actors. The historian's desire 
to fashion a “coherent whole” from their particular area of study, Walsh argued, was 
instead accomplished by looking, “for certain dominant concepts or leading ideas by 
which to illuminate his facts, to trace connections between those ideas themselves, 
and then to show how the detailed facts become intelligible in the light of them by 
constructing a 'significant' narrative.”222 
Walsh contrasted this idea of “significant” narrative with that of a “plain” narrative. 
A “plain” narrative, he argued, was an “exact description of what happened,” whereas 
the “significant” narrative “goes beyond” description and “aims not merely at saying 
what happened but also at (in some sense) explaining it.”223 Yet, despite the obvious 
importance of these comparative terms for Walsh, he does not define what narrative 
itself is.  In  the  chapter  of  An  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy  of  History  devoted  to 
historical explanation, for example, he spends several pages decisively rejecting both 
the empathic idealism of Collingwood and the doctrinaire nature of the covering law 
theory advanced as its replacement. Yet he does not develop narrative as part of his 
solution. Instead, he merely restates his idea of colligation as an alternative to both, 
albeit an alternative drawn from the actual practice of historians rather than from 
abstract principles of philosophy. Even as he does this, however, he again concedes 
that colligation “while of great importance, could not constitute the whole nature of 
historical explanation.” But then neither, he continues, could the covering law model. 
“Our general result,” he concludes, “can be summarised by saying that history is... a 
form of knowledge with features peculiar to itself...”224 
Narrative is clearly extremely important to Walsh's vision of history. Not only does it 
complement colligation, it also appears to be the distinguishing feature of historical 
explanation – one of the “features peculiar” that is not empathy, but is not scientific 
either. Yet we are left in the dark as to precisely what he means by the term, at least in 
the  Introduction to  the  Philosophy of  History.  Fortunately,  he  comes  much closer  to 
defining his  vision of  narrative  in  a  1958 reply to criticism from the philosopher 
Arthur Danto. In this short paper he writes:
222 Ibid., p.61.
223 Ibid., p.32. (emphasis added) See also: W. H. Walsh, ''Plain' and 'Significant' Narrative in History,' 
The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 55, No. 11 (May 1958). pp.479-484.
224 Walsh, An Introduction to the Philosophy of History. p.70.
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If  the word “cause” is  taken in a broad sense,  as  by Aristotle,  who used it  in  
reference to dispositional and teleological explanations as well as explanations in 
terms  of  efficient  causes,  we  may  say  that  historical  narrative  is  essentially 
characterized by the presence of causal words and phrases; from the point of view 
of the logician, this is just what makes it intriguing.225
What  Walsh  appears  to  be  saying  here  is  that  narratives  (presumably  those 
“significant” narratives which contain explanatory content) invoke causal phrases, 
but that we cannot be sure ahead of time what the relevant causes might be in any 
given historical explanation. We must, therefore, be somewhat liberal with respect to 
the kinds of events and processes we will grant the title of “cause.” In this view, a 
“significant”  narrative  is  simply  a  “plain”  narrative  (i.e.,  a  mere  description  of 
events) with the missing causal links between events filled in. And, by linking events 
causally, it might be reasonably said that they are explained. It is precisely this form 
of explanation, Walsh appears to be arguing, which underlies the practice of history,  
including his own notion of colligation. 
But there is another problem here. Given this liberal definition of the word “cause,” 
we could argue – as Popper, Hempel, or Gardiner might – that each of these causal 
links should ideally be directly deducible from general laws. If this were the case, the 
result would be an almost textbook example of the covering law thesis, with each 
step of the particular narrative at issue being shown to be the necessary product of 
general laws. Indeed, Walsh skirts precisely such a “laws in history” argument in 
Introduction  to  the  Philosophy  of  History,  but  ultimately  withdraws from it  for  the 
familiar reason that it  is  simply too difficult to make the necessary deductions in 
actual  historical  practice.  Nor  is  it  clear  that  such  deductions,  even if  they  were  
possible,  would  help  explain  the  kinds  of  events/objects  in  which  historians  are 
interested. And regardless of whether or not it is possible, Walsh argues, historians 
simply do not do this:
...  we  have  rejected  the  main  contention  of  the  idealists  about  historical 
explanation and argued that it involves some sort of reference to general truths. 
This may seem to commit us without further ado to some form of the positivist  
thesis...  But before accepting that conclusion we ought perhaps to take a closer 
look at the actual practice of historians. If we do that we cannot help being struck 
by their use of a procedure which fits the idealist better than the positivist theory,  
the  procedure  of  explaining an  event  by tracing its  intrinsic  relations  to  other 
events and locating it in its historical context.226 
225 Walsh, ''Plain' and 'Significant' Narrative in History,' pp.482-483.
226 Walsh, An Introduction to the Philosophy of History. p.59.
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What Walsh is  doing here is  making, in a roundabout way,  the point that  causal 
events/objects in history are usually not directly deducible from any known general 
laws, and that even if they were, it is their proximately unique (as opposed to the 
purely general) aspects which are doing the explaining. For example, the fact that it 
rained heavily before the Battle of Waterloo is sometimes thought to have been a 
significant  causal  factor  in  that  battle's  outcome,  having  turned the  battlefield  to 
mud. Regardless of whether or not this was the case, if one wished to invoke heavy 
rain as a causal factor, it would be of little help to follow the nomothetic “laws in 
history” approach and make reference to, for example, atmospheric physics and the 
chemistry of water absorption in soil. Certainly these would be admirably general 
processes which we might expect to be able to identify wherever and whenever it 
rains. But it is not these processes themselves which are doing the explaining in this  
case. What is explanatory is that it rained in that particular place and at that particular  
time. We have no reason, of course, to think that the place and time of the rain are not  
also somehow determined by natural laws. But to demonstrate this link is difficult 
(likely  impossible),  and successfully  doing so would add little  or  nothing to  our 
explanation that could not be made equally clear by simply stating “it rained before 
the Battle of Waterloo, turning the battlefield to mud” and producing the evidence by 
which we make such a claim. And it is this latter kind of particularistic causation in 
which  historians  are  interested  and which  forms the  basic  causal  connections  of 
Walsh's “significant” narratives. In this sense, Walsh really is offering colligation and 
narrative as  alternatives to  “some sort  of  reference  to general  truths.”  This  makes 
possible  an  alternative  model  of  explanation,  yet  does  not  require  Walsh  to 
recapitulate  the  idealist  assertion  that  history  and  the  sciences  inhabit 
incommensurable worlds – one mental and one material.
Walsh and the Nomothetic Assumption
As  we  have  just  seen,  Walsh's  treatment  of  colligation  and  his  inchoate  idea  of 
narrative  leave  us  with  an  unmistakable  impression  that  Walsh  was  actively 
attempting to avoid direct reference to “general truths” in historical explanation. The 
question that faces us now is why? The answer can be found, once again,  in the 
nomothetic assumption, and what the admission of “general truths” into historical 
explanation would mean for Walsh's model. Having absorbed so much of the idealist  
program, Walsh was convinced that history was purely a study of unique particulars. 
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“The central preoccupation of the historian,” he wrote in the Introduction, “is not with 
generalities, but with the precise course of individual events: it is this which he hopes 
to recount and render intelligible.”227 Walsh takes this general/particular division a 
good deal  further,  however,  by  arguing that  the  epistemology of  such  a  vision  of 
history must also avoid any direct connection to general truths. By doing this, Walsh 
is attempting to hold history completely apart from the sciences, thus allowing it to 
formulate its own rules. This is necessary because, if it were not done, history might 
become philosophically answerable to science. For Walsh, in the grip of a nomothetic  
assumption and much closer to the heat and light of the covering law debate, this 
would be functionally equivalent to admitting that Popper and Hempel were right, 
and that history must be transformed into a deductive enterprise in the likeness of 
physics.  Walsh  was  understandably  anxious  to  avoid  such  an  outcome,  and 
attempted to forestall it by postulating his ideas of colligation and narrative as purely 
particularistic modes of explanation. These epistemic devices, he claimed, did not 
proceed  from  “general  truths”  and  thus  represented  knowledge  of  an  entirely 
different kind, not beholden to the kinds of methods Popper and Hempel advocated. 
History was, as we have already seen him claim, “a form of knowledge with features 
peculiar to itself...”228 
But this claim to historical autonomy, of course, only makes sense if one accepts the 
premiss that science is  only the study of the general through nomothetic laws. The 
corollary to this is that, if history cannot work with general laws, then it can only be 
the study of the particular. This is clearly an assumption which exercises considerable 
infuence over  Walsh.  And yet  there  is  nothing in  Walsh's  stated ideas  regarding 
colligation and narrative which necessitates or adequately justifies such a separation 
between history and the sciences. It  had  to be presupposed. This is, once again, the 
nomothetic assumption in action. If science could intrude into the particular, or be 
shown to utilise concepts such as historical colligation and/or narrative, this would 
negate Walsh's premiss and his entire argument would collapse. There would be no 
difference left  to  defend  between  the  two  (at  least  if  we  accept  Walsh's  other 
arguments). Nor would there be any need to even argue for such a difference in the 
first place,  as the consequences of admitting a role for “general truths” would no 
longer be quite so dire. Thus, once again, the nomothetic assumption is implicated in 
the formulation of history's own self-image and in the separatist impulse it exhibits.  
227 Ibid., p.39.
228 Ibid., p.70.
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In  order  to  more  precisely  ascertain  the  depth  of  the  nomothetic  assumption  in 
Walsh's thinking, it will be necessary to briefy examine his vision of science.
To his credit,  Walsh's view of science avoids several of the most common idealist  
misconceptions.  Of  the  view  that  historical  knowledge  –  being  concerned  with 
events/objects  in  the  unreachable  past  –  is  thus  a  substantively different  kind of 
knowledge  from  the  sciences,  Walsh  replies,  “it  is  not  true  that  the  scientist  is 
concerned  with  the  present  to  the  exclusion  of  the  past,”  citing  geology  and 
paleontology  as  examples  of  backwards-looking  sciences.229 Moreover,  he  also  is 
careful to rule out the inverse conclusion (that geology and paleontology should be 
declared history rather than science) by arguing that it cannot be held that “history is, 
without qualification, a study of the past” as a whole, for “there are large portions of 
the past  of which history...  takes no cognisance whatever.” Thus,  the mere  act  of 
examining  past events cannot be sufficient to establish history's autonomy, for this 
would  gather  disciplines  we  would  still  wish  to  call  sciences  into  history's  net.  
History then, for Walsh, is just “the past of human beings.”230 This, of course, is a 
fairly typical conclusion among philosophers of history, and is a largely reasonable 
one. Certainly it admits of fewer errors of categorisation. 
More important, however, is the view of science with which Walsh compares this 
recognisably idealist definition of history. He initially argues that to call an area of 
study a science is to assert that it is “a body of knowledge acquired as the result of an  
attempt  to  study  a  certain  subject-matter  in  a  methodical  way,  following  a 
determinate set of principles.” Yet, seemingly aware of the shortcomings of such a 
definition, which would allow a “railway timetable or a telephone directory,” to be 
counted as scientific, Walsh moves quickly to qualify it.  These examples are to be 
refused scientific status because “we tend to employ the word 'scientific' only where 
we have to do with a body of general propositions.”231 Rather than attempt any form 
of “ultimate” explanation, he writes, scientists:
... are content with the far more modest task of building up a system of observed  
uniformities in terms of which they hope to elucidate any situation which falls to 
be  examined.  Given  any  such  situation,  their  procedure  is  to  show  that  it 
exemplifies one or more general laws, which can themselves be seen to follow 
from, or connect with, other laws of a wider character. The main features of this 
229 Ibid., pp.30-31.
230 Ibid., p.31.
231 Ibid., p.35. (emphasis in original)
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process are, first, that it consists in the resolution of particular events into cases of 
general laws, and secondly that it involves nothing more than an external view of 
the phenomena under considerations (since the scientist is not professing to reveal 
the purpose behind them).232
This  quote  is  particularly  salient  with  respect  to  Walsh's  understanding  of  the 
“procedure” of doing science. This is, in essence, a nod to Whewell's idea of scientific 
colligation. For Whewell, the procedure of colligation in science was based around 
the  idea  of  laws.  For  Walsh,  while  the  procedure  in  history  was  still  that  of 
colligation, the explanatory structure toward which that process was oriented was 
something very different:  a  significant  narrative  expressing a  colligatory concept. 
When  considered  in  tandem with  Walsh's  desire  to  reject  empathic  notions  of  a  
separate  dimension  of  mind  (thus  effectively  claiming  that  history  and  science 
inhabit the same epistemic world), the only remaining substantive difference between 
the colligation of Whewell and that of Walsh – and thus between science and history 
–  was  the  degree  to  which  laws  and/or  bodies  of  “general propositions”  were 
involved in their construction. We say “degree” here because, as we have already 
hinted, it  was extremely difficult for Walsh to argue that general propositions are 
never  involved in historical  narrative or colligation. They clearly are,  even if  they 
could not carry the  explanatory load the covering lawyers might have wished for 
them. Walsh clearly acknowledged this. History, he wrote,  “differs from the natural 
sciences in that it is not the aim of the historian to formulate a system of general laws; 
but this does not mean that no such laws are presupposed in historical thinking.” 
Thus,  while  the  historian  must  ultimately  “appeal  to  general  propositions  in  the 
course of his study,” he “does not make these explicit in the same way as the scientist 
does.”233 Thus, in formulating his model of historical explanation by colligation and 
'significant'  narrative,  Walsh  chose  to  eschew  any  direct  reference  to  laws  and 
attempted to focus historical explanation solely on the particular. In this way, Walsh 
claimed  to  have  cultivated  a  different  and  wholly  unique  relationship  between 
historical knowledge and the “general propositions” of the sciences.
Colligation versus Classification
Despite his admission that the historian must sometimes “make appeal to general 
propositions,”  Walsh's  colligation  (and  presumably  his  idea  of  narrative,  had  he 
232 Ibid., pp.23-24.
233 Ibid., p.25.
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developed it sufficiently) relied heavily on the idea that historical explanation must 
use a particularistic colligation. This was a point he strongly insisted upon throughout 
his  career.  “It  seems  clear,”  he  argued  in  his  1967  paper,  “that  the  subjects  of 
discourse  which  are  designated  by  colligating  phrases  are  one  and  all  complex 
particulars: each of them has a temporal and also a spatial spread ('the rise of the 
bourgeoisie in western Europe')” Whatever complications the subject matter might 
present, Walsh argues, generally the historian finds “a set  of events which can be 
intelligibly treated as the vicissitudes of a single subject.”234 This would seem to be 
another way of saying that colligatory concepts must be of the form “the American 
Revolution,” rather than merely “a revolution.” The former is a colligation, the latter a 
classification. But  classification,  when  seen  from  the  general/particular  mindset 
nurtured by the nomothetic assumption, must necessarily be more appropriate to the 
sciences, as it is consistent with their attempts to subsume phenomena under “general 
truths.”  And so Walsh becomes a prisoner of  his own division of  historical  from 
scientific knowledge. He must insist on the pure particularity of colligation in order 
to satisfy his own pronouncements regarding the nature of science and its differences 
from  history.  This  would  be  excusable  if  such  a  particularistic  emphasis  could 
adequately capture the “actual practices” of historians from which Walsh claims to 
have drawn his model. Sadly, there are reasons to believe it cannot. To this end, let us  
examine just one example in which even the historical  practice which Walsh was so 
keen to protect – to say nothing at all of theory – must make reference to the general  
in order to be intelligible. This is the difference highlighted by the philosopher C.  
Behan McCullagh between colligation and classification.
McCullagh's  paper  on  this  subject,  entitled  'Colligation  and  Classification  in 
History,'235 was primarily an examination not only of Walsh's concept of colligation, 
but  also of  its  reception by subsequent  authors.  Throughout  the  paper,  however, 
McCullagh returns several times to the question of how the concept of colligation 
balances notions of the particular and the general.  Because of this, Walsh's strong 
insistence  on  the  particularistic  nature  of  his  colligation  is  of  great  interest  to 
McCullagh. Of the long history and multiple revisions Walsh made to the concept, 
McCullagh writes:
What  Walsh  has  insisted  upon  throughout  is  that  the  processes  of  historical 
234 Walsh, 'Colligatory Concepts in History,' pp.142-143.
235 C. Behan McCullagh, 'Colligation and Classification in History,' History and Theory. Vol. 17, No. 3 
(October 1978). pp.267-284.
115
change,  by  means  of  which  historical  events  are  colligated,  are  unique.  Such 
processes as the British Industrial Revolution or the Romantic movement are what 
Walsh  has  called  “complex  particulars”  and  “concrete  universals.”  The  events 
which make up these processes or movements give concrete expression to ideas 
shared universally by the people who initiated them. The processes are unique, 
Walsh has maintained, because the ideas underlying them are unique. The terms 
referring  to  or  naming  these  processes,  therefore,  are  always  singular,  not 
general.236
But this, McCullagh argued, was far too restrictive. For it rejected the possibility of 
any general process ever playing a role in a colligatory concept. He continues:
If Walsh is right and all the processes by which historical events are colligated are 
unique,  then  to  colligate  events  by  reference  to  those  processes  cannot  be  to 
classify the group of events involved. One can classify a group of events only by 
means of a general concept, that is, by showing that the features of the group are 
common  to  those  of  other  groups  to  which  the  same  concept  applies.  For 
colligation to be an instance of classification, the process by means of which events 
are colligated must be to some extent common, not unique, and the term referring 
to that process general, not singular.237
While  McCullagh  has  much  to  say  about  the  philosophical  merits  of  Walsh's 
insistence  that  colligation  must  be  a  purely  particularistic  process,  he  has 
comparatively  little  to  say  about  why Walsh  resisted  “admitting  that  colligatory 
concepts  can  be  general.”  McCullagh  largely  attributes  Walsh's  reluctance  to  his 
“belief that the unity of the historical processes to which colligatory terms refer is 
achieved in only one way, by means of unique sets of ideas which direct them.”238 
That is,  McCullagh believed that it  was Walsh's  focus on the  content of the ideas 
which  motivated  colligations  like  “the  Industrial  Revolution”  that  led  to  his 
emphasis on particularity. But to limit the allowable content of a colligatory concept, 
McCullagh argues, is to cripple colligation as an explanatory mechanism. For there 
are potentially many other ways to skin the colligatory cat, many of which involve 
the use of general concepts. 
McCullagh had two key objections  to  Walsh's  assertion  that  historical  colligation 
could  only  be so-called in particular situations where the colligatory concept being 
deployed expresses the ideas which animated the event/object to be explained. The 
first,  according  to  McCullagh,  was  that  while  “some  of  the  processes  to  which 
colligatory concepts refer are unified by a common set of ideas, others are unified 
simply by the form of the change in a subject which they constitute.” That is, one 
236 McCullagh, 'Colligation and Classification in History,' p.268.
237 Ibid.
238 Ibid., p.271.
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could reasonably colligate a collection of historical events, objects, and processes as 
“a  revolution,”  without  having  any knowledge at  all  of  the  specific ideas  which 
drove it.239 Such a colligation would be a description of the  form  of a change only, 
rather  than  the  underlying  idea  it  expressed. From  our  point  of  view,  this  is  a 
relatively minor point.  The second of McCullagh's objections, however,  was more 
serious. Although “some colligatory concepts which refer to processes unified by a 
common set of ideas are singular,” McCullagh writes, “others are general, since such 
processes  sometimes  do  occur  more  than  once  in  history.”240 In  other  words,  a 
concept like “renaissance,” even if defined in a relatively strict sense – McCullagh 
offers “a “revived interest in and infuence by the cultural of classical Rome” – is still  
a far more general concept than its typical deployment (“the  Renaissance”) would 
suggest, for “there have been several periods of renaissance.”241
For McCullagh, terms like “revolution” are “formal colligatory concepts” in that they 
indicate the form but not the content of a historical process. Because of this, they are 
often deployed with “another word indicating the subject  of  change, as  in 'social 
revolution,' 'scientific revolution,' and 'revolution in government.'” While this usage 
pattern helps give a general term like “revolution” a more particularistic focus, such 
formal terms still say “nothing about the ideas behind instances of changes to which 
they could refer.” Thus, McCullagh argues, even a term like “scientific revolution,” 
which seems quite uncontroversial in terms of its subject, leaves open the question of 
the ideas which animated it. Nor is this an isolated example. To this list could be 
added such terms as : “evolution,” “growth,” “decay,” “polarization” and “confict.” 
Thus, despite Walsh's particularistic commitments, his concept of colligation is not 
specific  enough.  An unwanted generality also intrudes, McCullagh continues, with 
colligatory concepts that,  while they are  not mute with respect  to  their  animating 
ideas, can nevertheless apply to multiple unrelated processes. His primary example 
is the concept of “renaissance,” but he also points out that there are arguments which 
might  be made for  multiple  periods of  “enlightenment” in Europe.  And, like the 
above examples of  formal colligatory concepts,  this  list  too is  potentially endless. 
“Feudalism,” he argues, “has been discovered, not only in Europe, but also in Japan. 
And there have been many instances of mercantilism and imperialism, capitalism 
239 Moreover,  McCullagh argued,  this was not merely a theoretical  objection, but a practical one: 
“Quite  often.”  he  argues,  “historians  know the  form of  a  change but  are  uncertain  about  the 
reasons for it.” See: McCullagh, 'Colligation and Classification in History,' p.272.
240 Ibid., p.271.
241 Ibid., p.272.
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and socialism, nationalism and fascism.”242
As  this  brief  summary  makes  clear,  McCullagh  makes  some  extremely  valuable 
points, all of which suggest that it was a good deal more difficult to maintain the 
notion  of  history  as  being  purely  a  study  of  the  particularistic  than  Walsh  had 
supposed.  McCullagh's  case  for  admitting  at  least  something  of  the  general  into 
history  is  compelling,  and  this  thesis  has  no  wish  to  add  to  his  substantive 
arguments. We are, however, in a position to augment McCullagh's account of  why 
Walsh chose to insist on the particularistic nature of colligation. We might offer, for 
instance, our own observation that Walsh's very definition of colligation demanded an 
emphasis on particularism. This was necessary in order to secure history's autonomy 
from scientific explanation, and thus avoid the difficulties of accounting for historical 
explanation in terms of “general truths” that the lack of such autonomy was thought 
to require.  We are also in a position to see a plausible  reason for something else 
which puzzled McCullagh. With reference to Walsh's paper 'Colligatory Concepts in 
History,'  McCullagh  observes  that,  despite  his  particularistic  emphasis,  Walsh 
“repeatedly referred to colligation as a process of generalization,” using such terms 
as “summative generalization” and “large-scale  generalizing history.”  Walsh even 
went so far, McCullagh notes, as to devote “a section of the essay to the problems of  
generalization  associated  with  colligation,  the  dangers  of  over-simplification  and 
consequent  distortion  of  the  past.”243 What  McCullagh  saw  as  confusion  and 
contradiction on Walsh's part, however, is neatly explained by the very difference we 
established earlier between Walsh's colligation and Whewell's – the role of laws. For  
Walsh,  colligations  are generalisations.  But  they  are  generalisations  of  their  own 
separate and unique kind, built up out of pure particulars through a mechanism of 
narratives. That is, they aren't generalities built from, or seeking to establish, “general 
truths.” That is the aim of  scientific explanation, which Walsh considers something 
entirely separate. Understanding Walsh's desire to keep historical explanation and 
scientific explanation separate therefore allows us to make sense of what otherwise 
appears to be a schizophrenic use of the term “generalization.”244
242 Ibid., pp.272-273.
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must have been aware that scientists also interpret natural facts by means of colligation, since he  
acknowledged  a  debt  to  Whewell's  account  of  the  function  of  colligation  in  science.”  See: 
McCullagh, 'Colligation and Classification in History,' p.267. As we have seen, Walsh certainly was 
aware that colligation was possible in the sciences. But Whewell's vision of colligation, as we have 
argued,  was  rooted  in  general  laws.  Walsh  saw  his  own  version  of  colligation  as  rooted  in  
narratives.  Thus  we  can  reasonably  conclude  that,  for  Walsh,  the  admission  that  colligatory 
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So,  while  McCullagh's  purpose  was  not  to  pursue  the  consequences  of  these 
arguments, it should be apparent (in light of our own discussion of Walsh) that they 
broadly support our conclusion that there is no compelling philosophical justification 
for  Walsh's  insistence  on  particularism as  necessary  for  every  stage  of  historical 
explanation and the point of its separation from the sciences. Yet, for Walsh, having 
conceded that the subject matter of history was not fundamentally different to that of 
the sciences, such a separation was essentially the only difference left between history 
and the sciences. It can reasonably be concluded, therefore, that Walsh's attachment 
to idealism, when coupled with his nomothetic assumptions regarding science, goes 
a long way toward explaining his insistence upon particularism as a fundamental 
property of historical explanation. And this, while certainly a serious faw in Walsh's 
philosophy  of  history,  has  even  greater  consequences  than  might  initially  be 
supposed.  For  Walsh  (like  many  other  early  narrativists)  never  offered  a  strong 
definition  of  narrative,  despite  it  being  a  cornerstone  of  his  reconstruction  of 
idealism. But because Walsh also believed that  the epistemic tools of the sciences 
were denied him because history could not be meaningfully nomothetic, his notions 
of narrative and colligation were required to be much more than merely methods and 
interpretive concepts. They were required to provide the epistemic basis for what 
was  widely  perceived  as  an  autonomous  discipline  completely  apart  from  the 
sciences – to stand in the place of the absent laws. This they were simply unable to 
do. This was not necessarily because they were conceptually weak, but because they 
were simply being asked to do too much. 
In closing then, it should be remembered that the extended examples of Gardiner and 
Walsh have been used here  to  illustrate  the  profound change in  the  terms upon 
which the philosophy of history was conducted in the aftermath of the covering law 
attack. The boundaries between the old positivist and idealist camps were beginning 
to soften. Empathy and re-enactment were discredited as methods, as was the tacit 
claim that  the  only interesting  aspects  of  history  lay  in  the  minds  of  long  dead 
historical  actors.  Narrative  was  beginning  to  emerge  as  an  alternative  to  both 
idealism and positivism. On the other side of the aisle, the covering law debate had 
moved from a nineteenth century “laws  of history” mode to the “laws  in history” 
concepts need not be particular was functionally equivalent to admitting that colligation could be 
classification. And this would destroy precisely the distinction between scientific and historical 
colligation he was trying to establish. 
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mode of  Popper  and Hempel.  And yet,  while  Maurice  Mandelbaum, in dubbing 
those  authors  constituting  the  narrativist  backlash  against  covering  law  theory 
“reactionists,” was careful to distinguish them from old idealists like Collingwood 
and Croce,245 it  seems that their  attempts to move beyond the nineteenth century 
positivist/idealist dichotomy had succeeded only in rehabilitating it. For despite the 
stated declarations of both authors to walk some kind of middle path in this age-old 
dispute, this chapter has shown that both can be better understood as having merely 
stripped some of the more implausible arguments away from either side, leaving the 
central division intact. Between Gardiner's desire to rescue a nomothetic approach to 
history from one of  its  most potent criticisms and Walsh's  stated intent to  find a 
“plausible”  idealism,  both  authors  were  still  recognisably  foot-soldiers  for  the 
positivist and idealist traditions respectively. 
245 Maurice Mandelbaum, 'Historical Explanation:  The Problem of “Covering Laws”,'  History and 
Theory. Vol. 1, No. 3 (1961). pp.229-230.
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Chapter Three
“The Rise of Narrative”
Where Chapter Two attempted to examine the intellectual transformation undergone 
by the philosophy of history in response to the covering law assault, Chapter Three 
will  seek  to  deal  with  the  narrativist  movement  which  was  its  eventual  result.  
Growing from Walsh's hesitant first steps, narrativism would go on to become one of 
the leading concepts in the philosophy of history, and remains so even to this day. 
Our first aim in this chapter will be to attempt to show something of how narrative 
came to this prominence. This will be achieved through close readings of the work of 
several prominent philosophers of history who used narrative as a device by which 
the creaking old edifice of empathic idealism might be abandoned, yet subsumption 
into the nomothetic sciences avoided. By doing this, we shall see that there were two 
ways in which this narrative vision of history was articulated. First – as we shall see  
in the examples of William Dray and Arthur Danto – there was an attempt to build a 
narrative philosophy of history which adhered to the logical principles of analytical 
philosophy. That is, authors like Dray and Danto attempted to offer an explanatory 
mechanism that was unique to history, but still empirically grounded and logically 
defensible. While their authors perceived such systems as separate from the sciences, 
they were still in some sense  compatible with them. History still  explained, in other 
words.  It  merely  did  so  using  its  own  unique  methods  and  concepts.  This  is  a 
continuation  of  the  kind  of  argument  we  saw deployed  by  W.  H.  Walsh  in  the 
previous chapter, and is what we shall mean by the term “epistemic-narrativism.” 
The second way in which narrative was deployed, however, was to emphasise the 
overlap  in  meaning  between  the  words  “narrative”  and  “fiction.”  We  shall  see 
examples of this approach in the work of W. B. Gallie and Louis Mink. This approach 
marginalised or ignored entirely the difficult problems of method and justification 
with  which  authors  like  Dray  and  Danto  were  wrestling,  in  favour  of  declaring 
history a predominantly literary exercise – the narratives of which could thus claim 
little  or  no  correspondence  with  the  past.  History  did  not  explain so  much  as  it 
emplotted. This, in turn, is the intended referent of the term “literary-narrativism.” 
Regardless of which of these approaches are deployed, however, the second aim of 
Chapter  Three will  be to demonstrate that,  for  all of these authors,  narrative was 
valued as the basis for a philosophy of history precisely because it seemed to provide 
a good fit for the form of historical explanation, yet was not considered a concern that  
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science could have. This useful quality helps to explain why narrative succeeded in the 
wake of the Popper/Hempel thesis. Yet this key axiom upon which narrativism was 
predicated itself  fowed from the assumption that science was  only the pursuit of 
general laws from which particular truths might be deduced. Whatever role narrative  
played  in  history  –  literary  or  epistemic  –  it  certainly  didn't  appear  to  fit  that 
definition.  Therefore,  while  there  was  argument  regarding  the  exact  nature  of 
narrative  and  the  precise  nature  of  its  explanatory  role  in  history,  it  became  an 
unchallenged axiom that history – so long as it  were based in narrative – simply 
could not be science. This also helps to explain why the literary-narrative view, in the 
form of the so-called “linguistic turn,” has more recently emerged as the dominant 
strand in contemporary philosophy of history. For epistemic-narrativists like Dray 
and Danto were (like Walsh) largely unable to provide a convincing epistemic account 
of  what  narrative  was,  and  thus  how historical  explanation  functioned.  And the 
reason for that failure, Chapter Three will argue, was the nomothetic assumption. For 
where literary-narrativists  could choose to simply  ignore questions of  explanation 
and  justification  by  asserting  that  history  was  essentially  fiction,  epistemic-
narrativists  could  afford  no  such  luxury.  And  yet,  having  used  the  nomothetic 
assumption to cut off narrative from the sciences,  epistemic-narrativists could not 
then draw upon the intellectual resources of science to provide better definitions of 
narrative.  Defining  narrative  in  scientific  terms  was  simply  not  considered.  It 
couldn't be, as the very reason for the development of narrative philosophy of history 
in the first place was as an alternative  to the scientism seen as the covert aim of the 
covering  law  model.  The  examples  of  Chapter  Three,  therefore,  will  bring  our 
examination of the nomothetic assumption throughout twentieth century philosophy 
of history up to the present. This will conclude Part One of this thesis and complete 
our demonstration that there is  both a persistent nomothetic  assumption running 
through much of modern philosophy of history, and that said assumption has played 
an important role in the definition and self-image of history as a discipline.
An excellent place to begin our examination of the isolation of narrativist philosophy 
of history from the sciences is with the work of William Dray. A former pupil of W. H. 
Walsh,  Dray  was  situated  squarely  in  the  middle  of  the  emerging  narrative 
movement. His work on historical explanation owes a clear debt to Walsh, yet is not 
uncritical of him. More importantly,  Dray's own work built on several  of Walsh's 
chronically underdeveloped ideas, including narrative. Dray attempted to articulate, 
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in a way that Walsh had not, in just what sense a narrative might be said to actually 
explain. In addition to this, Dray also directly and thoroughly tackled the question of 
the  role  of  nomothetic  laws in  history.  In  his  1957 book  Laws and Explanation  in  
History,246 Dray offered a detailed examination of the relevance of the covering law 
position for historians, squarely challenging both strong covering law theory and the 
weaker  variant  which  argues  that  the  theory  might  be  made  to  fit  historical 
explanations with only minor modification. With respect to the latter argument, Dray 
takes particular aim at Patrick Gardiner, using his introduction to position Laws and 
Explanation as a reply to Gardiner's The Nature of Historical Explanation.247 This makes 
Dray even more valuable as an example, given that we have already seen something 
of  Gardiner's  vision  of  historical  explanation  in  the  previous  chapter.  But  while 
acknowledging Gardiner's concessions to “what the historian actually does” in his 
modification of covering law theory, Dray ultimately argues that the covering law 
model cannot possibly capture all  aspects  of  historical  explanation without  being 
modified into non-existence.248 The model  itself,  Dray argued, was “so misleading 
that it ought to be abandoned as a basic account of what it is to give an explanation.” 
With this in mind, Dray set about the task of discrediting any possibility of applying 
covering law theory to history, arguing that its rigorous application would have the 
result that “more will sometimes be read into an historical example than is actually 
there,” as well as causing “important features which are there” to “pass unnoticed.”249 
William Dray's Model of Historical Explanation
As a strident critic of the application of covering law theory to history then, Dray was 
clearly no friend of the nomothetic neo-positivists. But neither was he a defender of  
empathic  idealism.  While  sympathetic  to  empathy  as  a  means  of  contextualising 
what one has learnt about an historical actor – that is, as a source of understanding 
rather  than of  actual  new  information – Dray was careful  to  argue that historical 
explanation must ultimately be defensible in terms of evidence:
It  is  therefore  worth  my  denying  explicitly  that  what  I  have  called  rational 
explanation  is  in  any  damaging  sense  beyond  empirical  inquiry...  it  has  an 
inductive,  empirical  side,  for  we build up to  explanatory equilibrium  from the 
evidence. To get inside Disraeli's shoes the historian does not simply ask himself:  
246 William Dray, Laws and Explanation in History. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1957.
247 Ibid., pp.13-21.
248 Ibid., p.29.
249 Ibid., p.19. (emphasis in original)
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'What  would  I  have  done?';  he  reads  Disraeli's  dispatches,  his  letters,  his 
speeches...250
Dissatisfied  with  both  the  positivist  and  idealist  approaches,  Dray  set  out  to 
formulate a model  of  historical  explanation which did not depend on either.  His 
work on this problem began with his 1954 paper 'Explanatory Narrative in History.'251 
Here, Dray stated the general problem as follows:
In  thus insisting that  any logically  reputable  explanation must  be  'covered'  by 
general statements of some kind, exponents of the model make no secret of the 
alternative account  which they wish to  forestall.  It  is  the  view,  often found in 
philosophizing about history, that what is needed in order to explain a historical 
subject matter is not general knowledge of the kind the various sciences provide, 
but a special sort of insight, which will enable the individual connections between 
events to be 'seen' immediately.252
This whole dichotomy is totally misconceived, Dray argued, for there are “certain 
logical features of what we would ordinarily not hesitate to count as explanation” 
which are “not what even the modified model  of Professors Popper and Hempel 
would lead us to expect.”253 Also of particular interest here is Dray's use of the term 
“logical.” This is a key feature of Dray's style of argument, for, by using this term, he 
sought to argue that in many cases (including the historical) explanation could be 
satisfactorily logically justified without recourse to general laws. In other words, Dray 
was reluctant to let the covering lawyers claim a monopoly on the logical property of 
explanation and, by decoupling logic from laws, was attempting to claim it back. In 
this respect,  Dray's  efforts represent a classic  statement of autonomous epistemic-
narrativism. Dray's approach to achieving this kind of middle way, however, is not to 
dilute covering law theory into irrelevance (as Gardiner effectively did), but instead  
to lower the bar for what constitutes explanation. Or, more accurately, to argue that 
the bar was never set all that high to begin with:
The chief contention of the covering law theorists is that to explain something, it 
must be shown to be  necessary. By contrast, I shall argue that, in many contexts, 
including some historical ones, a request for explanation is satisfactorily met if the 
event in question is shown to be possible; there is no need to go on to show that it 
was necessary as well.254
250 Ibid., p.129. (emphasis in original)
251 William  Dray,  'Explanatory  Narrative  in  History,'  The  Philosophical  Quarterly.  Vol.  4,  No.  14 
(January 1954). pp.15-27. This paper later appears in a rewritten (but still clearly recognisable) form 
as the final chapter of  Laws and Explanation in History.  See: Dray,  Laws and Explanation in History. 
pp.156-169.
252 Dray, 'Explanatory Narrative in History,' p.16.
253 Ibid., pp.16-17.
254 Ibid., p.17. (emphasis in original) See also: Dray, Laws and Explanation in History. p.157.
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This Dray called “how possibly” explanation, as opposed to the “why necessarily” 
explanation of the nomothetic sciences.255 Dray formulates this model, in both his 
'Explanatory  Narrative  in  History'  paper  and  in  the  final  chapter  of  Laws  and 
Explanations in History, with reference to a seemingly inexplicable baseball catch. The 
example itself was sourced from a 1952 issue of Maclean's Magazine, and Dray quotes 
it in full:
An announcer broadcasting a baseball game from Victoria, B. C., said: “It's a long 
fy ball to centre field, and it's going to hit high up on the fence. The centre fielder's 
back, he's under it, he's caught it, and the batter is out.” Listeners who knew the 
fence was twenty feet high couldn't figure out how the fielder caught the ball.  
Spectators could have given them the unlikely explanation. At the rear of centre 
field was a high platform for the scorekeeper. The centre fielder ran up the ladder 
and caught the ball twenty feet above the ground.256
This, Dray argued, has the appearance (and, more importantly, performs the function) 
of an explanation. But the  form of that explanation is something that the models of 
neither  the  covering  law  theorist  nor  the  idealist  can  adequately  capture.257 In 
'Explanatory Narrative  in  History,'  Dray argued that  there  was no appeal  in  this 
example – not even implicitly – to any kind of covering law. High-level “historical” 
laws – such as “in baseball... fielders usually catch long fy balls” – will not suffice to 
explain this particular instance, Dray points out,  as the radio audience will  likely 
already be aware of the relative prospects for fy ball catches. The problem with this 
example  is  that,  prior  to  its  explication,  it  presents  a  unique  difficulty  for such 
generalisations.  That  is,  it  is  the  perplexing  nature  of  this  catch which  requires 
explanation  and  not  every  other  (presumably  non-miraculous)  catch.  The 
generalisation is therefore, Dray argues, superfuous:
...  although we may assume that there is nothing to wonder at in the fact that 
catches are very often made, there is a real mystery about this particular one... No 
generalizations about fielders catching long fies are of explanatory value... until 
this prior problem is solved. And once the audience learns about the scorekeeper's 
platform, it  would be superfuous to call  the generalization to mind – and not 
superfuous only in the practical sense allowed by Popper and Hempel when they 
admit that the appeal to law in explanation may be 'implicit.' For the law is then 
logically superfuous; the explanation which is required has already been given. It 
is complete.258
One might attempt to evade this conclusion by protesting that the motions of the 
255 Dray, Laws and Explanation in History. p.164.
256 Dray, 'Explanatory Narrative in History,' pp.17-18. See also: Dray, Laws and Explanation in History.  
p.158.
257 Dray, 'Explanatory Narrative in History,' p.18,23.
258 Ibid., p.18. (emphasis in original)
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baseball, and even the atomic constituents of the players, obey basic laws of physics 
and could therefore be said to be law-governed. But,  Dray counters,  this  is  quite 
simply irrelevant. To demand a higher standard of explanation (i.e., one that sought a 
nomothetic “why necessarily” rather than “how possibly” explanation) for this catch 
would “only be appropriate in the face of a further demand for explanation, and one 
of a different type.”259 Dray is similarly unconvinced of the possibility of the catch 
being explained via empathic divination of the inner life of an historical agent. For 
the problem of the miraculous catch is simply not the kind of problem empathy can 
solve.  Certainly it  meets  many of  the requirements  that  empathic idealism might 
insist upon. That is, it is a highly particular event involving human activity and a 
human  actor  whose  motivations  might  be  reconstructed.  Yet,  Dray  argues,  to 
approach the problem this way – whether based on empathy or something more 
empirical (such as Gardiner's dispositional analysis) – is simply inappropriate. It is 
quite simply the “wrong sort of answer to give to the demand for explanation which 
arises out of the circumstances supposed here.”260 Neither nomothetic positivism nor 
empathic idealism, in other words, can provide tools to deal with an event of this 
kind, and so another alternative must be formulated. This is the niche towards which 
Dray's  “how possibly”  explanation  is  aimed.  Dray  makes  the  further  connection 
between “how possibly” explanations and the concept of narrative as follows:
The fact of historical procedure which it  was said would be illuminated by the 
distinctions that have been drawn was that, when asked for an explanation of a  
certain event or state of affairs, the historian often responds by telling a story. The 
claim I wish to make is that the narrative he offers sometimes explains in the 'how' 
rather than the 'why' sense.261
Dray believed, in other words, that he had arrived at a sound epistemic argument for 
the  assertion  that  history  proceeds  by  narrative.  Moreover,  his  “how 
possibly”/narrative solution possessed the additional advantage of tracking actual 
historical  practice  much more  closely than either the covering law or  the idealist 
theories  could.  “Historians,”  he writes,  “are well  aware of  the importance of  the 
narrative  form  in  which  their  conclusions  are  usually  expressed,  and  they  often 
emphasize this when they come to theorize about their subject.”262 Dray could thus 
plausibly claim that  his  “how possibly”/”why necessarily” distinction potentially 
provided  an  explanatory  model  which  might  lend  real  epistemic  legitimacy  to 
259 Ibid. (emphasis in original)
260 Dray, Laws and Explanation in History. p.159.
261 Dray, 'Explanatory Narrative in History,' p.24.
262 Ibid.
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history. This was because, for Dray, the “how possibly” account of how a particular 
event/object  came  to  happen/exist  in  the  manner  in  which  it  did  is  effectively 
identical to what historians have meant by the term “narrative.” Narratives were, in 
other words, reducible to “how possibly” explanations:
An historical  explanation  may  thus  amount  to  telling  the  story  of  what  actually  
happened,  and  telling  it  in  such  a  way  that  the  various  transitions...  raise  no 
eyebrows. The story is told in such a way that presumptions of the form, 'But 
surely that couldn't have happened!,' are rebutted in advance. Answers to likely 
objection are built into the narrative, which may thus have explanatory force...263
From this example, it is clear there is much which is compelling about Dray's “how 
possibly” definition of narrative. It preserves traditional historical questioning and 
practice, retains the general/particular division philosophers of history were so keen 
to  defend,  and uses  the  concept  of  narrative  to  avoid  having  to  adopt  the  more 
unpalatable implications of either covering law theory or empathic idealism. Indeed, 
Part Two of this thesis will show that Dray was in many ways quite correct about the 
potential  gulf  between the necessity of  laws and their  ability to  resolve  the finer 
details of the historical past. But there is also much Dray omits. As the Introduction 
has argued, his attempt to offer a principled epistemic definition of narrative suffers  
from a lack of what might be called deep structure. He makes no attempt at all, for 
instance, to offer any principled mechanism for the confirmation or falsification of 
narratives. Historical accounts, he writes, “build up to explanatory equilibrium from 
the  evidence.”264 Yet  without  any  given  way  to  use  evidence  to  move  from “how 
possibly” to “what actually happened,” Dray's method seems woefully incomplete in 
one of its most important areas.265
This  problem  is  compounded  by  Dray's  lack  of  clarity  as  to  whether  narrative 
explains in any causal sense. This is a potentially catastrophic failure, especially for a 
mode of explanation that Dray claims to be as fundamental as nomothetic “why” 
explanations.266 For by questioning whether the term 'cause' means anything at all in 
historical  explanations  but  not asking  a  similar  question  of  the  sciences,  Dray  is 
effectively  ceding  any  strong sense  of  causal  explanation  to  the  nomothetic  (i.e., 
“why necessarily”) sciences. In  Laws and  Explanation in History,  for example, Dray 
argues  that  causal  explanations  in  history  are  problematic  in  a  way  that  causal 
263 Ibid., p.27. (emphasis in original)
264 Dray, Laws and Explanation in History. p.129. (emphasis in original)
265 Dray, 'Explanatory Narrative in History,' p.27. (emphasis in original)
266 Ibid., p.20.
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explanation through laws is not:
Historians use the notion to draw attention to some necessary condition which, for 
one reason or another, is considered important in the context of writing. To say 
that  the  word  is  ordinarily  used  'vaguely'  or  'loosely'  is  thus  misleading.  We 
should say rather that it has its own peculiar logic, which happens to be different  
from that invented for it by some philosophers. It cannot be tightened up in either 
the  metaphysical  or  scientific  ways  without  changing  its  function;  and  the 
reformed notion could not, in any case, be employed without bringing historical 
narrative to a halt.267
But this raises the question: what else could we possibly mean by the term explain? 
Dray's own model seems instead to favour the arguments of later literary-narrativists 
like W. B. Gallie, who have argued that the explanatory role of narrative is to render  
events intelligible – to show that certain events need not have caused surprise. In such 
a model, the nomothetic causes are comparatively unimportant. They are like the laws 
of  physics  which  presumably  underpinned  all  of  the  components  of  Dray's 
improbable baseball catch – present but not really relevant. There is, of course, nothing 
inherently fawed about such a model. Dray himself says as much, arguing that there 
is  “nothing  wrong with  calling anything less  than a  set  of  sufficient  conditions  a 
cause.”268 If we actually  do call  “anything less than a set of sufficient conditions a 
cause,” however, Dray seems to be arguing that we are using the term in a uniquely 
historical way, with its own “peculiar logic.” But it is difficult to see why this should 
be the case. It does not seem problematic to state that the  cause of, for example, an 
automobile accident was the failure of the brakes on the vehicle in question. There 
are any number of basic laws of physics here which can help explain how and why a 
brake failure can lead to an accident. But surely it is not a unique brand of “peculiar  
logic” to simply say that the brake failure “caused” the accident. Nor is it problematic 
to proceed further down the causal chain and submit evidence that the “cause” of 
that failure was, for example, rooted in the financial inability of the car's owner to 
perform adequate maintenance. Neither of these are complete explanations – for that 
we  really  would need  to  include  the  laws  of  physics  –  but  the  fact  is  that  both 
statements  do  provide  causal  information.  More  importantly,  they  do  so  without 
being required to invoke a special sense of the word “cause.” And even if such a 
sense of the word “cause” were required, Dray is not clear about what it might be, 
preferring  instead  to  stake  the  explanatory  capacity  of  narrative  on  criteria  of 
intelligibility – the relating of a narrative in “such a way that the various transitions... 
267 Dray, Laws and Explanation in History. p.112.
268 Ibid. (emphasis in original)
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raise no eyebrows.”269
Dray and the Nomothetic Assumption
An assessment of the underlying reason for these shortcomings of Dray's model will 
require a deeper examination of how Dray perceived the relationship between the 
“how  possibly”  (narrative)  and  the  “why  necessarily”  (scientific)  modes  of 
explanation.  And,  in  this  respect,  Dray  was  comparatively  sophisticated,  at  least 
when  compared  with  the  philosophers  of  history  we  have  examined  so  far.  For 
instance, Dray was careful to point out that he saw no meaningful basis upon which 
to claim that any one of these explanatory models had primacy over the other. “I  
see,”  he  states,  “no  point  in  going  on  to  ask  whether  one  or  other  is  the  more 
'fundamental' type. Having given the one type of explanation, it very often makes 
sense to ask for (although it may not always be possible in practice to give) one of the  
other type.”270 They are answers, Dray writes, to “different kinds of questions,” and 
therefore have “quite different logical functions.” Thus, covering law theory cannot 
claim to be the universal form of explanation. In fact, not only is it “not the universal 
type of explanation,” Dray argues, “it is not even the right sort of thing to be such a  
type.”271 It is merely, Dray appears to be saying, one voice in a choir. This pluralistic  
and egalitarian approach to explanation had the ancillary implication, however, of 
calling into question the role of laws in any knowledge generating field, scientific or 
otherwise.  Laws have their  place,  Dray is essentially arguing,  but laws alone can 
never constitute a complete explanation. This, it would seem, makes Dray one of the 
first  major twentieth century philosophers of history to be explicitly unconvinced 
that nomothetic, generalising explanation was a necessary criterion for doing science:
There is, in fact, some reason for thinking that what the covering law theory gives 
us is  the criterion of  a technical  sense of  'explanation'  found only in narrowly 
scientific  discourse,  perhaps  only  among  certain  philosophers  of  science.... 
Whether  a  sense  of  'explain'  is  widely  employed  among  theoretical  scientists 
which means no more than 'bring under a general law' I cannot claim to know, 
although I suspect that it is at any rate less widespread than the philosophers in 
question would lead us to believe.272
Here  Dray  is  seemingly  suspicious  that  the  shortcomings  he  saw  in  terms  like 
“explain” and “cause” when they were applied to narrative might possibly spill over 
269 Dray, 'Explanatory Narrative in History,' p.27. (emphasis in original)
270 Ibid., p.20.
271 Ibid., p.23.
272 Dray, Laws and Explanation in History. p.76.
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into the sciences as well. This might appear at first glance to be a means by which we 
might  allow  “how  possibly”  and  “why  necessarily”  explanations  to  co-exist  in 
science (and thus presumably in history as well). For if laws could not be complete 
explanations in any field, then presumably even strongly nomothetic sciences such as 
physics would sometimes be required to make use of “how possibly” explanations. 
On what basis could we then claim a fundamental distinction between history and 
the sciences? Seemingly aware of this line of argument, however, Dray takes explicit  
steps to thwart it. For while Dray was critical of what he saw as the over-reliance of 
covering law theorists on explicitly nomothetic physics as the paradigm of a pure 
science, he was not entirely ready to abandon the bifurcated vision of science and 
history such nomothetic assumptions had been used to establish. 
To this end, while Dray postulated a plurality of explanatory models, each serving 
the needs of a different kind of questioning, he also made it abundantly clear that 
there  was  still  a  peculiarly  scientific mode  of  explanation  which  remained 
incompatible  with  history.  And,  more  importantly,  that  mode  was  still  primarily 
concerned with generalisation. For in the absence of a universal requirement for laws, 
Dray  argued,  there  must  still  be  something  which  can  act  as  an  explanatory 
mechanism for “how possibly” type questions as they might occur in the  sciences. 
This, for Dray, was the role of general theories:
For although... it is not my purpose here to assess the adequacy of the covering 
law model  in  scientific  contexts,  it  would  appear  to  be  at  least  arguable  that 
reference to a scientific theory may be explanatory in the  ordinary sense,  while 
reference to a generalization is not. In so far as reference to a theory does give an 
explanation – in science or elsewhere – it seems to me that it does so not for the 
quasi-inductive  reasons  suggested  by  Gardiner  and others,  but  because  it  is  a 
means  of  satisfying  just  the  kind of  pragmatic  demands  which  we have  been 
discussing.273
In essence, Dray is arguing that in those cases where the “how possibly” mode is 
appropriate for the sciences, general  theories perform explanatory work in place of 
laws. For example, a case of food poisoning might be difficult to explain purely in 
terms of known laws, but is readily explicable in terms of the germ theory of disease. 
Theories themselves might (and perhaps even  must) rest upon laws, but they also 
273 Ibid., p.79. (emphasis in original) Note also that the “pragmatic demands” that Dray is citing here 
is essentially a shorthand reference to his previously examined arguments regarding the need for a 
mode of explanation above the crudely nomothetic, even if the phenomena in question actually are  
ultimately law governed. In other words, even if we explain the miraculous baseball catch using 
only the laws of physics, we haven't really explained it in the pragmatic sense required by the sheer 
complexity of the subject matter. See: Dray, Laws and Explanation in History. pp.72-73.
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allow their component laws to be effectively bypassed. Thus high-level explanation is 
facilitated without a descent into nomothetic complexities. Of the nature of scientific 
theories specifically, Dray argued that they were required to satisfy two criteria. First,  
“they must increase our predictive power, i.e., have the characteristic of  generality,” 
and second, “they must explain the phenomena, i.e., have intelligibility.”274 This is an 
interesting argument, in that it seeks to preserve prediction in the absence of laws 
while simultaneously recognising that one need not have a strictly nomothetic theory 
in  order  to  make predictions.  The  theory  of  evolution  by  natural  selection,  for 
instance,  cannot  be  stated  nomothetically.  Thus  it  cannot  be  used  to  predict,  for 
example, the exact body configurations of future organisms. But it  can be used for 
other forms of prediction, such as that famously attributed to the British scientist J. B. 
S. Haldane, who, when asked what might constitute evidence against evolution, is 
said  to  have  replied,  “fossil  rabbits  in  the  Precambrian.”275 While  of  uncertain 
attribution, this is nonetheless a sound prediction. Evolution really does predict that 
no fossil rabbits – indeed, no organism  at all of the organisational complexity of a 
rabbit – should be found in rock strata of that era.  In just this way, Dray argues, 
theories  enable  “us  to  tell  'a  likely  story'.”  And  it  is  this,  Dray  claimed,  which 
distinguished  history  from the  sciences.  For  in  history,  “explanations  are  seldom 
given by means of, or in terms of, theories.”276 In fact, a “theory of the subject matter,” 
Dray  asserts,  “may  excuse an  investigator  from  explaining  a  thing  historically.” 
Historical explanations are only invoked where “what is to be explained cannot be 
understood  merely  by  referring  to  such  systematic  general  knowledge.”277 He 
continues:
We  give  theoretical  explanations  where  our  knowledge  of  the  subject  matter 
allows  explanatory  interpolation;  we  give  historical  ones  where  no  such 
interpolation is licensed – where we have to refer to the peculiar history of what is 
to be explained.278
This makes some sense, especially when considering Dray's contrast between “how 
possibly”  and  “why  necessarily.”  We  need  to  explain  the  seemingly  miraculous 
baseball catch historically. No systematic law or general theory will help us to make 
sense of that particular event. But Dray seems to tacitly define historical explanation 
as an area in which theory is not only  not present, but irrelevant. Historians “often 
274 Dray, Laws and Explanation in History. pp.79-80. (emphasis in original)
275 Richard Dawkins,  The Greatest Show on Earth: The Evidence for Evolution.  Bantam: London, 2009. 
p.147. 
276 Dray, Laws and Explanation in History. p.80.
277 Ibid., p.84. (emphasis in original)
278 Ibid.
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explain,” Dray argues, “by means of, or in terms of, a theory, but there is nothing in 
the  nature  of  such  explanation  which  need  persuade  us  that  we  cannot  explain 
satisfactorily without one.”279 However, by insisting that one of the key characteristics 
of theory is generality, Dray is effectively invoking the familiar argument that science 
is the study of the general,and history the particular.  It  would be “very natural,” 
argues  Dray,  “to  draw  a  sharp  contrast  between  historical  explanations  and  all  
theoretical ones.”280 
But in setting up such a division, Dray invites the question: is the historical/narrative 
mode really a species of explanation that science can never  encounter? Consider the 
following example. Approximately 65 million years ago, a significant fraction of all 
life  on  Earth  perished  (geologically  speaking)  quite  suddenly,  including  –  most 
famously – the dinosaurs. For geologists, this event marks a convenient boundary 
between what are known as the Cretaceous and Tertiary Periods. This event is often 
referred to in shorthand as the K/T boundary or the K/T extinction.281 There are 
several  competing  explanations  for  why  this  extinction  might  have  occurred, 
although  only  two  enjoy  significant  levels  of  empirical  support.  The  first  is  the 
meteor impact hypothesis, which cites as evidence the remains of an impact crater 
near Chicxulub in the Yucatan region of Mexico which dates to the appropriate time 
period, and the elevated presence of the rare metal iridium in clays of K/T age. From 
this it is hypothesised that an object approximately 10 kilometres in diameter struck 
the Earth at the K/T boundary. Ejected material from this impact is believed to have 
caused sudden and severe climate change, which led to mass extinction. The second 
theory  is  more  gradualist,  citing  increased  volcanism  toward  the  end  of  the 
Cretaceous (perhaps in the formation in India known as the Deccan Traps, which is  
thought to have produced large quantities of lava at that time) as driving the climatic 
changes which led to the extinction. 
By  Dray's  own  logic,  these  are  examples  of  historical explanation  attempting  to 
address a specifically “how possibly” problem. And indeed, it is difficult to disagree 
with this. The real question is: does that make them inherently unscientific? By Dray's 
279 Ibid., p.81.
280 Ibid., p.84. (emphasis in original)
281 K is an abbreviation for the Cretaceous Period derived from the German name Kreidezeit, whereas 
T is  an abbreviation representing the Tertiary Period.  It  is  worth noting that  the term Tertiary 
Period is now no longer in wide use among geologists.  The time period it  represented is  now 
distributed between two periods, the Paleogene and the Neogene. Thus, the extinction event might 
also be correctly referred to as the K/Pg event. 
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logic, even though the language of theory is present, neither of the two theories on 
offer  possesses  the  required  quality  of  generality.  Rather  they  are  aimed  at  the 
explication of one particular event – just one extinction among the several our planet 
has endured. They aim to show, in Dray's words, that such an extinction event was 
possible  and  thus  “need  not  have  caused  surprise.”282 Moreover,  both  are  only 
technical theories to the extent that they mobilise other scientific concepts in service 
of their own explanatory project. In Dray's terms, a  properly  theoretical – and thus 
properly  scientific – explanation would be one that assimilated the K/T extinction 
into a wider theory of extinctions in general. But such a theory, were it even possible, 
would, as Dray has said, “excuse” the “investigator from explaining... historically.”283 
In that case, neither of these theories of the K/T extinction would have any need to 
exist  at all, unless it was as  history  rather than science. Thus, in Dray's terms, we 
would be more correct  in speaking of the meteor impact  narrative  rather than the 
meteor impact  theory.  And yet,  it  seems entirely appropriate to refer to the above 
examples as not only  theories,  but as theories which belong firmly in the domain of 
the sciences. Such is the price of insisting on broad generality as a necessary criterion 
of scientific theories. More importantly, if these theories of the K/T extinction really 
are narratives in the sense Dray would understand them, then we might also wish to 
point out that we are not required to equivocate or otherwise hedge our use of the 
word “cause” in advancing them. These two theories are enquiring – in the strongest 
sense of the term – into the causes of the K/T extinction, requiring no “peculiar logic” 
to  do  so.  This  raises  several  questions.  Why  does  Dray  insist  that  his  model  is 
separate from the sciences? If it is not strictly necessary to use general theories to do 
explanatory work even in acknowledged sciences such as geology and paleontology, 
then has Dray's “how possibly” model not offered us another way to explain which is 
independent of  any one discipline? What is to stop us from granting Dray's  “how 
possibly” narratives the status of scientific theories? After all, that is how the various 
attempts to explain the causes of the K/T extinction are referred to. Where did Dray's 
insistence on the generality of theory come from if its only contribution was to wall 
history off from the wider world of science? 
The  answer  would  appear  to  be,  once  again,  the  nomothetic  assumption.  Dray's 
substitution of general  theory for general  law, while perhaps making for  a better 
definition  of  science  than  the  strictly  nomothetic-deductive  model  can  provide, 
282 Dray, 'Explanatory Narrative in History,' p.17. 
283 Dray, Laws and Explanation in History. p.84. (emphasis in original)
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ultimately  fails  to  underscore  an  impermeable  boundary  between  history  and 
science. Or, more specifically, it fails to do so if we approach it with a more modern 
understanding of scientific theory and practice. Yet Dray seems to have invoked this 
substitution of theory for law for no other reason than to erect just such a boundary.  
This seemingly perplexing move can only be made sense of when considered in the 
light of the nomothetic assumption. For, if that assumption were accepted by Dray, 
then allowing the walls between history and science to become permeable would be 
functionally equivalent to conceding the central argument of the covering lawyers 
and be thus committed to finding a way to apply both general laws and general 
theories to human history. From our previous examination of his work, it is clear that  
Dray did not think that this could be successfully done. The justification of such a 
boundary was therefore essential if Dray was to clear a space for history in which he 
might argue for a separate mode of explanation based on his ideas of narrative. So 
while Dray, it seems, did not himself accept a purely nomothetic vision of science, he 
remained committed enough to the worldview that vision had been used to establish 
to attempt to re-legitimise it by other means. This was the purpose of his suggested 
division between general theories and historical particularism. But, as we have seen,  
as a criterion for demarcation it excludes too much. 
Indeed, the fact that even someone as sceptical of the nomothetic-deductive model as 
Dray had a clearly identifiable vestigial  variant  of  it  underwriting his  account  of 
historical  explanation,  represents  good  evidence  that  narrative  separatism  was 
quickly becoming a sublimated axiom among philosophers of history,  regardless of 
their  expressed view of  the  nature  of  science and its  relationship to  history.  Any 
model which was based on narrative as a means of explanation, it was effectively 
assumed,  could not  be  scientific  –  irrespective  of  whether  or  not  one  thought  of 
science  in  explicitly  nomothetic  terms  or  not.  Despite  having  argued against  the 
centrality of  laws as agents of  explanation,  Dray had nonetheless constructed his 
model of historical explanation in such a way as to maintain the division which that 
centrality had engineered. In just this manner, philosophy of history began to move 
from its  mid-twentieth  century  period  of  intense  debate  over  the  nature  of  both 
history and science into a period in which narrative philosophy was ascendant, and 
the question of history's relationship to science was considered effectively settled. 
Philosophy  of  history  was  moving  down  a  path  of  narrative  separatism,  which 
would ultimately culminate in a rhetorical reversal of fortunes in which narrative 
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theorists  and philosophers would claim that,  rather than history being subsumed 
into the sciences, the reverse would be far more appropriate. 
We will see more of this argument later in this chapter when we come to the work of  
the  philosophers  of  history  Louis  Mink  and  Hayden  White,  as  well  as  the 
philosopher  and historian of  science  Thomas  Kuhn.  It  will  suffice  to  say  for  the 
moment that Dray, writing in 1957, certainly did not intend to go as far as  that. Yet 
that is where all attempts to claim narrative as a totally separate mode of knowledge 
would ultimately end up, if only because the task of adequately defining narrative 
epistemically  while  still  maintaining  a  clear  narrative  separatism  (and  thus 
preserving historical autonomy) was exceedingly difficult. The literary interpretation 
of the term 'narrative,'  however,  had the advantage of  at  least  seeming intuitively 
plausible. Moreover, if history really  were separated from the sciences by its use of 
narrative (an assumption that was seemingly becoming received wisdom) then what 
need was there to define narrative in anything other than its own terms? Epistemic-
narrative was hard. The likening of the meaning of “narrative” with “fiction,” on the 
other hand, seemed, if not exactly licensed, then at least permitted. For if narrative was 
not  seen  as  scientific  in  any  sense,  then  what  reason  could  there  be  to  prefer  a  
scientific – or even epistemic – interpretation of it? To illustrate this crucial shift in 
perspective,  we  shall  now  turn  to  the  example  of  W.  B.  Gallie,  one  of  the  first  
narrativist  philosophers  of  history  to  take  a  distinctly  literary  approach  to  the 
definition of the term. Gallie's example will prove instructive here not only because 
of his literary leanings, but also because of his attempt to actively claim the failure of 
scholars like Walsh and Dray to adequately define the term “narrative” epistemically 
as evidence for his own views. 
W. B. Gallie and The Literary Interpretation of Narrative
As a philosopher of history, W. B. Gallie was – like Dray, Gardiner, and Walsh before 
him – ostensibly concerned with finding some middle way between the perceived 
extremes of idealism and covering law positivism. His principal work devoted to this 
end was his 1964 book Philosophy and the Historical Understanding.284 Much like Walsh 
284 W. B. Gallie,  Philosophy and the Historical Understanding.  2nd Edition. Schocken Books: New York, 
1968. It should be noted that much of this book had previously appeared before 1964 as academic  
papers. See: W. B. Gallie, 'The Historical Understanding,'  History and Theory.  Vol. 3, No. 2 (1963). 
pp.149-202. See also: W. B. Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts,'  Proceedings of the Aristotelian  
Society. New Series, Vol. 56 (1955-1956). pp.167-198.
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and his desire to find a “plausible idealism,” however, Gallie was, in practice,  far 
more sympathetic  toward the idealists  than the covering lawyers.  He makes  this 
abundantly  clear  in  the  preface  to  the  1968 second edition of  Philosophy  and The 
Historical Understanding:
The writing of this book was an essay in revivalism. I wanted to breathe new life 
into a way of philosophising which had shot up vigourously around the turn of 
the last century... The central idea of that movement, of which Windelband and 
Rickert and later Croce and Collingwood were the main spokesmen, was that the 
way we understand history is basically the same as that in which we understand 
all  purposive  thought  and  action,  and  radically  unlike  the  way  in  which  we 
understand natural phenomena as instances of some scientific law or theory.285
The reason this “way of philosophising” required “new life” at all,  Gallie argued, 
was because previous idealist philosophers had failed to find a “sufficiently clear-cut 
and arresting starting-point from which to shake the entrenched presuppositions of 
the dominant empiricist epistemology” of that time. This had, in turn, relegated their  
arguments to the level  of mere “methodological  concern...  peripheral to  the main 
issues of philosophy.” Such concerns were, from Gallie's perspective, far beneath the 
dignity  of  history.  Proper  “historical  understanding,”  as  Gallie  called  it,  was 
potentially  relevant  to  “the  whole  range  of  human  knowledge.”286 Previous 
philosophers of  history had failed  to comprehend this  expanded role  for  history, 
Gallie  argued,  as  they  had  focused  too  heavily  on  the  justification of  historical 
conclusions. 
To make sense of this claim, it must be remembered that, at the time at which Gallie  
was writing, almost all debate in the philosophy of history consisted of arguments as 
to  whether  the  truth  of  an  historical  proposition  was  underwritten  by  logical 
entailment (as in the covering law approach), empathic understanding (as in classical 
idealism), or some other as-yet-unknown mechanism. Concerns with such technical 
minutiae,  in  Gallie's  opinion,  had  prevented  philosophers  from  forming  a  truly 
comprehensive  historical  epistemology  which  might  survive  outside  of  history 
departments.  “With  hardly  an  exception,”  he  argues,  philosophers  of  history 
“persistently confuse delineations and analyses of historical understanding – or, if it 
be  preferred,  the  task  of  marking  it  off  from  the  kind  of  understanding  that  is 
achieved in the sciences – with the problem of its vindication...”287 In other words, 
285 Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding. p.1. 
286 Ibid.
287 Ibid., pp.11-12.
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Gallie did not see the definition of what was science and what was history as resting 
solely on methods of  justification (and by extension,  explanation).  Instead he saw 
history and science as entirely different epistemologies. So completely different, in fact, 
that it was meaningless to argue over some arbitrary border between them. Rather 
than attempt (as Walsh and Dray had) to show that narrative could function as an 
explanatory mechanism in history, Gallie instead argued that historical knowledge 
had  no  need  for  –  or  even  an  ability  to  impart  meaning  to  –  the  concept  of  
“explanation.” This did not mean, however, that Gallie did not have an opinion on 
the  form of  properly  historical  knowledge.  The  native  form  in  which  knowledge 
ought to be expressed on the historical side of the history/science divide, he argued, 
was narrative. And narrative was ultimately, for Gallie, a species of story. Indeed, it 
was this quality of story which separated historical knowledge from the sciences. “If 
it is true,” he argued, “that in the physical sciences there is always a theory, it is no 
less  true  that  in  historical  research  there  is  always  a  story.”288 And  the  reason 
historical epistemology had failed to realise this, Gallie claimed, was because no fully 
developed  concept  of  narrative  had  yet  been  offered.  This,  in  turn,  had  made 
questions of justification more complicated than necessary:
... I find it astonishing that no critical philosopher of history has as yet offered us a  
clear account of what it is to follow or to construct an historical narrative. And yet 
such an account is plainly essential to any successful answers to more complicated 
questions regarding either the nature or the vindication of historical thinking. The 
effects of this omission are as great as those that we might expect if in philosophies 
of  science  we  were  to  find  no  discussion  of  measurement  or  of  controlled 
observation.289
Gallie  saw  the  correction  of  this  failure  as  his  unique  contribution  to  the  post-
covering law rehabilitation of  idealism. Due to this  idealist  sympathies,  however, 
Gallie was heavily infuenced by R. G. Collingwood's famed division between the 
“inside” and “outside” of historical events. He thus sought to frame his work as a 
corrective to  Collingwood's  idealist  thesis,  rather than its undertaker.290 To do this, 
Gallie chose to define his vision of narrative as a mode of explanation purely for the 
“inside”  of  events  –  those  aspects  of  history  inextricably  bound up with  human 
thoughts and intentions. This philosophical commitment, however, left Gallie with a 
very  different  problem  to  solve  than  any  faced  by  Walsh  or  Dray.  Rather  than 
building  a  concept  of  narrative  as  a  mind-external  construction  from  empirical 
288 Ibid., p.72.
289 Ibid., p.12.
290 Ibid., pp.56-59.
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evidence,  Gallie's  vision  of  narrative  was  designed  primarily  to  be  a  direct 
replacement for empathy, intentionally reproducing an idealist emphasis on the inner 
workings of human cognition. A narrative, for Gallie, was  exclusively  about human 
actions, and could only be interpreted – or “followed” – if this was so. And it was this 
facet of Gallie's narrativism which provided the distinction between historical and 
scientific understanding:
The  events  that  lie  back  of  the  origin  of  language,  of  the  family,  of  law  and 
government  are  obvious  examples.  Now  these  events  might  conceivably  be 
reconstructed  anyhow  in  schematic  outline,  by  biological  or  psychological 
theorists, working from evidence that is appropriate to their methods and theories. 
And  such  reconstructions  might,  conceivably,  profoundly  affect  our  ways  of 
thinking about all human beings and human societies. But would we regard them 
as history? I do not think so. For presumably these hypothetical reconstructions 
would deal with changes in human life that were not subject to conscious purpose 
and control. And it is certainly part of our idea of history that it shall deal with 
human actions, efforts and purposes which we can recognise as akin to our own. 
Hence  the  supposed  biological  or  psychological  reconstructions  would  at  best 
supply  part  of  the  naturalistic  background  of  history,  along  with  many  other 
biological, geological and astronomical descriptions.291
In order to  devise a definition of  narrative which might adequately express such 
uniquely historical  understandings of  human conscious purpose,  Gallie turned to 
another human-centric construction – the concept of story. For Gallie, narratives were 
essentially stories which possessed an additional quality of standing in some kind of 
relationship  to  historical  evidence.  While  Gallie  was  certainly  aware  of  the 
importance of this evidential relationship, he argued that it was not evidence or the 
manner of its  use which made historical knowledge different from the sciences. 292 
Instead it was this property of narrative – of story. All that this achieves, however, is a 
transference of the requirement for definition from one term to another. To make any 
sense of Gallie's account of narrative, therefore, we must examine what he means by 
the term “story.” 
“Every story,” Gallie argues, “describes a sequence of actions and experiences of a 
number of people, real or imaginary.” These narrative subjects are then “presented in  
some characteristic  human situation,” which they must infuence or alter through 
some deliberate action. This often gives rise to a “predicament,  calling for urgent 
thought  and action from one or  more  of  the main characters.”  This  confict  then 
“brings the story to within sight of its conclusion.” This is only one aspect of a story, 
291 Ibid., pp.51-52.
292 Ibid., p.71.
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however,  as  a  story  must  also  possess  an  intelligible  logical  development.  This 
development,  however,  is  more  than  merely  “understanding  words,  sentences, 
paragraphs, set out in order.” Rather it is to “understand the successive actions and 
thoughts and feelings of certain described characters with a peculiar directness, and 
to  be  pulled  forward  by  this  development  almost  against  our  will.”  This  initial 
definition  might  be  too  fimsy  for  general  discussion,  Gallie  concedes,  but  it  is 
broadly defensible as a “rough sketch-map of the area.” Gallie then goes on to offer  
better  definitions  of  three  of  the  key  terms  laid  out  in  this  map:  “conclusion,” 
“following,” and “interest.”293
“Conclusion” argues Gallie, is a fundamental property of story (and, by extension, 
narrative),  which  represents  the  outcome of  historical  understanding,  and  is  “a 
different kind of conclusion from that which is synonymous with 'statement proved' 
or 'result deduced or predicted'.”294 Likewise, to “follow” a narrative is not merely to 
predict the  conclusion  to  which  it  is  leading,  or  to  see  that  “some  earlier  event 
necessitated  a  later  one,”  but  instead  to  see  “that  a  later  event  required,  as  its 
necessary  condition,  some  earlier  one.”295 This  lends  intelligibility to  a  narrative, 
which is the basis of its ability to be followed:
...  almost  every  incident  in  a  story  requires,  as  a  necessary  condition  of  its 
intelligibility,  its  acceptability,  some indication  of  the  kind  of  event  or  context 
which occasioned or evoked it, or, at the very least, made it possible. This relation, 
rather than the predictability of certain events given the occurrence of others, is 
the main bond of logical continuity in any story.296
In this respect, Gallie's “following” resembles Dray's rejoinder to relate events so that 
they  “need  not  have  caused  surprise,”  related  in  a  literary  rather  than  a  causal 
vocabulary.  Gallie's  quality  of  “interest,”  however,  has  no  clear  antecedents.  For 
Gallie,  the  desire to  follow  a  narrative  comes  from  a  quality  of  “interest”  in  its 
conclusion. “The conclusion of a story,” he argues, “guides our interest almost from 
the start.” When one is introduced to the principal characters of a story, Gallie claims, 
one begins “so to speak, to live in them and with them, we are willing to go with 
them, to follow them, in almost any direction. They interest us, and all we can ask is 
'What will happen to them now?' and 'What will happen to them next?'” And this 
interest  ultimately,  Gallie  argues,  naturally  becomes  an  investment  in  the  story's 
293 Ibid., pp.22-23.
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conclusion:  “'How will  things  turn out  for  them  in  the  end?'”297 This  interplay of 
interest and conclusion Gallie refers to as “teleologically guided” attention.298
“Can this analysis of story,” Gallie asks, “help us to articulate what is peculiar to 
historical understanding?” Moreover, is an “element of story or narrative... essential 
to all history”? Gallie answers in the affirmative in both cases. It should be noted, 
however,  that  Gallie  almost  immediately  moves  to  qualify  this.  For  given  the 
immense variety of material which might legitimately called history (even counting 
only that which meets Gallie's criteria of concern with purposive human action), the 
criteria of narrative would have to be a good deal  more fexible  than this.  Gallie 
argues, however, that “a great deal of historical literature is ancillary to or parasitic 
upon history of  a  more  central  and  substantial  kind.”299 Such “ancillary”  history 
consists of “not only the production of lists, accounts, diary jottings, etc., as evidence 
for or against some generally accepted conclusion” but also:
... the kind of book or article which sets itself the modest purpose of filling in the 
background to certain major and already deeply studied events,  and again the 
ever-increasing amount of discussion between leading historians as to the proper 
or most profitable line of approach to and interpretation of different topics and 
periods.300
Such historical material, Gallie argued, could safely be dismissed from consideration 
as merely providing support for those more important histories which “treat of some 
major  achievement  or  failure of  men living and working together,  in  societies  or 
nations  or  any  other  lastingly  organised  groups.”  Although  the  dry  style  and 
emphasis on the complexities of causation might cause even this kind of history to  
offend “against both romance and simplicity,” and while also conceding that “every 
genuine work of history is also a work of reason, of judgement, of hypotheses, of 
explanation,” Gallie nevertheless maintained that history was “a species of the genus 
Story” because its appreciation and usefulness of such works were realised through 
“following” and “interest.”301 Gallie contrasted this view with understanding in the 
sciences:
To appreciate, and in a proper sense, to use, a book or a chapter of history means 
to read it through; to follow it through; to follow it in the light of its promised or 
297 Ibid., p.28. (emphasis in original)
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adumbrated outcome through a succession of contingencies, and not simply to be 
interested in what resulted or could be inferred as due to result from certain initial 
conditions. Both the natural and the social sciences are particularly and properly 
interested in results in this sense, since it is their logically required and predicted 
results  that  prove  their  laws  and  hypotheses  right  or  wrong.  The  systematic 
sciences do not aim at giving us a followable account of what actually happened in 
any  natural  or  social  process:  what  they  offer  us  is  idealisations  or  simplified 
models of the sorts of thing that should have happened, if their currently accepted 
laws and theories are to be trusted, and from which further testable deductions 
can be made. But history, like all stories and all imaginative literature, is as much a 
journey as an arrival, as much an approach as a result. Again, every genuine work 
of  history  is  read  in  this  way  because  its  subject-matter  is  felt  to  be  worth 
following – through contingencies,  accidents,  setbacks,  and all  the multifarious 
details of its development. And what does this mean if not that its subject-matter is 
of compelling human interest...302
That is, histories can only be made sense of  as a whole.  If  one wishes to properly 
understand a work of history, one cannot merely skip to the final page and read the 
concluding remarks. The same is not true, Gallie claims, in scientific works. 
And so we arrive at a fairly traditional understanding of history as a particularistic 
study of past human affairs. But, Gallie argued, his addition of a developed concept 
of narrative to the philosophy of history has important additional consequences. For 
by  defining historical  understanding  as  fowing from the  component  concepts  of 
narrative,  Gallie  claimed  to  have  brought  the  philosophy  of  history  out  of  the 
methodological ghetto to which it had traditionally been relegated, and allowed it to 
be  applied  anywhere his  narrative  criteria  are  met.  Thus “history,”  Gallie  argued, 
“conceived as a form of understanding, has a proper concern with every other field and 
form  of  knowledge  and  understanding.”303 All knowledge-generating  disciplines 
have experienced historical development to get to their present moments, and these 
developments, being temporal and particular, could only be understood historically. 
Which,  for  Gallie,  was  functionally  equivalent  to  saying  that  they  could only  be 
understood  through  narrative.  Much  of  the  rest  of  Philosophy  and  the  Historical  
Understanding  is  devoted  to  arguing  this  epistemological  point.  Traditional 
approaches to epistemology, Gallie argued, had focused on the static and timeless, 
either  by  “equating  what  is  knowable  with  what  is  unchanging  (e.g.,  the 
Parmenidean  One,  the  Platonic  Forms,  the  Cartesian  simple  natures)”  or  by 
“restricting  knowledge  and  indeed  all  genuine  thought  within  necessarily  fixed 
limits  (e.g.,  Kantian  a  priori  categories...).”  Because  of  this,  philosophy had often 
302 Ibid., pp.66-67.
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chosen to ignore the “constantly changing and expanding empirical content” implied 
by  such  limits,  focusing  instead  on  the  “fixed  conceptual  framework,  which  is 
enshrined  in  and  imposed  by  the  categories  of  thought  or  of  language.”304 Both 
approaches, Gallie argued, ignore history almost totally. And it was to this failure 
which  Gallie  offered  narrative  and  the  concept  of  historical  understanding  as  a 
corrective. Narrative was, for Gallie,  a way of formally conceptualising change  as 
knowledge. 
It is this facet of Gallie's philosophy of history which he saw as providing a way to 
move beyond the old idealist/positivist dichotomy. By attempting to define history 
as exclusively narrative, and linking it – via the axiomatic assumption of an inherent 
human interest in narrative/story – to human conscious purpose, Gallie believed that 
the naïve intuitionism of empathy was averted. This is because the human interest in 
“following”  a  narrative  and in  its  conclusion  was  a  necessary component  of  the 
definition of narrative itself. It was 'built-in,' so to speak, and thus a problem of form 
rather than  justification. The idealist favour of history was thus preserved, and the 
problem of empathy being used to attempt to justify historical descriptions avoided. 
This constituted Gallie's third way, and was the basis for his entire philosophy of 
history. One area Gallie's narrative did not address, however, was the provision of 
some mechanism by which narrative could be said to explain. We have already seen 
how Walsh and Dray struggled with this question. Gallie's way of dealing with this 
seemingly crucial aspect of historical knowledge, however, was to use the literary 
dimension of his vision of narrative to argue that explanation was simply not an 
issue history was required to address.  This  was just  one way in which a literary 
vision of narrative could be used to evade the kinds of difficult questions epistemic 
accounts were required to answer. 
The Role of Explanation in Gallie's Model of Narrative
Where historical understanding was, in Gallie's words, “the exercise of the capacity to 
follow a story,” his vision of the role of  explanation was somewhat different.  For 
Gallie, historical narratives only invoked explanation when it was required to make a 
narrative followable. To follow an historical narrative, Gallie argued, “requires the 
acceptance, from time to time, of explanations which have the effect of enabling one 
304 Ibid., p.6. (emphasis in original)
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to follow further when one's vision was becoming blurred or one's credulity taxed 
beyond patience.” This was the “peculiar and all-important role of explanations in 
history.”305 Despite being described as “all-important,” however, it is clear that this 
role is auxiliary to the purpose of history, rather than being the purpose itself.306 This 
assertion, however, can  only be made if one accepts Gallie's argument that history 
(and thus historical understanding) is separated from the sciences by its narrative 
nature,  and  can  therefore  operate  entirely  independently  of  its  epistemic 
requirements. Previous philosophers of history, Gallie argued, had fallen into error 
by failing to grasp this,  and had thus assumed that history and the sciences took 
place in the same epistemic territory:
There  has  been  a  persistent  tendency,  even  in  the  ablest  writers,  to  present 
historical  explanations as so many curiously weakened versions of  the kind of 
explanation that is characteristic of the natural sciences. To speak more exactly, it is 
claimed  or  assumed  that  any  adequate  explanation  must  conform  to  the 
deductivist model, in which a general law or formula, applied to a particular case, 
is  shown to  require,  and hence  logically  to  explain,  a  result  of  such  and such 
description.307
This  was  deeply  misguided,  Gallie  argued,  as  both  history  and  historical 
understanding were oriented toward fundamentally different ends. Indeed, even if 
an “historic incident or development” provided “a model instance of some scientific 
law,” the historian might:
... remark that the developments he has described conform exactly to the law in 
question. But there is no compelling reason why, in his role of historian, he should 
do so; and if he does, he will mention it as something incidental to his main job, 
which is to present the development as part of a followable, and on the evidence 
acceptable narrative.308
This is a picture of historical and scientific understanding starkly divided according 
to  the  nomothetic  assumption.  Scientific  understanding,  for  Gallie,  was  about 
explanation in terms of laws. Historical understanding, on the other hand, was about 
intelligibility through narrative. This, in Gallie's view, provided several advantages, 
not least of which was the ability to claim that history simply did not need a model of 
explanation. Explanation was something that sciences – and only sciences – did. Thus 
Gallie  could  claim  not  to  need  to  even  address  the  question  of  whether  or  not 
narratives could be said to  explain  the events they described. Certainly a narrative 
305 Ibid., p.105.
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could involve some sort of explanation, but this would be “incidental” to its main 
purpose. And on those occasions when it  was necessary, the explanation so offered 
was presumably underwritten by laws and theories from the sciences, because that is 
what  explanation  means.  Once  again,  then,  we can  see  the nomothetic  assumption 
being indirectly used to shape the philosophy of history. 
Gallie's decision to evade questions of explanation and justification altogether also 
left  him free  to  re-adopt  the  idealist  emphasis  on  human action  and  thought  in 
history  without being forced to assert some form of empathy as an epistemological 
guarantor of its explanatory power. For there was, in his view, no explanation taking 
place which required such a guarantee. Yet Gallie's entire philosophical construction 
depended on his basic assertion that the very concept of narrative itself (not merely 
his own definition of it) was utterly hostile to the possibility of explanation. And that 
assertion was, in turn, based upon the inability of previous narrativists to adequately 
define the concept in such a way as to show it to be explanatory. Of such previous  
attempts at narrativism, Gallie writes:
... our contemporary analysts leave us, and leave the weight of their argument, 
resting  entirely  upon  our  familiarity-bred,  intuitive,  unanalysed  and  indeed 
undiscussed notion of what an historical narrative is and of its resemblances and 
differences to other basic forms of communication.309 
Given  our  previous  examination  of  the  examples  of  Walsh  and  Dray,  we  might 
certainly agree with Gallie's sentiment that their attempts to articulate a vision of 
narrative were unconvincing. It is worth remembering, however, that their attempts 
were doubly so for Gallie. For his stated understanding of what constituted genuine 
explanation was similar to that of the covering lawyers – the ability to show that 
something was a necessary consequence of a general theory or law. Where Dray, as 
we  have  seen,  was  prepared  to  at  least  consider intelligibility as  constituting 
explanation,  Gallie was not.  The unreasonably high bar the nomothetic-deductive 
method had erected for what constituted an explanation, coupled with the failure of 
previous narrativists to offer anything approaching a comprehensive definition of 
narrative, led Gallie to believe that the concept of narrative simply could not function 
in the epistemic sphere. Their failure, in other words, had licenced the abandonment 
of  the  epistemic  dimension  of  narrative  altogether.  For  whatever  the  failings  of 
Gallie's definition of narrative, at least it  was a definition. Moreover, such a literary 
309 Ibid., p.19.
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definition of narrative could be seen (in the light of the nomothetic assumption) as 
the only way in which a narrative vision of history could be made to work. Thus we 
can  see  that  Gallie's  decision  to  abandon  epistemology  and  pursue  a  literary-
narrativist path through the idealist/positivist dichotomy was due, at least in part, to 
a strongly held nomothetic assumption regarding science.
Gallie and Narrative Determinism
Unfortunately,  Gallie's  breaking  up  of  narrative  into  concepts  rooted  in  human 
cognition  –  including  “interest,”  “following,”  and  “conclusion”  –  was  to  have 
additional  far-reaching consequences  for  contemporary philosophy of  history.  For 
this emphasis on human interpretation meant that the terms themselves could shift in 
meaning, depending on the time and place in which they were used/interpreted. 
Thus it was possible that the definition of narrative itself could change over time. Not 
only was the evidentiary material by which we know the past open to interpretation, 
in other words, so were the very meshes and nets by which it was to be organised.  
This was made possible by the particularism inherent in the concepts themselves. 
Take, for  instance, Gallie's  most fexible concept – “interest.” As we have already 
seen,  Gallie's  approach  to  history  allowed him to  focus  on  human intentionality 
without any concomitant requirement to  explain  human actions. This was essential 
because, in Gallie's view, explanation, being characteristic of scientific understanding, 
must  necessarily  be  accomplished  through the  use  of  general  laws  and  theories. 
Producing an explanation of human action, therefore, would require a general law or 
theory of human actions, the possibility of which Gallie believed was self-evidently 
absurd.  There  was no single  fixed theory by which to explain human action,  he 
argued,  only  “interest.”  And  who  could  say  what  might  interest  any  particular 
individual/group at any time? Such concepts could not be formalised or otherwise 
reduced to generalities: 
... there is no history of human beings or societies that cannot and do not, in an 
extended sense of the phrase, speak to us: that do not belong with us in a single – 
no  matter  how fragmentary  –  communication  system.  Thus  there  is  no  single 
study or method of study of the human past per se. To be studied as history, a set of 
past human actions must be felt by members of some human group to belong to 
its past, and to be intelligible and worth understanding from the point of view of 
its present interests.310
310 Ibid., p.52. (emphasis in original)
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In other words, if human conscious purpose is presupposed in narrative – and thus 
in history – it is not an epistemic stretch to then define narrative/history  purely in 
terms of human appreciation/interest. Thus, by Gallie's own argument, while we can 
say that “interest” is fundamental to narrative, we can say nothing more concrete 
about it. The complexity which effectively renders every moment in history unique 
forbids it.  The same is true of the qualities of “following” and “conclusion.” One 
might argue that terms incapable of such refinement are correspondingly weak as 
definitions. In Gallie's view, however, such terms simply do not  require  any further 
definition or formalisation of any kind, and would resist any attempt to provide it.  
This  is  the  basic  shape  of  Gallie's  more  widely  known  argument  regarding 
“essentially contested concepts.” These are concepts like “art” or “democracy,” the 
borders  of  which  are  intuitively  clear,  but  the  more  precise  content  of  which  is 
capable of endless revision and debate. In the case of such concepts, Gallie argues, 
such ceaseless redefinition and argument is not a sign of imprecision or conceptual 
weakness, but is a true expression of the most basic nature of that concept. Hence the  
essentially in  “essentially  contested.”  The  “proper  use”  of  essentially  contested 
concepts, he writes, “involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of 
their users.”311
Removing explanation as a goal for history thus effectively paved the way for what 
was  to  become  a  far  more  literary  understanding  of  history.  For  example,  if 
“following”  (i.e.,  intelligibility)  rather  than  explanation  was  the  proper  object  of 
historical understanding, then the quality of the written narrative description itself –  
that is,  how well it  realised the goal of intelligibility – could potentially become a 
central concern. Thus it is with Gallie that we first begin to see a shift in emphasis 
from the realist/empirical realm to the realm of narrative itself – from content to form. 
Nor is this limited only to the definitional components of Gallie's narrative. Its most 
tangible (and arguably dangerous) manifestation is to be found in Gallie's weakening 
of the notion of “one historical world” – that is, the realist axiom by which no two 
true historical accounts could fundamentally contradict either one another (or indeed 
any true conclusion made in the sciences). This idea, which was so important in the 
work of Gardiner, Walsh and Dray, Gallie instead thought of as:
... an intellectual ideal or device which is essential for the practice of history as we 
know it; but its location, if it must be given one, is in the heads, because in the 
311 Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts,' p.169.
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hopes of  historians. To speak more exactly:  the one historical world is an idea 
without any definite descriptive content, indeed it is not an empirical idea at all.312
This represents nothing less than the transference of what had previously been seen 
as a strong empirical/epistemic issue to the realm of form and convention. In this 
way, the concept of narrative, decoupled from epistemology and aligned with the 
literary, began to be seen as having power to  determine  content rather than merely 
describe it. This, in turn, was possible because Gallie's definition of narrative (and thus 
all  historical  understanding)  placed  such  strong  emphasis  on  the  perceptual 
machinery  of  human  beings.  Gallie's  qualities  of  “interest,”  “conclusion,”  and 
“following,”  were  effectively  meaningless  without  some  reference  to  human 
cognition. A narrative must be of interest to somebody, followable by somebody. They 
cannot be understood apart from this.313 And given the “essentially contested” nature 
of the basic components of Gallie's narratives, the failure of a work of written history 
could be ascribed to either a faw in evidence or logic, or to the assessor's disagreement  
with the author's ability to engender “interest” and/or “following.” Form and content are 
thus blurred together. Thus implied constantly throughout Gallie's work is the idea 
that narratives were inextricably  linked with human consciousness in a way that 
scientific knowledge was not. And it was this focus on human perception which was 
the  driver  of  this  greatly  expanded  role  for  formal  construction  in  historical 
knowledge. 
Gallie's definition of narrative, therefore, represented a radical attempt to dissolve the 
(perceived) problem of intuitionist revival versus nomothetic scientism. That Gallie 
sought to accomplish this by denying that explanation had any place in history was 
certainly inventive. But by predicating his model on human ideals of interest and 
followability,  Gallie  had  effectively  smuggled  a  different  set  of  supposedly  self-
evident intuitionist ideas in through the back door. These ideas, moreover, had been 
implicitly licenced by the assumption that history was utterly removed from scientific 
understanding by its  complexity and inability to  be captured in general  systems. 
More importantly, the form of Gallie's narrative was viewed as so fexible (due to the 
complexity of human interests which underpinned it) that decoding the  form itself 
became a significant part of historical study. These charges would likely not have 
worried Gallie,  of course, as it  was clearly his intention to formulate history as a 
mode of knowledge based on story, fully cognisant of all the connotations the term 
312 Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding. p.59.
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carried. But from such a beginning was born the school of philosophy which viewed 
history  as  a  primarily  literary  phenomenon.  This  was  the  thread  which  would 
provide  a  rationale  for  the  “linguistic  turn”  in  history  and ultimately  led  to  the 
narrative determinism of Louis Mink and Hayden White. If explanation in science 
could  be  shown  to  encompass  a  non-nomothetic  vision  of  explanatory narrative, 
however,  then this  turning away from epistemic issues  in history would become 
unsupportable, and the requirements which Gallie and subsequent narrativists were 
happy  to  dismiss  as  problems  of  scientific  rather  than  historical  understanding 
would begin to reassert themselves. Or, put another way, if Gallie and subsequent 
literary-narrativists are wrong about science, then they are wrong about history. And, 
as we shall see in Part Two, they have been very wrong about science indeed. Purely  
epistemic approaches to narrative, however, were not to be defeated quite so easily. 
In order to demonstrate this, let us now turn to the case of Arthur Danto, a multi-
disciplinary philosopher whose work in the philosophy of history attempted to offer 
precisely the kind of epistemic definition of  an  explanatory narrative which Gallie 
claimed had been lacking from the philosophy of history. 
Arthur Danto and the Logic of Narration
In Arthur Danto's writing on the philosophy of history can be found perhaps the best 
and most complete attempt to clearly define what narratives are, how they relate to 
historical evidence, and how they can function as explanations. Exactly the kind of 
questions,  in  other  words,  that  Gallie  and  subsequent  literary-narrativists  would 
choose  to  abandon or  otherwise  marginalise.  Because  of  this,  Danto's  1965  work 
Analytical Philosophy of History  stands essentially alone in the field.314 While, as we 
shall see, the conclusions Danto reached were not particularly revolutionary – due in 
part to his nomothetic assumptions regarding science – his work in articulating a 
logical form for narrative description is remarkable for its sheer depth alone. Indeed, 
the criticism we have already levelled at the unwillingness and/or inability of Walsh, 
Dray, and Gallie  to  properly define narrative in anything other than oppositional 
terms (that is, primarily useful because it wasn't science) cannot be credibly levelled at 
Danto.  Analytical  Philosophy  of  History  was  oriented  almost  entirely toward  such 
definitional questions. Danto's approach to this problem was to show, by paying the 
314 Arthur C. Danto,  Analytical Philosophy of History.  Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1965. 
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kind of  close attention to definitions which had hitherto been lacking, that  many 
seemingly intractable issues in the philosophy of history were based on little more 
than the conficting usage of terms like “explanation” and “significance.” Thus, the 
Analytical  Philosophy  sought to dissolve problems rather than “solve” them in any 
traditional sense. 
Many of the old structures of idealism are rejected in Danto's analysis. His rebuttal of 
empathy/re-enactment was comprehensive. His argument against any meaningful 
difference  between 'plain'  and  'significant'  narrative  (to  use  Walsh's  phraseology) 
similarly so. His analysis of the class of arguments which insist that the “the past” is 
possessed  of  a  special  nature,  which  requires  a  wholly  different  epistemological 
approach  from that  of  the  sciences,  was ruthlessly  efficient  and presaged  similar 
work in  the  philosophy of  science  by  such philosophers  as  Peter  Kosso.  Largely 
spared Danto's critical appraisal, however, was the notion of narrative as a peculiarly 
historical property  which  might  be  usefully  contrasted  with  a  science  oriented 
exclusively toward generality. Thus, despite his sophistication in other areas, Danto 
essentially reproduced the narrative separatism of his predecessors. “The difference 
between history and science,” Danto argued, “is not that history does and science 
does not employ organizing schemes which go beyond what is given. Both do. The 
difference has to do with the kind of organizing schemes employed by each. History 
tells stories.”315 Danto's notions of science, therefore, were deeply implicated in his 
definition of both narrative and history as a whole.
Danto constructed his model of history by collecting together the consequences of a 
series  of  careful  definitional  arguments  regarding  what  it  is  to  call  something 
“history.” And these arguments are worth examining here in some detail,  as they 
explicitly contrast historical knowledge with that of the sciences at every step. More 
specifically, Danto sought to identify what history did that the sciences did not, and 
to build his definition of both history and narrative upon any points of difference so 
identified. This not only reveals Danto's own presuppositions about science, it also 
effectively renders his entire vision of history dependent upon the correctness of those 
presuppositions. Before even beginning to speculate as to the nature of narrative and 
historical  explanation,  however,  Danto  sought  to  isolate  exactly  what  a  narrative 
would be required to explain and what might safely be jettisoned. To do this,  he 
315 Danto, Narration and Knowledge. p.111. (emphasis in original)
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devoted a chapter of the Analytical Philosophy to establishing a firm logical difference 
between what he called “substantive” and “analytical” philosophies of history. Danto 
drew this distinction in order to make a clear point about the nature of historical  
knowledge.  “Substantive  philosophers  of  history,”  were,  Danto  argued,  like 
historians in that they were “concerned to give accounts of what happened in the 
past.” But where historians had this as their  only aim, Danto claimed, substantive 
philosophers of history sought “to give an account of the whole of history.” And this 
(since one can only assume that history is an ongoing concern and that the events of  
today will be fodder for the historians of tomorrow), must necessarily include the 
future. Thus, writes Danto, the “substantive philosophy of history is an attempt to 
discover a kind of theory concerned with the... notion of the whole of history.” These 
theories  could  be  either  descriptive  or  explanatory.  A descriptive  theory  would 
attempt to “show a pattern amongst the events which make up the whole past, and 
to  project  this  pattern into  the future,”  whereas  an explanatory theory would be  
additional to this, an attempt to “account for this pattern in causal terms.” Danto 
compares the difference between these two approaches to the difference between the 
descriptive  theory  of  planetary  motion  offered  by  Kepler,  and  the  explanatory 
approach (via universal gravitation) of Newton.316 
Yet,  Danto argued, all  attempts at such “substantive” philosophies of history had 
been  manifestly  unsuccessful.  The  reasons  for  this,  he  argued,  were  two.  First,  
because philosophies of history have been (when compared to laws and theories in 
the sciences) “unspeakably inept,  with almost no power to predict.”  And second, 
because such an analogy reduced the actual practices and products of the discipline 
of history to the level of mere data-gathering – useless without further synthesis. In 
other words, the “substantive” approach divorced the  making  of factual statements 
from their interpretation. In such a view, the tightly focused historical monograph or 
journal publication which makes up the bulk of modern historical scholarship would 
be equivalent to the tables of data from which, for example, Kepler distilled his laws 
of  planetary  motion.  Yet,  to  say  that  there  were  not  arguments  being  made  and 
interpretation of evidence being performed in even the most minutiae-obsessed of 
historical publications, Danto argued, was absurd. Historical explanation, whatever 
its nature, could not only be taking place at the level of grand laws. For this reason, 
Danto concluded that history must be some other form of knowledge underwritten 
316 Ibid., pp.1-3. (emphasis in original)
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by an entirely different explanatory process. “If we think,” he wrote, “of ordinary 
historical  accounts  (and not  even just  the  best  of  these),  they  seem to  be  highly 
developed instances in their  own genre, satisfying criteria applicable to that genre, 
and throwing into relief the way in which philosophies of history fail miserably to 
satisfy the criteria for a scientific theory.”317 This, of course, begged the question as to 
just what “genre” history belonged to if historical accounts/explanations could not 
be captured by the nomothetic model. The answer, Danto asserted, lay in the concept 
of narrative. From a dissatisfaction with past attempts to replicate the nomothetic 
ideal  of  science  within  history,  therefore,  Danto  began to  construct  his  narrative 
alternative. But before saying precisely how narrative operated, Danto first had to 
define it in such a way as to allow the exclusively past-focused academic history he 
wished to preserve to be separated from the grand “substantive” philosophies of 
history he wished to exclude. Moreover, he also had to make sure that both might be 
firmly distinguished from the nomothetic sciences. Or, put another way, he had to 
make history  historical. Danto achieved both of these goals through the concept he 
variously called “meaning” or “significance.” 
'Significance' as the Basis for Danto's Narrative 
Danto's concept of “meaning”/”significance” was the most basic building block of 
his  definition  of  narrative.  It  was  not  only  the  most  fundamental  property  of 
narrative, but also the single basic characteristic which was to firmly and completely 
divide historical  from scientific knowledge.  All historical  accounts,  Danto argued, 
employed some sense of “meaning,” whereas explanations in the sciences did not. 
Philosophies of history, he wrote:
...  tend to give interpretations of  sequences of  happenings which are very like 
what one finds in history, and very unlike what one finds in science. Philosophies 
of history make use of a concept of interpretation which it seems to me would be 
grossly inappropriate in science, namely a certain concept of meaning.318
From the route by which Danto has arrived at not only the need to separate history 
and science but the method (“meaning”) by which he has done so, we can see a clear  
acceptance of a nomothetically conceived science in which the “power to predict” is a 
required  test  for  membership.  Danto  is  effectively  pointing  out  that  the  reason 
substantive  philosophies  of  history (such as  those  of  Vico,  Hegel,  or  Marx)  have 
317 Ibid., p.5. (emphasis added)
318 Ibid., p.7.
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failed when judged by the standards of nomothetic science is because they simply 
aren't science,  despite  their  focus  on  reduction  and  prediction.  For  even  these 
substantive accounts, Danto claims, are working instead within an entirely different 
mode  of  knowledge.  That  is,  they  are  producing  narrative accounts  of  the  past, 
oriented around a central idea of “meaning” or “significance.” And it is  this idea, 
Danto argues, which is both the source of the illegitimacy of substantive philosophies 
of history, and the key to successfully formalising narrative as an epistemology.
On the surface, Danto's arguments for the necessity of “meaning” or “significance” as 
concepts seem similar to those of Gallie. Gallie, it will be recalled, chose to define 
narrative in terms which relied specifically on the machinery of human cognition in 
order to gain any content at all. Danto's vision of “meaning,” however, was more 
empirically  grounded.  For  Danto,  the  terms  “meaning”  and “significance,”  when 
applied  to  historical  events/objects,  acquired  content  not  from  some  unknown 
process of the human mind, but from other events/objects. More specifically, an earlier 
event/object acquired a sense of “significance” because it had some important causal 
relation to a later event/object. Thus the concept of meaning, Danto argued, must be 
logically and inherently temporal. “It is only retrospectively,” he writes:
... that we are entitled to say that an episode has a given specific meaning, and 
then only with respect to the total work. But information concerning the total work 
is  just  what  we lack when we  are  going  through it  for  the  first  time:  then,  if 
something strikes us as meaningless, we have to wait and see whether it is so: and 
if something seems to us to have a certain meaning, then again, we must wait and 
see  if  we  are  right.  We  are  often  obliged  to  revise  our  views  concerning  the 
meaning of an episode,  in the light of what happens afterwards. This  sense of 
meaning has application in history too. Now that the French Revolution is over, 
we can say what was the significance of the Tennis Court Oath – something which 
even the participants in that event might have been wildly wrong about.319
In  this  way,  Danto  both  introduces  and  justifies  the  intuitively  familiar  form  of 
narrative as some kind of account over time. Simultaneously, Danto also succeeds in 
logically justifying the stipulation that a narrative can only be created about events in 
the past of the person who produces it. This definitional move not only captures the 
exclusive focus of actual historians on the explication of events in their own past, but 
also has the additional advantage of showing the efforts of  substantive philosophers 
of history to be deeply misguided. For the temporal nature of “meaning” and/or 
”significance” would mean that the substantive philosopher of history who wants to 
319 Ibid., p.8.
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discern the pattern behind the  whole  of history, which must necessarily include the 
future (in its capacity of history-to-be), is making judgements regarding the meaning 
and significance of events that have not yet occurred. Or, if they have occurred, without 
the  re-contextualisation  that  subsequent  events  might  provide.  For  even  if  the 
event/object is extremely ancient, it might yet acquire some new significance on the 
basis  of  some  future  event  or  discovery.  Consider,  for  example,  the  added 
significance for evolutionary biology that certain dinosaur fossils (those creatures of 
the suborder Theropoda) acquired after compelling evidence was discovered that they 
were  the  ancestors  of  modern birds.320 It  is  precisely  this  possibility  of  indefinite 
future addition/revision which is the source of the illegitimacy of the substantive 
philosophy of history, argues Danto. The substantive philosopher of history “is one 
who speaks about the future in a manner which is appropriate only to the past, or 
who speaks of the present in the light of a future treated as a fait accompli.”321 This, for 
Danto, was a profound abuse of the possibility of historical knowledge, and was due 
(at least in part) to a desire to force history into the likeness of nomothetic science. 
And yet that which made such speculative work illegitimate – the temporal nature of 
any  concept  of  “meaning”  and/or  “significance”  –  was  also  that  which  justified 
“ordinary” historical work. 
Danto's  idea  of  a  specifically  historical  “meaning”  or  “significance”  is  also 
fundamentally connected to narrative. “To ask for the significance of an event, in the 
historical sense  of  the  term,”  Danto  argued,  “is  to  ask  a  question  which  can  be 
answered only in the context of a story.”322 And so it was narrative which, for Danto, 
was  the  basis  of  this  unique  form  of  historical  knowledge.  This  was  in  stark 
opposition  to  scientific  form  of  knowledge,  which  was  instead  concerned  with 
prediction and general laws:
The mode of organizing events which is essential to history does not, I shall argue,  
admit of projection into the future, and in this sense the structures in accordance 
with which these organizations are effected are not like scientific theories.323
So, in sum, historical knowledge deployed concepts of “meaning” and “significance” 
which, according to Danto, had no place in the sciences. Moreover, it was those same 
320 This hypothesis  can be traced back to the nineteenth century – specifically to  Thomas Henry 
Huxley himself.  Truly compelling evidence however,  did not  emerge until  the development of 
cladistic  methods  of  anatomical  comparison  during  the  1960s.  See:  Luis  M.  Chiappe,  Glorified 
Dinosaurs: The Origin and Early Evolution of Birds. John Wiley & Sons: Hoboken, New Jersey, 2007.
321 Danto, Narration and Knowledge. p.9. (emphasis in original)
322 Ibid., p.11. (emphasis in original)
323 Ibid., p.15.
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qualities  which  prevented  prediction,  and  thus  –  via  a  nomothetic  assumption 
regarding science – disqualified history from being a science. And, because the event 
itself  and  the  subsequent event  by  which  it  must  acquire  said  significance  are 
necessarily temporally separated (even if only by a very short time), the significance 
of events could  only be told as a story in time – which Danto called a narrative. 
Moreover, Danto argued, the fact that historical events acquired their significance in 
terms of other events meant that it was logically impossible for any account of the past 
to be complete (in the sense of requiring no further revision). For some future event 
might occur which would lend new significance to a past event, and thus require the 
revision of relevant historical accounts. Thus Danto has also provided a consistent 
logical defence for the endless revision and shifts in perspective which characterise 
the  historical  enterprise.  If  one  accepts  the  fow  of  his  logic,  it  seems,  one  is 
committed to a view of history reminiscent of the (almost certainly apocryphal, but 
instructive nonetheless) anecdote usually attributed to the Chinese statesman Zhou 
Enlai. When asked (supposedly by Richard Nixon in 1972) about the impact of the 
French Revolution on Western civilisation, Zhou – a former student of French history 
– is alleged to have replied, “it is too soon to tell.”
Danto and the Explanatory Power of Narrative
In  order  for  Danto's  model  of  narrative to be an  epistemic  model,  however,  he is 
required to say something regarding how narratives relate to explanation. Without 
such an account, his own work on explanation is subject to precisely those failures 
which led Gallie to turn away from the epistemic possibilities of the narrative form 
altogether. Danto's approach to this problem is both prescient and unique, and will 
have  important  implications  for  Part  Two  of  this  thesis.  The  problem with  past 
attempts to integrate narrative and explanation, Danto argued, was that narrativists 
like Walsh and Dray had insisted on the narrative form and the issue of explanation 
as being  separate issues.  And this,  Danto claimed, was simply incorrect.  At best it 
demonstrated a lack of seriousness regarding narrative as an epistemic alternative to 
laws. One did not, for instance, demand a further account of  why nomothetic laws 
constituted explanations. This is because explanation is part of the very definition of 
what a law is. So why was narrative assumed to be so weak as to be required to define 
itself in terms  external to itself? This would seem to be a case of narrativists tacitly 
accepting the inferiority of narrative even as they ostensibly worked to defend it.  
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Much better, Danto argued, to seek the explanatory content of the concept itself. 
In order to demonstrate this, Danto examined the classic example of the separation of 
narrative  and  explanation  as  represented  by  W.  H.  Walsh's  proposed  difference 
between  “plain”  and  “significant”  narrative.  “Plain”  narrative,  it  will  be  recalled 
from Chapter Two, being “an exact description of what happened,” and “significant” 
narrative being aimed “not merely at saying what happened but also at (in some 
sense)  explaining it.”324 This  division,  Danto pointed out,  separated narrative and 
explanation,  meaning  that  the  two  concepts  had  to  be  separately  defined  and 
justified. Danto was unconvinced by such arguments, however, and instead argued 
that to relate any kind of narrative at all was explanation, thus collapsing these two 
processes into one.325 This approach had two key advantages. First, it removed the 
need to  integrate conceptually  separate  discussions  of  explanation with  narrative. 
And second, it removed the requirement to see history as a  transformational method 
(i.e.,  a  process  which  took  the  past  as  input,  and  produced  “proper”  history  as 
output). For Danto, narrative was a  much more fundamental process than that. In 
fact, Danto argued, narrative is that which takes place whenever time-separated events  
are described.  And that description, no matter how seemingly trivial, represents an 
explanation insofar as it links these events in some way. 
Central to these arguments for history as a process which produced narrative, Danto 
argued, was the idea that an account of the past containing no explanatory content 
was not only possible, but practical. Such an account was what Walsh had called “a 
description of the facts restricted to a straightforward statement of what occurred.”326 
From such descriptions, Walsh's argument runs, historians fashioned interpretations 
–  higher  level  structures  which  somehow  explained the  transformations  that  the 
chronicle merely described. “This is,” Danto responds, “a distinction I am unable to 
accept. For I wish to argue that history is of a piece... there is nothing one might call a  
pure description in contrast with something else to be called an interpretation.”327 If it 
is a narrative at all, Danto argued, then it must contain some interpretive (i.e., selected 
according to some criteria of meaning/significance) content:
324 W. H. Walsh,  An Introduction to the Philosophy of History.  Third (Revised) Edition. Hutchinson & 
Co.: London, 1967. p.32.
325 Danto, Narration and Knowledge. p.119.
326 W. H. Walsh, ''Plain' and 'Significant' Narrative in History,' The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 55, No. 11 
(May 1958). p.480.
327 Danto, Narration and Knowledge. p.115.
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I shall say, then, that any narrative is a structure imposed upon events, grouping 
some of them together with others, and ruling some out as lacking relevance. So it 
could not be a distinguishing mark of any given kind of narrative that it does 
this.328
Danto  pushed  this  argument  much  further,  arguing  that  descriptions  of  even 
seemingly  trivial  events/objects  must  contain  explanatory  content.  It  is  not  even 
possible to say, he argues, without involving this fundamental temporal property of 
narrative, that a person is performing an activity like “planting roses.” They might, 
so far as an eyewitness might report after a moment's glance, “just be putting a seed 
in a hole when we describe [them] as 'planting roses,' or simply turning screws when  
we  describe  [them]  as  'repairing  the  radio'.”329 Such  statements  Danto  called 
“narrative sentences.” Such sentences, in Danto's broadest definition, “refer to at least  
two time-separated events though they only describe (are only about) the earliest event 
to which they refer.”330 Such sentences are explanatory in the sense that if we were to 
enquire as to  why someone was, at that very moment, putting a seed in a hole, the 
reply  “they  are  planting  roses”  would  carry  some  explanatory  power.  Narrative 
sentences can be made to explain still further if we choose to draw specifically causal 
links between earlier events and later ones. Similarly,  narrative sentences can also 
have a colligatory function – drawing together disconnected events/objects (such as 
“simply turning screws”) into a higher level theoretical description (“repairing the 
radio”). And in this sense too, explanation is performed. 
Danto's “narrative sentences” are also unique in that their truth value depends upon 
the time at which they are uttered. Therefore, given the constant re-contextualisation 
which (as we have already seen) must always be possible with respect to assessments 
of historical significance, the class of true statements it  is  theoretically possible to 
make about any given past event/object can only grow with temporal distance from 
that event/object. There must, therefore, be  many more true statements which can 
only be made after an event/object than there are true statements which could have 
been made at the time. From this it follows that the vast majority of true statements 
about the past will – being made in hindsight and with selection for significance – 
involve  temporal  displacement,  and  must  therefore  (by  definition)  be  narrative 
sentences. This, coupled with Danto's axiom that one cannot claim to predict (or to 
know  what  will  be  of  significance  in)  the  future,  means  that  the  range  of  true 
328 Ibid., p.132.
329 Ibid., p.160.
330 Ibid., p.143. (emphasis in original)
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statements which one might make about any given past event logically extends from 
the historian's own present as far back into the past as available evidence will take 
you.  Thus  narrative is  better  understood as  a  fundamental  property of  historical 
descriptions themselves, and not an explanatory mechanism which is later applied by 
historians to the raw material of the past.
Danto's  Narratives  Considered  as  Theories,  and  Their  Relationship  to  The 
Scientific
In this sense then, Danto is offering a view of history where almost every statement 
made about the past constitutes a miniature theory which collects evidence in support 
of some conclusion. How can we know that someone is “planting roses”? Because we 
have several  pieces of  evidence which we might draw together  under that  term. 
Danto calls such terms “project verbs.”331 According to this model, an historical entity 
such as “the Second World War” represents a large narrative theory in support of 
which many pieces of evidence – in the form of a myriad of other narrative sentences 
and project verbs – can be cited. No-one is saying, of course, that the very occurrence 
of the war itself could plausibly be falsified at this stage. In that respect, one might 
think of it as an extremely successful theory! But to what extent are we justified in 
referring to those events under that name? Which events/objects should be included 
and which left out? For what reasons? Can we ascribe any properties to “the Second 
World War” as a whole, and if so, by what evidence? This is Danto's vision of history: 
the  deployment  of  interlaced and  interlocking “narrative  sentences”  and “project 
verbs” in order to organise and explain the significance of past events. In Danto's 
view, evidence  never stands alone, it must always be evidence  for  something. And 
that  something  is  not  given,  or  not  only  given,  by  the  evidence  itself.  Temporal 
separation (and the issues of significance which arise from it) ensures this. But this  
raises the question: in what way do these kinds of theoretical structures differ from 
those in the sciences? Danto's answer is to assert that narratives must be localised in 
terms  of  subject.  They  tell  a  particular  story,  in  answer  to  particular historical 
questions:
I  have  been  endorsing  the  view  that  narratives  may  be  regarded  as  kinds  of 
theories,  capable  of  support,  and  introducing,  by  grouping  them  together  in 
certain ways, a kind of order and structure into events. A narrative, so considered, 
is nevertheless localized as to space and time, it forms an answer to an historical 
331 Ibid., p.161. (emphasis in original)
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question, and is accordingly to be distinguished from a general theory which is not 
thus localized, and is not therefore an answer to an historical question.332
And so we arrive at essentially the same argument as that made by Dray. In order for  
theories to be scientific, Danto argues, they must have the quality of generality. They 
cannot be localised. 
But the similarity of Danto's argument to Dray's leaves him vulnerable to the same 
objection: how does a theory like “the Second World War” differ from a theory like 
“the  K/T  extinction”?  Both  are  highly  localised  and  unique  clusters  of  related 
historical  events.  Both  presumably have narrative  explanations.  Why then is  one 
history and the other science? It would seem that, yet again, the possibility that there 
might be scientific questions with narrative answers is simply not considered. One 
might counter, of course, that the Second World War is history (rather than science) 
because it concerns the actions of human beings. But this is not an argument which 
can be established from Danto's model  of  narrative  alone.  In the case of  the K/T 
extinction, any number of narrative sentences could be offered which would satisfy 
Danto's broad definition of the term. Even a comparatively high-level statement such 
as “a meteor impact approximately 65 million years ago caused the extinction of the 
dinosaurs,” for example, satisfies Danto's definition. That is, it concerns two time-
separated  events,  but  is  only  about  the  earlier.  Moreover,  it  clearly  contains 
explanatory content. As we have already seen, however, Danto made it very clear 
that he considered the use of narrative to be the only difference between history and 
the  sciences.  “The  fact,”  he  wrote,  “that  these  sentences  may constitute  in  some 
measure a differentiating stylistic feature of narrative writing is of less interest to me 
than  the  fact  that  use  of  them  suggests  a  differentiating  feature  of  historical 
knowledge.”333 Thus Danto's idea of narrative does surprisingly little heavy lifting in 
service  of  his  history/science  division,  despite  this  being  the  very  division  he 
invoked it to establish. Narrative for Danto was a tool for following the threads of 
localised, particular events, and was thus well suited to human history. But that does 
not explain why it should be considered only a property of human history. Only in 
opposition to a purely generalising vision of science could narrative justify such a 
separation. And if  this assumption regarding science were to prove false,  then so 
would the division. This is not to say that Danto's view of history is not useful (for it  
is potentially profoundly so), only that it rules itself apart from the sciences unjustly. 
332 Ibid., pp.137-138.
333 Ibid., p.143.
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Certainly, Danto succeeded in producing a compelling analytic reconstruction of the 
logic of temporal (i.e., narrative) statements. But, adhering as he did to a nomothetic  
assumption regarding science, he was unable to see the wider potential significance 
of that work. 
Having  attempted  to  argue  that  narrative  (i.e.,  historical)  and  nomothetic  (i.e., 
scientific) explanations were entirely separate, Danto leaves himself with the task of 
showing how these two explanatory models can co-exist. Danto wishes to argue that 
narratives can and do explain. He also, as we have seen, wishes to argue for the 
epistemological autonomy of history. And lastly, he appears to have endorsed that 
realist  'one  world'  axiom by  which  history  and  science,  despite  their  separation, 
could not materially confict. “The claim,” he wrote, “that there are two distinct kinds 
of events – scientific events, which can be predicted and explained, and historical  
events, which cannot – is erroneous. There are not two classes of events, but perhaps 
two  classes  of  descriptions.”334 When  considered  in  light  of  the  nomothetic 
assumption,  however,  these  aims  seem  to  exhibit  some  tension.  The  method  by 
which Danto attempted to resolve this  tension and render these two classes  (the 
narrative and the nomothetic) compatible was through the weakening of the tacit 
assumption that a nomothetic explanation represents a  complete explanation of any 
given phenomenon. He does this by demonstrating that a nomothetic explanation 
cannot explain any given phenomenon across all of its possible descriptions. “There are,” 
Danto argues, “explananda which logically presuppose general laws, and explananda 
which do not.”335 Nomothetic explanations are thus only ever partial. This leverages 
to Danto's advantage his prior claim that true descriptions of any given object/event 
are potentially limitless (if only due to the possibility of later re-contextualisation):
Phenomena  as  such are  not  explained.  It  is  only  phenomena  as  covered  by  a  
description which  are  capable  of  explanation,  and  then,  when  we  speak  of 
explaining  them,  it  must  always  be  with  reference  to  that  description.  So  an 
explanation of a phenomenon must, in the nature of the case, be relativized to a 
description of that phenomenon. But then, if we have explained a phenomenon E, 
as covered by description D, it is always possible to find another description D' of 
E, under which  E cannot be explained with the original explanation. If there are 
indefinitely  many  possible  descriptions  of  a  phenomenon,  there  may  be 
indefinitely many possible explanation of that phenomenon...336
Explanation by means of a general law does not therefore exhaust the possible space 
334 Ibid., p.178. (emphasis added)
335 Ibid., p.218. (emphasis in original)
336 Ibid. (emphasis in original)
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of explanation for any single phenomenon. By way of illustration, Danto offers the 
example  of  Prince  Rainier  III  of  Monaco's  marriage  to  Grace  Kelly.  “During  the 
celebration  of  the  last  fete  nationale  monegasque,”  he  writes,  “the  streets  were 
decorated, as one would expect, with the fag of Monaco. But side by side with these 
were to be found  American fags.” One might wonder – why only American fags? 
Why not German or French? This is a fact which – at least for those uninitiated to the 
facts of the marriage – requires explanation. Such an event, Danto argued, could in 
principle  be covered by a  law.  Perhaps something like:  “whenever a  nation has a 
sovereign of a different national origin than its own citizens, those citizens will, on 
the appropriate occasions, honour that sovereign in some acceptable fashion.” Stating 
the presence of the fags, Kelly's country of origin, and the appropriate nature of the 
fete as  initial  conditions,  one  might – in  theory – deduce  the result.  This  should, 
Danto argued, satisfy even Hempel – if only as an explanation sketch.337 A problem 
arises, however, when one attempts to view this law as predictive. For given only the 
above law and the fact that Grace Kelly was of non-monegasque origin, one would be 
entitled to deduce only that some honour would be paid to her. One would not have 
sufficient information to derive the  specific form of that honour. “One can,” Danto 
points  out,  “honour  a  foreign-born sovereign  without necessarily putting out  the 
fags of that  sovereign's native country.” In other words, the law is  not enough  to 
explain the specific fact  of the fags, for the  same law could potentially cover any 
number of other potential honours. Thus the law does not logically guarantee the 
observed  outcome.338 This  is  not  to  say  that  the  law is  useless,  merely  that  it  is 
incomplete. It can only explain under certain descriptions, which correspondingly limits 
its applicability. And it is the role of narrative, Danto argued, to explain those details 
and cases which laws cannot cover:
… narratives, rather than being simply explanation sketches which mark the place 
where laws are to be inserted, might instead be regarded as the result of taking an 
explanation sketch which makes use of general laws already, these marking the 
place where the description of an  event is to be inserted. That is, where we are 
certain of the law but uncertain as to what precisely happened, the narrative then 
consisting in an account in which the general knowledge of what kind of thing must 
have happened is replaced by the specific knowledge of what specific thing, of the 
required kind, in fact occurred.339
Thus, even if specifically historical laws do govern history, and even if those laws one 
day became known, the historian's task would not be materially altered:
337 Ibid., pp.220-222. (emphasis in original)
338 Ibid., p.226-228.
339 Ibid., p.238. (emphasis in original)
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...  the  task  of  history  itself  would  still  be  to  tell  the  story  of  what  precisely 
happened,  even  if  the  story  should  fall  under  a  general  historical  law  as  an 
instance, and even if the law should be known. History alone would be able to 
exhibit the amazing variety of temporal wholes which none the less all fall under a 
single historical law. Our fascination with the details of the past would, if anything, 
increase.340
Thus is Danto's rapprochement accomplished. In order to provide a truly  complete 
description  of  any  phenomenon,  one  would  require  both laws  and  narratives. 
However, while compelling, this argument fails to address the underlying problem of 
why it is that nomothetic explanations are assumed to be the exclusive province of 
science,  and  narratives  are  assumed  to  be  concerns  that  science  can  never  have. 
Danto has argued eloquently for two fundamental modes of explanation rather than 
one. What he  assumes rather than proves, however, is that only  one of those modes 
ought to be considered science. The difference which makes the difference is, Danto 
claims, the presence of narrative. But, as we have already hinted at in the case of the 
K/T  extinction,  the  use  of  narrative  in  sciences  like  geology,  paleontology,  and 
evolutionary biology is not only possible, but often highly desirable. For the kinds of 
questions asked by these acknowledged sciences are just as likely – perhaps even 
more so – to strain the boundaries of what nomothetic explanation can accomplish as 
any question in human history. Why should they not also avail themselves of Danto's 
insights? Danto's model is thus an extremely successful one in almost all respects. It 
admits  the  existence  and  validity  of  nomothetic  explanation,  and  effectively 
reconciles narrative with it without compromising the explanatory power of either. 
Indeed, as Part Two will show, Danto anticipates much of the substantive content of 
work done in the philosophy of science by authors like David Hull and Peter Kosso. 
Where  Danto  differs  from these  later  philosophers  of  science,  however,  is  in  his 
insistence that scientific explanation can only be performed by means of nomothetic 
laws, and that the use of narrative must therefore shift  historical knowledge into 
some parallel explanatory universe. This effectively renders parochial that which has 
the potential to be a general logic of all temporal phenomena. This is, once again, the 
result of a nomothetic assumption, uncritically held.
Thomas Kuhn's Revision of the Nature of Science
In actuality, Danto's seemingly uncritical acceptance of the nomothetic assumption 
340 Ibid., p.256. (emphasis in original)
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was, as he himself has admitted, largely an accident of timing. In an introduction 
added  to  a  1984  reprint  of  Analytical  Philosophy  of  History,  Danto  wrote:  “the 
Analytical Philosophy of History was conceived and written on the cusp, as it were, of a 
profound revolution in the philosophical conception of science.”341 That revolution 
was the transformation in the perception of science wrought by the publication of 
Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.342 Prior to the profound change 
in scientific thought this work ushered in, Danto argued, philosophy of history had 
been little  more than an extended discussion of  the applicability of  a  nomothetic 
model of knowledge to history. The basic premiss of that model, however,  passed 
largely  unquestioned.  It  was,  Danto argued,  “more or  less  assumed by Hempel's 
opponents...  that  the  model  was  quite  adequate  for  explanation  in  the  natural 
sciences.” What Kuhn represented then, was a “systematic questioning of this entire 
conception of natural science.”343 He accomplished this through what Danto called a 
“historicization” of the philosophy of science:
Instead  of  history  being  connected  to  the  wider  body  of  science  by  a  logical 
Anschluss,  the  natural  sciences  themselves  became  matters  for  the  kinds  of 
interpretation  the  earlier  theorists  had  identified  as  the  methodological 
prerogative of the human sciences: ways of reading the world. To be sure, there 
now really was a unity of science, in the sense that all  of science was brought 
under history rather than, as before, history having been brought under science 
construed on the model of physics.344
In other words, Kuhn had shown (to Danto's satisfaction at least) that history was 
fundamental not merely to the philosophy of science, but to science itself. Because of 
this, Kuhn argued, static, timeless structures (such as the idea of general laws) could 
no longer claim to adequately represent the whole of scientific knowledge. Narrative, 
Danto argued, had “become focal to the philosophy of science itself, construed in the 
post-Kuhnian  period  as  a  thoroughly  historical  undertaking.”  The  Analytical  
Philosophy of History had therefore been written at an awkward time, Danto wrote, as 
the “structures  it  works with and against  were  inherited from the philosophy of 
science as practiced by Hempel.”345 
By the 1980s, Kuhn's Structure had become the most cited English-language academic 
work of the twentieth century.346 Because of this, and because Kuhn's work has been 
341 Ibid., p.ix. (emphasis in original)
342 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1962.
343 Danto, Narration and Knowledge. p.x.
344 Ibid., p.xi. (emphasis in original)
345 Ibid., pp.xii-xiii.
346 E. Garfield, 'The 250 most-cited authors in the Arts and Humanities Citation Index, 1976-1983,'  
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ably and amply discussed elsewhere, there is no need to consider the specifics of his 
argument here. It will suffice merely to say that the Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
was successful in cultivating a historical dimension within the philosophy of science. 
Kuhn accomplished this by building a model of science from a historical analysis of 
its past transformations, rather than attempting – as had been the norm in earlier 
philosophy of science – to establish a static structure of ideal scientific theory and 
practice. Central to Kuhn's argument was his contention that science did not progress 
in a linear fashion. Nor was science a steadily increasing accumulation of reliable 
knowledge which could all be described and understood within a single explanatory 
model.  Kuhn  instead  postulated  that  science  was  periodically  transformed –  the 
“revolutions” of the title – by new overarching worldviews, which did not merely 
add to previous knowledge but displaced it. Kuhn called such worldviews paradigms. 
By choosing this term, Kuhn states:
...  I mean to suggest that some accepted examples of actual scientific practice – 
examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together – 
provide  models  from  which  spring  particular  coherent  traditions  of  scientific 
research. These are the traditions which the historian describes under such rubrics 
as  'Ptolemaic  astronomy'  (or  'Copernican'),  'Aristotelian  dynamics'  (or 
'Newtonian'), 'corpuscular optics' (or 'wave optics'), and so on.347
This meant that the way reality was described in scientific models was a factor in the 
kinds of questions scientific theories/laws could ask, and the kinds of conclusions 
they could intelligibly formulate. And these descriptions, Kuhn argued, need not be 
continuous. For example, the Ptolemaic description of astronomy and the Copernican 
description  were  both  –  despite  being  models  of  a  real  system  –  theoretically 
incommensurable.348 It was impossible, in other words, to understand one paradigm 
from  the  conceptual  viewpoint  of  another.349 Different  paradigms  would  have 
different ideas of what constituted evidence for a proposition, for instance, or even 
different ideas of what a valid proposition was. Copernicus and Ptolemy, for example, 
would  have  seen  something  very  different  in  the  same sunset,  and  would  have 
drawn from it somewhat different conclusions regarding the motion of the Earth – or 
the lack thereof. Paradigms are required to be  internally coherent, but need not be 
coherent with each other.
Current Contents. Vol. 48 (December 1986). pp.3-10.
347 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. p.10.
348 Ibid., pp.111-112.  For  more  on  the  Copernican/Ptolemaic  example  specifically,  see:  Kuhn,  The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. pp.67-69.
349 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. p.103.
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The implication of this incommensurability argument, however, also extended to the 
explanatory  models  of  science  themselves.  For  if  paradigms  really  were 
incommensurable, then one could hardly expect the knowledge generated across all 
paradigms to conform to a single nomothetic-deductive model. Indeed, if this were 
the  case,  it  would  constitute  direct  evidence  against Kuhn's  conclusions.  This 
immediately called into question the positivist doctrine of the methodological unity 
of  knowledge  –  the  claim  that  all knowledge  must  be  of  the  same  (preferably 
nomothetic)  form.  Kuhn  had  effectively  opened  up  the  possibility  that  different 
paradigms  could  have  different  explanatory  models.  As  a  result,  the  Hempelian  
model of explanation came to be accorded far less respect in both the philosophy of 
science and the philosophy of history. From being a paradigm case that any model of 
historical explanation had to either accommodate or plausibly divorce itself from, it  
became merely another voice in the choir. This, it should be remembered, was no bad 
thing. As Part Two will demonstrate, the doctrinaire insistence that something like 
the Hempelian model could capture all of scientific practice was far too reductive. In 
this sense, Kuhn had provided plausible theoretical backing to the idealist concept of 
autonomous epistemic domains. More importantly, he had done so from within the 
philosophy of  science  rather than history. This meant that he could not be seen as a 
partisan  when  cited  in  the  service  of  disputes  in  other  disciplines,  and  perhaps 
explains – at least in part – his popularity as an authority among the humanities. 
By bringing a historical dimension to the sciences, however, Kuhn did not intend to 
destroy science or grant licence to the total abandonment of epistemology. In fact, the 
expanded  role  Kuhn  saw  for  historical  method  and  enquiry  in  the  sciences 
represented exactly the kind of dissolution of barriers between the two fields that this 
thesis would seek to achieve. For Kuhn, the closing of the gap between history and 
science was not a radical demotion of one over the other. For example, in a postscript 
to a later edition of The Structure, Kuhn writes:
To  the  extent  that  the  [Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions] portrays  scientific 
development  as  a  succession  of  tradition-bound  periods  punctuated  by  non-
cumulative  breaks,  its  theses  are  undoubtedly  of  wide  applicability.  But  they 
should be,  for  they are  borrowed from other  fields.  Historians  of  literature,  of 
music, of the arts, of political development, and of many other human activities 
have  long  described  their  subjects  in  the  same way.  Periodization in  terms  of 
revolutionary breaks in style, taste, and institutional structure have been among 
their standard tools. If I have been original with respect to concepts like these, it 
has mainly been by applying them to the sciences, fields which had been widely 
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thought to develop in a different way.350
This hardly seems a damning assessment for the possibility of scientific knowledge. 
Indeed, having made this argument, Kuhn immediately goes on to reaffirm a belief in 
realism and the possibility of scientific progress. He writes:
This book was intended also to make another sort of point, one that has been less  
clearly visible to many of its readers. Though scientific development may resemble 
that in other fields more closely than has often been supposed, it is also strikingly 
different. To say, for example, that the sciences, at least after a certain point in their  
development,  progress in a way that other  fields do not,  cannot have been all 
wrong, whatever progress itself may be. One of the objects of this book was to  
examine such differences and begin accounting for them.351
In  light  of  these statements,  it  seems far  more reasonable to  conclude that  Kuhn 
believed history and science  were  deeply intertwined and complementary,  rather 
than profoundly epistemically mismatched. It would thus seem that it was only if one  
already had a particularly low opinion of the  epistemic possibilities of historical knowledge  
that statements like the above looked like any threat to scientific realism. In order to 
see the intrusion of history into science as a disaster, in other words, one needed a 
view of history more like Gallie's literary-narrativism than Walsh, Dray or Danto's 
epistemic-narrativism.  Gallie,  it  will  be  recalled,  had  a  view  of  historical 
understanding  as  not  only  infinitely  interpretive  and  dependent  on  human 
subjectivity, but also as almost entirely disconnected from epistemology. For anyone 
holding such a dim view of the possibilities for historical knowledge, its intrusion into 
the sciences could hardly be seen as anything less than a total disaster for the latter's 
privileged  epistemic  position.  The  intrusion  of  a  more  epistemic-narrativist  view, 
however,  would mean little more than the taking down of a barrier  between the 
historical and scientific worlds that had had no real reason to exist in the first place.  
To prevent science from being dissolved into irrelevance, in other words, Kuhn was 
in dire need of a principled epistemic model  of history. This is not a problem he 
examined in depth, but the need for it is clear. Such a model would have to be, at a 
minimum, able to conceptualise change in a way that the static, timeless structures of 
the nomothetic-deductive method could not. It will be our contention that not only 
can some variant of Danto's epistemic model of narrative perform such a role, but 
that such a model of history should itself be understood as scientific. But by the time 
Kuhn had offered a window of opportunity for narrative and historical knowledge to 
350 Ibid., p.208.
351 Ibid., p.209.
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be amalgamated into science without being forced into a narrow Hempelian model,  
long years of debate with that model had forced narrativism away from science and 
out of the epistemic sphere altogether. It was, quite simply, too late. 
Louis Mink, Hayden White and the Flight From Epistemology
Consider,  for  example,  the  work  of  pioneering  literary-narrativist  philosopher  of 
history  Louis  Mink.  Like  many  others  of  his  era,  Mink  began  his  career  as  a 
philosopher  of  history  infuenced  by  the  covering  law debate.  “It  could  be  said 
without  exaggeration,”  he  wrote  in  1974,  “that  until  about  1965  the  critical 
philosophy of  history  was  the controversy over the covering-law model.”352 Thus, 
Mink's  own views were  shaped,  in  just  the manner  our previous examples  have 
suggested, by the view that he was opposing. In his 1966 article 'The Autonomy of 
Historical Understanding,'353 for instance, he argued as follows:
Common to all arguments that there is no irreducible difference between historical 
and scientific method is an acceptance of something like these propositions: (1)...  
there  is  a  single  logical  mode  of  explanation.  (This  is  the  principle  of  the 
methodological unity of science.) (2) The explanation of any phenomenon involves 
its  subsumption  under  general  principles...  Specifically,  the  explanation  of  a 
phenomenon  requires  showing  the  statement  describing  it  to  be  a  deductive 
consequence of  a set  of  general  laws...  (This  is  the principle  of  explanation by 
hypothetico-deductive theory.)354
Wishing to evade the consequences of such a strictly nomothetic  view of science, 
Mink went on to frame his own arguments about history in terms of autonomy:
...  the  primary  assumption  of  the  proto-science  view  is  that  there  can  be  no 
legitimate mode of understanding not analyzable by an explicit methodology. If it 
can be shown that history is autonomous, and not proto-science, it must be done, I 
think, not by showing that there is some fact or set of facts which can be explained 
“historically” but not “scientifically,” nor even by providing alternative models of 
scientific explanation, but by a critique of this assumption.355
The paper that followed was essentially a comparison of several features of historical 
practice  which  conficted  with  a  nomothetic  view  of  science,  and  could  thus  be 
considered evidence of  history's autonomy. Mink ultimately concluded that while 
352 Louis O. Mink, 'The Divergence of History and Sociology in Recent Philosophy of History,'  cited 
in:  Richard T. Vann, 'Louis Mink's Linguistic Turn,' in  History and Theory.  Vol. 2, No. 1 (February 
1987). p.2. (emphasis in original)
353 Louis O. Mink, 'The Autonomy of Historical Understanding,'  History and Theory.  Vol. 5,  No. 1 
(1966). pp.24-47.
354 Ibid., pp.28-29.
355 Ibid., p.30.
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history  could  be made to  conform to  something like  the  propositions  above (if  a 
certain amount of methodological immaturity were allowed), such a model would 
omit what he considered to be the most important aspect of history – interpretation. 
“A common theme,” he argued, “runs through... the characteristics of historiography 
on which I have tried at least to focus attention: the idea of “historical synthesis” or 
“interpretive  history”;  and  it  is  the  special  character  of  this  as  a  mode  of 
understanding  which  a  theory  of  historical  knowledge  must  recognize  if  the 
methodological autonomy of history is to be justified or preserved.”356 Mink's entire 
view of history, in other words, was defined in opposition to a nomothetic model of 
science. And although he did not (in this paper) offer his own model of history, he 
argued that  one was necessary because of  the  inability of  the scientific model  to 
adequately capture historical practice. 
One can hardly fail to notice the similarity of Mink's defence of historical autonomy 
to those seen in almost all  of  our prior examples.  In each case,  the autonomy of 
history was predicated on the inability of science to capture the kinds of questions 
historians  routinely  sought  answers  to.  Mink also  resembles  many of  our  earlier 
examples  in that  he  sought  to  base the  knowledge generated by an autonomous 
history in the concept of narrative. Where Mink differed from those who came before 
him, however, was in his argument that narrative – in the sense of “story” – was a 
distorting lens.  In  this,  Mink could be compared only to W. B.  Gallie.  For  Mink, 
narrative was the key idea which separated history from science because it was itself 
a discursive structure which could not be separated from the evidence from which it 
was constructed. The “significant conclusions of historical arguments,” Mink argued, 
“are embedded or incorporated in the narrative structure of historical writing itself; 
they are not propositions for which the historian provides an array of evidence, but 
the specific way in which the evidence is discursively ordered.” Thus where scientific 
conclusions “dispense with their evidence,” historical conclusions “contain  theirs, as 
(narrative)  structure  contains  content.”357 This,  of  course,  assumes  the  total 
transparency  of  scientific structures,  which  is  itself  highly  questionable  (to  say 
nothing of also implying an acceptance of the nomothetic assumption). Putting this 
aside for the moment, however, Mink linked narrative to his concept of “synoptic 
judgement” as follows:
356 Ibid., p.46.
357 This  citation  is  from  an  unpublished  paper  of  Mink's  entitled  'Historical  Knowledge.'  The 
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The fact to which any theory of knowledge must return is the simple fact that 
experiences come to us  seriatim in time and yet  must be capable of being held 
together in an image of the manifold of events. The steps of a proof, the actions of 
a  narrative,  the  notes  of  a  melody,  and  even  the  words  of  a  sentence  are 
experienced one after  the other,  but must be considered in a single mental  act 
before they even constitute data for significant discourse.358
This was,  for  Mink,  the defining problem of all  history.  How could the historian 
“communicate his experience of seeing-things-together in the necessarily narrative 
style of one-thing-after-another”?359 And,  more importantly,  it  was a problem that 
science simply could not have:
I  have  tried,  therefore...  to  ask  whether  “history”  differs  from  “science”  not 
because it deals with different kinds of events and not because it uses models of 
explanation which differ from – or may include but go beyond – the received 
model  of  explanation  in  the  natural  sciences,  but  because  it  cultivates  the 
specialized  habit  of  understanding  which  converts  congeries  of  events  into 
concatenations, and emphasizes and increases the scope of synoptic judgement in 
our refection on experience.360
Later  in  his  career,  however,  as  the  fixation  on  a  single,  overarching  model  of 
explanation faded, we begin to see a change in Mink's work. Rather than comparing 
history with (and defining it against) an ideal model of  scientific explanation, Mink 
instead began to consider history in the light of narrative fiction. For although history 
had a presumption of realism which fiction did not, Mink argued, history and fiction 
possessed in common “the characteristics, structure, order and devices of narrative 
form.”361 The shift in tone between 'The Autonomy of Historical Understanding' and 
his 1970 paper 'History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension,'362 is particularly 
revealing in this respect. The concern of the earlier paper for how history and science 
might relate to one another was replaced in the latter by a blanket assumption of the 
complete autonomy of history from science, and a view of narrative as an agent for 
producing “comprehension” rather than explanation.363 In 'History and Fiction,' Mink 
argued that the “synoptic judgement” of which he had spoken in earlier work could 
be realised in three ways:
358 Louis O. Mink, 'Modes of Comprehension and the Unity of Knowledge,'  cited in: Vann, 'Louis 
Mink's Linguistic Turn,' p.3. (emphasis in original)
359 Mink, 'The Autonomy of Historical Understanding,' p.44.
360 Ibid., p.47. (emphasis in original)
361 Louis Mink,  'Letter  to the Director,  Center for  the Humanities,  Wesleyan University,'  cited in: 
Vann, 'Louis Mink's Linguistic Turn,' p.4.
362 Louis O. Mink, 'History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension,' New Literary History. Vol. 1, No. 
3 (Spring 1970). pp.541-558.
363 Ibid., p.544.
168
There are, I suggest, three... fundamental modes, irreducible to each other or to 
any more general mode. I shall call these the theoretical mode, the categoreal mode, 
and  the  configurational mode.  They  are  roughly  associated  with  types  of 
understanding characteristic of natural science, philosophy and history...364
These are, Mink argued, the three possible ways in which “a number of objects can be 
comprehended in a single mental act.” The theoretical  mode comprehends them “as 
instances of the same generalization,” a nomothetic mode that is “powerful but thin,” 
and comprises all of the natural sciences. The categoreal mode comprehends them as 
“examples of the same category,” as “both a painting and a geometry are examples of 
complex form...” It was this mode, Mink argued, which “Plato – and, in fact, most 
systematic philosophers – envisioned as an ideal aim.” And lastly, the configurational  
mode, which comprehends things “as elements in a single and concrete complex of 
relationships.” It  was this mode, Mink argued, which was governed by narrative, 
and  had  as  its  constituent  members  both  history  and  fiction.  It  “is  in  this 
configurational mode,” he wrote, “that we see together the complex of imagery in a 
poem,  or  the  combination  of  motives,  pressures,  promises  and  principles  which 
explain a Senator's vote...”365 The most important aspect of these modes, however, 
was  their  incommensurability.  All  three  were  incompatible,  Mink  argued,  because 
“each has ultimately the totality of human experience, or if one prefers, the 'world of 
fact'  as its subject  matter.” In this view, these three modes represented something 
much like Kuhnian paradigms – different ways of reading the world entire which, 
while internally coherent, could not be translated into the terms of the others. From 
this Mink derived a view of academic disciplines forever estranged:
One can see, in this light, that what are called “disciplines” are actually arenas in 
which the partisans of each mode contend for dominance, each with its own aim 
of understanding, identification of problems, and privileged language.366
For  Mink,  this  represented  an  answer  to  all  prior  questions  of  how  historical 
explanation  might  be  made  to  fit  with  the  scientific.  History  could  not  only  not 
answer such  questions,  it  did  not  have to.  History  was  simply  not  required to  be 
concerned with anything outside of its own mode. “If it is true,” Mink argued, “that 
the  three  modes  are  incompatible  as  ultimate  aims,  we  must  abandon  hope  of 
achieving  an  eclectic  or  panperspectival  outcome...”367 By  adhering  only  to  this 
configurational mode of narrative,  however,  Mink's history found only fiction for 
364 Ibid., p.549. (emphasis in original)
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company.  This  meant  that  it  was  now  fiction which  was  the  proper  article  of 
comparison for the definition of history. “We could learn to tell stories of our lives 
from nursery rhymes, or from culture-myths if we had any,” Mink argued, ”but it is 
from history and fiction that we learn how to tell and to understand complex stories, 
and how it is that stories answer questions.”368 Thus Mink's philosophy of history 
began to wrestle  more and more with questions of  how the narrative chosen (or 
imposed) by an historian might determine the past being described. And of the usual 
grounds for distinguishing history from fiction, he began to equivocate:
It is not illuminating to distinguish history as true or as having a referent, from 
fiction as imaginary, or as not having a referent – despite the fact that the birth and 
death  of  Bismarck  are  reported  in  public  records  and  the  birth  and  death  of 
Leopold Bloom are not. Individual statements about the past may be true or false, 
but a narrative is more than a conjunction of statements, and insofar as it is more it 
does not repudiate a complex past but constructs one.369
Mink's views regarding the relationship between history and fiction were to prove 
highly infuential370 on the philosopher of history Hayden White, whose 1973 book 
Metahistory:  The  Historical  Imagination  in  Nineteenth-Century  Europe371 has  since 
become a classic of contemporary philosophy of history. White's thesis went a good 
deal further than Mink's, however, and without Mink's apparent reluctance. In the 
preface to Metahistory, White clearly laid out his theoretical commitments:
In this theory I treat the historical work as what it  most manifestly is: a verbal  
structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse. Histories (and philosophies of 
history  as  well)  combine  a  certain  amount  of  “data,”  theoretical  concepts  for 
“explaining” these data, and a narrative structure for their presentation as an icon 
of sets of events presumed to have occurred in times past. In addition, I maintain, 
they contain a deep structural content which is generally poetic, and specifically 
linguistic in nature, and which serves as the precritically accepted paradigm of 
what a distinctively “historical” explanation should be.372
Borrowing  explicitly  from  literary  theory,  White  argued  that  this  deep  “poetic”  
structure was manifested in written history through the use of organising principles 
called  “tropes,”  of  which  there  were  four  basic  kinds  –  metaphor,  synecdoche, 
metonymy, and irony. These tropes, White argued, effectively determine the kinds of 
368 Ibid., p.558.
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explanations and interpretive structures which will be considered permissible. “Each 
of these modes of  consciousness,” he writes,  “provides the basis  for a distinctive 
linguistic protocol by which to prefigure the historical field and on the basis of which 
specific strategies of historical interpretation can be employed for “explaining” it.”373 
Literary considerations, in other words, intrude upon epistemological concerns. But 
this  is  not  the  unavoidable  interpretive  component  introduced  by  human minds 
attempting the study of anything beyond themselves and which might be corrected 
with diligence and sound epistemic method. For White, the literary/poetic structure 
which underpinned the entire concept of narrative was sufficient to render historical 
realism effectively impossible.  Among the  enumerated general  conclusions  White 
offered in the preface to  Metahistory,  for example, he wrote:  “the best grounds for 
choosing one perspective on history rather than another are ultimately aesthetic or 
moral rather than epistemological.” The “demand for the scientization of history,” 
therefore, “represents only the statement of a preference for a specific modality of 
historical conceptualization, the grounds of which are either moral or aesthetic, but 
the epistemological justification of which still remains to be established.”374 This is 
narrative determinism of a most extreme sort. Rather than the balancing of form and 
content  envisioned  by  earlier  literary-narrativists  like  Gallie  and  Mink,  we  see 
instead the denial of the possibility of true historical content altogether. Moreover, 
the subsequent popularity of Metahistory among both historians and philosophers of 
history in the late twentieth century suggests that many found this assessment at 
least  plausible.375 This,  put  briefy,  is  how a  perceived demotion  in  the  status  of 
science as a whole (when it was only the much narrower claim that the nomothetic-
deductive method was the only possible form of scientific knowledge which was 
ever  under  serious  dispute)  was  combined  with  the  ongoing  assumption  that 
narrative  was  an  inherently  anti-scientific  concept  to  produce  an  environment  in 
which epistemic concerns were no longer deemed worthy of serious attention among 
philosophers of history. 
On  first  consideration,  this  approach  seems  counterintuitive.  But,  if  one  accepts 
certain premisses, it does make some sense. Historical narratives must, given their 
373 Ibid., p.xi. For more detail regarding White's concept of tropes, see: White, Metahistory. pp.31-38.
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frequently linguistic mode of expression, be able to be analysed (at least partially) in 
terms of their literary qualities. The question then arises: how much emphasis does 
one place on those qualities as determining historical content. There are two potential 
paths to take here – two potential relationships between language and the world. As 
Arthur Danto has argued:
In  one  relationship,  language  stands  to  reality  merely  in  the  part-whole 
relationship: it is among the things the world contains, and is merely a further 
element in the order of  reality.  In its other relationship,  language stands in an 
external relationship to reality in its entirety.376
The first relationship, seeing language as something to be studied scientifically along 
with the myriad other things of the world, would return history to the sciences. The 
second would not. Bear in mind, however, that the scientific study of language – for 
those who held the nomothetic assumption – seemingly required the reduction of that 
language to laws. This not only seemed impossible,  it  also violated the separatist  
impulse which, as we have seen, was the primary motivation for the establishment of 
narrativism in the first place. Therefore, Danto's second option – the positioning of 
language outside of reality – was seen as the only possible position. And in that view, 
the goal  of  the philosophy of  history could not be the linking of  statement  with 
reality – that was impossible – but of narrative with statement. This was, put simply,  
how the so-called linguistic turn in philosophy of history was justified. But notice 
that, even here, the nomothetic assumption still persists. In fact, it is on display even 
in Mink's later work, where he devotes an entire pillar – the “theoretical” – of his 
tripartite model of  comprehension to it.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  all  post-Kuhnian 
philosophy (and  sociology)  of  science  had accomplished  was  to  render  scientific 
explanation a  concern that  philosophers  of  history no longer  believed  they were 
required to attend to.  In  this  sense,  despite  views of  science  finally beginning to 
change, the damage had been done.  All that was achieved was the  entrenching of 
narrativist  assumptions  of  autonomy.  At  no  point  had  a  genuine  debate  over  the 
relationship between history and science taken place. Only the idea of static and timeless 
laws  had  been  rejected,  not  the  idea  of  science  as  a  whole.  The  nomothetic 
assumption, however, had caused any possible difference between those two positions 
to be overlooked. As L. B. Cebik has observed:
In  short,  current  narrative  theory  and  phenomenological  analysis  misconstrue 
epistemology's  relationship  to  narrative  theory  by  focusing  upon  one  sort  of 
376 Danto, Narration and Knowledge. p.305.
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epistemic  theory.  In  rejecting  covering-law  epistemology  (and  most  counter-
covering-law  versions),  they  ignore  epistemology's  more  general  concerns  in 
which science, explanation, objectivity, proof, and reference begin as problemata, 
not as presuppositions... If we ignore history's regulative commitment to telling 
the truth (however we analyze the term) and to being bound within the limits of 
reliable  evidence,  then  of  course history  becomes  no  more  than  a  variant  of 
literature...377
By  seeing  epistemology  as  epitomised  by  the  idea  of  laws,  in  other  words,  
philosophers of history generally (and narrativists in particular) had taken history's 
nomothetic failures as evidence of its utter separateness from epistemological issues 
generally. But, as we shall see, laws are not the only tool in science's toolkit. 
Before we close the book on both the nomothetic assumption and Part One of this 
thesis,  it  should  be  remembered  that  it  is  not  our  intention  here  to  castigate 
philosophers of history for not anticipating key developments in the philosophy of 
science. For while non-nomothetic views of science were beginning to take shape as 
early as the 1830s, one could not claim that they held any kind of ascendancy – then 
or  now.  Instead,  the  aim  of  this  chapter  has  been  to  show  how  contemporary 
philosophy of history has arrived at its present condition, with particular emphasis 
on the key role perceptions of science played in that account. This, as will be seen, is 
necessary in order to show the relevance of the arguments which will be presented in 
Part Two. Indeed, the role of science becomes even more strikingly evident when one 
considers the present state of discourse within popular philosophy of history. At the 
time of writing, the claims and counterclaims surrounding the postmodern/linguistic 
turn in history represent terrain already extremely well explored – both in historical 
and philosophical terms. This being the case, there has been no need to cover it again 
here.  But  it  will  no  doubt  be  familiar  to  the  reader  that  many  historians  and 
philosophers have strongly resisted the recent linguistic emphasis in contemporary 
philosophy of history, and a significant number have attempted counterattacks in 
print against that approach. Their arguments have often tended, however, to be pleas 
for  historical  realism  as  “common  sense”  rather  than  well-reasoned  bottom-up 
approaches to its defence.378 Instead of attempting to justify historical realism, for 
377 L. B. Cebik, 'Understanding Narrative Theory,' History and Theory. Vol. 25, No. 4. (December 1986). 
p.59. (emphasis added)
378 Examples of such work include: Richard J. Evans,  In Defence of History.  Granta Books: London, 
1997.  Arthur  Marwick,  The  New  Nature  of  History:  Knowledge,  Evidence,  Language.  Palgrave: 
Hampshire, 2001.  Keith Windschuttle, The Killing of History: How a Discipline is Being Murdered by  
Literary Critics and Social  Theorists.  Revised and Expanded International Edition. Macleay Press: 
Paddington,  1996.  Perez  Zagorin,  'History,  the  Referent,  and  Narrative:  Refections  on 
Postmodernism Now,' History and Theory. Vol. 38, No. 1 (February 1999). pp.1-24.
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example, such accounts have focused on the potentially dire consequences were it to 
be abandoned. “If any considerable number” of historians were to adopt the relativist 
and literary conclusions of the postmodernists, writes Perez Zagorin in a polemic 
published in the journal History and Theory, then it would become:
... difficult to see how the larger society could continue to place any trust in the 
veracity and sincerity of history as a genuine discipline of knowledge directed to 
the human past. By the same token the latter would also be rendered incapable of 
performing its vital and ever more necessary intellectual function in the schools, 
universities, and wider culture of today's world.379
In the same breath, it is also often concluded that it is the results of history practised 
in  the  traditional  mode  which  provide  the  best  argument  for  its  correctness. 
“Although they are being assailed on all sides,” Keith Windschuttle writes, “there is  
still  enough work produced by empirical historians to confirm the worth of what 
they are doing and to establish that the complete victory of their opponents would 
amount to a massive net loss for Western scholarship.”380 It is the contention of this 
thesis  that,  despite  an  obvious  glib  circularity,  such  claims  really  are correct. 
However,  apocalyptic  warnings  that  'you  will  miss  us  when  we're  gone'  do  not 
themselves constitute an account of historical epistemology. In other words,  these 
oppositional accounts have suffered from an inability to offer a plausible alternative. 
Having absorbed exactly the kind of historical separatism which Part One of this 
thesis  has  detailed,  they  are  simply  not  equipped  to  offer  any  well-grounded 
theoretical alternative for how history should be practised and understood. Wishing 
to resist the assertion that history is literature, and yet unwilling to counter with the 
assertion that history is science, they have found themselves caught between two fires 
– and have been easy prey for the more philosophically literate proponents of the 
linguistic approach. A discussion between Zagorin and the literary-narrativist Keith 
Jenkins in the pages of History and Theory, for example, finds Zagorin responding to 
Jenkins arguments381 – which, despite their obscurity and somewhat dubious merits, 
were at least philosophically literate and worthy of a reply in kind – with an almost  
petulant dismissal of any kind of philosophy in history:
Much  of  what  Jenkins  has  to  say  represents  an  attempted  imposition  and 
usurpation  of  philosophy  upon  history.  History,  or  historiography,  is  an 
independent  empirical  discipline  of  great  sophistication  with  a  long  tradition 
379 Zagorin, 'History, the Referent, and Narrative,' pp.10-11.
380 Windschuttle, The Killing of History. p.223.
381 Keith Jenkins, 'A Postmodern Reply to Perez Zagorin,'  History and Theory.  Vol. 39, No. 2 (May 
2000). pp.181-200.
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behind it, which has given rise to many masterpieces. It is in no need of instruction 
or reform by philosophers or philosophical neophytes. If philosophy is to have a 
fruitful relationship with history, it must accept the historian's methods and ways 
of thinking as it finds them.382
This throwing out of the baby with the bathwater effectively doubles as an assertion 
that historical realism and the methods by which it is realised in historical accounts 
are somehow  self-evident. This is the basis of what might be called the “history as 
common sense” defence. Such a reply is not entirely without merit, of course.  We 
have already seen Walsh and Dray attempt to provide philosophical models which 
adequately capture existing historical practice. But in those cases, Walsh and Dray 
were attempting to arrive at a comprehensive philosophical justification which might 
have been used to justify historical realism and thus oppose Jenkins directly. Zagorin, 
on the other hand, is arguing that the truth of his position is so obvious as to render 
such work unnecessary. It is the intention of the remainder of this thesis to show that 
the way out of this dilemma is simple: show that history is a science. This has not been 
done, as we have seen, because the acceptance of the nomothetic assumption had 
convinced many that it  couldn't be done. If this nomothetic emphasis is seen as the 
myopic argument that it is, however, then it becomes possible to argue that history is  
a  science  among the  company of  disciplines  such as  geology,  palaeontology,  and 
evolutionary biology. In order to accomplish this, however, two tasks remain. First, it 
must be shown that such a non-nomothetic, narrative-based definition of science is 
possible. And secondly, it must be shown that history does not confict with such a 
definition. It is to these epistemic tasks which we now turn.
382 Perez Zagorin, 'Rejoinder to a Postmodernist,' History and Theory. Vol. 39, No. 2 (May 2000). p.201.
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Part Two
“Taking Narrative Seriously”
Epistemic Narrative
and the Philosophy of Science

Chapter Four
“The Nomothetic Model and the Historical Sciences”
The second half of this thesis has been designed as an extension of the argument of  
the first. Part One has argued that there has been a systemic nomothetic assumption 
regarding science  among twentieth century philosophers of  history,  and that  this 
assumption infuenced their  assessments of history's borders in such a way as to 
seemingly require  a  hard separation between historical  and  scientific  knowledge. 
Building on this, Part Two will seek to demonstrate that the removal of this outdated 
and incorrect nomothetic assumption allows for the construction of a unified model 
of  explanation  in  which  a  formal  separation between history and the  sciences  is 
neither required nor possible. There is also a sense, however, in which Part Two will 
introduce a certain symmetry by re-examining the central concern of Part One from 
the  opposite  direction.  Where  the  first  half  of  this  thesis  has  dealt  with  the 
understanding of  science among philosophers of history,  it  is  the intention of the 
second half to examine the understanding of  history among philosophers of  science. 
The purpose of this is twofold. First, it must be shown that the nomothetic model has 
not only failed the discipline of history, but has also failed many key branches of the 
sciences.  In  other  words,  not  only  is  the  nomothetic  model  not applicable  to  all 
knowledge,  it  is  not  even  adequate  to  describe  all  of  those  fields  which  are 
unproblematically recognised as sciences. This, it will be argued, is evidence less of 
failure than of incompleteness. To this end, Part Two will examine the approach taken 
by scholars in some of those fields which have been poorly served by a nomothetic-
deductive  model  of  explanation –  with a  particular  emphasis  on the  intersecting 
fields of geology, paleontology and evolutionary biology. Particular emphasis will be 
placed  on  how  these  sciences  felt  a  kinship  with  history,  often  invoking  the 
similarities  of  their  fields  with  history  as  a  potential  solution  to  the  bind  the 
nomothetic model had placed them in. 
The second of our purposes in Part Two will be to show that there has been a key  
difference  in  how  philosophers  of  history  and  philosophers  of  science  have 
approached this problem of history. While philosophers of history have tended to use 
the  nomothetic  model  as  evidence  for  a  fundamental  difference  in  kind between 
historical and scientific knowledge, philosophers interested in the historical sciences 
have not had that luxury. Feeling a kinship with history was one thing, claiming that 
geology was history quite another. And it is this contrast which provides the desired 
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path forward. Because of the unavailability of this comparatively easy way out, it is 
the philosophers of these historical  sciences who have produced compelling models 
of narrative as an epistemic device rather than merely a literary one. The overarching 
purpose of Part Two as a whole, therefore, is to take the model of narrative produced 
by these philosophers of science and show that it  can be applied to the kinds of 
explanations historians have traditionally been concerned with. Subsequent chapters 
will examine the potential narrative solutions offered by philosophers and historical 
scientists to the problems the nomothetic model presented them with, and consider 
how they might be generalised into a model of narrative explanation relevant to both 
science and history. This chapter, however, is the beginning of this overall project,  
and  will  focus  on  providing  a  brief  demonstration  of  the  unsuitability  of  the 
nomothetic model for the fields of geology and evolutionary biology, as well as the 
hostility  with  which  those  fields  have  frequently  been  treated  by  nomothetic 
philosophers of science. Also of interest to us in this chapter will be the attitude of  
geologists,  biologists  (and  philosophers  of  same)  toward  history.  It  will  be 
demonstrated that, even from their earliest beginnings, philosophers of these sciences 
often identified more closely with history than with nomothetic sciences like physics. 
This, it will be argued, represents a problem for any claim the nomothetic-deductive 
model might make to represent the entirety of science. 
Some Brief Remarks on Contemporary Epistemic Philosophy of History
Before we begin the work of Part Two in earnest, however, it is worth taking some 
time to make clear that the previous chapter must  not  be taken to imply that the 
philosophy of history has now become entirely a literary affair, with either positive 
engagement with that fact or withdrawal in disgust being the only possible options.  
Nor should it be assumed that the remainder of this thesis is orienting itself as a sole 
beacon of  hope against  some imagined postmodern tide.  Much has already been 
written, both for and against, that literary-narrativist view of history, and it is not the  
intention of this work to rehearse these arguments again. The previous chapter has 
merely sought to illustrate how the literary-narrativist perspective has been shaped 
by  the  arguments  it  has  opposed.  This  has  been  done  in  order  to  lay  bare  the  
underlying  assumptions  involved  so  that,  by  correcting  them,  we  might  unite 
narrativism and epistemic (i.e., scientific) philosophy of history. But first, we must 
take  a  moment  to  recognise  that,  despite  the  exclamations  of  many  modern 
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methodological  textbooks,  philosophy  of  history  which  chooses  to  focus  on  the 
epistemic issues of historical study rather than literary poetics is still being written. 
This  point  is  worth  emphasising  because,  as  the  philosopher  of  history  Aviezer 
Tucker has rightly argued: “it has become something of a ritual, a mystic communion 
of sorts, to commence long discussions of the philosophy of history with an analysis 
of  its  neglect  and decline,  of  why philosophers  have 'grown tired of  it.'”383 Such 
claims, however, are almost entirely without empirical merit. With respect to both 
book publications and journal articles, Tucker's own investigations (circa 2001) found 
evidence of substantial growth rather than decline, leading him to conclude that “the 
sense of gloom and doom of some philosophers of history refects the academic status 
of the philosophy of history, rather than the actual (booming) research, publishing, 
and demand for reading in the field.”384 Tucker came to some sociological conclusions 
regarding this, arguing that it was, at least in part, “an academic phenomenon that 
refects the faults and weaknesses in the structures of institutionalized philosophy 
and historiography,” rather than “a decline in actual research activity, public interest 
in the field, or the significance of the problems and topics of the field.” In fact, he 
writes, “it is quite amazing that so much research is conducted with so few economic 
or  social  incentives.”385 Given  Tucker's  conclusions  regarding  the  realities  of 
publication in the philosophy of history, however, it also seems likely that at least 
some of the philosophers who have spoken of “neglect and decline” are not simply 
unaware of the fact that much philosophy of history is being published, but that they 
consider the kind of material which is  being published to be, in some crucial sense, 
illegitimate. That is, such material as is being published is considered – by a certain 
audience – to be so misguided as to not really count as philosophy of history at all. 
Such  is  the  seriousness  of  the  gulf  which  has  arisen  between  the  literary  and 
epistemic camps. 
Despite the now-antique nature of the positivist/idealist argument upon which it is  
ultimately based, therefore, it seems there remains a deep schism in the philosophy 
of  history  between  the  literary-narrativists  and  those  who  have  favoured  an 
emphasis on epistemology. The question that this thesis is interested in, however, is 
what lies at the root of this disagreement, and whether there is any productive way 
383 Aviezer Tucker, 'The Future of the Philosophy of Historiography,' History and Theory. Vol. 40, No. 1 
(February 2001). p.37.
384 Ibid., pp.38-39. (emphasis in original)
385 Ibid., p.43.
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forward. And in this respect, the analysis of L. B. Cebik is particularly illuminating. 
Written during the comparatively early days of the postmodern debate, Cebik's 1986 
paper  'Understanding  Narrative  Theory'386 neatly  contextualises  the  disconnect 
between narrativist  and epistemic  philosophers  of  history,  even if  it  cannot  fully 
explain it. Cebik summed up the state of the field (at that time) as follows:
...  in  the  interests  of  literary  criticism,  [Hayden]  White  would  leave  to 
epistemologists “the question of the veracity of a certain type of discourse, with 
respect  to the 'object-world'  of which it  speaks.” Likewise, in the concentration 
upon history's  explanatory function,  Hempelians largely  ignored everything in 
historical narrative that they could not translate with ease or by force into causal 
statements.387
Cebik was interested in whether some sort of reconciliation of these opposing views 
might be possible and, towards that end, identified two “major difficulties” which 
stood  in  the  way  of  such  a  project:  “the  denigration  of  epistemology  and  its 
interests,” and “the failure to develop a comprehensive view of what a theory of 
narrative  should  contain  in  its  finished  state.”388 While  the  latter  claim  is  self-
explanatory, Cebik defined “the denigration of epistemology” as the “general view 
that epistemology deserves little place within contemporary narrative theory.” Such a 
view,  Cebik  argued,  effectively  equated  “questions  of  objectivity  and  proof  with 
questions on the methods of science.”389 This, as seen in the previous chapter, meant 
that  narrativists  –  having already convinced themselves  that  history was entirely 
outside of the sciences by virtue of the stark incompatibilities between narrative and 
the nomothetic form they assumed scientific explanation must take – were effectively 
granting  themselves  permission  to  declare  problems  of  “objectivity  and  proof” 
simply irrelevant to the discipline of history. 
Such anti-epistemic assumptions not only rendered narrative theory incomplete, Cebik 
argued, but were also problematic from a purely definitional point of view. For if the 
word “history” was to retain anything even  close to the meaning it had had in the 
past, then questions of reference and justification could hardly be ignored. If, as we 
have  already  seen  Cebik  argue  in  the  previous  chapter,  “we  ignore  history's 
regulative commitment to telling the truth... and to being bound within the limits of 
reliable  evidence,  then  of  course history  becomes  no  more  than  a  variant  of 
386 L. B. Cebik, 'Understanding Narrative Theory,' History and Theory. Vol. 25, No. 4 (December 1986). 
pp.58-81.
387 Ibid., p.58.
388 Ibid.
389 Ibid., pp.58-59.
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literature...”390 Or, put another way, the conclusion of literary-narrativist philosophers 
of history regarding the purely literary nature of the subject is possible only by ruling 
out-of-bounds  anything  which  might  endanger  that  conclusion.  The  literary-
narrativist is  therefore forced into one of two conclusions. If  they wish to defend 
White's brand of literary-narrative argument as a complete theory, then they are forced 
into just such a begging of the question. If,  however,  they concede that epistemic 
factors must play at least  some role in historical research and writing, then they are 
forced  to  admit  that  purely literary  theories  of  narrative  must  necessarily  be 
incomplete. Cebik articulated this dilemma more elegantly. “Narrative creation,” he 
wrote,  “must either fold back upon basic conceptual structures or be left  foating 
amid merely  aesthetic  clouds.”391 The  problem was that  these  two approaches  to 
philosophy of history – the literary and the epistemic – had become disconnected. So 
disconnected that, as hinted at above, each camp had trouble accepting the work of 
the  other  as  actual  philosophy  of  history  –  as  opposed  to  a  mere  shifting of  the 
problems of history into the philosophy of literature or the philosophy of science.392 
Cebik  hinted  at  the  emergence  of  this  disconnect,  and  even  traced  its  origin  to 
incompatible  understandings  of  epistemological  issues.  In  terms  of  outlining  the 
shape of a potential solution, however, he argued only that if narrative really was a 
better descriptive model for history than any other, then the concept would have to 
be somehow reunited with epistemic issues such as reference and justification in order 
to be be considered a viable philosophy of  history. “Any comprehensive theory” of 
narrative, Cebik wrote, “must accommodate both the justificational and the creative 
elements  of  narrative,  the  activities  leading to  narrative,  and  refection  upon the 
finished  narrative.”393 The  first  half  of  this  thesis,  by  demonstrating  a  pervasive 
nomothetic  assumption regarding science among philosophers of  history on both 
sides of the debate,  has supported and extended Cebik's argument that epistemic 
factors lie at the root of this disconnect by throwing some light on the precise nature 
of those factors. The half of this thesis which remains will attempt to address Cebik's 
subsequent argument that the previously problematic relationship between narrative 
and epistemology must be clarified and given deep structure in order for narrative to 
be taken seriously as a mode of historical explanation rather than merely a literary 
affectation. 
390 Ibid., p.59. (emphasis added)
391 Ibid.
392 Tucker, 'The Future of the Philosophy of Historiography,' pp.44-45.
393 Cebik, 'Understanding Narrative Theory,' p.59.
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Before we begin this task, however, we must say something about why contemporary 
epistemic approaches have failed or otherwise fallen out of favour when compared 
with those of the literary-narrativists. For it is almost certainly the case that many 
modern  epistemic projects in the philosophy of history have been undertaken with 
similar aims to that  of  this  thesis  – cognisant of  the ascendancy of  narrative,  yet 
unsatisfied  with  its  epistemic  dimensions  and  eager  to  find  a  productive  way 
forward.  Why did they fail  to  convince? And,  more importantly,  why should we 
succeed where they have not? There are many possible epistemic and sociological 
factors which might contribute to answering such a question, and we do not have the 
space to examine them all here. We shall therefore have to content ourselves with 
pointing out that modern epistemic philosophy of history has tended to suffer from 
precisely the  same  problem  as  that  which  has  plagued  the  narrativist  view  –  a 
misunderstanding of the boundaries and possibilities of narrative itself. The literary-
narrativists, as we have seen, had begun to claim (by the late twentieth century at 
least) that the presence of narrative – regardless of precisely how it was defined – 
necessarily undermined the possibility of history being able to make unproblematic 
true  statements  about  the  past.  This,  given  the  arguments  encountered  in  the 
previous  chapter,  is  perhaps  unsurprising.  What  is surprising  is  that  modern 
epistemic philosophers of  history largely  came to  hold exactly  the  same assumption. 
They have,  in  other  words,  almost  universally  assumed that  the  very concept  of 
narrative itself could have no place in any epistemology which wished to be taken 
seriously. And because of this,  they have attempted to purge all  traces of it  from 
history. They were not so much epistemic-narrativists, it might be said, but merely 
epistemic.  It  will  be  the  contention  of  Part  Two,  however,  that  this  is  profoundly 
mistaken. For, as Cebik has reminded us, any epistemic philosophy of history which 
does not take narrative seriously is, at best, severely handicapped.
This  tendency  to  view  epistemological  respectability  and  narrative  as  mutually 
exclusive has naturally led many epistemically-minded philosophers of history to 
attempt to restore the former by excising the latter. To do this, however, some other 
way of conceptualising and underwriting historical knowledge had to be found. This  
has led to a profusion of potential attempts to produce philosophies of history which 
were epistemically well-grounded. There were many ways in which this was done. 
Indeed,  almost  every  author  who  has  attempted  it  has  had  their  own  unique 
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approach. The first and most obvious, if somewhat atavistic, way was to attempt yet 
another rehabilitation of the nomothetic-deductive model of science in such a way as 
to allow its application to history. We have already examined a similar position in 
Chapter Two using the example of Patrick Gardiner. More modern exponents of this 
position have included Murray Murphey394 and Clayton Roberts.395 This approach, 
however, has proved unconvincing for the same kinds of reasons we have already 
hinted at in Part One – the triviality of the laws involved, and the inability of the  
model  to  deal  with the kinds of  structures  historians  actually use.  As Murray G. 
Murphey wrote in a review of Clayton Roberts' book, for example, the “elaborate 
system of causally linked events and conditions” which Roberts had offered as a 
model of historical explanation “does not provide what one usually finds in historical 
works: narrative interpretations.”396 Other philosophers – presumably more familiar 
with more modern philosophy of science – have made attempts to link history with 
non-nomothetic scientific explanation. These have included, for instance, attempts to 
render historical explanation as a special case of evolutionary biology,397 or to link 
historical explanation to the Bayesian model of statistical inference.398 Many of these 
philosophers have, in undertaking such reductions, considered themselves to have 
adequately justified the claim for a scientific history. Other epistemic philosophers of 
history, however, have not, preferring to keep their epistemic philosophy of history 
separate from science for other reasons.399 Others still simply have not devoted all 
that much attention as to where the vision of history they offer fits in terms of a 
relationship  to  science  or  literature.400 What  these  approaches  have  all  shared, 
394 Murray G. Murphey, Our Knowledge of the Historical Past. Bobbs-Merrill: Indianapolis, 1973.
395 Clayton Roberts, The Logic of Historical Explanation. Pennsylvania State University Press: University 
Park, Pennsylvania, 1996.
396 Murray G. Murphey,  'Review of The Logic of Historical Explanation by Clayton Roberts,'  American 
Historical Review. Vol. 102, No. 4 (October 1997). p.1118.
397 For example: William H. McNeill, 'Passing Strange: The Convergence of Evolutionary Science with 
Scientific History,' History and Theory. Vol. 40, No. 1 (February 2001). pp.1-15.
398 For an example of this approach, see: Aviezer Tucker, Our Knowledge Of The Past: A Philosophy of  
Historiography. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004. pp.95-100.
399 For example: Leon J. Goldstein, Historical Knowing. University of Texas Press: Austin, 1976. Leon J. 
Goldstein, The What and Why of History: Philosophical Essays. E. J. Brill: Leiden, 1996. See also: Luke 
O'Sullivan, 'Leon Goldstein and the Epistemology of Historical Knowing,'  History and Theory. Vol. 
45, No. 2 (May 2006). pp.204-228.
400 In this camp we might include the work of C. Behan McCullagh, who has written extensively on  
the mechanisms by which historical accounts can be justified, but without feeling it necessary to 
explicitly  position  his  work  on  any  one  side  of  the  history-as-science/history-as-autonomous-
epistemology  debate.  See:  C.  Behan  McCullagh,  Justifying  Historical  Descriptions.  Cambridge 
University  Press:  Cambridge  &  New  York,  1984.  C.  Behan  McCullagh,  The  Truth  of  History.  
Routledge: London & New York, 1998. In fact, McCullagh has also written on precisely that neglect 
of the epistemic dimension of narrative which Cebik has identified. See: C. Behan McCullagh, 'The 
Truth of Historical Narratives,' History and Theory. Vol. 26, No. 4, Beiheft 26: The Representation of 
Historical Events. (December 1987). pp.30-46. This paper, while illuminating, has little to say about 
the  central  concern  of  this  thesis  –  the  deeper  structure  of  narrative  and how it  might  attain 
epistemic legitimacy.
185
however, is a blanket dismissal of narrative as a serious explanatory mechanism. As 
Aviezer Tucker has written, the “important issue is not whether historiography is a 
narrative (it is obvious to me that some parts of it are and others are not), but the 
relation  between  historiography  (whether  narrativist  or  non-narrativist)  and  its 
evidence.”401 This quote is revealing not only for its dismissal of an entire class of  
philosophy with the glib “it is obvious to me,” but also for its apparent unwillingness 
to  even consider  that  narrative  might  be  anything other  than the  literary  way in 
which  historical  conclusions  (properly  justified  by  some  other  mechanism)  were 
presented. 
But this position ignores the fact that not only does the concept of narrative seem to 
be  considered relevant  to  historians  and philosophers  of  history –  at  least  when 
judged by the sheer  popularity of  the approach – it also seems to describe historical 
practice and the shape of historical accounts a good deal better than, for instance,  
covering laws or Bayesian statistics. Surely then, a better solution would be, as Cebik 
has suggested, to attempt to reunite concepts of narrative with the kinds of epistemic 
concerns postmodern narrativists have largely rejected. Or, in other words, to revive 
the epistemic-narrativist premisses of projects like those of Dray and Danto. This will 
not,  however,  require us to  abandon our commitment to  arguing for history as a 
science. In fact, it is precisely that commitment which will allow us to succeed where 
Dray and Danto failed. This is because we will consciously and deliberately abandon 
the  presumption  of  narrative  separatism  which  has  been  such  a  prevalent  and 
destructive result of the nomothetic assumption. We will recognise, in other words, 
that an epistemically respectable and properly  scientific vision of history is possible 
without the rejection of narrative. 
This is why we have expended such effort in Part One making clear the role of the  
nomothetic assumption in the conceptual separation of history and science. For by 
dissolving that assumption, we must also dissolve any impermeable barrier between 
history and the sciences, and are thus free to make use of more recent developments  
in  the  philosophy  of  science  which  have  embraced  narrative  as  an  explanatory 
concept.  This  will  allow  us  to  offer  a  sense  of  narrative  which  is  not  only 
epistemically legitimate, but which is equally at home in human history as it is in 
historical sciences such as geology and evolutionary biology. We will show, in short, 
401 Tucker, 'The Future of the Philosophy of Historiography,' p.51.
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that history is a science. In order to begin to realise this goal, however, we must now 
turn our attention to both the theory and practice of the sciences. This will be our 
primary focus for the next two chapters. For while we are ultimately interested in 
how philosophers of the historical sciences both arrived at and justified narrative as 
an appropriate explanatory mechanism for their fields, we must first see why they 
felt the need to undertake such a search in the first place. To this end, the remainder  
of this chapter will be devoted to a brief historical sketch – using the earth sciences 
and biology as examples – of precisely how the nomothetic model of explanation has 
failed much of what we now think of as science.
The Failure of the Nomothetic Model to Adequately Capture Scientific Practice
The  modern  concept  of  a  law of  nature  has  been  defined  by  the  philosopher  of 
science  Peter  Kosso  as  a  “claim  that  associates  a  general  kind  of  thing  with  a 
particular behaviour or property.” Such laws, Kosso states, “identify natural kinds in 
the  world  and  imply  a  causal  connection  between  being  that  kind  of  thing  and 
having the associated property or behaviour.”402 While this definition leaves out a 
great deal of detail relevant to specialists, it is adequate for our purposes. Kosso's 
definition is particularly valuable as it makes clear that a natural law need only imply 
(as  opposed  to  define) a  causal  connection.  Modern  laws,  in  other  words,  are 
essentially  descriptive.  Newton's laws, for instance, might describe the motion of a 
falling body, but they are agnostic as to what causes bodies to fall. This has not always 
been the case, of course, but according to an historical analysis of the concept by the 
historian of science Jane Ruby, the most important aspects of this usage were largely 
in place by 1540, with the related idea of laws as uniquely mathematical descriptions 
able to be found as far back as Roger Bacon's thirteenth century work on optics. 403 By 
the close of the seventeenth century, however,  the idea of mathematical laws had 
come to dominate – even define – the scientific approach. The main reason for this, it 
seems,  was  its  success.  In  the  seventeenth  century  alone,  the  historian  of  science 
Friedrich  Steinle  has  observed,  an  “impressive  number  of  what  we  now  see  as 
classical examples for laws of nature were established... Kepler's astronomical laws, 
Galileo's laws of free fall and of motion of pendulums, the law of inertial motion, the 
laws of impact, the sine-law of optical refraction, Boyle's law of the compression of 
402 Peter Kosso,  Reading the Book of  Nature:  An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science.  Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1992. p.190.
403 Jane E. Ruby, 'The Origins of Scientific “Law”,' Journal of the History of Ideas.  Vol. 47, No. 3 (July-
September 1986). pp.341-359.
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air, Hooke's law of the spring of elastic bodies, and Newton's law of gravitation.”404 
Each one of these examples represented a phenomenally successful systematisation 
and mathematical formalisation of some invariant aspect of nature. Put simply, the 
approach worked. Key aspects of nature could be accurately described and modelled, 
even if the precise nature of the underlying causes were still matters for speculation.
In addition to these practical successes, the concept of laws was also aided by the 
active  dissemination of  the  idea  in  the  writings  of  several  of  its  most  successful 
practitioners.  In his analysis of the idea of law in the work of  Galileo, Descartes, 
Francis Bacon, Boyle, and Newton, for instance, Steinle has argued that while each 
author exhibited some important differences in their published formulations of the 
idea  of  laws  (usually  with  respect  to  the  relationship  between  laws  and  actual 
causes),  together  they  represented the  most  prominent  agents  in  the  “formation-
process” of a coherent law-based view of science.405 Such infuential philosophical 
explications, when coupled with highly successful work (often by the same authors) 
in  actually  establishing  examples  of  such  laws,  contributed  to  the  rapid  and 
widespread  adoption  of  the  concept  as  the  most  fundamental  premiss  in  the 
philosophy of  science.  By the  close  of  the  seventeenth  century,  the  historian and 
philosopher of science Edgar Zilsel has argued, references to “laws” of nature had 
become commonplace, being clearly identifiable in the work of British scientists and 
philosophers such as Wallis,  Wren,  Hooke,  Halley,  Cotes,  and Bentley,  as  well  as 
European  figures  such  as  Baruch  Spinoza  and  Christian  Huygens.406 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly,  however,  the  most  infuential  single  figure  in  this  “formation-
process” was Isaac Newton. As the historian of science Ernan McMullin has argued 
in his 2001 paper 'The Impact of Newton's Principia on the Philosophy of Science,'407 
the success and sophistication of Newton's 1687 work Philosophiae Naturalis Principia  
Mathematica,  led to its almost immediately being considered an exemplar of scientific 
method and practice. Such was the infuence of this work, McMullin argued, that a 
“variety of morals for the philosophy of science” were drawn from it by subsequent 
philosophers.  McMullin  examined  three  examples  of  this  infuence  in  detail,  
ultimately concluding that:  “these philosophers  were at  one in believing that  the 
404 Friedrich Steinle,  'The Amalgamation of a Concept – Laws of Nature in the New Sciences,'  in  
Friedel Weinert (ed),  Laws of Nature: Essays on the Philosophical, Scientific and Historical Dimensions.  
De Gruyter: Berlin & New York, 1995. p.316.
405 Ibid., p.354.
406 Edgar Zilsel, 'The Genesis of the Concept of Physical Law,' The Philosophical Review. Vol. 51, No. 3 
(May 1942). pp.270-273.
407 Ernan McMullin, 'The Impact of Newton's  Principia on the Philosophy of Science,'  Philosophy of  
Science. Vol. 68, No. 3 (September 2001). pp.279-310.
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mechanics of the Principia could be held up as a model of the sort of knowledge to 
which the investigation of the natural world should aspire.”408 Newton's infuence 
was not only felt among philosophers, however. There is reason to believe his views 
regarding science and law were also infuential among practising scientists. In all of 
those British and European uses of the term “law” which Zilsel had identified, for 
example,  Steinle  was  able  to  identify  clear  traces  of  Newton's  descriptive  and 
mathematical usage in each of them. This is not to say that it was Newton's idea of 
laws alone which became canonical, of course, but merely that Newton had given an 
idea  with  a  long  and  complicated  genesis  “a  particularly  clear  and  infuential 
voice.”409 And from this paradigmatic expression of the idea, Steinle writes:
The pretension of combining systematic empirical enquiry and strict mathematical 
formulation is  from then on inextricably  involved in  the  concept  of  laws.  The 
concept outlined by Newton serves as starting point for further developments in 
the 18th and 19th century. In the course of these developments the concept of law 
undergoes profound changes. Some essential aspects are altered, even disappear, 
such  as  the  theological  commitments;  others  arise  and become important,  like 
statistical considerations. The driving forces of this development are manifold and 
complicated, all the more so as the field of investigation widens and spreads in 
many different directions.410
Ultimately, however, this widening and spreading of the “field of investigation,” as 
Steinle  phrased it,  would take the  sciences  into areas  the ideal  of  laws could no 
longer be stretched to accommodate.  For while the concept of laws was certainly 
capable of remarkable development and adaptation, there were practical limits to its 
ability to model certain classes of otherwise reliable knowledge – limits which first  
became apparent in the patchwork of disciplines which was to eventually become the 
earth sciences. 
The Nomothetic Model and the Early Earth Sciences
By  the  eighteenth  century,  the  idea  of  laws  had  become  fully  and  completely 
synonymous with  the  very  concept  of  explanation  itself.  To illustrate  this,  let  us 
briefy  consider  Denis  Diderot  and  Jean  le  Rond  d'Alembert's  Encyclopédie (Ou 
Dictionnaire Raisonné Des Sciences, Des Arts et Des Métiers), published between 1751 
and 1772.  This  famed document  of  Enlightenment  knowledge and values,  which 
itself claimed to be nothing less than a record of  all human knowledge, divided its 
408 Ibid., p.281.
409 Steinle, 'The Amalgamation of a Concept,' p.362.
410 Ibid.
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contents into three broad categories: “history,” “philosophy” and “poetry.”411 These 
descriptors differed markedly from their modern interpretations, however. “History” 
in  the  Encyclopédie,  argues  the  historian  of  the  geosciences  Martin  Rudwick, 
“embraced  all  those  sciences  that  aimed  to  describe the  diversity  of  the  world; 
“philosophy” incorporated those  that  sought  to  explain how the  world works.”412 
This, Rudwick pointed out, had conceptual consequences for scientific practice at the 
time:
As  Diderot's  chart  shows,  there  was  a  major  distinction  between  two 
complementary ways of studying the natural world.  “Natural history” dealt with 
the description and classification of natural phenomena and natural objects of all 
kinds.  “Natural  philosophy” –  or  what  Diderot  called  the  “science  of  nature”  – 
included the causal and mathematical relations between natural phenomena, as 
well as mathematics itself.413
And  while  it  may  be,  as  Rudwick  asserts,  that  these  “two  kinds  of  study  were 
regarded  as  being  of  equal  importance,  profundity,  and  difficulty,”  this  division 
would  ultimately  leave  the  earth  sciences  caught  between  two fires.  In  order  to 
illustrate this, we must briefy examine the structure of the earth sciences before their 
modern synthesis.
In the latter half of the eighteenth century, Rudwick argues, there were “four fairly 
distinct sciences... concerned with the material objects and phenomena of the earth.” 
Three  of  these  four  –  Mineralogy,  Physical  Geography,  and  Geognosy  –  were 
“concerned  primarily  with  the  description  and  classification  of  the  diversity  of 
terrestrial things and were therefore treated as branches of natural history.” However,  
the fourth – Earth Physics – attempted to deal instead with “the causal explanation of 
the materials presented by any of the other three, or at least with the regularities or 
“natural laws” displayed by their occurrence.” This was (at least according to the 
Encyclopédie) a fundamentally different kind of enquiry. “Since the four sciences of the 
earth,” Rudwick writes, “straddled the major boundary between natural history and 
natural philosophy, there was at the time no obvious need for a single term to denote 
them collectively.”414 And even if there  had been such a need, it seems unlikely an 
appropriate term could easily have been found. For, when considered in the strictly 
411 Diderot and D'Alembert's overall schematic is reproduced in: Martin J. S. Rudwick,  Bursting the 
Limits of Time: The Reconstruction of Geohistory in the Age of Revolution. University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago & London, 2005. pp.50-51.
412 Ibid., p.49. (emphasis in original)
413 Ibid., p.52. (emphasis in original)
414 Ibid., pp.58-59.
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nomothetic terms of the philosophy of science at the time, only “Earth Physics” was 
even the right kind of enquiry to be called scientific. “Earth Physics,” however, was 
also  the  most  troubled  of  the  four  disciplines.  “The  problems  were  obvious,” 
Rudwick writes,  “but in many cases the solutions were highly ambiguous or just 
plain speculative.” This was due, in no small part, to the fedgling nature of the field.  
But the limited possibilities for systemic isolation and/or experiment, not to mention 
the uncertainty involved in assigning mathematical values to geological properties, 
also played a role. “It is not therefore surprising,” Rudwick argues, “that many of the 
savants who studied the physical features of the solid earth devoted more of their 
time and energy to description and classification: often they relegated their causal 
conjectures to an appendix, sometimes with an apology for straying into the field of 
speculation.”415 
These problems of method notwithstanding, the ultimate goal of all of these nascent 
earth sciences  in the late  eighteenth century was still  a  nomothetic  synthesis  –  a 
unified system which reduced the observed geological features of an entire planet to 
the consequences of set of laws and/or processes. The aim, Rudwick argues:
... was to emulate on a terrestrial scale the achievement of Newton in the realm of  
celestial mechanics. It was to discover the one and only true explanation of how 
the earth works, just as Newton was believed... to have discovered the one and 
only true theory to explain the movements of the sun and its planets... under the 
law of universal gravitation.416
Given the realities  of  actually  practising earth physics,  however,  it  seemed highly 
unlikely that the “one and only true theory” would actually consist of laws in any 
recognisably Newtonian sense. For,  as Rudwick points out,  while “Earth Physics” 
struggled with “lawlike 'dispositional regularities' that might point towards causal 
explanations,”  any  large  scale  explanation  for  the  observed  features  of  geology 
would have to be something rather different. Rudwick refers to this as a “Theory of 
the Earth.”417 For our purposes, however, the most important aspect of this debate 
was that the potential usefulness of such a system could be seen even among those 
earth scientists whose primary focus was purportedly restricted to description and 
classification. The desire for a “Theory of the Earth,” in other words, cut neatly across 
the history/natural philosophy boundary:
415 Ibid., pp.114-115.
416 Ibid., pp.133-134.
417 Ibid., p.133.
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In fact, to describe the more restricted kind of study as if it were an end in itself is  
rather misleading, for such work was usually undertaken as a means towards a 
much more important end. The ultimate goal of many savants concerned with the 
sciences of the earth was to construct what they called a  “system” or high-level 
theory about  the  earth.  This  would not  merely  be  a  theory to explain specific 
features,  such as the elevation of  mountains,  the consolidation of rocks,  or the 
emplacement of fossils, important though such problems were. On the contrary, a 
system would try in principle to include all such limited explanations within a 
single overarching causal theory.418
The Newtonian impulse is,  of  course,  clearly present in  such systems.  But this is 
hardly  surprising  given  that,  at  that  time,  the  nomothetic  model  effectively  was 
science. However, additional questions and complications naturally arise when one 
contemplates the possibility of a theory which might explain on the scale of an entire 
planet.  Would  this  much coveted “Theory of  the  Earth”  turn out  to  be  a  single, 
simple natural law? If so, could it be used to predict? Or for calculation? Or would 
such a theory be better understood as the uncovering of the processes which had 
operated over time to bring about the observed geology of the present? But there 
could hardly be only one such process. And if such a theory was not a “law” per se, 
what was its relationship to laws? From even such a cursory contemplation of what a 
“Theory of  the  Earth”  would require,  it  seems reasonable  to  conclude that  these 
nascent earth sciences were, from their very beginnings, blurring the line between 
natural  history and natural  philosophy. Indeed, it is precisely this observation which 
provides the central argument for Rudwick's book. Because of the difficulties – both 
conceptual  and  practical  –  of  taking  the  mathematical,  nomothetic  approach, 
Rudwick argues,  “the  sciences  of  the earth became  historical by  borrowing ideas, 
concepts, and methods from human historiography.”419 
This borrowing, however, was not from the speculative Enlightenment philosophers 
of history, but from the late eighteenth century “erudite histories of more limited 
scope,  based on detailed critical study of massive documentary evidence.”420 Also 
inspirational were the historical practices of chorography and antiquarianism – the 
“detailed  scholarly  description  of  specific  localities  or  regions;  in  effect,  local 
geography,” which often included the examination of not only textual sources but 
also  artifacts  such  as  “ancient  buildings,  megaliths,  and  earthworks.”421 Such 
borrowings, Rudwick argues, collectively represent some of the earliest evidence of 
418 Ibid. (emphasis in original)
419 Ibid., p.181. (emphasis added)
420 Ibid., p.182.
421 Ibid., p.186.
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the  inadequacy of  the  narrow nomothetic  conception of  science when applied to 
historical questions. More importantly, this inadequacy was not (or not entirely) due 
to  the lack of  developed methods such as  were then  available  in  disciplines  like 
physics and chemistry. In many cases, the mismatch between nomothetic theory and 
the  reality  of  the  earth  sciences  was  due  instead  to  the fact  that  what  the  earth 
sciences desired in terms of theory simply had more in common with history:
The varied genres of erudite or “antiquarian” history...  were based on detailed 
concrete  evidence,  whether  texts  or  artifacts.  They  were  histories  compiled 
bottom-up, not deduced top-down. They claimed to describe the particularities of 
how  human  events  had  truly  happened,  where  and  precisely  when...  They 
described specific events, and sequences of events, that could not possibly have 
been predicted in advance, or even retrodicted afterwards. Their sheer contingency 
was due not only to the uncertainties of all human actions and decisions, but also 
to the unpredictable  complexities  of  natural  circumstances  surrounding human 
lives:  the  first  recorded  eruption  of  Vesuvius,  with  its  catastrophic  effects  at 
Herculaneum  and  Pompeii,  stood  as  a  vivid  reminder  of  that  ineluctable 
contingency. So if erudite or antiquarian history were to be used as a model or 
analogy for recovering and reconstructing the history of  nature,  it  would bring 
with it a strong sense of history as a contingent and unpredictable sequence of 
events,  rather  than  as  any  kind  of  intrinsically  predictable  or  “programmed” 
temporal development.422
The  human  world,  in  other  words,  was  not  the  only place  where  one  found 
contingency to such an extent that  the tight  systematisation and prediction upon 
which the nomothetic ideal was predicated were rendered not only impossible but 
irrelevant.  Rudwick goes  on to  identify this  consciously historical  program in the 
work of several scholars of the late eighteenth century, including one of the pioneers 
of  fossil  analysis,  Francois-Xavier  Burtin.  Burtin's  work,  Rudwick  observes,  was 
especially replete with historical  analogy. For Burtin,  fossils  were the “coins,” the 
“documents,” and the “monuments” of the natural world,” to be “deciphered” and 
“read.”423 Clearly then, from the very beginnings of the earth sciences, the nomothetic  
model of science has acted to theoretically alienate a great deal of legitimate research 
regarding the operations of the Earth. And the problem would only grow worse. 
The Nomothetic Model and the Earth Sciences in the Nineteenth Century
Gradually, as the eighteenth century gave way to the nineteenth, the conclusions of 
the  disparate  patchwork  of  disciplines  which  would  become  the  modern  earth 
422 Ibid., p.193. (emphasis in original)
423 Ibid., p.201,203.
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sciences were beginning to interlock, leading the disciplines themselves to begin to 
fuse together. The philosophy of science, however, had changed comparatively little.  
The changes that Steinle has identified in the basic concept of natural laws – such as 
the abandonment of theology and the arrival of statistics – were both necessary and 
welcome,  but  they  were  hardly  fundamental reforms.424 They  certainly  were  not 
sufficient to permit laws to adequately model a discipline whose area of interest was 
riddled with multiple, chaotically interacting processes which had little or no causal 
relationship  with  one  another.  Because  of  this,  Rudwick's  observed  alignment 
between geology and history remains detectable well  into the nineteenth century. 
Charles  Lyell's  introduction  to  the  first  chapter  of  his  hugely  transformative  and 
infuential  Principles  of  Geology425 is  particularly revealing in this  respect,  drawing 
explicit parallels with history in both method and intent:
When we study history, we obtain a more profound insight into human nature, by 
instituting a comparison between the present and former states of society. We trace 
the long series of events which have gradually led to the actual posture of affairs; 
and by connecting effects with their causes, we are enabled to classify and retain in 
the memory a multitude of complicated relations – the various peculiarities of 
national character – the different degrees of moral and intellectual refinement, and 
numerous  other  circumstances,  which,  without  historical  associations,  would 
uninteresting or imperfectly understood. As the present condition of nations is the 
result  of  many antecedent  changes,  some extremely remote  and  others  recent, 
some gradual, others sudden and violent, so the state of the natural world is the 
result of a long succession of events, and if we would enlarge our experience of the 
present economy of nature, we must investigate the effects of her operations in 
former epochs.426
This citation, while instructive, does not represent evidence that Lyell wished to see 
geology as part of history. Lyell's commitment to both the scientific status of geology 
and  the  nomothetic  ideal  of  science  remained.  On  the  very  same  page  of  the 
Principles,  for  example,  Lyell  argued  that  through  geological  research  into  past 
events,  “we acquire  a  more perfect  knowledge of  its  present condition,  and more 
comprehensive views concerning the laws now governing its animate and inanimate 
productions.”427 That  Lyell  should  recognise  history  at  all,  however,  was  highly 
significant.  For  Lyell's  work  was  considerably  more  than the  mere  classifying  of 
fossils or the naming of geological strata. The Principles of Geology also represented a 
sophisticated set of causal theories which could account for a myriad of geological 
424 Steinle, 'The Amalgamation of a Concept,' p.362.
425 Charles Lyell,  Principles of Geology: Being an Attempt to Explain the Former Changes of the Earth's  
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observations – a “Theory of the Earth.” With respect to the divisions of knowledge 
the nomothetic sciences had inherited from earlier centuries, such an active seeking 
for causes moved Lyell's geology from the realm of natural history into that of natural 
philosophy.  Yet  Lyell's  introduction seemed to make it  clear that he considered the 
Principles to be engaged in an essentially historical enquiry.428 He retained, as almost 
all nineteenth century scientists did, a commitment to the ideal of laws. But this could 
not disguise the fact that Lyell's work – which represented not only his own work, 
but the collected labours of  a vastly matured earth science – contained little  that 
actually resembled such laws. 
This mismatch between theory and practice did not go unnoticed by Lyell's critics. 
While  generally  supportive  of  his  work,  critics  such  as  the  nineteenth  century 
geologist  Adam Sedgwick  and  the  philosophers  of  science  William Whewell  and 
John Herschel  were nevertheless uncomfortable with the theoretical  gulf  between 
Lyell's causal theories and actual quantifiable  laws. This scepticism, moreover, was 
directly attributable to their philosophical commitment to a purely Newtonian vision 
of science. As the philosopher Michael Ruse has written of Herschel:
Herschel's  paradigm  science  was  Newtonian  astronomy,  with  its  appeal  to 
quantitative  laws  and  its  hypothetico-deductive  (axiomatic)  structure;  and 
certainly  the Lyell  of  the  Principles  of  geology,  subtle  and successful  though his 
strategy may have been, did not produce a theory with precisely quantified laws 
bound together in a deductive framework.429
Of Whewell, Ruse writes: “like Herschel, Whewell thought that Newtonian physics is  
the  finest  of  sciences...  the  one  that  should  serve  as  the  model  for  all  the  other 
sciences, including geology.” These doctrinaire commitments led both philosophers 
to a kind of gentle scepticism with respect to Lyell's claim to have produced truly 
causal explanations for the geological features of the Earth. While neither Herschel 
nor  Whewell  could  deny  the  magnitude  of  Lyell's  achievement,  the  mismatch 
between what Lyell had delivered and what science was expected to look like meant 
they could hardly pronounce his work an unqualified success either. As Ruse writes,  
“although  Herschel  still  felt  that  geology  as  compared  with  astronomy  was 
immature, he obviously found in the Principles things which he thought essential to 
428 Martin J. S. Rudwick, 'The Strategy of Lyell's Principles of Geology,'  Isis.  Vol. 61, No. 1 (Spring 
1970). p.8. See also the second volume of Rudwick's history of the early earth sciences: Martin J. S.  
Rudwick,  Worlds Before Adam: The Reconstruction of Geohistory in the Age of Reform. University of 
Chicago Press: Chicago & London, 2008. pp.297-300.
429 Michael Ruse, 'Charles Lyell and the Philosophers of Science,' The British Journal for the History of  
Science. Vol. 9, No. 2 (July 1976). p.121.
195
good science.” Similarly, Whewell praised Lyell for bringing an account of causes to 
what he saw as little more than the mere description and classification of previous 
geologists.  “Given  the  fact  that  earlier  geologists  had  gathered  a  great  deal  of  
phenomenal  information  about  the  world  inorganic  and  organic,”  Ruse  argues, 
“Whewell allowed that Lyell had practically transformed the study of its causes.” 
Whewell's endorsement, however, was sharply circumscribed. “Although Whewell 
thought  Lyell's  methodological  approach had proved incredibly successful,”  Ruse 
writes, “he thought that, when applied to this world of ours, it must be hedged with 
severe limitations.”430 
The  limitations  at  which Whewell  had hinted were  those  concerning the general 
applicability  of  Lyell's  conclusions,  given  that  they  clearly  could  not  fulfill  the 
requirements of nomothetic laws. The Victorian geologist Adam Sedgwick, on the 
occasion of his second anniversary address to the Geological Society of London in 
1831, summarised these misgivings as follows: “this theory confounds the immutable 
and primary laws of  matter with the mutable  results  arising from their  irregular 
combination.”431 This statement not only captures the historical character of much of 
Lyell's geology – driven as it was by the contingency created by multiple interacting 
processes and events – it also expresses precisely why philosophers of science were 
uncomfortable  with  it.  Similar  objections,  Rudwick  has  argued,  are  reliably 
identifiable across a broad cross-section of Lyell's critics. “They claimed,” Rudwick 
writes:
... that Lyell, in arguing for the “uniformity” of nature, had confused the highly 
complex processes of geological agency with the basic physico-chemical “laws of 
nature” on which they were founded.  The latter,  they agreed,  must  indeed be 
assumed  to  be  stable  from and to  eternity;  but  the  former  might  have varied 
greatly  in  power  and  intensity  in  the  course  of  geohistory,  and  only  a  close 
empirical study of the surviving traces of their action could or should settle the 
question one way or the other.432
This class of criticisms is instructive insofar as it is entirely accurate, yet can only  
have any rhetorical force if one considers the proper form of all scientific conclusions 
to  be  nomothetic.  For  the  variation  in  “power  and  intensity”  of  past  geological 
processes  could  easily  be  the  result  of  other  processes  (or  even  singular  events) 
unrelated  to  those  being  studied.  Consider,  for  example,  how  the  geological 
430 Ibid., pp.125-126.
431 Adam Sedgwick, 'Address to the Geological Society' (1831), cited in: Rudwick, Worlds Before Adam. 
p.333.
432 Rudwick, Worlds Before Adam. p.345.
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processes of the Earth were potentially disrupted by the impact of the meteor at the 
K/T boundary. No laws of geology alone could have predicted that impact – coming 
as  it  did  from  deep  space.  Yet  no  account  of  Earth's  history  could  be  complete 
without mention of  it.  We will  examine this line of  argument in greater  detail  in 
Chapter Six. Suffice it to say at present that there is no practical way to accurately 
isolate the laws at work in such situations without having to bring those laws acting 
upon the entire universe into play as well. The only way to fully conceptualise such 
systems is historically. Lyell's mistake, therefore, was not to be found in his work, but 
in his desire to present that work as having fulfilled the nomothetic ideal of science. 
Adding further insult to injury, however, was the failure of the philosophy of science 
to revise or amend its nomothetic stance in response to the achievements of even 
such a consummate scientist as Lyell. The result was a continued disconnect between 
geological practice and scientific orthodoxy. In some cases, theory was abandoned 
almost entirely. The philosopher of geology David Kitts has argued, for instance, that 
later nineteenth century geologists – particularly the infuential American geologist 
Grove Karl Gilbert – came to believe that geologists did not utilise the traditional 
structures of science in the pursuit of their work  at all. Gilbert, Kitts argued, was a 
particularly active contributor to the “establishment, during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, of a methodological view that persists to this day.” This was the 
view that  geology as  a  science  was not  organised around the concept  of  natural  
laws.433 This, in turn, contributed to a sense in geology of being abandoned by the 
mainstream philosophy of science, and has given rise to a certain insularity within 
the  discipline.  As  Kitts  has  observed,  “it  is  interesting  to  note  that  many of  the 
geologists who extol the virtues of Gilbert profess to find nothing in contemporary 
philosophy of science which illuminates the problems of geological knowledge.”434 
Even today, it seems, there is a lingering sense of alienation from theoretical issues 
prevalent among geologists and their theorists. As recently as 2008, the geographer 
and historian of geology Robert John Inkpen has argued:
Given the limited philosophical basis available within geosciences, practitioners 
have tended to focus on the practice of doing the field work, collecting the data,  
carrying out the analysis and getting an answer they are comfortable is relevant to 
the question. In environmental reconstruction, for example, the focus remains on 
433 David B. Kitts, 'Grove Karl Gilbert and the Concept of “Hypothesis” in Late Nineteenth-Century 
Geology,'  in  Ronald  N.  Giere  & Richard  S.  Westfall  (eds),  Foundations  of  Scientific  Method:  The  
Nineteenth Century. Indiana University Press: Bloomington & London, 1973. p.265.
434 Ibid., p.266.
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the  identification  of  traces  of  the  past  and  their  construction  into  a  plausible 
description  of  the  past  and  how  it  has  changed.  The  philosophy  is  seen  as 
something that can be worked out later if anyone is really that interested.435
Moreover,  in the absence of  any serious philosophical  attention being devoted to 
geology, Inkpen has argued, a tendency has arisen in which geological practice is 
seen as dictated not by a strong philosophy of science but by “a history of tradition 
guiding  the  hand  of  the  operator  and  requiring  no  further  scrutiny.”436 It  is 
impossible not to note the similarity between this conclusion and the similarly facile 
argument  that  historiography  is  a  “craft”  rather  than  a  science  or  a  set  of  
methodological principles. Whether found in geology or history, this amounts to little 
more than a discipline granting itself permission to be unrefective.437
The Nomothetic Model and the Biological Sciences in the Nineteenth Century
A similar tension to that observed in the work of Charles Lyell can also be seen in 
that other towering achievement of nineteenth century science – the 1859 publication 
of Charles Darwin's On The Origin Of Species By Means Of Natural Selection.438 Despite 
its immense success as a work of science, it can be argued that Darwin's work too 
had  a  distinctly  historical  slant  to  it  which  was  difficult  to  reconcile  with  a 
nomothetic model of science. Darwin was thus also vulnerable to some variant of 
Sedgwick's accusation of confusing “the immutable and primary laws of matter with 
the  mutable  results  arising  from  their  irregular  combination.”439 The  similarities 
between  these  two  cases  are  more  than  merely  superficial,  however.  Like  Lyell, 
Darwin  also  had  a  pronounced  tendency  in  The  Origin  to  talk  of  science 
nomothetically in terms of its chiefy discovering laws, despite his own conclusions 
frequently failing to satisfy the classical definition of the term. In the closing pages of 
The Origin, for example, Darwin listed the “laws” which he argued had interacted to 
make the higher principle of natural selection possible:
It is interesting to contemplate an entangled bank, clothed with many plants of 
many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects fitting about, 
and  with  worms  crawling  through  the  damp  earth,  and  to  refect  that  these 
435 Robert John Inkpen, 'Explaining the Past in the Geosciences,'  Philosophia.  Vol. 36, No. 4 (2008). 
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elaborately  constructed forms,  so different  from each other,  and dependent  on 
each other in so complex a manner,  have all  been produced by laws acting all 
around us. These laws, taken in largest sense, being Growth with Reproduction; 
Inheritance which is almost implied by Reproduction; Variability from the indirect 
and direct action of the external conditions of life, and from use and disuse; a Ratio 
of  Increase so  high as  to  lead to  a  Struggle  for  Life,  and as  a  consequence  to  
Natural Selection...440
But, despite the language of laws being employed here, there is also a sense in which 
Darwin clearly positions his own original contribution of Natural Selection as a law441 
arising  from  the  interaction  of  multiple  unconnected  (yet  interlocking)  laws  and 
processes operating at lower levels. He was, of course, quite justified in thinking this. 
More  than  a  century  and  a  half  of  progress  in  the  biological  sciences  has 
subsequently  shown  Darwin  to  have  been  correct  about  the  discernibly  and 
predictably  law-governed physical  and  chemical  character  of  many  of  the  above 
processes. This is especially impressive given that Darwin, writing in the nineteenth 
century, could have had no strong evidence at all for the molecular basis which was 
later shown to govern that “Inheritance which is almost implied by Reproduction.” 
Darwin spoke of these underlying laws frequently in  The Origin,  referring to them 
variously as “dimly seen” or “complex and little-known.”442 He knew very well they 
must exist, but of their exact nature he could have known nothing. 
The interaction of these laws and processes with the “indirect and direct action of the 
external conditions of life,” however, was much more problematic. Presumably such 
“external conditions” were also (ultimately) law-governed, but it was hardly possible 
to  systematise  and predict  their  effects.  Nor  were  the  laws  and  processes  which 
governed  such  environmental  factors  in  any  sense  proximate to  those  molecular 
processes  which drove reproduction.  To illustrate  this,  let  us  return  again to  our 
example of the K/T meteor. This impact, and the extinctions it is thought to have 
caused,  could hardly  fail  to  have had profound consequences  for  the survival  of 
organisms  alive  at  that  time  –  whether  through  climate  change,  for  instance,  or 
through the extinction of a key predator allowing their prey to fourish and become 
dominant. Yet the properly nomothetic causes of that impact are not to be found in 
biology,  but  in the  comparatively  far-removed physics  of  gravitation acting upon 
440 Darwin, On The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. pp.489-490.
441 As Richard England has argued, while “Darwin at first considered natural selection to be a natural 
law,” he had come to hold “rather different views by the time the Origin was published in 1859.” 
See: Richard England,  'Natural Selection, Teleology, and the Logos: From Darwin to the Oxford 
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objects  in  space.  If  even  the  physics  of  deep  space  objects  might  sometimes  be 
counted  as  among  the  “external  conditions  of  life,”  arrayed  alongside  more 
traditional  environmental  processes  such  as  climate  and  predation,  then  said 
“external conditions” could hardly be reduced to their own precise laws. Put simply, 
while the molecular processes of life proceeded in a satisfyingly systematic manner, 
the environment in which they operated was – from the point of view of biology – a 
chaotic mess of competing laws and processes,  any of which might potentially have 
an impact on the differential survival of organisms which was at the heart of natural 
selection. The end result, Darwin wrote, was the arrival of a field of enquiry which 
was quite incomplete without some acknowledgement of contingency and history:
When we no longer look at an organic being as a savage looks at a ship, as at 
something wholly beyond his comprehension; when we regard every production 
of nature as one which has had a history; when we contemplate every complex 
structure and instinct as the summing up of many contrivances, each useful to the 
possessor,  nearly  in  the  same way  as  when  we  look  at  any  great  mechanical 
invention as the summing up of the labour, the experience, the reason, and even 
the blunders of numerous workmen; when we thus view each organic being, how 
far more interesting,  I  speak from experience, will  the study of  natural  history 
become!443
Just as with Lyell, however, this historical dimension of Darwin's work did not go 
unnoticed by his  critics.  Indeed,  it  was  often precisely  this  historicity which was 
mobilised in service of his dismissal. Such objections, once again, could only carry 
weight  if  one  accepted  the  assumption  that  the  nomothetic  form  was  the  ideal 
expression of science. As we might expect from our example of Lyell, however, this 
assumption remained pervasive during Darwin's time. The Origin, published after the 
most infuential nineteenth century philosophies of science and proving difficult to 
accommodate  within  their  nomothetic  structures,  was  thus  received  quite  poorly 
among theorists  and philosophers of  science.  Indeed,  the reception which was to 
greet Darwin – even when confined to philosophical issues alone – was to prove even 
harsher than that which was accorded to Lyell. 
In his paper examining Darwin's reception by the nineteenth century philosophers of 
science John Stuart Mill,  William Whewell, and John Herschel, the philosopher of 
biology David Hull argues that all three men had formulated their views regarding 
the nature of science with the desire to “provide an explicit and detailed analysis of 
443 Ibid., pp.485-486.
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science  consonant  with  the  great  achievements  in  physics which  had  preceded 
them.”444 This  being  the  case,  it  is  perhaps  unsurprising  to  find  that  all  three 
philosophers rejected Darwin's conclusions. Whewell rejected the The Origin  almost 
entirely, primarily on religious grounds.445 And while Herschel and Mill were willing 
to at  least entertain the  possibility of species transmutation, both rejected Darwin's 
mechanism  for  being  insufficiently  law-like.  “Chance  variation,”  Hull  writes, 
“sounded too much like the absence of law. The introduction of new species might be 
by law but not the law of higgledy-piggledy.”446 But as we have already seen – and as 
Hull  has  also  pointed out  –  Darwin had repeatedly  stated  in  The  Origin that  by 
“chance variation,” he did  not mean to imply an “absence of laws governing these 
variations,”  but  that  “whatever  these  laws  might  be,  they  were  unknown...”447 
However, it was precisely this lack of knowledge which was the problem. For while 
Darwin had repeatedly affirmed his ultimate commitment to the nomothetic model 
of science within it, The Origin had broken new ground with respect to the sheer scope 
of  its  conclusions.  To  say  nothing  of  the  immense  theoretical  distance  between 
natural  selection  itself  and  the  laws  upon  which  Darwin  perceived  it  as  being 
based.448 Put simply, both Darwin and Lyell had shown it was possible to produce 
scientific models  and theories which could  not even name their  most fundamental 
laws, and yet were not prevented from doing useful explanatory work by this.
This is not to say that the difficult – if only in nomothetic terms – nature of biology 
was  entirely without  allies  among  philosopher  of  science.  Yet  even  Darwin's 
staunchest  ally,  Thomas  Henry  Huxley,  had  private  misgivings  about  natural 
selection. Five years before Darwin's publication of The Origin, for instance, Huxley 
had argued:
How then has this notion of the inexactness of Biological science come about? I 
believe from two causes: first, because in consequence of the great complexity of 
the science and the multitude of  interfering conditions, we are very often only 
enabled to predict approximately what will occur under given circumstances; and 
secondly,  because,  on  account  of  the  comparative  youth  of  the  Physiological 
sciences, a great many of their laws are still imperfectly worked out.449
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Such a defence is, while well-intentioned, ultimately unconvincing. In reply to the 
charge that biology was not sufficiently lawful, Huxley was essentially saying 'wait 
and see.' This did little more than shift the burden of proof into the future. One might 
therefore wonder if  the arrival  of Darwin's  mechanism of natural  selection might 
have seemed like a vindication to Huxley – the arrival of the first of the laws he had 
hoped for. Yet there is reason to believe that Huxley, while supportive of Darwinian 
evolution in general, was sceptical regarding the sufficiency of natural selection as its 
mechanism. This scepticism, moreover, was specifically predicated on the inability of 
natural  selection to  function in  the  law-like  manner  that  the  Newtonian  view of 
science would seem to demand. As the historian of science Mario Di Gregorio has 
argued,  Huxley  was  persuaded  of  the  value  of  evolution  “only  as  a  working 
hypothesis in respect to the phenomena of organic nature,” and only supported the 
theory in public “as a kind of 'program' worthy of serious consideration but not yet  
ready for  broad application because of  natural  selection,  its  basic  tenet.”450 In the 
wake of one of the most infuential scientific works ever published, in other words, 
which had explained so much while assuming so little, Huxley was still driven by his 
nomothetic commitments to 'wait and see.' 
Another example of philosophical discomfort with Darwin's biology came from the 
famed geologist, mathematician, and disciple of Whewell, William Hopkins. His 1860 
review of Darwin's On The Origin of Species in Fraser's Magazine, for instance, strongly 
attacked Darwin for precisely the failing Huxley had only hinted at. For Hopkins, 
natural  selection  could  be  little  more  than  descriptive  speculation,  because 
“explanation” – as opposed to “mere description” – required a demonstration that 
the phenomenon in question was a necessary consequence of known laws of nature.451 
This commitment to a nomothetic ideal of science, as the historian M. J. S. Hodge has 
argued, almost entirely determined Hopkins' assessment of Darwin: 
For, of course, the only candidate for a physical cause that he [Hopkins] finds there 
is natural selection; but no explanation is achieved by this,  because there is no 
acceptable  proof  that,  in  the  initial  conditions  obtaining,  this  “force”  has 
necessitated  any  of  its  supposed  effects.  Moreover,  since  the  law  of  common 
descent is, considered on its own, only a “descriptive” law, it can have, Hopkins 
Essence of T. H. Huxley: Selections from his Writings.  Cyril Bibby (ed). St. Martin's Press: New York, 
1967. p.53.
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insists, no explanatory power to solve problems in biogeography and comparative 
anatomy.  It  was,  manifestly,  his  ontology  as  much  as  his  methodology  that 
sustained Hopkins's dissatisfaction. Explanatory causes had to be for him either 
Newtonian forces or some other agents that, like them, lawfully mediate between 
God and matter.452
This, Hodge argued, was an example of how “a commitment to Newton and to God 
could... lead very directly to a rejection of Darwin.” This is not to suggest that all 
objections to Darwinian biology were so motivated, however. In fact, according to 
Hodge, nineteenth century objections to Darwinian biology could be understood as 
arising from four distinct areas. First, from the theologically inspired objections of 
those such as William Whewell. Second, from a group Hodge called “unambitious, 
conservative  naturalists  who...  dismissed  all  theorizing  as  inconclusive,  divisive 
speculation.” Third, from the lay community of “popular, religious, or literary critics” 
who could claim “no regular membership in the researching community.” And lastly, 
from  “anyone  like  Hopkins”  who  “measured  theoretical  innovations  in  biology 
against the arguably irrelevant standards of Newtonian science.”453 Given that the 
first  three  of  these  groups  represented  rejections  for  less  than  empirically  sound 
reasons, it was  only this final category which presented any real threat to Darwin. 
And yet objections from that same quarter were effectively dominated by concerns 
that Darwin's work represented a troubling mismatch between theory and practice. 
Concern about the implications and verifiability of Darwin's ideas were one thing, 
concerns as  to  whether  they could adequately  be  called science  at  all  were quite 
another.  Regardless  of  whether  Newtonian  standards  were  “irrelevant”  or  not, 
rejection from people like Hopkins and scepticism even from champions like Huxley 
was ultimately an expression of discomfort with Darwin's work based less on its 
content and more on its perceived fit with some ideal form. And given that Darwin's 
work has since come to represent some of the most successful scientific practice in the 
history of biology or any other science, one cannot help but wonder whether it was 
not this ideal form which was at fault.
Contemporary Nomothetic Objections to Darwinian Biology
The  more  difficult  (that  is  to  say,  historical)  implications  of  Darwinian  biology 
continued to experience a great deal of philosophical resistance in the early to mid 
twentieth century. Especially hostile were those philosophers of science associated 
452 Hodge, 'England,' p.23.
453 Ibid., pp.23-24.
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with  logical  positivism  –  that  mid-century  movement  which  had  also  produced 
Hempel's legendarily troublesome 'The Function of General Laws in History.' During 
this  period,  mainstream  philosophers  of  science  were  often  so hostile  toward 
Darwinian biology, that the philosopher of biology David L. Hull devoted one of the  
earliest  papers in his  career  purely to their  rebuttal.  Published in 1969,  the now-
classic 'What the Philosophy of Biology is Not,' was a review of the contributions (or 
the lack thereof) made by orthodox philosophers of science to issues relevant to the 
biological sciences.454 The real power of this paper, however, came not from Hull's 
dissection of the substantive arguments about biology made by the philosophers he 
examines, but from his explication of their serious  factual errors regarding even the 
most basic aspects of  that  biology. “One striking feature of  the remarks made by 
philosophers  about  biology,”  Hull  argued,  “is  how  frequently  they  are 
misinformed.”455 To this observation we might only add that it is equally striking just 
how often such dismissals of Darwinism were rooted not only in ignorance, but also 
in the doctrinaire expectation that all real science should look and act like nomothetic 
physics. Mario Bunge, for instance, in a paper exploring the quality of simplicity in 
scientific theory, argued the following of Darwinian natural selection:
What gave Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection the victory over 
its various rivals, notably creationism and Lamarckism? Darwin's theory was in 
part logically faulty (remember the vicious circle of the “survival of the fittest”); it  
contained several false or at least unproven assertions (“Each variation is good for 
the  individual,”  “Acquired  characters,  if  favorable,  are  inherited,”  “Sexual 
selection operates universally”); it had not been tested by observation, let alone by 
experiment on living species under controlled conditions... it's explanatory power 
was clearly smaller than that of its rivals (irrefutable theories have the maximum 
post factum explanatory power); it had no inductive basis but was, on the contrary, 
a  bold  invention  containing  high-level  unobservables.  And,  if  these  were  not 
enough to condemn the theory, Darwin's system was far more complex than any 
of its rivals.456
Against this seemingly damning assessment, Hull proceeded to show that almost all  
of Bunge's assertions regarding natural selection in the above quote were not only 
errors of argument, but errors of fact. In spite of the “tiresome regularity” with which 
the argument of logical circularity is made, Hull argued, “it has little foundation.” 
454 David  L.  Hull,  'What  Philosophy of  Biology is  Not,'  Synthese.  Vol.  20,  No.  2,  Methodological 
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For while the claim that “the fittest tend to survive can be made viciously circular if  
fitness were determined only by means  of  actual  survival  or  into a tautology by 
defining 'fitness' exclusively in terms of actual survival,” Hull argued, “biologists do 
neither.”  Of  Bunge's  purported  examples  of  Darwin's  false  and/or  unproven 
assertions,  Hull  argued that  Darwin demonstrably  held none of  them.  And with 
respect  to Bunge's  claim that Darwin's theory had no inductive base,  Hull  stated 
simply: “one wonders what Bunge can mean by 'inductive basis' if Darwin's 30 years' 
labor in attempting to support his theory and all the data marshalled in the  Origin 
provided no inductive basis.” While these points were not of critical importance for 
the overall argument of Bunge's paper, Hull argued that his comments nonetheless 
represented evidence of an “obvious disinterest in evolutionary theory” as a properly 
scientific proposition. “It is certain,” Hull wrote, “that he would not treat quantum 
theory in such a cavalier fashion.”457
Much of Hull's paper consisted of just this kind of factual debunking, often of targets 
even softer than Bunge. As was the case with Bunge, however, many of the factual  
errors  he pointed out were only rarely  truly  significant relative to  the matters  of 
philosophy  at  issue.  In  the  second  half  of  the  paper,  however,  he  reframes  his 
question.  “Enough  has  been  said,”  Hull  wrote,  “to  show  how  unsuccessful 
contemporary philosophers have been in extracting the consequences of biology for 
philosophy.  What  of  the  other  side  of  the  coin?  Have  philosophical  analyses  of 
biology  provided  any  insights  into  biological  phenomena,  any  clarity  which 
biologists themselves have been unable to provide...?” But in this respect also, Hull 
found the  philosophy of  science  to  be  sadly  out  of  touch with biological  reality, 
continuing to argue over archaic issues such as vitalism and teleology which had 
long been conclusively settled among actual biologists. “From the point of view of 
contemporary biology,” Hull stated bluntly, “both vitalism and teleology are stone 
cold dead.”458 One biological issue in which philosophers of science were interested, 
Hull  argued,  was the  possibility  of  reductionism.  This  philosophical  interest  was 
decidedly not for the benefit of biology, however. Instead it was seen as an avenue by 
which  logical  positivists  hoped  to  salvage  the  purported  universality  of  the 
nomothetic model in the face of a century of sustained failure by biologists to deliver 
the laws that Huxley had so long ago promised. Biology was being used, in other 
words, as a paradigm case in a wider discussion of the nature of explanation.
457 Hull, 'What Philosophy of Biology is Not,' pp.158-159.
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205
Reductionism,  as  applied  to  biology,  was  concerned  with  the  basic  question  of 
“whether biology was in some sense reducible to chemistry and physics and what 
such a reduction entailed.” The then-recent discovery of the molecule DNA was the 
primary catalyst for this. As Hull has observed, “during the last 30 years, a process 
has  been under  way in  genetics  which fulfills  all  the requirements  of  what  both 
scientists  and  philosophers  have  in  mind  when  they  speak  of  reduction.  A 
biochemical  explanation  is  being  produced  for  phenomena  which  have  been 
explained previously in terms of classical Mendelian genetics.”459 Philosophers and 
biologists,  however,  disagreed over the  significance of this.  For biologists,  this was 
significant  in  terms  of  its  possible  applications  in  genetics,  but  was  not  of  any 
overarching relevance:
It may well be true that in principle all macroscopic phenomena are governed by 
deterministic  laws  and  that  all  these  laws  can  be  organized  into  a  deductive 
hierarchy, but biologists do not have these laws. The laws which give substance to 
the claim that an organism which did not survive was nevertheless exceedingly fit 
are currently not deducible from evolutionary theory and are formally independent of  
it.460
That is to say, biology could do useful work without being reduced to physics and/or 
chemistry. For biologists, evolutionary theory was legitimate even without knowledge 
of how it was linked to properly nomothetic general laws. More importantly, while 
the  three  revolutions  in  biology  represented  by  Darwin's  discovery  of  natural 
selection, Mendel's work on genetics, and the discovery of DNA, had all massively 
increased the explanatory power of biology, they had  not succeeded in eliminating 
the basic contingency inherent in biological evolution. They were not, in other words, 
predictive  in  the  classical  sense.  Biologists  might  therefore  have been  forgiven for 
wondering  just  how  advanced  biology  would  have  to  get in  order  to  be  taken 
seriously as a non-nomothetic science. For some philosophers of science, on the other 
hand, the possibility of a complete reduction provided hope that, if biology could not 
produce its own laws, it might at least be shown to be the necessary applied product 
of more fundamental known laws of chemistry and physics. This is not to say, of  
course, that biology did not have any generalisations, large-scale theories, or law-like 
statements.  That  was  not  the  problem.  The  problem  was  the  insistence  by 
nomothetically  inclined  philosophers  of  science  on  prediction as  a  necessary 
459 Ibid., pp.164-165.
460 Ibid., p.167. (emphasis added)
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consequence of explanation. And this requirement made such generalisations as did 
exist illegitimate. As Hull has argued:
During the last decade or so, biology has been forced briefy to the center of the  
stage in the philosophy of science because of the relevance of explanation and 
prediction in evolutionary studies to a remark made by Hempel and Oppenheim 
in their classic paper on the logic of explanation. After setting out four conditions 
of adequacy for scientific explanation,  they state  that  the same formal analysis 
applies to scientific prediction as well.461
To be fair, by the time Hull was writing, the Hempelian model was already under 
attack from many quarters. But this argument that truly scientific explanation should 
be “symmetrical” was a point upon which evolutionary biology had been attacked 
before, and would be again. As such, it is worth mentioning here. Briefy put, the 
symmetry thesis was the assertion that an explanation was only truly  scientific if it 
could have (even if  only theoretically)  predicted the events it  explains.  One might 
explain  some unique and  unrepeatable  event  after  the  fact,  for  instance,  but  the 
explanation so offered – in order to be valid under the symmetry thesis – ought to 
have  been  able  to  demonstrate  ahead  of  time  (i.e.,  predict)  that  the  event  was 
necessary.  The  form of  the  explanation in  both  cases should be  identical.  The  only 
difference between a prediction and a  post facto explanation is the relative time at 
which it is given. And this symmetry, as Hempel and Oppenheim famously argued, 
was a crucial component of science:
It  is  this  potential  predictive  force  which  gives  scientific  explanation  its 
importance: only to the extent that we are able to explain empirical facts can we 
attain the major objective of scientific research, namely not merely to record the 
phenomena  of  our  experience,  but  to  learn  from them,  by  basing  upon  them 
theoretical generalizations which enable us to anticipate new occurrences and to 
control, at least to some extent, the changes in our environment.462
But this would hardly be possible in any discipline without the availability of highly 
precise  general  laws  and  principles.  Evolutionary  biology  also  suffered  from  the 
additional  handicap  of  being  unable  to  –  whether  by  experiment  or  repeated 
observation – ameliorate the contingency which abounded in the kinds of long-run 
systems it  attempted to make sense of.  The symmetry thesis was thus a test  that 
evolutionary  biology  quite  simply  could  not  pass.  As  Hull  has  argued,  the 
“significance  of  biology  for  this  controversy  in  the  philosophy of  science  is  that 
biologists frequently set forth what they take to be explanations of the evolutionary 
461 Ibid., p.165. The “classic paper” Hull is referring to here is: Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, 
'Studies in the Logic of Explanation,' Philosophy of Science. Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1948). pp.135-175.
462 Hempel and Oppenheim, 'Studies in the Logic of Explanation,' p.138.
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development of certain groups when they readily admit they could not have made 
much in the way of any reasoned predictions in the matter.”463 This meant that, if we 
accept Hempel and Oppenheim's logic, evolutionary biology would be required to be 
completely reduced to physics and/or chemistry if it wished to be considered capable 
of anything even approximating a properly scientific explanation. From this it would 
follow that biologists – Darwin, Mendel, Watson, and Crick included – have yet to  
succeed in offering a single genuinely scientific explanation. Given the remarkable 
contributions of these biologists to human knowledge, this seems almost comically 
unfair.  As Hull  has argued,  whatever the outcome of  the discussion surrounding 
reductionism, it was clear that biology was not being taken on its own terms. “As 
gratified as biologists may be for the attention that one of their theories had at last 
received from first rate philosophers of science,” Hull wrote, “the actual nature of  
evolutionary  inferences  was  investigated  none  too  intensively.  What  biologists 
actually did in producing certain putative explanations rapidly became peripheral to 
the issue of whether or not these formulations were truly explanations.”464 
Or, it might be added, whether evolutionary biology was even science  at all. For it 
was  on  similarly  nomothetically  inspired grounds  of  symmetrical  prediction  that 
Karl Popper, in his 1974 paper 'Darwinism as a Metaphysical Research Programme,' 
famously  declared  that  “Darwinism  is  not  a  testable  scientific  theory  but  a 
metaphysical  research  programme  –  a  possible  framework  for  testable  scientific 
theories.”465 Popper based this controversial argument on what he interpreted as the 
ability of Darwinian theory to explain the outcome of any observation:
... assume that we find life on Mars consisting of exactly three species of bacteria 
with a genetic outfit similar to that of terrestrial species. Is Darwinism refuted? By 
no means. We shall say that these three species were the only forms among the 
many mutants which were sufficiently well adjusted to survive. And we shall say 
the same if there is only one species (or none). Thus Darwinism does not really 
predict the evolution of variety. It therefore cannot really explain it.466
It  seems that for Popper,  like Hempel and Oppenheim, an assertion must be  fully 
predictive (i.e., symmetrical) in order to be considered an explanation. This would 
therefore  seem  to  be  little  more  than  yet  another  example  of  the  rejection  of 
463 Hull, 'What Philosophy of Biology is Not,' p.165.
464 Ibid., pp.165-166.
465 Karl  Popper,  'Darwinism  as  a Metaphysical  Research  Programme,'  in  P.  A.  Schilpp  (ed),  The 
Philosophy  of  Karl  Popper:  Volume  One.  Open  Court:  LaSalle,  Illinois,  1974. p.134.  (emphasis  in 
original)
466 Ibid., p.136. (emphasis in original)
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Darwinian  evolution  motivated  by  an  a  priori commitment  to  the  nomothetic-
deductive model of science. But there is more we might profitably say about Popper's 
case. For while the hypothetical example Popper offers might very well be genuinely 
ambiguous,  it  seems  disingenuous  to  propose  two  situations,  both  of  which 
Darwinian  evolution  could  theoretically  explain  (and  thus  be  unable  to  choose 
between) and therefore conclude that Darwinian evolution can explain any possible 
observation  and justify  all  possible  outcomes.  Michael  Ruse  makes  precisely  this 
point  at  length  in  his  1977  article-length  refutation  of  Popper's  “evolutionary” 
philosophy.467 In addition to this structural failure in Popper's argument, however, 
Ruse also finds in his work several extremely serious factual errors with respect to 
basic biology, leading him to conclude that Popper could “draw his conclusions only 
because he is abysmally ignorant of the current status of biological thought.” Thus, 
Ruse argues, Popper's “criticisms of biology are without force and his suggestions for 
its improvement are without need.”468 The philosopher Robert J. Richards has since 
noted that, in the wake of just such counterarguments, Popper had largely retreated 
from his position by 1978 and had been compelled to “admit evolutionary biology 
into the temple.” But this reversal, Richards argued, was seemingly political rather 
than philosophical. For even setting aside his basic errors of biology, there was still 
the problem of the symmetry thesis inherent in the nomothetic-deductive model to 
contend with.  There  was,  Richards writes,  “no good reason why he should have 
succumbed  to  ecumenism.  Evolutionary  biology  still  does  not  meet  the  logical 
criteria that Popper proposed for science.”469 
From the  selection of  examples  offered here,  it  should by  now be  clear  that  the 
classical  nomothetic  model  of  science  has  a  long  history  of  failure  in  both  the 
geological and biological sciences. That failure, moreover, has not been a catalyst for 
the revision or replacement of that model. Instead it has been used as a cudgel to call 
into question the basic legitimacy of both sciences, as though it were their fault for 
not living up to the ideal. Nor are these the only sciences from which examples might 
have been drawn. But this thesis has no need to further reinvent the wheel. For our  
purposes,  what is  important is the demonstration that,  at the root of  this general 
hostility toward such historically focused sciences is the assumption that a science 
467 Michael Ruse, 'Karl Popper's Philosophy of Biology,' Philosophy of Science. Vol. 44, No. 4 (December 
1977). pp.643-646.
468 Ibid., p.638.
469 Robert J. Richards, 'The Structure of Narrative Explanation in History and Biology,' in Matthew H. 
Nitecki & Doris V. Nitecki (eds), History and Evolution. State University of New York Press: Albany, 
1992. p.20.
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must make use of general laws in order to be genuinely explanatory. Moreover, glib 
claims  by  nomothetic  philosophers  of  science  that  such  disciplines  are  merely 
awaiting their inevitable theoretical reduction to more fundamental (i.e., nomothetic) 
sciences have acted to engender a 'wait and see' approach to any counter-example 
which has threatened nomothetic orthodoxy. This is not only logically dubious in the 
sense that it allows the nomothetic-deductive model to claim success no matter what 
counter-examples it is presented with, it also fails to recognise the insights historical  
sciences which have not (or not yet) been so reduced have been able to provide. This 
is another way of saying that while the nomothetic position will very likely prove 
correct in the long run, geologists and evolutionary biologists (among others) have 
science to do right now, and require a principled way in which to go about doing it. 
To  this  end,  we  must  examine  the  kinds  of  practical  models  philosophers  and 
practitioners of these sciences have developed in order to describe and guide their 
work  in  the  absence  of  any  strong  philosophical  guidance.  We  will  examine  an 
extended example of just such a solution in the following chapter, with a view to 
showing how historical sciences have attempted to generate theories regarding single 
events/objects and submit them to meaningful empirical confirmation.
In the examination of the “actual nature” of  explanatory practice in the historical 
sciences  which  occupies  Chapter  Five,  particular  emphasis  will  be  placed  on 
attempts to offer historical accounts which could also maintain a scientific legitimacy. 
For  while  philosophers  of  the  historical  sciences  were  required  to  account  for 
contingency in  their  attempts  to  model  historical  explanation,  they  could not,  as 
philosophers of  history had done,  use  this  requirement  as  an excuse  to  abandon 
science altogether.  This  in turn meant  that  the claim of  the nomothetic-deductive 
model  to  be  universal  had to  be directly  challenged.  Thus the first  stirrings of  a 
historical, narrative approach to science would lead ineluctably to a philosophical 
challenge against one of its most central tenets. As Robert J. Richards has argued, the 
reason  that  evolutionary  biology  did  not  meet  Popper's  nomothetic  criteria  for 
science was because “it is historical and suffers from the presumed disabilities of all  
history attempting to pass as science.”470 But such disabilities, Richard continues, are 
imagined rather than actual. This is because they arise from trying to force historical 
explanations into a nomothetic form when it is the reverse which is more appropriate:
... Hempel got it just backwards: it is not that history can offer only explanation 
470 Ibid.
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sketches,  but  that  nomological-deductive  accounts  –  insofar  as  they  can  be 
detected  in  such  sciences  as  geology,  paleontology,  astrophysics,  anthropology, 
and  evolutionary  biology  –  provide  only  narrative  sketches;  the  covering  law 
model yields sound explanations only insofar as that skeleton can be feshed out 
imaginatively with the sinew and muscle of the corresponding narrative.471
If the common basis of the sciences Richards has listed above is their historical focus 
–  and  this  seems  a  more  than  reasonable  conclusion  –  then,  he  claims,  their 
explanatory mechanisms must involve narrative to some degree. For  only narrative, 
Richards  argues,  can take  account  of  the  kinds of  contingencies  and interlocking 
chains of causality inherent in such historical explanations. David Hull  came to a 
similar conclusion, arguing not only that narrative is the best mechanism available 
for understanding and explaining historical  developments,  but also that historical 
explanations need not strive for some arbitrary threshold of generality in order to be 
considered legitimate:
...  I  argue  that  explanations  in  terms  of  particular  circumstances  are  perfectly 
legitimate and set out what might be termed a Particular-Circumstance Model of 
scientific explanation. Of course, there may be some general laws lurking around 
in  the  background  somewhere,  but  the  particular  circumstances  carry  the 
explanatory load.472
One can hardly fail to notice the similarity of these arguments to the rapprochement 
between laws and narrative suggested by Arthur  Danto.  Unlike Danto,  however, 
what  these  philosophers  are  suggesting  is  not  only  that  a  model  of  scientific 
explanation  which  expands  upon  the  traditional  nomothetic-deductive  form  is 
possible,  but  that  such  a  model  uses  narrative  as  a  central  mechanism.  More 
importantly, the means by which this argument can even be made at all is through the 
weakening of the nomothetic assumption. If Roberts and Hull are correct about this, 
then the two main reasons narrativist philosophers of history have offered for why 
history cannot be considered scientific – the inability to produce or otherwise make 
use  of  general  laws,  and  the  inherently  unscientific  nature  of  narrative  –  are 
effectively neutralised. And given the elimination of these objections, the question 
immediately arises: could such a scientific model of narrative also be applied to the 
study of human history as we currently know it?  If  so,  the potential rewards are 
immense. At the very least, the kinds of tensions between historical explanation and 
the scientific ideal detailed in Part One will be dissolved. Similarly, the retreat into a 
471 Ibid., p.23.
472 David  L.  Hull,  'The  Particular-Circumstance  Model  of  Scientific  Explanation,'  in  Matthew  H. 
Nitecki & Doris V. Nitecki (eds), History and Evolution. State University of New York Press: Albany, 
1992. p.70.
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literary  definition  of  the  term  “narrative”  among  contemporary  philosophers  of 
history would be revealed as an unnecessary response to an illusory problem. For if a 
broadly inclusive concept of narrative could be made scientifically respectable, then  
its role in the construction of historical accounts need not immediately banish those 
accounts to the subjective ghetto of the humanities. And finally, and perhaps most 
significantly, the age-old question as to whether history is a science will be, if not 
answered,  then  at  least  forever  reframed in  a  way far  more  conducive  to  future 
progress. 
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Chapter Five
“The Science of Stories”
The previous chapter has begun our overarching task of dismantling the nomothetic 
assumption by showing the inability of the nomothetic-deductive ideal upon which 
that  assumption is  based to adequately  model  even all  of  those fields  which  are 
unproblematically considered scientific – let alone be exported to more controversial 
areas such as history.  The task of  this  chapter,  therefore,  will  be to  build on this  
insight by examining a real example of how historical scientists – in the face of a  
seemingly indifferent philosophy of science – have attempted to conceptualise and 
justify the kinds of explanations they actually offer. More specifically, this chapter will 
argue that such an example of internal theorising can provide us with the broad 
outline of a conceptual approach to science which not only emphasises narrative, but 
which can also claim sufficient methodological sophistication to submit narratives to 
some empirical test. The result, as we shall see, is an approach to science which does 
not rely directly on general laws, yet can still produce robust conclusions and mitigate 
ad hoc explanations. This will leave for the following chapter only the requirement to 
argue that such a model can be successfully generalised and thus be made available 
to the study of human history. Instead of imposing a theoretical model from the top 
down,  in  other  words,  we will  see how an alternative  model  has  emerged from 
within the historical sciences themselves. One might ask how this approach differs 
from that of W. H. Walsh, who argued that his own colligation would provide “a 
proper characterization of what historians  in fact do, their  actual procedure being 
taken as  decisive  in  this  matter.”473 We have,  after  all,  already  examined Walsh's 
proposed  solution  to  precisely  this  problem  and  have  found  it  wanting.  Walsh, 
however,  was  forced  by  the  nomothetic  assumption  to  argue  for  a  historical 
separatism that his ideas could not sustain. This was not an option available to those 
who  first  sought  to  model  the  practices  of  the  historical  sciences.  Evolutionary 
biologists  and  geologists,  in  other  words,  could  not  merely  decree  themselves  a 
narrative (and therefore literary) enterprise which was not required to adhere to the 
epistemic standards of the sciences. There has never been, for instance, an idealist 
theory of  geology which has  argued that rocks  (rather  than human beings,  as  in 
traditional idealism) were somehow exempt from the ultimate strictures of the laws 
of physics. 
473 W. H. Walsh, ''Plain' and 'Significant' Narrative in History,' The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 55, No. 11 
(May 1958). p.480. (emphasis added)
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Because historical  scientists were thus forced to face the reality of the nomothetic 
model's success in other fields, there simply could not be any serious claim (such as  
Dray might have made, or even Danto) that laws were outright hostile to the practice 
of  biology,  geology,  or  any other  historical  science.  Philosophers  of  the  historical 
sciences  were  required  to  be  more  accommodationist  than  that.  David  Hull  has 
argued, for example, that  his “Particular-Circumstance” model “exhibits  the same 
form”  as  the  classical  Hempelian  nomothetic-deductive  model  but  “with  its 
emphasis reversed.”474 This suggests that there is still  some role for laws in Hull's 
model of narrative explanation. Similarly, of the common argument that geology is 
an  immature  “protoscience”  waiting  for  the  equivalent  of  its  Newton,  the 
philosopher of geology David B. Kitts has replied: “the Newton of geology has been 
here and gone. His name was Isaac Newton.”475 We will have more to say about such 
arguments in Chapter Six. For now it will suffice merely to say that at no point in the 
extended example  we  will  examine  in  this  chapter  is  a  complete rejection  of  the 
nomothetic-deductive  model  being  proposed.  For  that  model  has  enjoyed  quite 
spectacular  success  in  other  fields,  and  must  therefore  remain a  key part  of  any 
credible philosophy of science. This point of view is critical to the overall argument 
of  this  thesis.  Hull  and  Kitts  are  not suggesting  that,  because  of  a  failure  to 
adequately  function  in  a  nomothetic  fashion,  their  respective  fields  must  be 
fundamentally  divorced  from science.  They  are  arguing  instead  that,  in  order  to 
cover those historical cases it  has hitherto dismissed or been otherwise unable to 
accommodate, the philosophy of science requires extension. What follows then is an 
extended  example  of  one  particular  attempt  to  model  a  narrative  approach  to 
explanation in the historical sciences in which just such concerns were considered 
and an attempt to establish some kind of principled alternative offered. We will begin 
first by examining the model itself and the applied example of scientific narrative it 
claims to have offered. We shall then extend that applied example into the present in  
order to see how well it has in fact performed as an explanatory method. The result 
will be a roughly chronological journey through an account of scientific explanation 
spanning  nearly  70  years,  which  will  convincingly  demonstrate  that  a  formal 
narrative model of scientific explanation is not merely desirable but indispensable.
474 David  L.  Hull,  'The  Particular-Circumstance  Model  of  Scientific  Explanation,'  in  Matthew  H. 
Nitecki & Doris V. Nitecki (eds), History and Evolution. State University of New York Press: Albany, 
1992. p.79.
475 David B. Kitts, The Structure of Geology. Southern Methodist University Press: Dallas, 1977. p.xiv.
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An Account of Narrative Explanation in Evolutionary Biology
One  of  the  earliest  attempts  to  formally  conceptualise  the  kinds  of  explanations 
historical sciences actually offer and the methods by which they were constructed was 
that of the Canadian philosopher T. A. Goudge. Goudge was also notable for being 
among  the  first  to  explicitly  argue  –  in  both  his  1958  paper  entitled  'Causal 
Explanations in Natural History'476 and his 1961 book The Ascent of Life477 – that these 
explanations took a recognisably  narrative form. Goudge's 1958 paper, for example, 
opened with the following:
There are certain empirical  sciences such as geology, paleontology and biology 
whose  subject-matter  is  partly  historical.  They  investigate  phenomena  which 
originated and existed for varying periods of time in the remote past... One aim of 
these sciences is to describe as fully as possible each of the phenomena in question 
by  utilising  available  evidence.  Often,  however,  this  evidence  is  fragmentary. 
Hence  a  particular  phenomenon  may  have  to  be  reconstructed  by  supplying 
conjectured details to fill in the gaps. In addition to describing, they also formulate 
causal explanations of the phenomena with which they deal.478
However, Goudge argued, then-contemporary philosophy of science had “done less 
than justice” to such sciences by insisting that they could not give actual explanations 
unless they invoked general  laws.  In an attempt to rebut  this  argument,  Goudge 
sought  to  leverage  the  tacitly  implied  link  in  positivist  philosophy  between 
nomothetic  explanations  and  causal  explanations.  Goudge  argued  that  if  he  could 
provide an example of a causal explanation which did  not involve laws, then the 
logical necessity of that link would be called into question. More importantly, such a 
demonstration would show that,  if  only in theory,  at least  one additional  class  of 
explanation  was  possible.  Goudge  thus  sought  to  demonstrate  that  “causal 
explanations do occur in natural history,” and that at least some of these explanations 
possess  “logical  features  which  differentiate  them  quite  sharply  from  causal 
explanations which apply a general law or set of laws to particular events.”479 This 
being  Goudge's  aim,  he  needed  (theoretically,  at  least)  to  establish  only  a  single 
example  of  a  causal  explanation which somehow transcended those fundamental 
laws  which  might  be  applied  to  it.  The  rest  of  Goudge's  relatively  short  (and 
476 T. A. Goudge, 'Causal Explanations in Natural History.'  The British Journal for the Philosophy of  
Science. Vol. 9, No. 35 (November 1958). pp.194-202.
477 T. A. Goudge,  The Ascent of Life: A Philosophical Study of the Theory of Evolution. George Allen & 
Unwin, Ltd.: London, 1961.
478 Goudge, 'Causal Explanations in Natural History.' p.194.
479 Ibid.
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admittedly  “exploratory”480)  paper  was   therefore  devoted  to  devising  such  an 
example. But first, Goudge made a familiar argument with respect to the historical  
sciences:
When a biologist investigates a phenomenon of natural history, what he frequently 
wants to explain is an individual occurrence, something which has 'come to be' or 
'ceased to be' just once. The phenomenon is therefore non-recurrent, and hence not 
subject to controlled experimentation. The precise circumstances under which it 
arose  or  disappeared,  including  the  temporal  interval  involved,  cannot  be 
duplicated. Its spatio-temporal boundaries are impossible to specify exactly.481
As readers will recall from Part One, similar arguments from uniqueness have been 
well-rehearsed among philosophers of history, who have often used them to argue 
that  human history cannot  be scientific.  Such arguments  coming from a  biologist, 
however,  would lack a certain  amount of  credibility.  Hence Goudge's  subsequent 
approach  is  instructive.  Despite  the  limitations  imposed  by  this  functional 
uniqueness,  he writes, the evolutionary biologist must attempt to “reconstruct the 
causal  conditions  which  were  operative,”  and  “arrange  them  in  an  explanatory 
pattern.”482 Goudge has argued, in other words, for the use of  narrative as a valid 
scientific  tool  for  explanation  in  such  unique  and  unrepeatable  cases.  More 
importantly, he has argued that the succession of events which might make up such a 
narrative can, if composed of properly causal statements, be meaningfully scientific. 
A causal explanation is thus not (or at least not necessarily) an additional step that one 
performs  over and above the reconstruction of a narrative sequence, but is  the very 
sequence itself. This, it should be noted, is consistent with the definition of narrative 
offered by Danto in Chapter Three.
What  then  made a  narrative  substantively  different  from a more  traditional  (i.e.,  
nomothetically derived) explanation? This was,  for Goudge,  a matter  of  logistical 
necessity. Causal explanations – speaking in the philosophical jargon of “necessity” 
and “sufficiency” – should either: “(a)... indicate those conditions temporally prior to 
(or simultaneous with) P which are independently necessary and jointly sufficient for 
the  occurrence  of  P,”  or  “(b)...  indicate  those  conditions  temporally  prior  to  (or 
simultaneous with) P which are jointly sufficient but not independently necessary for 
the occurrence of P.”483 The first of these approaches explains P in terms of necessary 
conditions  –  those  without  which  P  cannot occur  –  and  is  thus  somewhat  more 
480 Ibid., p.196.
481 Ibid., p.195. (emphasis in original)
482 Ibid.
483 Ibid. (emphasis in original)
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conducive to nomothetic explanation. For example, it was a necessary condition of the 
Great Fire of London that the Earth's atmosphere contain oxygen. This was not a 
sufficient condition,  however,  as  the  presence  of  atmospheric  oxygen  does  not 
guarantee large  fires  in  London (or  indeed  anywhere  else).  Goudge's  “(a)” model 
would therefore require the collection of enough necessary conditions to isolate a 
singular event. Due to this emphasis on necessity, however, these conditions can only 
be nomothetic laws or otherwise  exceptionless generalisations. This requirement, as 
we have seen in Part One, has a tendency to allow only the most obvious and implicit 
laws – as is the case in the above hypothetical example of atmospheric oxygen and 
the  Great  Fire.  It  is  therefore  far  from  clear  that  enough  necessary  (and  only 
necessary) conditions could be amassed in order to arrive at the kind of explanation 
historians and historical scientists are typically seeking.
Goudge's “(b)” model, however, is slightly but crucially different, choosing to arrive 
at an explanation through a plurality of non-necessary conditions which together add 
up  to  a  sufficient  cause.  This  is  much  closer  to  the  familiar  form  of  historical 
explanations. An historian might argue, for instance, that the Second World War had 
multiple  causes  –  the  Great  Depression,  unresolved  tensions  resulting  from  the 
earlier Treaty of Versailles, and so on. None of these causes  acting alone,  however, 
could  be  said  to  have  caused the  war.  In  that  sense,  they  were  not  individually 
sufficient. But, when acting in concert, the Second World War was their result. This is 
much closer to a true narrative model, Goudge argued, but was still an ideal only 
rarely  approached  in  actual historical  explanation.  “The  causal  explanations  with 
which I am concerned,” Goudge wrote, “are at best approximations to schema (b).” 
In other words:
... they are explanations which seek to formulate a possible sufficient condition of 
P by specifying as many of the necessary and contingent contributory conditions 
of P as can be discerned or imagined. Sometimes the sufficient condition is first  
entertained  in  a  vague  form,  and  then  its  vagueness  is  gradually  reduced  by 
'filling  in'  a  number  of  the  necessary  and  contributory  conditions  which  it 
embraces.  This also increases its testability,  as I  will  try to show.  But the strict 
requirements of schema (b), let alone  (a), are never met. Hence a large degree of 
fexibility attaches to the notion of causal explanation in natural history.484
From the perspective of a nomothetic model of science, however,  there is another 
difficulty with Goudge's “(b)” schema. For it  is difficult to see how schema “(b),” 
even in its ideal form, need invoke laws. Certainly it could. But it does not appear to 
484 Ibid., p.196. (emphasis in original)
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need to  do so.  To  illustrate  this,  Goudge made extensive  use  of  an example  first 
offered in 1933 by the paleontologist A. S. Romer. This example is worth examining 
in some detail here, as it represents a paradigm case of the kind of historical and 
narrative reasoning with which this  thesis  is  concerned.  It  concerned the famous 
evolutionary  explanation  Romer  postulated  for  the  emergence  of  the  first  land 
vertebrates – those “primitive amphibians which inhabited fresh-water pools  and 
streams in Carboniferous and Devonian times,  and which possessed rudimentary 
limbs.”485 Romer phrased the problem he was trying to solve as follows:
Why should the amphibians have developed these limbs and become potential 
land-dwellers? Not to breathe air, for that could be done by merely coming to the 
surface of the pool. Not because they were driven out in search of food, for they 
were fish-eating types for which there was little food to be had on land. Not to 
escape enemies, for they were among the largest animals of the streams and pools 
of that day.486
Romer's subsequent attempt to answer this question, however, takes a recognisably 
narrative form:
The  Devonian,  the  period  in  which  the  amphibians  originated,  was  a  time  of 
seasonal droughts. At time the streams would cease to fow... If the water dried up 
altogether and did not soon return...  the amphibian, with his newly-developed 
land limbs, could crawl out of the shrunken pool, walk up or down the stream bed 
or overland and reach another pool where he might take up his aquatic existence 
again. Land limbs were developed to reach the water, not to leave it.487
From this, Romer was able to forge a plausible connection between the conditions 
which might have given rise to the first amphibians488 and the further progress of 
terrestrial life as evidenced by the fossil record:
Once  this  development  of  limbs  had  taken  place,  however,  it  is  not  hard  to 
imagine how true land life eventually resulted. Instead of immediately taking to 
the water again, the amphibian might learn to linger about the drying pools and 
devour  stranded  fish.  Insects  were  already  present  and  would  afford  the 
beginnings of a diet for a land form. Later, plants were taken up as a source of 
food supply...  Finally, through these various developments, a land fauna would 
have been established.489
485 Ibid.
486 A. S. Romer, Man and the Vertebrates. 3rd Edition. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1941. p.47.
487 Ibid., p.48.
488 It should be noted that the more inclusive term now used to denote these early limbed creatures is 
“tetrapod” rather than “amphibian.” This term is more precise in that it implies only the presence 
of limbs. “Amphibian,” on the other hand, carries with it additional connotations which are not 
relevant here. This thesis will henceforth use the former term, except in the case of direct citations  
from those who have not.
489 Romer, Man and the Vertebrates. p.48.
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The development of limbs and the ability to make use of the opportunities that dry 
land  afforded,  Romer  argued,  was  therefore  the  result  of  a  “happy  accident.”490 
Goudge had the following to say of this attempt to account for the selection pressure 
which drove tetrapod evolution:
This piece of reasoning has a number of distinctive features. Although it is part of 
a scientific discussion, it is not concerned to discover or to confirm a general law. It 
does not establish any new empirical fact which is simply to be added to the store  
of human knowledge. It does not make an explicit, positive prediction about what 
will be found by future investigations, though there is a sense in which it makes 
certain negative predictions... What the reasoning does is to propose a theoretical 
pattern...  This  pattern presents  an intelligible  sequence  of  events  such that the 
phenomenon to be accounted for 'falls into place'  as  the terminal  phase of the 
sequence. The phenomenon ceases to be isolated, and is connected in an orderly 
way with states of affairs which led up to it.491
Romer's  explanation,  in  other  words,  would  seem  to  be  a  clear  example  of  a 
recognisably narrative model of explanation applied to what is  clearly a scientific 
question. More importantly, Goudge argued, such narrative explanations were (in the 
context of evolutionary biology at least) not only necessary, but unable to ever be 
totally subsumed by nomothetic explanations. “Since the aim is to make these events 
intelligible as unique, non-recurrent phenomena,” he wrote, “recourse must be had 
to historical or 'narrative'  explanations.” This was because the singularity of such 
situations prevented their “being treated systematically in terms of general laws.” 
Narrative explanations were therefore unavoidable wherever “singular events of major 
importance for the history of life are being discussed.”492 Given this conclusion, two 
questions quite naturally arise. First, to what extent is this narrative model different 
from (rather than merely a special case of) the nomothetic-deductive model? And 
second, is this actually a satisfactory explanation from the point of view of empirical 
testability? We shall now examine both of these questions in turn.
Narrative as a 'Special Case' of the Nomothetic Model
The counter-argument that the kind of narrative explanation Goudge is offering is 
actually a special (i.e., incomplete) case of the nomothetic model is one that, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, is often raised by defenders of the covering law model. The covering 
law argument is, after all, predicated on declaring those explanations which do not 
490 Ibid., p.47.
491 Goudge, 'Causal Explanations in Natural History.' p.197.
492 Goudge, The Ascent of Life. pp.70-71.
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conform  to  the  model  –  whether  in  biology,  history,  or  anywhere  else  –  to  be 
incomplete  “explanation  sketches.”  This  is  taken  to  mean  that,  were  more 
information available, a “proper” explanation (i.e., one with clear reference to laws) 
could be found. Or it could be argued that the laws in such “sketches” were merely 
implicit rather than  explicit  and that the resulting explanation, while perhaps fit for 
some  purposes,  was  not,  in  some  important  sense,  finished.  Michael  Ruse,  for 
instance, has attacked both Romer and Goudge (as well as narrativism in general) on 
precisely  these  grounds.  “Taken  completely  in  isolation,”  Ruse  argues,  “Romer's 
account  of  the  evolution of  the  land-vertebrates  falls  short  of  being  an  adequate 
explanation.”493 This is because Romer did not establish that the evolution of land-
capable vertebrates via the path that he proposed was  necessary.  “Not only,” Ruse 
writes:
...  was the development of limbs not the only response which  might have been 
made to droughts by organisms like the amphibians (i.e., organisms which needed 
water),  it  was  not  the  only  response  which  such  organisms  in  fact made  to 
droughts.  Another  group of  organisms,  lung-fish,  when faced  with  a  situation 
similar to the amphibians, developed the ability to remain during droughts in a 
dehydrated state of suspended animation baked in the mud at the bottom of dried 
up pools... Why did not the amphibians evolve in a similar manner, rather than 
going the way that they actually did? Until this question is answered we will not  
have a sufficient condition for the actual evolutionary event which did occur, and 
thus... we will not have a totally adequate explanation.494
From this it seems clear that, in true covering law fashion, what Ruse requires from 
an “explanation” is the exclusion of  all other possibilities. In other words, necessity. 
And the  only  known way in  which to achieve  this,  he writes,  is  to  make use of 
timeless and universal general laws:
Let  us  look  in  a  little  more  detail  at  some  of  the  questions  which  Romer's 
'explanation' invokes – questions which suggest that despite the conditions which 
Romer gives, the evolutionary path of the vertebrates might have been other than 
that  which  it  actually  was.  Consider  the  following  three.  Why  should  the 
amphibians be able  physically to develop limbs at  all?  Why, at  first,  was it  so 
important for the amphibians to stay in water? Why, later, even though there was 
food on land, did the amphibians not remain far more tied to their pools than they 
did?495
Answers  to  such  questions  are  necessary,  Ruse  argues,  in  order  to  produce  an 
explanation which (to leverage Ruse's own example)  allows for the development of 
493 Michael  Ruse,  The  Philosophy  of  Biology.  Hutchinson & Co.:  London,  1973. p.84.  (emphasis  in 
original)
494 Ibid. (emphasis in original)
495 Ibid., pp.84-85.
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limbs in the first tetrapods, but precludes that same development in lungfish. This is 
simply unachievable, Ruse argues, without laws and relevant generalisations:
... I fail to see how any of the questions posed can be answered without making 
some reference to laws. Consider the first question, why amphibians should be 
able to develop at all. To answer this, even briefy, one must necessarily sketch 
some of the principles of genetics...  One must explain the nature of mutations, 
how these affect the physical characteristics of organisms, how these can be passed 
on from one generation to the next, and how such new characteristics can spread 
throughout a group.496
Not only is Romer's explanation therefore reducible to laws, Ruse claims, the same 
must also be true of any explanation which adheres to Goudge's model of narrative. 
“If Romer's explanation is to be considered adequate, even with respect to Goudge's 
model  of  narrative  explanation,”  Ruse  states,  “we  must  assume  that  there  is  an 
implicit  reference  to  law.”497 With  respect  to  the  theoretical  likelihood  that  all 
biological explanations must depend on general laws, there is no reason to doubt 
Ruse. But even if the relevant laws were known, the narrativist might reply, they are 
not – or are not the  only – agents of explanation in Romer's account. This creates a 
clear need for  some other kind of explanation. Ruse is thus castigating narrative for 
failing to fulfill the criteria of necessity demanded by the covering law model. But 
why should it  seek  to?  Ruse's  criticisms  succeed only  in  highlighting  a  problem 
narrative  was  never  intended  to  solve.  For  what  is  being  explained  in  Romer's 
example is not the general response of creatures to drought, but the particular response  
of one group – the first tetrapods. Ruse therefore succeeds only in showing that he is 
either unwilling or unable to understand explanation in anything other than in terms 
derived from the covering law model. 
Keeping this in mind, what can one  accurately say about the relationship between 
Goudge's model of narrative and laws of nature? Before we attempt to address this 
question,  it  must  once  again  be  stressed  that  the  assertions  of  Ruse  and  other 
covering law theorists that laws are somehow implicit in any explanation is almost 
certainly true. Narrativism is, in other words, compatible with the possibility of a 
deterministic  universe.  But  to  claim  this  as  evidence  for  the  universality  of  the 
nomothetic-deductive method is to duplicate Ruse's mistake by assessing one model 
of  explanation  by  the  standards  of  another.  Narratives  are  about  explaining  the 
transformations of a central subject through contingent circumstances – the tracing of 
496 Ibid., p.85.
497 Ibid., p.86.
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a path taken. This is what is meant by Goudge's insistence that they explain singular 
occurrences. So while it is undeniably tempting to argue that there is something law-
like about the behaviour Romer has attributed to those early tetrapods,  that claim 
would belong to an entirely different mode of explanation. So even if it were possible  
to  accurately  say  something  like:  “animals  in  environment  x,  tend  to  evolve 
according to principle y,” it would be irrelevant. For Romer is not saying (nor is he 
required to say) that all vertebrates exhibited this particular adaptation. He need not 
even  suggest  that  most of  them  did.  He  need  only  claim  that  those  which  did 
survived to reproduce, and attempt to give a reason for this. This hardly seems law-
like. And yet it  is  this singular combination of events which is doing the work of 
explaining,  so  to  speak.  There  are  many  possible  historical  paths  the  earliest 
tetrapods could have taken in order to arrive at their currently observed place in the 
fossil record. A truly narrative explanation must therefore seek to work out which was 
the  actual path  taken  among  the  many  that  were  possible.  In  this  sense,  Dray's 
distinction  between  “how  possibly”  and  “why  necessarily”  explanations  seems 
entirely appropriate – with the “possibly” being a commendably modest reference to 
the unique difficulties of narrative confirmation, which we will discuss later in this 
chapter.
All of this is essentially another way of saying that Romer was talking about a state 
of affairs which – when considered on any level of enquiry above that of the most 
fundamental laws of physics – might be true, but did not have to be. Hence his use of 
the term “happy accident.” But, if there need not be (or need not only be) hard and 
fast laws underlying a narrative explanation, how can we know whether any given 
narrative  explanation  is  correct?  For  if  there  are  no  laws  which  guarantee  the 
necessity  of  the  particular  events  so  narrated,  then  we know that,  by  definition, 
things  could have  been different.  It  would have violated no  known law,  in  other 
words,  for  Romer's  tetrapods  to  have  adopted  some  other  evolutionary  strategy. 
Mutations  are,  after  all,  random.498 Or  they might  have failed  to adapt  and have 
disappeared from history. It is also possible that it was not rudimentary limbs alone 
which ensured the success of the early tetrapods, but merely pure  luck that some 
crucial ancestor did not dry out and die on a journey between pools (or that some 
potential  competitor/predator  did).  Nor  is  Romer's  pool-hopping explanation the 
only possible evolutionary strategy for surviving droughts. For not every population 
498 Although, just to be perfectly clear on this point, their subsequent selection is anything but random.
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of  creatures  finding  themselves  in  similar  conditions  evolves  limbs.  Ruse's  own 
example of the lungfish attests to this. None of these counterfactual examples, it must 
be stressed, could have been conclusively ruled out by the use of known law(s) of 
nature alone. 
A defender of the covering law model might, at this point, reply that these kinds of 
contingencies  represent  the harsh realities  involved in working with probabilistic 
laws, and that there must still exist some way in which to formalise likely responses 
to selection pressure on the gene pool of any given animal. Perhaps there is. But the 
narrative explanation is navigating within – rather than defining outright – the phase 
space  of  possibilities  here.  Better  defining the extent  of  that  space  will  always be 
helpful. For the narrativist, this is the primary function of statistical inference and 
laws of  nature.  It  was not an option for early vertebrates to  develop anti-gravity 
organs, for example. We can confidently assert this because such organs would violate  
known laws of physics, not because we have so far failed to find their fossils. At some 
point, however, we will want to know not what the allowable space for vertebrate 
evolution was, but which path within that space a single group actually took when 
others were potentially available. Stephen Jay Gould, in one of his many musings on 
the nature of historical explanation in his book Wonderful Life,  makes this argument 
as follows:
Historical  explanations  take  the  form  of  narrative:  E,  the  phenomenon  to  be 
explained, arose because D came before, preceded by C, B, and A. If any of these 
earlier stages had not occurred, or had transpired in a different way, then E would 
not  exist  (or  would  be  present  in  a  substantially  altered  form,  E',  requiring  a 
different explanation). Thus, E makes sense and can be explained rigorously as the 
outcome of A through D. But no law of nature enjoined E; any variant E' arising 
from an altered set of antecedents, would have been equally explicable, though 
massively different in form and effect.499
This emphasis on contingency, Gould argued, is why narrative explanations are of a 
different type entirely than even statistical/probabilistic nomothetic explanations. It 
is also why the implicit presence of laws in the background of narrative explanations 
is  merely  incidental.  This  is,  as  David  Hull  has  phrased  it,  a  “Particular-
Circumstance” model of explanation – a philosophy of initial conditions.
In order to emphasise the parallel with human history, it will be instructive to briefy 
499 Stephen Jay Gould, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History. Hutchinson Radius: 
London, 1989. p.283.
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return to the example Arthur Danto offered of the American fags used to honour 
Grace Kelly on the occasion of her marriage to Prince Rainier III of Monaco. Danto's  
argument, it will be recalled, was that while it was at least plausible that the fact that 
Kelly would be honoured  in some fashion  could be covered by some kind of  law-
like/probabilistic  statement,  it  was  far  less  plausible  that  the  actual  form of  that 
honour  could be  so  covered.  There  are,  after  all,  a  myriad  of  ways  to  honour  a 
foreign-born sovereign.500 It  might  be  the case,  of  course,  that  the  choice of  fags 
(rather than, say, the baking of a cake) was necessitated by the laws of physics in a 
totally  deterministic  universe.  Such  an  argument,  however,  is  beside  the  point. 
Neither scientists nor historians are in the habit of explaining tornadoes, the Russian 
Revolution of 1917, supply-side economics, or the Treaty of Tordesillas with respect 
to  only  the most  fundamental  postulates  of  quantum theory.  Why should we be 
required to approach a royal wedding in such a way? Once again, narratives explain 
the path taken, not those which are closed. Here is Stephen Jay Gould again:
Am I really arguing that nothing about life's history could be predicted, or might 
follow directly from general laws of nature? Of course not; the question that we 
face is one of scale, or level of focus. Life exhibits a structure obedient to physical  
principles. We do not live amidst a chaos of historical circumstance.... Invariant 
laws of nature impact the general forms and functions of organisms; they set the 
channels  in  which  organic  design  must  evolve.  But  the  channels  are  so  broad 
relative  to  the  details  that  fascinate  us!  The  physical  channels  do  not  specify 
arthropods,  annelids,  mollusks,  and  vertebrates,  but,  at  most,  bilaterally 
symmetrical organisms based on repeated parts. The boundaries of the channels 
retreat even further into the distance when we ask the essential questions about 
our own origin: Why did mammals evolve among vertebrates? Why did primates 
take to the trees? Why did the tiny twig that produced  Homo sapiens arise and 
survive in Africa? When we set our focus upon the level of detail that regulates 
most common questions about the history of life, contingency dominates and the 
predictability of general form recedes to an irrelevant background.501
The narrative and nomothetic approaches must not only be consistent, in other words, 
they  must  be  inextricably  woven  together.  All  possible  event/objects  must,  in 
principle,  be  able  to  be  explained  in  both  ways.  At  certain  high  levels  of  focus, 
however, there will simply be too much variation possible within the confines of the 
appropriate laws to allow explanation  only in terms  of  those laws to be a practical 
reality.  More  importantly,  this  would  be  true  even  if  humankind  possessed  a 
hypothetically perfect understanding of all of the laws which underpin the operation 
of every aspect of the universe. 
500 Arthur C.  Danto,  Narration and Knowledge (including the  Integral  Text of  Analytical  Philosophy of  
History). Columbia University Press: New York, 2007. pp.220-228. (emphasis in original)
501 Gould, Wonderful Life. pp.289-290. (emphasis in original)
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Confronted with the potential for conversion between the nomothetic and narrative 
modes, we might wish to ask: what is the signature of narrative? What conditions 
must be present in order to require its use? The answer is: contingency. Contingency is 
not,  it  must  be  stressed,  an  assertion  of  mere  randomness.  For  contingency  can 
(perhaps even must) be generated from the interaction of multiple predictable vectors 
of causation. It is this  interaction,  however, which produces the unpredictable (and 
thus unable to be isolated) events with which narrative must deal. If the course of  
biological evolution, for example, can be thrown into disarray by the arrival of a 
meteor (which can be understood as obeying known laws,  albeit  laws somewhat 
removed from the biological realm) then suddenly any strictly nomothetic account of 
evolution must now include the movement of extra-terrestrial bodies. This presents 
us with an infinite regress in which any  purely nomothetic explanation of even the 
most trivial singular subject could theoretically be required to take account of the 
laws  underlying  every  aspect  of  the  entire  universe.  Worse  still,  this  has  the 
additional consequence of implying that, at least until every last fundamental law of 
the  universe  has  been  discovered  and  confirmed,  nothing  has  ever truly  been 
explained.  By  providing  a  principled  way  of  modelling  contingency  through 
narrative, however, we are able to evade this unpleasant implication of a rigorously 
applied nomothetic worldview. More importantly, the concept of contingency enjoys 
the additional advantage of being entirely agnostic with respect to whether any given 
enquiry  might  be  considered  history  or  science.  For,  as  Stephen  Jay  Gould  has 
argued, contingency is found equally in both fields and is dealt  with in the same 
manner – narrative. The methods of history essentially  are  the methods of science, 
and vice versa:
I am not speaking of randomness...  but of the central principle of  all  history – 
contingency. A historical explanation does not rest on direct deductions from laws 
of nature, but on an unpredictable sequence of antecedent states, where any major 
change in any step of the sequence would have altered the final result. This final 
result is therefore dependent, or contingent, upon everything that came before – 
the unerasable and determining signature of history.502
With these arguments in mind,  it  becomes easy to see how narrative explanation 
could  be  not  only  desirable in  the  historical  sciences,  but  unavoidable.  More 
importantly, narrative explanations, while certainly containing implicit references to 
laws,  do  not  actually  use  those  implicit  laws  to  do  the  bulk  of  their  work.  The 
502 Ibid., p.283.
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historical sciences could therefore, theoretically at least, make use of true narrative 
explanation,  as  opposed  to  using  narrative  as  a  mere  “sketch”  for  a  “real” 
explanation to be realised later. From this we can reasonably conclude that the term 
“narrative” at least makes sense in a scientific context. But, if narratives are to function 
as actual scientific explanations, they need to be able to be confirmed. This leads us to 
the second of our earlier questions: empirical testability. Can a narrative explanation 
be sufficiently empirically justified to warrant being called a scientific explanation? 
Especially given that it must function (by our own definition of contingency) as a 
single thread within a forest of equally plausible possibilities? When navigating such 
a  space,  how could any  one narrative  ever  be  any  more  than speculation?  More 
importantly,  if  one  is  building  a  narrative  only  from known facts,  what  could a 
narrative possibly add to those facts? It is to such empirical questions we now turn. 
Problems with the Confirmation of Narrative
In considering the issue of how to go about the confirmation of narratives, it will be 
instructive  to  briefy  reconsider  Goudge's  assessment  of  Romer's  narrative 
explanation of tetrapod evolution. According to Goudge, Romer's reasoning was “not 
concerned to discover or to confirm a general law,” or “establish any new empirical 
fact which is simply to be added to the store of human knowledge.” Nor did it make 
“an explicit, positive prediction about what will be found by future investigations.” 
Romer  instead  proposed  a  “theoretical  pattern”  which  “presents  an  intelligible 
sequence of events such that the phenomenon to be accounted for 'falls into place' as 
the terminal phase of the sequence.”503 This raises two key issues. First, if narratives 
do not make positive predictions, how can they be tested and accepted or rejected 
accordingly? And second, what  are narratives? If they are not grist for the mill of 
some “higher” science, nor do they add “any new empirical fact” to the “store of 
human knowledge,” then what function do they serve? In order to answer these two 
questions, let us further interrogate the example Goudge makes of A. S. Romer by 
extending the line of evidence for Romer's account of tetrapod evolution up to the 
present day. This will allow us to not only see how narrative explanations can be 
supported or overturned by familiar empirical means, but also how they can function 
as fully explanatory scientific theories.
503 Goudge, 'Causal Explanations in Natural History.' p.197.
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With respect to the first of these issues let us return again to Goudge's analysis of 
Romer. Romer's reasoning, Goudge argued, was composed of several interconnected 
elements:
What the reasoning does is to propose a theoretical pattern composed of accepted 
statements of fact ('The Devonian... was a time of seasonal droughts'), statements 
inferred  from these  statements  of  facts  ('At  times  the  streams  would  cease  to 
fow...'),  statements  which  are  plausible  conjectures  about  various  occurrences 
('The amphibian...  could crawl out of the shrunken pool,  walk up or down the 
stream bed... learn to linger about the drying pools and devour stranded fish...'),  
etc.504
In Goudge's  model,  therefore,  a  narrative explanation is  constructed as a kind of 
interpolation between and around known data  points.  It  is  the  construction  of  a 
“theoretical pattern” which accounts for – perhaps a better term is unifies – available 
facts. This view is not without its problems, as we shall see, but for the purpose of 
beginning a discussion of narrative confirmation, it will suffice. The most important 
aspect of this interpolative picture of narrative is that it allows for some  separation 
between the explanation itself and the facts/reasoning/evidence which support it. If 
this  view  is  correct,  then  we  might  think  of  narrative  as  a  kind  of  analysis  or 
interpretation.  Rather  than verify  the narrative itself,  therefore,  we might  instead 
attempt to verify the facts upon which it rests. 
Romer's  explanation  provides  us  with  several  isolable  statements  suitable  for 
attempting to apply this reasoning. For instance, “the Devonian, the period in which 
the  amphibians  originated,  was  a  time  of  seasonal  droughts.”  Or,  “insects  were 
already present and would afford the beginnings of a diet for a land form.” Such 
statements  can be justified using evidence  which is  formally  independent  of  any 
account  of  tetrapod evolution.  The presence  of  fossilised insect  skeletons  in  rock 
strata of the appropriate Devonian age, for instance, would be a reasonable basis for 
concluding that insects would have been available to form part of the diet of early 
land-dwelling animals. Somewhat more complicated would be the geologic evidence 
from  which  Romer  concluded  that  the  Devonian  era  was  prone  to  drought 
conditions. If one wished to attempt to find evidence either for or against Romer's 
account,  therefore,  examining  these  kinds  of  statements  and  the  independent 
evidence for them provides a comparatively easy way in which one might attempt to 
do so.  Such a  line of  attack can be  instrumental  in the refinement  of  a  narrative 
504 Ibid.
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explanation,  or  it  may  succeed  in  discrediting  it  altogether.  The  success  of  this 
method,  however,  varies  greatly  depending  on  how  vital  the  statement  under 
examination is for the narrative in question. Similarly, there may also be issues of  
generality. For such supporting statements and their evidential basis are only rarely 
precisely defined by known general laws. 
If one wished to use this method to challenge Romer's account of tetrapod evolution, 
for instance, one might attempt to show that the Devonian era was  not a period of 
drought. If Romer's Devonian lakes did not periodically dry up, it could be argued, 
then the selection pressure necessary for his proposed account of tetrapod evolution 
could  not  have  existed.  This  is  no  mere  thought  experiment,  however.  Richard 
Dawkins has discussed precisely this approach in his 2009 book,  The Greatest Show 
On Earth.  Romer, writes Dawkins, “envisaged annual droughts during which lakes 
and ponds and streams dried up.” Fish that could survive on land were better placed 
to drag “themselves from a shallow lake or pond... to a  deeper one in which they 
could survive until the next wet season.” Unfortunately, Dawkins argues, “Romer 
introduced  his  theory  with  a  preamble  whose  purpose  was  to  show  that  the 
Devonian  era  was  a  time  of  drought.  Consequently,  when  more  recent  evidence 
undermined this assumption, it seemed to undermine the whole Romer theory.”505 
This  is  because,  as  the  paleontologist  Jennifer  Clack argues  in  her  2002 work on 
tetrapod evolution  Gaining Ground,506 “scenarios to explain the evolution of  limbs 
with  digits  were  intimately  tied  to  those  speculating  on  the  environment  of  the 
earliest tetrapods, and it is difficult to tease the strands apart.” The earliest theories – 
Romer's included – depended heavily on evidence from sediment formations from 
the late Devonian (when tetrapods were then thought to have evolved) known as 
“red-beds.” These formations, Clack writes, “are layers of sandstone that often have a 
reddish color due to the presence of iron.” Many such “red-beds,” all dating from the 
Devonian era, have been identified in sites all  over the world, and have “usually 
been  interpreted  as  the  result  of  arid  or  semiarid  conditions.”  This  was  an 
interpretation  thought  to  be  supported  by  the  independent  observation  that 
“comparable  red-beds”  of  much  later  Permian  and  Triassic  age  contained  plant 
fossils consistent with an arid climate.507 It therefore came to be assumed – as a kind 
505 Richard Dawkins,  The Greatest Show on Earth: The Evidence for Evolution.  Bantam: London, 2009. 
p.165.
506 Jennifer A. Clack, Gaining Ground: The Origin and Evolution of Tetrapods. Indiana University Press: 
Indianapolis & Bloomington, 2002.
507 Ibid., p.99.
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of limited covering law – that “red-beds” could be reliably correlated with particular 
climatic  conditions.  This  assumption  however,  would  prove  to  be  false.  Clack 
explains:
One  of  the  most  telling  objections  to  the  “drying  pool”  idea  is  that  on closer 
examination, red-beds are found not to be invariably correlated with arid climates. 
In modern times, red-beds are found in low-latitude, tropical climates, and they 
are always associated with oxidizing conditions. This was realized as long ago as 
1957...  and  has  been  corroborated  many  times  since.  The  red-beds  may  be 
associated  with  rainforests  or  places  where  rainfall  is  high  but  confined  to 
monsoonal periods. The conclusion from this is that red-beds are not really a good 
indicator of arid environments...508
But even if Devonian “red-beds” were indicative of arid climatic conditions, that fact 
would not be sufficient for confirmation of Romer's narrative. As Clack points out,  
“by no means do all Middle or Late Devonian sediments consist of red-beds. Some 
represent river and lake basins or nearshore deposits from lagoons that are rich in 
organic material, suggesting nearby forests.” Spatially speaking, it could plausibly 
have been in these environmental niches that tetrapods first emerged from the water.  
Even  if  the  Devonian  was  predominantly  dry,  in  other  words,  it  seems  like 
overreaching to argue that it was dry absolutely everywhere. A similar problem exists in 
the temporal sense. Until very recently, the earliest known tetrapod fossils all dated 
to the late Devonian period. But, as Clack points out, they likely “evolved somewhat 
before  that  time,  perhaps  before  the  red-beds  were  deposited.”509 Perhaps  the 
tetrapods had already left the water by the time climatic change had made drought 
conditions the norm?510 While each of these examples is plausible enough, they do 
lead  us  to  question  how essential  drought  really  was to  Romer's  account.  Is  the 
removal of this line of supporting evidence really a fatal blow? Perhaps not. In his 
2005 book, The Ancestor's Tale, Richard Dawkins argued as follows:
...  I  don't  think  Romer  needed  his  Devonian  desiccated.  Even  at  times  of  no 
particular  drought,  there will  always be some ponds shallow enough to  be in 
danger of becoming too shallow for some particular kind of fish. If ponds three 
feet deep would have been at risk under severe drought conditions, mild drought 
conditions will render ponds one foot deep at risk. It is sufficient for the Romer 
hypothesis that there are some ponds that dry up, and therefore some fish that 
could save their lives by migrating. Even if the world of the late Devonian was 
508 Ibid., p.101.
509 Ibid., pp.101-102.
510 This possibility has received some additional support recently with the discovery of preserved 
tetrapod tracks in Poland that place the water/land transition many millions of years earlier than 
had previously been guessed. See: G. Niedzwiedzki, P. Szrek, K. Narkiewicz, M. Narkiewicz, P. E. 
Ahlberg, 'Tetrapod trackways from the early Middle Devonian period of Poland.' Nature. Vol. 463, 
No. 7277 (January 2010). pp.43-48.
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positively waterlogged, one could say this simply increases the number of ponds 
available to dry up, thereby increasing opportunities for saving the life of walking 
fish and the Romer theory.511
Dawkins also points out that modern aquatic animals observed to have ventured onto 
dry land have usually done so “in humid, wet areas – that is, when conditions on 
land are 'good' for water animals, not poor as in the Romer hypothesis.”512 Further to 
this, he adds:
...  there  are  plenty of  other  good reasons for  a  fish to  emerge,  temporarily  or 
permanently,  onto  land.  Streams  and  ponds  can  become  unusable  for  reasons 
other than drying up. They can become choked with weeds, in which case, again, a 
fish that  can migrate over  land to  deeper water  might  benefit.  If,  as  has been 
suggested,  contra Romer, we are talking Devonian swamps rather than Devonian 
droughts, swamps provide plenty of opportunities for a fish to benefit by walking, 
or  slithering  or  fip-fopping  or  otherwise  travelling  through  the  marshy 
vegetation...513
While such possible scenarios remove the need for drought in Romer's explanation, 
Dawkins argues, they all  retain “the essential Romer idea that our ancestors left the 
water,  not  at  first  to  colonise  land,  but  to  return  to  water.”514 Even  after  the 
dissolution of one of the key supporting postulates upon which it was based, in other 
words, Romer's basic idea could still  be plausibly defended. What about other lines 
of  evidence?  Perhaps  evidence  Romer  had  not  known  about  or  otherwise 
considered? For there is no reason why we should stipulate that the “statements of  
fact” which underpin a narrative can be only those which were explicitly stated in 
the  original  explanation.  For  any scientific  explanation  to  be  valid,  whether 
nomothetic  or  narrative,  it  should  be  able  to  successfully  account  for  newly 
discovered evidence. 
To this end, consider more recently discovered evidence which has suggested the 
possibility that the first tetrapods need not have arisen in freshwater lakes and pools, 
but might instead have evolved in salt-water intertidal zones. As the biologist Keith 
Stewart Thomson has argued: “the evidence of environments of deposition and the 
patterns of distribution of Devonian lobe-finned fishes do not indicate that any of the 
major groups were primarily freshwater fishes.”515 This suggests that the most likely 
511 Richard Dawkins,  The Ancestor's Tale:  A Pilgrimage to the Dawn of Life .  Phoenix:  London, 2005. 
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ancestors of the first tetrapods were capable of dwelling in saline waters – and there 
is no reason to assume that their descendants would have lost the adaptations which 
made this possible. To continue to advance the narrative that the first tetrapods were 
exclusively  fresh-water  dwellers  would  therefore  seem  to  require  significant 
additional explanation. It would, in effect, make two problems out of one. This led 
Thomson  to  question  whether  it  could  continue  to  be  assumed  “that  the  first 
Amphibia were in any sense fully freshwater animals.”516 In place of this assumption, 
Thomson  advanced  the  alternative  idea  that  the  “first  tetrapods  evolved  in 
continuously  moist,  well-vegetated  environments,  probably  in  coastal  lowland 
estuaries  where abundant  fish food was available  in the water.”517 Clack,  in turn, 
links this possibility to her own argument for the irrelevance of Devonian climate.  
For if the first tetrapods evolved in the intertidal zone, then whether or not there 
were  drought  conditions  elsewhere  can  scarcely  have  mattered.518 Yet  one  might 
concede all of this and still defend some form of Romer's account. Perhaps these early 
amphibians hauled themselves from rock pool to rock pool in the intertidal zone? Or 
struggled back to the water after having been stranded at low tide? Tidal conditions, 
it might be argued, could have been even  more conducive to the kinds of selection 
pressure Romer had envisaged.
Such questioning of the supporting material is the most conceptually straightforward 
way in which we can go about trying to gather evidence for or against a narrative  
explanation. As we have seen, however, it is of extremely limited effectiveness. The 
lack of available laws frequently mean that inferences cannot be used deductively. In 
fact, as the confusion over the climatic significance of “red-beds” has shown, the idea 
of deduction from generalisations in narratives can be not only difficult, but actively 
treacherous. What had been thought to be a correlation reliable enough to support a 
particular deduction turned out to be not incorrect, but simply not universal enough. 
This is the reality of the historical sciences. Such intrusions of contingency mean that, 
to  use Goudge's  terms,  attempts  to  only falsify “accepted statements of  fact,” the 
“statements inferred from these statements of fact,” and/or “plausible conjectures 
about various occurrences” are made extremely difficult.519 But such statements and 
No. 15. Academic Press: London & New York, 1980. p.187.
516 Thomson, 'Ecology of Devonian Lobe-finned Fishes,'  p.216. This idea is also supported by the 
recent discovery of tetrapod trackways in Poland, as the tracks were found in rocks that appear to  
have been part of a tidal fat or lagoon.  See:  Niedzwiedzki, et. al., 'Tetrapod trackways from the 
early Middle Devonian period of Poland.' pp.43-48.
517 Thomson, 'Ecology of Devonian Lobe-finned Fishes,' p.187.
518 Clack, Gaining Ground. p.102.
519 Goudge, 'Causal Explanations in Natural History.' p.197.
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conjectures are not  all that Romer's narrative is.  For if such statements  alone were 
sufficient to determine the form of a narrative explanation then it would hardly be 
necessary to give one. A mere listing of the relevant “statements of fact” would do 
the same job. A narrative must,  therefore,  involve some degree of interpolation – 
some  inference  from  the  observed  to  the  unobserved.  Dawkins  hints  at  this 
possibility when he argues that a swampy Devonian did not rule out “the essential  
Romer idea.”520 It  seems that it is this “essential” idea which unifies or otherwise 
makes sense of the “accepted statements of fact” and “plausible conjectures” which 
we have been examining so far. And so it is to this idea we must turn if we hope to 
identify  a  more  potent  means  for  confirming  narrative  explanations.  The  very 
resilience  of  the  “essential  Romer  idea,”  however,  presents  us  with  a  potentially 
serious  problem.  The  fact  that  an  almost  complete  refutation of  his  supporting 
arguments  regarding  Devonian  drought  still failed  to  discredit  Romer  is  striking 
evidence of this. And so, in search of a better mechanism, we are led to the issue of 
narrative consequences, and to the question of prediction.
Confirmation By Consequences
Recall  once again Goudge's argument that Romer's account of  tetrapod evolution 
“does not make an explicit, positive prediction about what will be found by future 
investigations,  though  there  is  a  sense  in  which  it  makes  certain  negative 
predictions.” We will hear more from Goudge with respect to prediction later in this 
chapter. For now it will suffice to point out that Goudge's insight that what is  not 
found could potentially be as useful as what was would ultimately prove extremely 
useful to his vision of the historical sciences. For this seemingly innocuous concept, if  
handled carefully, can be developed into a much more powerful method by which 
we might  confirm or disconfirm narrative explanations in  the  absence of  general 
laws. We will refer to it as confirmation by consequences. Put simply, the method is this: 
identify  some  observable  additional consequence  of  the  narrative  account  under 
investigation (preferably one not present in any of its competitors) and then seek 
evidence for  that.  Such a consequence,  if  well  chosen,  can have quite exceptional 
confirmatory power.  Note also  that  we need not  seek a  positive consequence.  We 
might  postulate  that,  if  a  narrative  is  incorrect,  we  should  not observe  some 
consequence which we might reasonably expect to observe if that narrative were a 
520 Dawkins, The Ancestor's Tale. p.308.
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true account of the past. The logic will work either way. Indeed, it is through the 
deployment of just such a method that we are finally able to achieve something more  
than a mere rearrangement of the peripheral details of Romer's account.
Consider the following: if  Romer were correct in his “essential” idea, a necessary 
consequence of his account would be a strong and direct link between the evolution of 
limbs and emergence onto land. Terrestrial motion would be, in other words, what 
limbs were evolved for. This is what his account necessarily implies, and can therefore 
function  in  a  role  something  like  Goudge's  idea  of  a  “negative  prediction.”  Put 
simply, it tells us what we ought not to find. This adds additional constraints to the 
multiple possible readings of the available evidence, making a finite range of possible 
interpretations just that much more finite. In Romer's case, what we ought not to find 
is evidence of limbs in a creature which could not have used those limbs to move 
about on land – or at least could not have moved well enough to migrate between 
ponds. Were such evidence found, it would represent much stronger evidence against 
Romer's  account  than anything achieved by the “statement of  fact”  approach we 
have already examined. And, as it turns out, it was precisely this approach which 
ultimately led to the near total discrediting of Romer's “essential” idea in modern 
tetrapod  paleontology.  This  is  a  comparatively  recent  development,  however. 
Because all known tetrapod fossils seemed to support it, Romer's account – and thus 
the  presumed  consequential  link  between limbs  and  terrestrial  movement  –  had 
actually remained eminently plausible right up until  the late  1980s.  These fossils, 
however, were comparatively few in number. In fact, there was only one species for 
which  there  were  records  of  any  real  completeness  –  the  creature  known  as 
Ichthyostega. 
Examples of the tetrapod  Ichthyostega were first found in Greenland in 1931 by the 
Swedish paelontologist Gunnar Säve-Söderberg, and preliminarily described by him 
in 1932. They date approximately to the upper Devonian epoch – approximately 374-
359 million years ago. By the standards of tetrapod paleontology, Ichthyostega fossils 
were  comparatively  numerous  and  adequate  material  was  available  to  allow 
significant  reconstruction.  Despite  this,  the creature was not  fully  described until  
much later by another Swedish paleontologist and colleague of Säve-Söderberg, Erik 
Jarvik. Jarvik worked sporadically on Ichthyostega reconstruction from his first work 
on the creature's tail and hind limbs in 1952, until the publication of a much more 
233
detailed reconstruction in 1996.521 A lifetime of effort, all of which seemed to accord 
with the account Romer had offered. Although this was largely due to the fact that 
Ichthyostega was the only tetrapod fossil known in any detail until the 1980s and was 
therefore forced to bear a disproportionate interpretive burden.522 Jarvik's first reports 
on  Ichthyostega showed  a  creature  that,  as  popular  science  writer  Carl  Zimmer 
described it in a 1995 issue of Discover magazine:
...  was  an  amphibian  that  still  held  on  to  signs  of  its  fishy  heritage.  It  was 
obviously a tetrapod, with limbs and digits to walk on, and sturdy shoulders to 
support them. No longer able to depend on a cushion of water, it had developed a 
sturdy rib cage to hold up its internal organs. But Ichthyostega also had a broad, 
fat, fishlike head and a small fin on the top of its tail.523
In  other  words,  Ichthyostega  seemed to  fit  well  with  Romer's  account.  It  did  not 
provide  evidence  sufficient  to  confirm it,  but  it  was  at  least  consistent  with  the 
essential idea of limbs developed as a means to return to water. Ichthyostega had legs 
that could facilitate motion – and thus it made sense to assume that motion was why 
the legs had evolved. In the late 1980s, however, a related fossil called Acanthostega,  
about which almost  nothing was known, was coming to the attention of Jennifer 
Clack. Before Clack's work in Greenland, all that was known of  Acanthostega  were 
three partial skulls.524 They had been found by Säve-Söderberg and Jarvik in 1933, in 
the same suite of expeditions which had yielded the apparently far more abundant 
Ichthyostega.  But,  as there was not enough material with which to accomplish any 
significant reconstructive work, Jarvik did little more than name the species and set it  
aside.525 It  remained  obscure  and  incomplete  until  the  possibility  of  recovering 
additional fossil material came to Clack's attention in the 1980s:
It emerged that back in 1971, a geology student had collected tetrapod specimens 
from East Greenland as part of a sedimentological study, and that the material was 
not  of  the  more  abundant  Ichthyostega,  but  of  the  lesser  known  Acanthostega. 
Furthermore,  his  find,  which  consisted  of  the  remains  of  three  skulls  in  close 
association, made it clear that more material of  Acanthostega could be recovered 
521 E. Jarvik, 'On the Fish-Like Tail in the Ichthyostegid Stegocephalians,'  Meddelelser Øm Grönland.  
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Vertebrates.  Academic  Press:  London  &  New  York,  1980.  E.  Jarvik,  'The  Devonian  Tetrapod 
Ichthyostega,' Fossils and Strata. Vol. 40 (1996). pp.1-206.
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from the same site.526
Clack revisited the site in 1987 and recovered further fossils, ultimately amounting to 
an almost complete skeleton. And, after several years of analysis and reconstruction 
by Clack and her colleague Michael Coates, it became clear that Acanthostega clearly 
falsified Romer's account. It was precisely what should not have been observed had 
Romer's  essential  idea  been  correct.  For  Acanthostega,  being  a  tetrapod,  clearly 
possessed limbs. Indeed, the forelimb consisted of a recognisable radius and ulna, as 
well as eight distinct digits!527 It was, in any sense, a limbed animal – a true tetrapod. 
However, Clack concluded, the support structures for these distinct and jointed limbs 
were much too weak for them to have been able to facilitate terrestrial motion. Of the 
forelimb, she argued:
There is no true wrist or weight-bearing joint in this limb. Not only does this make 
an unlikely walking limb, but furthermore the pattern resembles that of its fish 
relative Eusthenopteron more than it does any other tetrapod. For this reason... the 
limb is seen as basically primitive, rather than one secondarily adapted for life in 
water.528
Clack came to a similar conclusion regarding the hind limb. “As with the forelimb,” 
she argues, “the ankle shows no weight-bearing joint surfaces or planes of fexibility 
and seems clearly paddle-like.”529 In other words, Acanthostega had highly developed, 
multi-jointed  digits  –  which  were  attached  to  a  weak  and  insubstantial  wrist.  
Acanthostega could not, therefore, have walked on dry land. In the context of Romer's 
account,  this  is  extremely  difficult  to  explain.  The  only  viable  possibility  for 
preserving Romer's account was to argue that  Acanthostega was descended from a 
land-capable tetrapod creature in the process of  returning to the water. But, as Carl 
Zimmer has argued, this seemed extremely unlikely:
How do you explain a land animal's body in an animal that couldn't survive on 
land? One possibility is that the animal had once come onto the land but,  like 
some  amphibians,  had  subsequently  returned  to  a  life  underwater,  where  its 
skeleton had gradually weakened. That scenario seemed unlikely, though, when 
Clack and Coates found Acanthostega's gills. Tetrapods simply aren't supposed to 
have a fish's gills. Amphibians like salamanders retain some of the struts of bone 
in their neck, but these now anchor the tongue muscles. All the amphibians that  
returned permanently to the water developed external gills, feathery tissue stuck 
to  these  struts  and extending out  from the  body.  But  Acanthostega  had a  full 
battery of gill struts in its neck. It even had a sheet of bone along its shoulders that 
526 Clack, 'The Emergence of Early Tetrapods,' p.169. (emphasis in original)
527 Ibid., p.172.
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supported the rear wall of an internal gill chamber. The strong implication was 
that  the  animal  still  possessed  an  internal  gill  system.  In  other  words, 
Acanthostega breathed like a fish.530
Highly  developed  gills  in  a  creature  supposed  to  have  left  the  water  and  then 
returned seems implausible. A great deal of gradual adaptation (and therefore time) 
would have been required to evolve limbs suitable for movement on dry land – to 
say nothing of the additional time presumably required for those limbs to begin to 
atrophy upon return to the water. Yet no significant modification could be observed 
in  Acanthostega's gill structures (at least from fossil evidence) from those of its fish 
ancestors and contemporaries. One could argue that structures within the gill could 
have re-evolved – but it is vanishingly unlikely (statistically speaking) that a structure 
evolved twice would possess the same form. The more plausible conclusion was that 
Acanthostega was a thoroughly aquatic creature. This had profound implications for 
Romer. As Clack states:
As a result of these discoveries, the scenario accounting for the acquisition of limbs 
and  terrestriality  changed  from  one  in  which  a  fish  emerged  onto  land  and 
subsequently evolved limbs from fins to one in which limbs with digits evolved 
while the animals still lived and moved predominantly in water, so that the limbs 
were viewed as an 'exaptation' co-opted for terrestrial locomotion only later.531
In other words, the fish-tetrapod transition did not happen in creatures adapting to 
land, but in creatures living in water. Limbs did not, as Romer's drying pond scenario 
would have it, evolve in response to selective pressures which favoured the ability to 
walk. It appears that limbs instead evolved for some other purpose and in response to 
some  other pressure, and were only  later repurposed for terrestrial  motion. As the 
paleontologist (and one of the discoverers of  Tiktaalik) Neil Shubin has written, it is 
even possible that “everything special about tetrapods – limbs, digits, ribs, neck, the 
lot – might well have evolved in water, not on land.”532 A whole new account,  in 
other words, would be required to explain how limbs had come about.
The question of why (and in response to what pressure) such structures evolved if 
they did not evolve specifically for terrestrial locomotion is an interesting one – and 
still the subject of much debate in the paleontological community – but it would be 
outside the scope of this thesis to carry this example any further. For our purposes, 
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what  is  important  is  that  this  line  of  reasoning  effectively  falsifies  the  essential 
premise of Romer's account. Given what is now known about Acanthostega, Romer's 
account  of  why limbs  evolved  and  why  they  were  successful  simply  cannot  be 
correct. This is not to say that subsequent adaptation of these already evolved limbs 
was not driven by the kind of  processes Romer had postulated.  As Dawkins has 
reminded  us,  many  contemporary  water-dwelling  creatures  today  engage  in 
something much like the pond-hopping Romer had imagined. But such pressures 
could not have been what caused those limbs to arise in the first place, as the first 
creatures known to have possessed them could not  have used them for anything 
more than a slow, painful dragging into the shallows. Thus the very evolutionary 
development Romer was trying to explain was no longer adequately addressed. 
We have now seen in some detail how we might go about gathering evidence for or 
against a narrative account.  Moreover, we have seen that the traditional model of 
positive future-focused prediction, while perhaps desirable, is not strictly necessary 
in  order  to  test  a  scientific  statement.  Through  the  use  of  confirmation  by 
consequences, we can reliably bring evidence to bear on accounts of singular and 
contingent events from the past, and can do so by recognisably narrative means in 
disciplines few would have trouble calling scientific. From this we can conclude that 
even  Goudge's  early  and  self-described  “exploratory”  outline  of  how  narrative 
explanation can work in paleontology seems a better guide to historical explanation 
than any covering law contortion or model of colligation we have seen in Part One. 
More importantly, Goudge managed to accomplish this without resorting to naïve 
arguments that paleontology was a fundamentally different kind of knowledge from 
science. For this reason at least, his concept of scientific narrative is worth taking 
seriously. 
Narratives as Scientific Theories
What then of the second key issue raised by Goudge's paper – that of the epistemic 
status of narratives and where they might fit within the wider scientific enterprise? 
As  Goudge  was  careful  to  point  out,  Romer's  explanation  was  not  merely  an 
anecdote to be counted for or against some greater natural law. Nor will this be the 
case for those more modern accounts which will come to replace it. How then should 
we  think  of  such  accounts?  For  a  clue  to  this  question,  it  seems  appropriate  to 
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examine  the  approach  of  some  of  the  scientists  involved.  Richard  Dawkins,  for 
instance, refers to Romer's account in  The Ancestor's Tale  as an “admirable theory” 
and the “Romer hypothesis.”533 Similarly, in Gaining Ground, Jennifer Clack also uses 
the term “theory,” as well as both “scenario” and “explanation,” in order to discuss 
various accounts of tetrapod terrestriality.534 Neil Shubin, in reference to both Romer's 
original account and to Clack's suggestion that tetrapod limbs evolved for life in the 
water  before  ever  being  co-opted  for  movement  on  dry  land,  uses  the  term 
“hypothesis.” Indeed, Shubin even applies something much like the confirmation of 
consequences to Clack's hypothesis, arguing that she had “made a prediction that 
could  be  tested:  Aquatic  animals  more  ancient  than  this  new  find  should  have 
intermediate structures.”535 This prediction was subsequently vindicated by Shubin 
and his colleagues Edward Daeschler and Farish Jenkins with their 2004 discovery of 
just such an intermediate in the creature now known as Tiktaalik – the “fishapod” (as 
Shubin has called it) which seemed to neatly split the difference between Devonian 
lobe-finned fish  and  comparatively  more  developed  creatures  like  Acanthostega.536 
Tiktaalik  exhibited exactly the kinds of structures which might be expected if Clack 
and  Coates  were  correct  in  arguing  that  limbs  primarily  evolved  to  serve  the 
purposes of life in the water. An article devoted to Tiktaalik in the 9 September 2006 
issue of New Scientist magazine argues as follows:
Tiktaalik's front appendages, for example, end in a fat paddle, rather than fingers, 
so Shubin and Daeschler call them fins. But inside them, several rows of bones 
extend beyond the wrist  region.  The researchers are not prepared to call  these 
fingers, because they cannot prove they are identical to the fingers of tetrapods... 
but the presence of anything remotely finger-like calls into doubt the widely held 
notion that fingers were a purely tetrapod innovation.537
In other words, an aquatic creature possessed features which, according to the Romer 
hypothesis, should have been exclusive to more developed, land-capable tetrapods.  
That this was clear evidence in support of Clack and Coates was made clear by Clack 
herself in the same  New Scientist  article. “It's one of the those things,” she stated, 
“you can point to and say, I told you this would exist – and there it is.”538 From this 
brief digression, then, it seems clear that the language being used among scientists  
involved in the relevant fields (such as Dawkins), and even among those involved 
533 Dawkins, The Ancestor's Tale. pp.307-308.
534 Clack, Gaining Ground. pp.99-104.
535 Shubin, 'The “Great” Transition,' p.85.
536 Edward B. Daeschler, Neil H. Shubin, and Farish A. Jenkins Jr., 'A Devonian Tetrapod-Like Fish 
and the Evolution of the Tetrapod Body Plan,' Nature. No. 440 (6 April 2006). pp.757-763.
537 Bob Holmes, 'Meet Your Ancestor,' New Scientist. 9 September 2006. pp.37-38.
538 Ibid., pp.35-36.
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with the relevant discoveries themselves (Clack and Shubin), is that of “theory” and 
“hypothesis.” Similarly, both Clack and Shubin have consistently used the language 
of  confirmation  and  prediction  in  talking  of  their  discoveries.  It  therefore  seems 
entirely appropriate to start a discussion of the epistemic role of narrative here. Are 
narratives  robust  enough to  support  the  kind of  explanatory  weight  expected of 
scientific theories? In Goudge's limited assessment at least, it would seem that they 
are. In support of this, Goudge offers two arguments. The first addresses the issue of 
choosing a viable narrative to function as a theory in the first place. The second, the 
issue of testing it.
The first of these arguments is specifically concerned with countering the objection 
that a narrative cannot function as a “theory” because it is more like a “just so story” 
–  an  arbitrary  post  hoc rationalisation  for  what  is  already  known  or  suspected. 
Goudge disputed this, arguing instead that an initial narrative theory emerges (albeit 
somewhat organically) from the initial pool of evidence one wishes to unite:
The  choice  of  the  over-all  pattern  as  a  possible  sufficient  condition  of  the 
phenomenon is made in the light of existing knowledge or reasonable inference 
therefrom.  In  the  example  quoted,  the  initial  move  is  to  eliminate  certain 
alternative possibilities because they are incompatible with accepted facts. (The 
amphibians did  not become land dwellers because they were driven out of the 
water by the need to breathe air, or to obtain food, or to escape from predators.)  
Another  alternative  (that  the  ability  to  live  on  land  was  an  adaptation  for 
continuing to live in water) is compatible with everything known.539
That the details of this reasoning are, from the modern viewpoint, almost certainly 
incorrect  is  irrelevant.  It  is  clear  from  Goudge's  argument  that  he  considers  the 
starting point for a narrative to be a kind of snapshot – a summation of the state of 
the art. One first constructs an account consistent with what is known. This is an 
operation tied to a particular time. This alone is not enough, however, potentially 
offering up an account so vague (i.e., “the ability to live on land was an adaptation 
for continuing to live in water”) as to permit the kind of  ad hoc extensions which 
would render it almost useless. Indeed, something like this process can be seen in the 
attempt to preserve Romer's theory by arguing that Acanthostega was in the process 
of returning from land to water. Principles of parsimony – that is, injunctions not to 
multiply explanatory entities beyond necessity – are extraordinarily helpful here, but 
there is no denying that such accounts are often vulnerable to charges of imprecision. 
However, narrative is not the cause of such issues, but their  solution. For in order to 
539 Goudge, 'Causal Explanations in Natural History.' p.200. (emphasis in original)
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remove the “paradoxical content” of such a high-level account, Goudge argued, as 
well as “reduce its vagueness,” a “number of the component events are narrated in 
temporal sequence.” In this way, Goudge puts the temporal dimension of narrative to 
work as a way to organise available evidence.  The materials of  the past are thus 
selected and organised not only according to “their relevance to the over-all pattern 
and  their  compatibility  with  the  general  body of  scientific  knowledge,”  but  also 
according to “the demands of internal coherence imposed by the sequential character 
of the total narrative. The narrative has to tell a 'likely' story.”540
This hints at a potential answer to the charge that a narrative can add nothing of 
value  to  a  collection  of  evidence.  For  we  can  use  this  requirement  to  preserve 
temporal coherence to argue that a narrative theory introduces  additional constraints 
on  the  possible  interpretations  of  that  evidence.  Effects  must  not,  for  instance, 
precede their postulated causes. Thus, a greater explanatory capacity can be gained 
by assessing evidence against an overarching narrative than would be the case if it 
were  assessed  in  isolation.  The  relevant  facts  of  Acanthostega's body  plan  by 
themselves, for instance, were capable of little explanatory work. Only when placed 
into a wider context – through their relationship to Romer's postulated narrative – 
did they gain their significance. The fact that  Acanthostega possessed the features it 
did  at the time it did, in other words, is what made it evidence against Romer. The 
significance  of  Acanthostega would have differed radically had it  been  dated to  a 
much earlier time period. Had Acanthostega (or a creature like it) been shown to have 
been  contemporary  with  the  Sarcopterygii lobe-finned  fish,  for  instance,  it  would 
represent a powerful blow against the related theory that these fish were the ancestors 
of the tetrapods, and would point instead toward an earlier point of divergence.541 
The explanatory significance of evidence is therefore strongly related to its  place in 
the postulated temporal sequence. The use of narrative in such cases not only acts as 
a powerful organising structure  for historical evidence, it  also allows us to extract 
much  more  explanatory  power  from historical  evidence.  These  are  both  key 
540 Ibid.
541 It is worth noting that the discovery in 2010 of fossilised tetrapod tracks in Poland dating from a 
period some 18 million years  earlier  than the first  tetrapods  were previously thought to have  
evolved will likely bring about precisely such a reassessment of tetrapod evolution. As of the time  
of writing, however, the broader consequences of this trackway for post-Acanthostega  theories of 
tetrapod origins have yet to be agreed upon. For the purposes of this thesis, however, this is not of 
crucial  importance.  We  are  more  interested  in  the  mechanism by  which  such  narratives  are 
confirmed or otherwise and have little invested in the precise outcome of this particular example. 
See: Niedzwiedzki, et. al., 'Tetrapod trackways from the early Middle Devonian period of Poland.' 
pp.43-48.
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desiderata of scientific theories. 
Even if there were not such constraints on initial theory selection, however, it would 
be  of  little  consequence.  For  one  need  not  be  overly concerned  with  where 
hypotheses come from, so long as – once arrived at – they can be meaningfully tested. 
This brings us to the second of Goudge's arguments for narrative as theories. Goudge 
stated the main potential objection to the verifiability of narratives as follows:
At this point it may be objected that if the above account is correct, then the causal 
explanations in natural history which have been discussed all suffer from a fatal 
defect.  They are insusceptible  to  any sort  of  empirical  testing. We can,  indeed, 
ensure that a given theoretical pattern is internally coherent and compatible with 
existing knowledge. But since it involves no general laws and makes no positive 
predictions, we can never subject it to any verificational procedure. It remains a 
sheer conjecture about a past event.542
However, as our contemporary extension of Romer's example of tetrapod evolution 
has shown, this is quite simply not true. This chapter has shown that by assessing the 
potentially observable and/or testable consequences of a narrative, empirical support 
can be gained or lost and the theory in question correspondingly strengthened or 
weakened.  Our argument is  strengthened in this  respect  by the observation that, 
despite the fact that Goudge could not have anticipated subsequent developments in 
tetrapod paleontology, the method for narrative verifiability he offered in 1958 has 
turned out  to be a fair  description of the process by which Romer's  account was 
eventually falsified:
To this objection the reply may be made that in as much as an explanatory pattern 
specifies  a  determinate  sequence  of  events  (or  conditions),  it  restricts  the 
possibilities with regard to what future empirical investigations will disclose. The 
pattern does, therefore, involve a number of negative predictions. It implies  that 
certain  phenomena  will  not  turn  up  in  any  future  enquiries (e.g.  in  paleontology, 
comparative anatomy, experimental biology, etc.) If one of these phenomena does 
turn up, it will invalidate or falsify the pattern. Hence, such causal explanations in 
natural  history  are  testable,  for  nothing  prevents  their  inadequacy  from being 
detected, in the long run, if they are inadequate. Since Popper has given powerful 
reasons  for  believing  that  a  distinguishing  mark  of  a  scientific  theory  is  its 
falsifiability,  i.e.  the  possibility  of  overthrowing  it  on  the  basis  of  empirical 
evidence,  these  causal  explanations  can  be  regarded  as  intrinsically  no  less 
scientific than (though in other respects quite different from) explanatory theories 
in the non-historical sciences.543
At this point, it must be stressed once again that it is the theory – the narrative – which 
542 Goudge, 'Causal Explanations in Natural History,' p.201.
543 Ibid. (emphasis in original)
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has provided this testability. It was only in the context of Romer's narrative theory that 
Acanthostega became an element of falsifying data. Therefore, it might reasonably be 
concluded that narrative accounts can not only function in a unifying capacity with 
respect to evidence, but also provide a method for verification that the examination 
of evidence alone cannot. They seem, in other words, to be viable candidates for being 
considered fully-fedged scientific theories in their own right. That is, narratives not 
only organise data into some coherent structure but go some way towards explaining 
it.  Similarly,  they  can  be  made  to  submit  to  evidence.  And,  most  importantly, 
narratives retain this theoretical character despite the fact that they are not generalised 
theories,  but  are  instead  theories  of  singular events.  This  calls  into  question  the 
validity of any insistence – such as we have seen in the work of Dray and Danto – 
that theories must have a quality of generality in order to be scientific. We will talk 
more about this in the following chapter.
If it is the case that narratives can function in the manner we have come to expect 
from  scientific  theories,  then  it  would  appear  that  the  only  viable  opposition 
available to the nomothetic purist is to assert that narratives must either rely  on or 
reduce  to nomothetic  explanations.  This  is  a  charge  which  has  been  leveled  at 
narrative explanation many times before,  and we have already encountered  it  in 
these  pages.  This  is  the  assertion  which  underlies  Hempel's  concept  of  the 
“explanation  sketch,”  for  instance.  But  in  this  case,  Goudge  has  argued  for  the 
usefulness of narrative as an explanatory mechanism in and of itself, rather than the 
kind of  consolation prize covering law theorists have often imagined it  to be.  To 
successfully  deploy  a  reductionist  argument  while  simultaneously  retaining  the 
advantages of this model,  one would be required to offer a nomothetic reduction 
which  also  acknowledged  the  usefulness  of  temporal  sequence  in  explanation. 
Historically, nomothetic models which conceivably accomplish this have tended to 
focus  on the  reduction of  each individual  statement  in  a  narrative  account  to  its 
nomothetic components. This forms a “causal chain” in which each link is deducible 
from  the  previous.  Goudge  anticipated  this  class  of  objection,  however,  and 
countered by arguing that such an approach badly underestimates the importance of  
contingency to a narrative model of science. For the causal chain model,  he wrote,  
relies  on  the  assertion  that  “the  statements  making  up  the  explanation  must  be 
capable,  at  least  in  principle,  of  being organised deductively.”  And this,  Goudge 
argued, was quite simply the wrong model to have in mind. For such an image led to  
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the  marginalisation  of  “contextual  considerations.”  This  was  important  because 
“each explanatory pattern of the sort we are considering is less like a segment of an 
isolated causal line stretching back indefinitely into the past, and more like a portion 
of a complex historical network with an enormous number of cross-connections.”544 
This image of a network, or perhaps a web, is apposite, as it captures the possibility of 
causes from far-removed causal systems interacting in unexpected cross-connections 
– such as a meteor intruding into biological evolution. To try to chart a single causal  
chain through such a network would be of limited explanatory value, as it would 
potentially  miss  these kinds of  connections.  There  is,  in  other  words,  simply too 
much complexity and contingency in historical  systems.  We cannot identify  every 
factor  –  every interaction  between  environment  and  organism –  which  produced 
Ichthyostega,  Tiktaalik,  and  Acanthostega.  To say  nothing  of  showing  that  no other 
organisms were possible and that there were no contributing contingent factors of 
any importance.  Our inability to  rely on deductions regarding the climate  of  the 
Devonian is evidence of this. In order to explain that failure, we need not resort to the 
claim that climate is not a deterministic system the laws of which might, in principle,  
be known and understood. We are required only to point out that the interaction of 
the laws underlying weather and climate with the laws underlying potentially every 
other relevant natural system produces consequences which are effectively unique and 
functionally unpredictable. Even a complete nomothetic description of every aspect of 
the Earth's atmosphere, therefore, would be of little or no explanatory use without a 
complete nomothetic description of everything else.
With respect  to tetrapod evolution,  it  might very well  be the case that  the entire 
lineage  owes  its  survival  to  some  factor  outside  of  biological  considerations 
altogether.  Perhaps a  harsher  than normal winter  caused a  reduction in predator 
numbers, allowing a crucial mutation to survive among the lobe-finned fish. What 
use are deductions from the relevant laws of heritability if their outcomes might be 
radically altered by such events? Even if such contingencies were vanishingly rare, it 
would make no difference – they would still need to be accounted for at some point. If 
we are to get any grip at all on systems where such possibilities can be imagined, 
therefore, we need a way to deal with those systems that allows something to be true 
which did not have to be. We need to trace the path taken, while remaining aware that 
544 Ibid., pp.198-200. (emphasis added)
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other paths were equally possible. In this sense, Goudge anticipated by some thirty  
years the central  argument of Stephen Jay Gould's  Wonderful Life.  For,  unless this 
complex  feature  of  the  world  might  be  somehow  excised,  Goudge  argued,  the 
necessity for narrative would remain. He concludes:
I submit, then, that natural history does employ causal explanations, and that the 
most  typical,  being  the  sort  I  have  attempted  to  describe,  do  not  bring  an 
individual  phenomenon  under  a  general  law.  Furthermore,  these  typical 
explanations  seem to  me wholly  appropriate  to  the  subject-matter  with which 
natural history is concerned. The method used in constructing them is entirely 
sound.  There  is  no  superior  method  (e.g.  that  of  physics)  which  ought  to  be 
substituted for it. Hence, no warrant exists for saying that all explanations found 
in the historical sciences are 'weak,' or for suggesting that these sciences are still at  
a rudimentary stage of development. Physics is not necessarily the adult form of 
every science, and natural history is not adolescent physics.545
The example we have examined here of historical science in action not only makes 
clear the need for an historical mode of explanation in the sciences, but also gives us 
some idea of the functions such explanations would be required to provide. Such a 
model must: deal with contingency and singular events, produce results which can 
function in the role of a theory, deal with multiple levels of generality and variable 
quantities  of  evidence,  and  submit  itself  to  empirical  testing.  Given  all  of  these 
requirements, Goudge's vision of narrative (or something like it) begins to look like a 
candidate well equipped for the task. It appears to model practice in the historical 
sciences well, and has the additional advantage of utilising an idea – the movement 
of time and the idea of cause and effect – which is both intuitively appealing to the 
human mind and seemingly a fundamental property of reality. So if we are to build,  
as Hull has argued we must, a philosophy of science with the traditional emphasis 
reversed,  it  seems plausible  that  something like  Goudge's  sense  of  narrative  will 
deeply inform its structure. Having said this, there is much that Goudge omitted in  
his  paper.  He  failed,  for  instance,  to  demonstrate  the  necessity  of  narrative  (as 
opposed to any other mode), or to link it in any deep way with cause and effect. And 
this is to say nothing of the more than fifty years of philosophy of science undertaken 
since its publication. If we wish to build a more complete narrative model of science,  
therefore,  we  must  examine  subsequent  developments  in  (non-literary)  narrative 
philosophy.  More importantly,  we must rebut the obvious objection that the only 
reason narrative appears to fit so well with historical practice is because it is a  post 
hoc rationalisation  designed  (with  the  benefit  of  hindsight)  precisely  in  order  to 
545 Ibid., p.202.
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exhibit such a fit.  This  is  a  very serious objection indeed,  and cannot be casually 
dismissed. In order to neutralise it, we must demonstrate that narrative is a necessary 
mode of explanation which is not only co-equal to the nomothetic mode, but is also 
concordant with our most fundamental understanding of the world. This is a purely 
theoretical task that only philosophy can attend to, and the chapter which follows 
will attempt to show how it might be done. 
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Chapter Six
“The Philosophy of the Science of Stories”
Where the previous chapter has sought to demonstrate something of how historical 
scientists approach the work of explanation in fields awash with contingency and in 
which any laws (implicit or not) are frequently unable to be called upon for aid, this  
final chapter will focus on the work of those contemporary philosophers of science 
who have attempted to abstract  a  general theory of  narrative  from such practical 
insights. It is worth noting at the outset, however, that the recognition of narrative in 
the philosophy of  science is still comparatively new. While the most basic tenets of 
narrative have, as previous chapters have shown, been around for quite some time, 
more generalised mechanisms of confirmation and observation are still actively being 
worked out. This is not merely the pursuit of detail for its own sake, however. The 
working out of such details in a philosophically coherent manner is absolutely crucial 
to any demonstration that a narrative model of explanation is something more than 
merely  a  post  hoc  convenience  or  a  method  fit  only  for  producing  “explanation 
sketches.” Showing how these mechanisms have been conceptualised must therefore 
be  among  the  tasks  of  this  chapter.  However,  the  newness  of  much  of  this 
philosophical work also contributes to a sense in which this chapter must also be a 
work of synthesis. Many of the theorists we will examine in this chapter have not yet 
even realised that their arguments form a coherent system when collected together, 
let  alone  perceived  the  scope  and  explanatory  power  of  this  emerging  narrative 
dimension of science. The enforcement of such a realisation through the application 
of narrative to  all those fields of enquiry which might benefit from it is, of course, 
beyond the scope of any one thesis. As part of a thesis on the philosophy of history,  
however, this chapter hopes to achieve some modest recognition of that power in the 
area  of  human  history.  Of  course,  the  relevant  philosophical  issues  even  in  a 
discussion  of  this  circumscribed  scope  are  still  vast.  This  chapter,  therefore,  will 
restrict itself to demonstrating that a historical science based on narrative can satisfy 
the three key requirements identified in the Introduction. These are:  “observation 
poverty” and the ability to gather empirical information about that which is to be 
studied, “central subjects” and the reality of the narratives which are the result of 
that  study,  and  the  non-arbitrary  method  of  “confirmation  by  consequences” 
required to  guard against  ad  hoc conclusions.  Moreover,  in  addition to  providing 
philosophically compelling arguments by which narrative can function in each of 
these areas, we must also demonstrate “nomothetic compatibilism.” That is, we must 
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make clear that such treatments as are offered retain the compatibility of narrative 
with existing philosophy of science. 
Peter Kosso and the Problem of Observation Poverty
The first of the hurdles that any specifically  historical approach to scientific enquiry 
must  clear  is  the  argument  from  “observation  poverty.”  Specifically,  this  is  the 
contention that any discipline which seeks to study events/objects from the past is 
critically hampered by a lack of direct accessibility  to that past.  To claim that this 
disadvantages only historical science, however, is to imply that the inverse is not the 
case. Nomothetic sciences like physics and chemistry, in other words, are thought to 
study materials which are  present to observation in a way historical events/objects 
are not. Because of this, the subject matter of physics or chemistry might become the 
subject of systematic direct observation and/or controlled experiment. It is not (or is 
no longer) possible, on the other hand, to observe World War II. Or, as the historian 
Marc Bloch concisely stated in his book  The Historian's Craft,  “no Egyptologist has 
ever seen Ramses.”546 The philosopher J. A. Passmore, in a consideration of historical 
objectivity, summarises this same argument with more precision:
... the scientist confronts the world as it nakedly is, whereas the historian sees it,  
always, through the medium of someone else's testimony – a testimony he can 
never... penetrate beyond, because the events the testimony describes are gone for 
ever.  If  a  scientist  doubts  the  testimony  of  some  other  scientist  that  when 
hydrochloric acid is poured on to zinc, hydrogen is produced, he can repeat the 
experiment  for  himself;  if  a  historian  doubts  Ben  Jonson's  testimony  about 
Shakespeare's character, he has no way of examining that character for himself...547
There  are  several  points  of  interest  in  this  citation.  First,  note  the  emphasis  on 
observational/experimental chemistry as an exemplar of scientific practice. This is 
not uncommon in such arguments, and it comes as no surprise to further observe 
that  this  emphasis  is  usually  accompanied  by  an  assumption  (whether  tacit  or 
explicit)  that  science  is  ideally  a  law-seeking  enterprise.  For  example,  R.  G. 
Collingwood argued the following in The Idea of History: “the sciences of observation 
and experiment are alike in...  that their aim is to detect the constant or recurring 
features  in  all  events  of  a  certain  kind.”548 This  implicit  link  between  laws  and 
546 Marc Bloch,  The Historian's Craft.  P. Putnam (trans).  Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 
1954. p.48.
547 J.  A. Passmore, 'The Objectivity of History,'  in Patrick Gardiner (ed),  The Philosophy of History.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974. p.148.
548 R. G. Collingwood,  The Idea of History.  Revised Edition. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994. 
p.250.
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observation/experiment exists because, as the philosopher of science Carol Cleland 
has  argued,  “hypotheses  tested  in  classical  experimental  research  are  general  in 
character.”549 They have to be, otherwise repeated experiment/observation would not 
be possible by definition. Far from being damning for the historical sciences, however, 
this refects only the fact that classical experimental method was first developed in an 
era when the assumption of science as exclusively nomothetic went unquestioned. 
Only when interest in more historically oriented questioning began to gather (as we 
have seen in the previous two chapters) did the need arise for an alternative.
This issue is extremely important for the debate at hand, however, as the supposed 
source of this inability to observe and experiment fows from another assertion about 
the nature of historical science that we do wish to affirm – that of the singular nature 
of historical events. As the previous chapter has hinted at (and as we shall see David 
Hull argue later in this chapter), the unique/unrepeatable nature of historical events 
is not merely an incidental feature of historical science but is effectively what defines 
them as historical. This realisation necessarily forces us to concede several important 
tools  of  nomothetic  science  –  most  notably  the  possibility  of  experimental 
manipulation. It seems quite self-evident that we cannot affect past events, nor can 
we produce truly identical events in controlled conditions. Given that this is so, the 
question remains: must we cede  observation along with experiment? If we do, then 
constructing and defending a general framework for historical science (of any kind) 
becomes vastly more difficult. Much hinges, it seems, on the status of observation 
with respect to the past. If it  too represents an insuperable (or even merely  de facto) 
barrier to historical  enquiry,  then it  becomes very difficult  to substantively refute 
arguments  like  those  of  Bloch  and  Passmore.  Fortunately  there  are  excellent 
philosophical reasons to think that this argument from observation poverty is based 
upon a naïve confusion between theoretical entities and the evidence for those entities, 
and is therefore without force. Such reasons have come to us from the philosophy of  
science rather  than  history,  however,  and  have  thus  largely  eluded  a  historical 
audience. 
Perhaps the most compelling philosophical argument against  observation poverty 
can be found in the work of the philosopher of science Peter  Kosso,  whose 1992 
549 Carol E. Cleland, 'Historical Science, Experimental Science, and the Scientific Method,'  Geology.  
Vol. 29, No. 11 (November 2001). p.987.
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paper 'Observation of the Past'550 and 2001 book Knowing the Past551 have both argued 
that the kinds of contrasts offered by Bloch or Passmore do not properly compare like 
with  like.552 Citing  Bloch's  example  of  Ramses  versus  electron  tracks  in  a  cloud 
chamber, Kosso has argued:
... there is a deeper faw in this contrast in that it is based on a mismatch between 
the objects of theoretical interest in history, for example Ramses, and the evidence, 
the  tracks,  for  objects  of  theoretical  interest  in  physics.  The  more  genuine 
comparison  of  observational  status  would  be  between  objects  of  theoretical 
interest,  Ramses in the historical  example and electrons in physics,  or between 
evidential objects, the archaeological and textual remains on the one hand and the 
tracks in a bubble chamber on the other.553
Essentially, Kosso is making an argument similar to that of Arthur Danto, but from a 
scientific perspective which Danto had failed to consider. Danto, it will be recalled 
from  Chapter  Three,  argued  that  all  narrative  statements  were  particularistic 
theoretical  constructs,  and  that  this  particularity  was  what  made  them historical 
rather than scientific. “A term like 'Julius Caesar',” he argued, “enjoys, in historical 
work,  somewhat  the  same  role  that  'electron'  and  'Oedipus  Complex'  enjoy  in 
physical and psychoanalytical theories respectively.”554 Given what we have learnt 
from Goudge in the previous chapter, we might further define “Julius Caesar” as a 
theoretical entity  which  functions  as  the  best  unifying explanation  for  a  range  of 
archaeological  and textual  evidence. This  is  precisely the manner in which Kosso 
would also have us think about ahistorical entities such as electrons – as theoretical 
entities the postulated behaviour of which unifies a broad range of diverse evidence,  
including tracks in a cloud chamber. The underlying pattern of reasoning in both 
cases, Kosso argues, is the inference of the occurrence/existence of an event/object as 
being the cause of a certain pattern of presently available evidence. By thinking in 
this way, Kosso argues, we can bring a consistent structure to  all types of scientific 
enquiry. More importantly, such a structure is agnostic with respect to the relative 
generality of the theoretical entities in question. Electrons are effectively identical and 
replicable, and thus lend themselves well to the experimental/nomothetic mode of 
550 Peter Kosso, 'Observation of the Past,' History and Theory. Vol. 31, No. 1 (February 1992). pp.21-36. 
551 Peter Kosso, Knowing the Past: Philosophical Issues of History and Archaeology. Humanity Books: New 
York, 2001. Note that Chapter Two of this book is effectively a re-print (with some some revisions 
and extensions) of Kosso's 1992 paper. See: Peter Kosso,  Knowing the Past:  Philosophical  Issues of  
History and Archaeology. Humanity Books: New York, 2001. pp.39-58. This thesis will cite from the 
2001 version wherever possible.
552 Kosso, 'Observation of the Past,' p.23.
553 Kosso, Knowing the Past. p.41. (emphasis in original)
554 Arthur C. Danto,  Narration and Knowledge (including the Integral  Text of  Analytical  Philosophy of  
History). Columbia University Press: New York, 2007. p.79.
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explanation.  Ramses  or  Julius  Caesar,  on  the  other  hand,  do  not.  But  this  is  an 
entirely  separate  problem,  as  we  shall  see  when  we  come  to  the  work  of  Carol  
Cleland. With respect to the language of theory alone, Kosso argues that there is  no 
difference between  Julius  Caesar  and  electrons.  This,  he  argues,  has  extremely 
important  implications  for  the  purported  difference  in  observability  between 
historical and ahistorical entities.
The inability or unwillingness of many philosophers to think about historical entities 
in this kind of consistently theoretical way, Kosso argues, has created an artificial 
barrier between history and science. More importantly, it is precisely this confusion 
that  underlies  the  entire class  of  “the  past  is  gone  and  is  thus  unobservable” 
arguments.  Eliminate  this  confusion,  Kosso  argues,  and  a  fundamental  unity  of 
observational  method  begins  to  emerge  which  highlights  deep  structural 
commonalities  between  historical  and  scientific  enquiry.  While  there  might  be 
practical and  logistical reasons  to  separate  history/archaeology  from  the  sciences, 
Kosso argues, the argument from observation poverty alone is simply not sufficient 
to achieve a convincing theoretical distinction.555 Kosso begins the work of establishing 
this claim by once again offering a more scientifically literate view of an argument 
made by Arthur Danto. In Analytical Philosophy of History, Danto had pointed out that 
the various classes of “the past is gone” arguments do not establish anything about 
historical practices in particular, because – logically speaking – all observation is of the 
past:
Epistemologists  never  weary of  pointing out  that  any perception,  of  anything, 
must, for purely physical reasons, occur at some time, however small, after the 
perceived event itself  took place,  that  it  takes  some time,  however little,  for  an 
impulse to reach the centres of perception, whatever these might be.556
The example Danto used to  illustrate  this  was the  contrast  between astronomers 
witnessing “stellar explosions” which “took place as long ago as it has taken light to 
reach us,” versus the witnessing of “terrestrial explosions,” where the transmission of 
the relevant information via light waves is nearly instantaneous. It might be more 
natural,  Danto  argued,  to  talk  of  “witnessing”  terrestrial  explosions  directly  in 
everyday speech, but such talk is  logically inconsistent and will not do for serious 
philosophy.  In  the  case  of  the  supposedly  direct  observation  of  a  “terrestrial” 
explosion, Danto writes, “we know that some time, if not as much time as in the case 
555 Kosso, Knowing the Past. p.40.
556 Danto, Narration and Knowledge. p.41. (emphasis in original)
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of stellar explosions, must have elapsed between the time the explosion occurred, 
and the time at which we witness it.” Given this, Danto argued, “the question is no 
longer whether it is possible to perceive past events, but whether... it is possible to 
perceive anything but past events.”557 This argument neutralises the claims of those 
who would single out human history (or  any other  historical  science) for special 
derision,  as precisely this  problem of “pastness” must affict  anyone –  whether in 
science  or  any  other  discipline  –  who  attempts  to  observe  anything.  Some  time, 
however  small,  must  elapse  as,  for  example,  light  travels  from  the  slide  to  the 
eyepiece of a microscope. The fact that we are comfortable calling the data gleaned 
by  microscopy  'observation'  therefore  implies  that  being  in  “the  past”  is  not  an 
impediment (in principle) to being observed. In fact, if we follow Danto's argument, 
it  is  a  requirement.  And this,  as  Kosso points  out,  is  not  merely the philosophical 
splitting of hairs, but is a fundamental constraint of the universe, made so by the  
finite velocity of light.558 
However, as Danto argued, it does not follow that because “all we witness are past 
events” that “we can now witness every past event.”559 Due to the constraints of the 
time and place in which an historian might find themselves, there will always be 
historical events beyond our reach. The information in question has passed beyond 
retrieval. Thus history must always find itself at some practical disadvantage due to 
observation poverty. “For some past events,” Danto writes, “we are forever outside 
the required range for witnessing them, and this is now the case with the Battle of  
Hastings.  The question then,  is  how we can know unexperienceable  past  events, 
events which are really 'dead and gone'.”560 Danto's answer is (among other things) to 
adopt something of the language of theory we have just mentioned – the marshalling 
of evidence into theories about past events/objects as a way to “organize present 
experience.”561 For the evidence is what we experience/observe, not the event/object 
itself. This is what drives Danto's arguments regarding how the past should be talked 
about and conceptualised. But underlying even Danto's arguments – as sophisticated 
as they are in comparison to those of Bloch or Passmore – is a subtle bias toward 
“witnessing”  as  an  inherently superior method  of  gaining  knowledge.  Revisiting 
Danto's own example, it is possible to argue that all information regarding the Battle 
557 Ibid. (emphasis in original)
558 Kosso, Knowing the Past. p.42.
559 Danto, Narration and Knowledge. p.42. (emphasis in original)
560 Ibid., pp.42-43.
561 Ibid., p.79.
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of Hastings has not passed out of reach. For if it had, nobody would know anything of 
it at all. Clearly this is not the case. There is ample evidence for concluding that there  
was such a battle and that it had certain significant outcomes. But this information, 
Danto seems to be suggesting, is known by something other than (and secondary to) 
“witnessing.” This  further  implies that  there is  some meaningful  de facto  division 
between  “observable”  and  “unobservable”  which  –  even  though  without  strict 
philosophical force – might still act to meaningfully separate studies of the “present” 
from those of the “past.” Kosso wishes to argue that no such division is possible in 
any sense (de facto or otherwise)  and that the theoretical  manner in  which Danto 
suggests we talk about history is actually sound practice in all  scientific disciplines. 
To achieve this, Kosso asks a question that Danto did not – what exactly do we mean 
when we use the term “witness”? 
The  first  point  that  Kosso  makes  is  that  an  emphasis  on  “witnessing”  or 
“observation” is effectively an elevation of the primary human senses – particularly 
that  of  sight  –  above  any  other  method  of  receiving  information.  This  light 
chauvinism not only assumes that light is a  neutral transmitter of information, but 
also that light is the only information transmitting medium which might legitimately 
facilitate the exalted operation of 'observation.'562 While this might seem intuitively 
satisfying,  Kosso argues,  it  is  not  philosophically  consistent.  To illustrate  this,  he 
offers the example of observing a basketball game on television:
...  consider the two different situations of watching the game live as it is being 
played, or recording the whole thing on a VCR and watching it later... In either 
case, we see the players, watch the good shots, and we see for ourselves who wins. 
The extra delay imposed by taping the game, the delay caused by allowing the 
information to sit idle for a while as patterns of tiny magnets on the tape, is not a  
significant epistemic factor in the observation of the televised event and does not 
undermine  the  contribution  the  observation  makes  to  our  knowledge  of  the 
game.563
The key difference here is not only the medium (or, more accurately, mediums) of 
information transmission, but also Danto's assertion that “all we witness are past 
events.” For we cannot so easily say that the live game was “present” and the taped 
game “past.” Kosso continues:
In both cases the image on the screen is of past events. It takes time for the light to 
562 This is also true for the other primary senses of course, albeit less pronounced. Kosso concentrates  
on the example of sight/light, but the argument is effectively the same for the other senses.
563 Kosso, Knowing the Past. p.42.
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get from the ball to the camera, more time for the electronic signal to get from the 
camera to the transmitter, and so on to the electrons in the TV picture tube. So  
even the live picture lags behind the actual events,  and the difference between 
watching a live broadcast and a taped version, in terms of the delay between event 
and observation, is a difference only of degree.564
There are two key points to take away from this example. The first is that, in both of 
these hypothetical situations, information is being carried from event to observer in 
multiple mediums, not all of which are meaningful (or even directly detectable) to 
human perceptual machinery. “Tiny pulses of electricity carry the information from 
the camera,” Kosso points out, “and during that link in the interaction between object 
and viewer the image becomes momentarily lost from view.” In the recorded game, 
moreover, the information “follows the additional encoded step of being cast as a 
pattern of micro-magnets, invisible and uninformative to the human viewer.” It can 
reasonably be concluded, therefore, that observation need not only involve mediums 
to which human perceptual  machinery is  directly sensitive in order to be reliable 
and/or  informative.  For  it  could  hardly  be  seriously  argued  that  the  kinds  of 
epistemic  difficulties  outlined  here  fatally  undermine  the  possibility  of  gaining 
reliable knowledge of televised sporting events.565
The second point to be gleaned from this example is the realisation that, as Kosso 
states, “while there is an upper limit on the speed of transmission of information, 
namely the speed of light, there is no lower limit.” This is because information can, as 
the previous point suggests, move by other means. If light were the only medium for 
observation, then true observation of the past could only be of objects which were 
also extremely distant. The light from the Battle of Hastings, for instance, has long 
since  left  Earth  and cannot  be  intercepted  by  any currently  known method.  The 
example  of  a  recorded  basketball  game,  however,  provides  an  example  of 
information moving  much more slowly. Such a recording might, depending on the 
medium in which it is stored, store information effectively for several decades. Yet 
when it is eventually played back, we might  still reasonably say that the relevant 
information has moved from the event to an observer – albeit much more slowly than 
for an observer watching the 'live' transmission. Bringing these two points together, 
we can therefore conclude that the term “observation,” if it is to mean anything at all, 
must be defined in such a way as to allow for both the coding of information in 
potentially  limitless  ways,  and  the  possibility  of  a  significant  time  differential  
564 Ibid., pp.42-43. 
565 Ibid., p.43. 
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between event and observation. As Kosso phrases it, a better definition of the term 
will  require  attention  “to  the  details  of  interaction  between  the  object  and  the 
observer, and resisting the persuasion of the rough language of simply observing.” 
This  can  be  accomplished,  Kosso  argues,  by  “a  careful  tracking  of  the  fow  of 
information through interactions.”566
Kosso maintains that this peculiarly misleading aspect of language might be cleared 
up  by  extending  the  concept  of  “observation”  to  take  into  account  the  various 
processes/mediums which bring information to those perceptual systems we feel we 
can  trust.  Kosso  refers  to  these  additions  to  the  language  of  observation  as 
“accounting claims.” If we adopt this language, Kosso maintains, we are no longer 
required to decide what qualifies as observable and what does not. This is replaced 
with the more nuanced requirement to provide an account of the method(s) by which 
a signal from an event/object reaches an observer. This leaves us not with a rigid 
divide between observable and non-observable entities, but a continuum upon which 
might be plotted the 'degrees of directness' of signal propagation. According to this 
view, one should not ask “is x observable?” or “is that really an observation of x?” but 
instead “about the information that is claimed in each case and how that information 
is transmitted from the object to the observer. The helpful answer to the question of  
observability  is  not  the  short  yes  or  no but  a  longer account  of  the  exchange of  
information and an assessment of the reliability of each exchange.” In such a case, 
Kosso argues, one might think of scientific observation as “observation, all things 
considered.”567 
This view clearly gives the lie to the misleading observable/unobservable dichotomy. 
For  the  concept  of  observation  via  accounting  claims  is  as  equally  amenable  to 
observation  via  traditional  light-chauvinistic  means  as  it  is  to  more  indirect 
observations. Consider the comparatively unproblematic example of observing light 
through a plate glass window. In order to justify the claim that the sheet of glass is  
not distorting the image in such a way as to destroy or disfigure the information we 
are seeking, Kosso argues, we must have some knowledge of relevant principles of 
optics to use as  accounting claims. It is  equally necessary, however, to have available 
the  accounting  claims  by  which  electron  microscopes  form  images  of  DNA 
molecules, despite the fact these will involve processes other than light propagation. 
566 Ibid., pp.43-44. 
567 Ibid., pp.44-45. (emphasis in original)
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Similarly, much of what is currently known about the interior of the Earth is known 
by  seismic  refection,  which  uses  non-light  wave  propagation  to  reveal  deep 
structures within the Earth's crust. In the case of the electron microscope, we might 
still be comfortable with the “rough language of simply observing.” It seems much 
more problematic, however, to claim that we are “simply observing” inside the crust 
of the Earth. And such conceptual difficulties can only increase as our observations 
become  more  and  more  indirect.  This  indirectness  does  not automatically  make 
observations  less  accurate,  however,  as  the relative accuracy of  an observation is 
determined by the quality of the accounting claims rather than their quantity. A long 
and complex chain of information interactions might exist between the observer and 
the event/object of interest. But if each of those interactions is highly reliable and 
conceptually  well  understood,  then  the  resulting  observation  is  not  in  any sense 
inferior  to,  for  instance,  the  “observation”  of  light  passing  through a  plate  glass 
window.568
Questions of “the past” come into this system when one considers the speed of this 
information propagation.  For,  as  we have already seen Kosso argue,  “there is  no 
lower limit” on this speed.569 It  is possible to argue, therefore, that it  is these  slow 
transmissions which are disproportionately exploited in the historical sciences. That 
is, instead of indirectness being enforced by scale (as in the “observation” of electrons 
too small to see), it is enforced by the passage of time. But it does not follow from this 
that observation in historical sciences is a fundamentally  different problem. It  only 
seems to be so because of the confusion of terms discussed earlier. If one assumes that  
scientists really do observe electrons and DNA, then history must appear objectively 
inferior for being unable to observe Julius Caesar or Ramses. But this, as Kosso has 
reminded us, is an unfair comparison. Physicists never “see” electrons directly, just as  
an historian never “sees” Ramses.  Both disciplines have to overcome considerable 
indirectness in making their observations. Historical observation, therefore, must also 
involve  a  “continuum  of  observability.”570 Just  as  there  is  no  non-arbitrary  line 
between observable and unobservable in, for instance, physics, neither is there such a 
line in the historical sciences. Or, for that matter, human history. The various degrees 
568 This is not to say, of course, that every scientist who uses a microscope (or looks through a plate  
glass window!) need have comprehensive knowledge of optics or atomic physics. Rather, these are 
claims  that  may  remain  implicit,  but  must  be  available in  the  event  of  some challenge  to  the 
accuracy of the observation and/or any conclusions drawn from it. See: Kosso,  Knowing the Past. 
pp.45-46. 
569 Kosso, Knowing the Past. p.43. 
570 Ibid., p.49. 
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of indirectness (and thus reliability) of documentary sources, for instance, has been a 
concern  for  historians  since  Thucydides.  But  these  assessments,  by  assuming 
observation to be an activity that takes place  exclusively in the present,  have often 
assumed the difference between observation and hearsay to be a difference of  kind 
rather than degree. Robert Atkinson, for instance, in paraphrasing David Hume, once 
wrote  that  “statements  about  the  past  are  claimed  necessarily  to  diminish  in 
credibility as time goes on. First observation, then memory, then first-, second-, third-
hand testimony, and so on to the point of complete incredibility.”571 But such a model, 
Kosso argues, would have greater credibility if it focused not on the number of stages, 
but on their quality:
Thus  one's  own  memory  may  be  no  more  credible  than  the  testimony  of  an 
eyewitness,  especially  a  witness  with  independent  credentials  as  a  competent, 
reliable,  and  even  expert  observer.  This  testimony  is  little  different  from  a 
newspaper  account  by a reporter  on the  scene,  which is  in  turn similar  to  an 
historical  account...  where  the  witnessing  and  faithful  recording  of  events  are 
independently  accountable.  The  point  is  that  objects  of  historical  interest,  like 
objects of scientific interest, fill out a tight spectrum in terms of indirectness in the 
process  of  observation.  Rather  than  drawing  a  dubious  dichotomy  in  this 
spectrum it is epistemologically more enlightening to analyze the various stages in 
the indirectness and their potential threat to the conveyance of information.572
When considered in this manner, Kosso argues, it is “surely misleading to claim that 
historical studies are constrained to study only what cannot be observed.”573 And it is 
even more misleading to make the somewhat softer argument that “the line between 
what  is  observable  and  what  is  not  is  much  less  clear  in  history  than  in  other 
disciplines,”  as  this  makes  the  mistake  of  assuming  that  observation  is  any  less 
problematic in  other  sciences.574 Thus  Kosso  concludes,  “given  the  unclarity  in  the 
sciences...  it  is  best to view the issue of  observability as being equally unclear in  
history.”575 If this is so, then one should be able to talk as easily of accounting claims 
and information interaction in the historical sciences as one can in the nomothetic.  
And this is precisely what Kosso argues. The traditional questions asked of written 
source material – for instance, “who wrote this and why?” – become, he writes, a 
starting point for the “process of accounting which plays an epistemic role exactly 
like the process of accounting for the formation of empirical evidence (information 
571 Robert F. Atkinson,  Knowledge and Explanation in History.  Cornell University Press:  Ithaca, New 
York, 1978. p.49.
572 Kosso, Knowing the Past. p.49. 
573 Ibid., p.50.
574 Murray Murphey, Our Knowledge of the Historical Past. Bobbs Merrill: Indianapolis, 1973. p.151.
575 Kosso, Knowing the Past. p.50.
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through interaction) in natural science.”576 He continues:
The  credibility  of  a  textual  report  is  infuenced  by  an  account  of  the  ancient 
author's  access  to  the  event  (What  did  Herodotus  see  for  himself,  and  which 
events did he relay from other witnesses?),  the preparation of  the text,  and its 
treatment through time (Was it edited? Translated? Lost and retold?). The point is 
that  the  evidence  presented  in  historical  documentation...  needs  this  kind  of 
accounting. The meaning of passages is often revealed only in context with other 
claims about the past such as about related events or the author's motives. And the 
authenticity of a report, its justification, is based on claims about the witnessing of 
events, the honesty of the author, and the preservation of the text. These are the 
accounting claims in the historical case. They are themselves claims about the past, 
just as the accounting claims in a natural science are usually of entities and events 
too small to be seen.577
In this sense, the actual text of Herodotus is the unfocused stage between event and 
observer,  and is  not  –  conceptually  speaking –  any different  from the temporary 
encoding  of  a  television  transmission  as  a  pattern  on  some storage  medium.  As 
Kosso argues, the “information in the text is evidence of the past in the sense that an 
information-bearing  signal  has  been  conveyed  through  a  series  of  interactions, 
beginning with the events themselves,  through Herodotus and his informers,  and 
eventually  to  us.”  The signal  is  not  based on the transmission of  light,  and it  is  
extremely  slow,  but  if  “neither  of  these  features  disqualifies  observational 
information in the case of  science,” Kosso argues,  “nor should it  in the historical 
case.”578 Therefore, Kosso concludes:
... the data in history, the tokens of written reports of the past, play an evidential  
role that  is  similar to  the data in science,  the images in microscopes,  tracks in 
particle detectors, and the like. Both bear information of less accessible objects of 
interest and both are amenable to an analysis of the credibility and accuracy of that 
information in terms of an independent account of the interactions between the 
object  and  the  final  medium  of  information...  As  long  as  we  understand  the 
formation process,  in science or in history,  we can be quite  liberal  in allowing 
many kinds of signals to carry the information.579
If “accounting claims” really are the correct way to talk of observation in any science, 
historical or otherwise, then one of the logical  consequences of this is to enforce an 
'apples to apples' comparison between entities across the historical and nomothetic 
sciences.  The mismatch of  language that Kosso identified at  the beginning of  his 
paper therefore introduces an imbalance of observational power that is only apparent. 
This gives a false picture of what historical scientists can know and how they can 
576 Ibid.
577 Ibid., p.51.
578 Ibid., p.51-52.
579 Ibid., p.52.
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know it. Scientists do not directly or “simply” observe electrons themselves. Instead 
they infer their existence and properties from the traces available to them – the debris 
of  a  particle  accelerator,  for  example.  Such  traces  are  turned  into  “observations” 
through the use of accounting claims which document the interchange of information 
at each step of the process. And this, Kosso has argued, is equally true of any example 
of  scientific  observation.  There  is  always some degree  of  indirectness.  Why then, 
should it matter if that indirectness is enforced by scale (as in particle physics) or 
time (as in history), provided accounting claims are available which will enable us to 
span  the  resulting  divide?  In  this  sense,  “electrons”  or  “DNA”  are  theoretical  
constructs that organise present experience, just as “Julius Caesar” or “The Korean 
War” do.  Conceptualising observation in this  way therefore significantly saps the 
force of the “past is gone” class of arguments. 
The Nature of Kosso's Accounting Claims
This  model  of  assessing  the  indirectness  of  observation  –  as  opposed  to 
dichotomising the world into observable versus  unobservable – has the desirable 
consequence of unifying much of the language used to talk about both science and 
history. The reliance on “accounting claims” in this model, however, will require us 
to re-examine the issue of covering laws. For it would be tempting for a covering 
lawyer to argue that these “accounting claims” merely represent the means by which 
historical claims might be reduced to their implicit general laws. There are, however, 
several problems with this argument. First, the requirement for accounting claims in 
observation  applies  to  all scientific  disciplines,  whether  their  primary  mode  of 
working is narrative or nomothetic. And second, any laws which might be invoked 
as accounting claims in a narrative explanation are not necessarily contributing to the 
explanatory content  of that explanation. In Kosso's simple example of light passing 
through plate glass, for instance, the theories and laws of optics are not in any sense 
determining the information that light might be carrying. They are merely assessing 
the reliability of its passage. If we are looking through a plate glass window in order 
to identify whether an approaching person is someone we know, in other words, the 
relevant laws of optics have no bearing on the information at issue. Said laws are 
merely available, should they be required, to justify the belief that the glass does not 
distort or destroy the particular information we are looking for. Thus Kosso's model,  
in  addition  to  its  many other  benefits,  also  provides  us  with  a  way to  properly 
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contextualise the role of laws in historical explanation,  without being vulnerable to 
the charge of being a nomothetic system by stealth. 
One potential stumbling block for applying Kosso's work to human history, however, 
would be any requirement for accounting claims to consist only of general laws and 
theories. This would prove an extremely difficult requirement for human history to 
meet. There is no suitably  general theory of human psychology, for example, which 
might be used as an accounting claim for the inference of an historical actor's state of 
mind from their actions. From this one might argue that the claims of human history 
must therefore depend on  non-general accounting claims, and that it  is  this  which 
separates history from the sciences. Kosso clearly argues, however, that accounting 
claims are not required to be general laws or theories. All that is required of them is 
that  they  credibly  (and  independently)  detail  the  transfer  of  some  informative 
content to the observer:
In neither the scientific nor the historical case is the level of generality of claims an 
issue. In both cases, some accounting claims are quite general, for example about 
the transmission of light or about the fidelity of unintended textual information, 
and some claims are quite specific, as about the refection of seismic waves from 
the western Pacific subduction zone or about the exploits of Herodotus. Nothing 
of epistemic significance depends on the level of generality.580
And so we are left with little with which we might separate history from the sciences 
– at least when it comes to observation and the use of evidence. 
In  closing then,  let  us  summarise  what  Kosso's  work is  able  to  provide to those 
seeking  a  unified  model  of  of  narrative  explanation.  In  Kosso  we  find  a  sound 
theoretical argument which not only standardises the language of observation across 
all sciences, but also makes clear the central role that the language of theory plays in 
observation.  This  frees  us  from  some  of  the  more  ridiculous  consequences  of 
observation chauvinism. Specifically, we are no longer tempted to talk of studies of 
the  past  as  fundamentally  handicapped  in  comparison  with  the  experimental 
sciences. For if the historian does not directly observe the storming of the Bastille in 
1789, then neither does the physicist  directly observe electrons. Kosso's language of 
indirectness and accounting claims is the correct way to talk in both cases. Moreover, 
the language of theory this new vision of observation enforces also allows us to more 
easily break our epistemic tasks into pieces, neatly separating theoretical claims from 
580 Kosso, 'Observation of the Past,' p.33.
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the observations on which they are based. Also of great value in Kosso's work is the 
argument that accounting claims are not required to be highly general in nature. This, 
when coupled with Danto's notion of historical statements as purely  particularistic 
theories, paints a picture of explanation in which slavish attempts at reduction to 
laws or general theories are not only unnecessary, but also prone to distort or destroy 
the very information desired. 
What Kosso does  not do, however, is concern himself with the  form of explanation. 
His conclusion that the explanatory power of accounting claims is not directly related 
to their generality clearly suggests he does not consider scientific explanation to be 
only a matter  of  general laws.  But as  to the nature of  any additional explanatory 
form(s) which might underwrite explanation in those cases in which laws are not 
applicable, he does not speculate. Our purpose here, however, is to show that the 
nature of that non-nomothetic mode is  narrative.  The previous chapter has shown 
that narrative is at least an intuitively plausible solution for historical problems, but 
has offered no formal definition of narration. This oversight must now be corrected. 
And so it is to the second of the epistemic issues with which this chapter has tasked 
itself that we must now turn. We must provide a philosophically (rather than merely 
intuitively)  convincing  account  of  what  narratives  are,  their  permissible  subject 
matter, and their relationship to nomothetic philosophy of science. To do this, we will 
draw upon the pioneering work of the philosopher of science David Hull.
David Hull and Nomothetic Compatibilism
Despite Kosso's sweeping revision of how history should be thought of and talked 
about in relation to the sciences, he left largely untouched those core questions of 
nomothetic explanation and historical separatism which have been at the core of the 
philosophy of history for much of the twentieth century. If historical explanations do 
not adhere to a nomothetic model, then are they really explanations? And if they are, 
then  what  logical  framework  describes  them?  As  Part  One  has  shown,  differing 
answers  to  these  fundamental  questions  lay  at  the  very  heart  of  the  disconnect  
between the covering lawyers (who claimed that all explanation must be nomothetic 
in order to be worthy of the name), and the idealists (who claimed that the form of 
explanation in history differed so fundamentally from that found in the sciences as to 
be  utterly  incompatible  with  it).  In  both  cases,  the  nomothetic  assumption  was 
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paramount.  The  work  of  David  Hull  would  be  instrumental  in  resolving  this 
apparent tension by dissolving the nomothetic assumption which had sustained it for 
so  long.  For  Hull  was  of  the  view  that  there  could  not  be  two  fundamentally 
incompatible notions  of  explanation.  But  he  was  also  far  from  convinced  that 
nomothetic  explanations  were  the  only form of explanation.  “Perhaps,”  he wrote, 
“philosophers have been unable to discover the essence of beauty, goodness, horses,  
lemons, and games, but they have discovered the essence of scientific explanation, 
and it is subsumption under a scientific law.”581 This assertion, Hull argued, seemed 
doctrinaire and rather too certain for philosophy – a discipline whose parameters and 
conclusions  are  notoriously  in  fux.  Insisting  that  “explanation”  as  a  precise 
philosophical term should refer only to a single (nomothetic) process seemed to Hull 
“as  implausible  as  supposing  that  'dishonesty'  refers  to  a  single  type  of  human 
activity.” He continues: “just as there are more ways than one to be dishonest, there 
may well be more than one way to explain something scientifically.”582 
Hull's project then, was to identify those elements within science which could not be 
grasped  nomothetically  and  attempt  to  formulate  a  way  in  which  they  could be 
grasped. To do this, he would argue that the notion of scientific explanation should 
be  extended from a  single  form of  explanation  to  a  binary form.  And this  other 
explanatory mode, Hull argued, was already implicit in the nomothetic model itself. That 
classical form, it will be recalled from earlier chapters, calls for the explanation of a 
phenomenon by showing it to be a consequence of a known law (or laws) of nature.  
To make such a demonstration, however, all of the various contingent and contextual 
factors which define the problem must also be specified. If one wishes to use known 
laws of motion to, for example, calculate the future position of a planet, one must 
know its position either at the present moment or at some known time in the past.  
This and all other information which is relevant to the deduction but additional to the 
laws  themselves are  what  is  meant  by  “initial  conditions”  or  “particular 
circumstances.”  This  creates  a  binary  system,  but  one  with  an  inherent  power 
imbalance between the two halves. For in such a classical nomothetic system it is the 
laws – and the laws alone – which do the explaining. In this view, as Hull phrases it, 
an “explanation entirely in terms of general laws could count as a genuine scientific 
explanation,  but  no concatenation of statements of particular circumstances  could 
581 David  L.  Hull,  'Central  Subjects  and Historical  Narratives,'  History and Theory.  Vol.  14,  No.  3 
(October 1975). p.273.
582 Ibid.
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possibly  explain  anything.”  But  this  could  also  be  seen  as  something  of  a 
philosophical  bait  and  switch  –  a  rhetorical  sweeping  of  all  the  non-nomothetic 
elements  of  a  calculation  into  a  broad  supporting  role  which  was  then  largely 
ignored. For while “logical empiricists,” Hull argued, “have spent considerable effort 
in  attempting  to  characterize  general  laws...  They  have  spent  much  less  time 
examining the hodgepodge of statements that are lumped together under the rubric 
“particular circumstances.”” But these statements, as Hull pointed out, are anything 
but the trivial matters this marginalisation implies, for they represent “everything in 
addition to general laws that is needed to carry out the derivation.” At the very least, 
Hull argued, their precise role in scientific work was worthy of some philosophical 
attention. This was the basis of Hull's so-called “Particular-Circumstance” model of 
scientific explanation.583
This understanding of the classical model not only neatly frames Hull's approach to 
the problem of particularistic (and therefore narrative) explanation, it also addresses 
the  issue  of  nomothetic  compatibilism.  Previous  attempts  at  realising  nomothetic 
compatibilism in human history have centred around the reworking of laws in order 
to allow for their application to particularistic cases. As we have seen in Part One, 
however,  such  attempts  were  of  limited  effectiveness.  Hull,  on  the  other  hand, 
wished to investigate whether narrative explanations could be related not to the law 
half  of  the  nomothetic  binary,  but  to  the  other half  –  that  of  initial 
conditions/particular  circumstances.  Not  only  does  this  seem  simply  more 
appropriate as an approach (given the oft-cited singular nature of historical events) it 
also possesses many theoretical advantages. First, it does not require any denial of 
the efficacy of laws in their areas of competence. This is a distinct improvement over, 
for  instance,  Dray's  approach.  And  second,  it  does  not  require  any  separation 
between history and the natural sciences.  Hull presents  instead a complementary 
vision  in  which  both the  narrative  (particular)  and  the  nomothetic  (general) 
approaches  are  required  in  order  to  yield  truly  complete  explanations.  The  only 
separation to be found between these two approaches is in the kinds of questions one 
chooses to ask of the world, as these will determine which mode the asker ought 
primarily to be concerned with. Most importantly for the purposes of this thesis,  
however,  Hull's “particular-circumstance” approach to narrative explanation is  far 
583 David  L.  Hull,  'The  Particular-Circumstance  Model  of  Scientific  Explanation,'  in  Matthew  H. 
Nitecki & Doris V. Nitecki (eds), History and Evolution. State University of New York Press: Albany, 
1992. p.69.
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less hostile to disciplines – human history included – which have traditionally found 
themselves placed outside of the scientific circle due to their lack of laws. Indeed, 
Hull consciously builds up his model  from issues which “arose in the context of  
human  history,”  but  which  also  “apply  equally  to  all  historical  disciplines,  for 
example, cosmology,  geology, and paleontology as well as human history.”584 
Hull's  model  not  only  succeeds  in  linking  narrative  to  what  is  undeniably  an 
extremely successful  model of explanation,  it  can also be seen as providing some 
theoretical substance to the argument (encountered in the previous chapter) that the 
purpose of laws for the narrativist is to define the space of the possible in which 
narratives  can  exist.  “General  laws,”  Hull  writes,  “are  relevant  to  historical 
explanations but not as premises from which the events to be explained are derived. 
Instead,  they  provide  the  theoretical  context in  which  historical  entities  are 
individuated.”585 As  the basis  for  a general  model  of narrative,  then,  Hull's  work 
seems very promising indeed. But there remains a good deal of definitional work to 
be done. A truly advanced theory of narrative, for instance, will have to not only 
demystify just what is meant by terms like “individuating” and “historical entities,” 
but  also  answer  additional  questions  such  as:  what  is  narration?  What  can  be 
narrated and what cannot? Is there a single narrative form and logic broad enough to 
cover events (“the K/T extinction,” or “World War II”), objects (“Mount Taranaki,” or 
“the Rosetta Stone”), as well as people (“Kate Sheppard,” or “the Buddha”)? It is to 
Hull's attempts to fesh out his model by answering such questions that we must 
now turn. In order to retain optimal clarity, however, it will be helpful to approach 
Hull's work in a somewhat backwards fashion. That is, we must examine his account 
of what it  is  that  is  narrated  before we can provide  an adequate account of  what 
narration is. This is because Hull's concept of “central subjects” is not only critical to 
an understanding of his work as a whole, but also definitionally contains and justifies 
an assertion absolutely fundamental to the concept of narrative – the uniqueness and 
singularity of their subjects.
Hull's Concept of the Central Subject
Hull first outlined his concept of a “central subject” in a 1975 paper entitled 'Central  
Subjects and Historical Narratives.' Due to the timing of its publication, this paper 
584 Ibid., p.70.
585 Ibid. (emphasis added)
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saw Hull  wading  into  a  debate  still  dominated  by  a  strong  disconnect  between 
covering lawyers and narrativists. By 1975, narrative had the upper hand, but was 
itself in the process of being transformed by those literary-narrativists who would 
come to dominate contemporary philosophy of history. Hayden White's Metahistory,  
for instance, was published in 1973. Similarly, Louis Mink's infuential paper 'History 
and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension' was published in 1970, and had exercised 
considerable infuence on White. Hull offered an alternative approach to narrativism 
based on a philosophy of science in which the nomothetic  assumption was more 
realistically understood. His arguments, however, were not fated to wield anything 
like the infuence of Mink or White. The central thesis of Hull's paper was that the 
doctrinaire assertion that explanation had only one (nomothetic)  form had forced 
philosophers  of  history to  “argue either  that  historical  narratives  do not  concern 
unique sequences of events or else that they are not explanatory.” Hull attempted to 
counter this view by arguing that this dichotomy was merely apparent and could be 
dissolved through a more careful definition of what a narrative was. “If historical  
narratives,” Hull argued, “are viewed as descriptions of historical entities as they 
persist  through time,  then the  currently  accepted analysis  of  science need not  be 
modified in  order  to  account  for  the  unity  evident  in  historical  narratives.”  This 
desire to work within the existing structures of science would lay the groundwork for 
his later work on narrative as the philosophy of “initial conditions.” Hull therefore 
accepted at the outset precisely that assumption philosophers of history had almost 
unanimously  rejected  –  that  narrative  was  a  valid  mode  of  scientific enquiry  in 
historical  disciplines.  Hull's  primary  task  was  to  form a  coherent  philosophy  of 
science around this. He knew from the very beginning, however, that a necessary 
consequence  of  his  work  would  be  the  destruction  of  any  formal  separation  of 
history and science. For, in Hull's view, while “each historical entity in and of itself is 
unique...  entities  of  this  kind are not  peculiar  to  history.”  Thus Hull  proceeds as 
Kosso  did  –  emphasising  the  continuity  of  history  and  science  and  drawing his 
examples from both.586
A “central subject,” Hull argues, is that which a narrative is about.587 Central subjects 
586 Hull, 'Central Subjects and Historical Narratives,' p.254.
587 This idea is not unique to Hull. Something like it can be found in the work of Morton White and 
Maurice Mandelbaum. (See: Maurice Mandelbaum, 'Objectivism in History,' in Sidney Hook (ed), 
Philosophy and History: A Symposium.  New York University Press: New York, 1963. pp.43-56., and 
Morton White, 'The Logic of Historical Narration,' in Sidney Hook (ed), Philosophy and History: A 
Symposium. New York University Press: New York, 1963. pp.3-31.) Hull, however, was the first to 
see that the idea required no separation between history and the sciences.
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are the defining characteristic of narrative, for not only do they provide a basis for the 
uniqueness of historical entities, they also act as a way to control issues of selection 
and significance. The materials of the past from which narrative descriptions might 
be constructed are, theoretically speaking, finite.  This suggests that the number of 
possible narratives which might be used to describe those materials must also be 
finite.  But,  as  Danto  has  argued,  there  is  always  a  possibility  that  a  future 
event/object will recontextualise a past event/object, thus generating new potential 
narratives. If we allow this, then the number of potential combinations into which the 
traces of the past can be narratively described becomes effectively limitless. Central 
subjects, Hull argued, control this fux by acting as organising structures, forming the 
“main strand around which the historical narrative is woven,” as well as helping to 
localise selection bias and determine the criteria of relevance for additional evidence. 
As to what constitutes an acceptable central subject, Hull has only one criterion. The 
most  important  definitional  aspect  of  central  subjects  for  Hull,  is  that  they  are 
individuals in the strong philosophical  sense of that  term. An “individual”  in this 
sense, Hull argues, “is a particular, a thing which is denoted by its name and nothing 
else.”588 In  other  words,  to  be  able  to  be  narrated,  a  central  subject  must  be  a 
phenomenon for which a description exists under which that phenomenon is the only 
qualifying example.
Essentially  Hull  is  offering  this  idea  of  a  “central  subject”  as  a  way  to  identify 
events/objects which must be narrated from those that cannot. Narration is  only  an 
appropriate  explanatory  option,  Hull  is  arguing,  for  those  descriptions  which 
produce  a  singular  event/object.  And  the  description  used  will  depend  on  the 
questions  asked and  the  information sought.  Narrative  is  therefore  a  function  of 
historical questioning. If we want to know, for instance, why nations go to war, then 
the  appropriate  descriptive  entities  for  answering  such  a  question  are  nations 
themselves.  The relevant  question/description singles out no nation in particular, 
however.  The  term  “nation,”  as  we  define  it,  has  multiple  possible  referents. 
Answering a question like this, of course, will likely proceed by examining narrative 
accounts of the reasons  particular nations have gone to war. But in this case those 
narratives  would ultimately  be used as the raw material  from which to generate 
some general explanation of the same form – if not the same specificity or precision – as 
a natural law. We might want, for instance, to create a generalised list of the broad 
588 Hull, 'Central Subjects and Historical Narratives,' p.255.
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types  of  rationales  for  waging  war,  supported  with  historical  examples.  Such  a 
project may seem a good deal removed from the ideal of general laws, but it is not so 
far removed as to be removed from the nomothetic mode of explanation altogether. 
The impulse to use abstraction in order to discern commonalities across multiple 
cases remains. The narratives themselves, however, are  only possible for  individual 
nations. By looking for this quality of uniqueness under a description, therefore, we 
are  able  to  tell  at  the outset  which  descriptions/central  subjects  are  amenable to 
narrative  explanation  and  which  are  not.  This  correlation  between  the  lack  of  a 
philosophical  “individual”  and  the  generalising  impulse  of  the  corresponding 
explanatory  project,  Hull  has  argued,  is  a  highly  reliable  one.  The  specificity  of  
description which gives rise to a central subject can therefore be taken to be a kind of 
signature of the necessity of narrative explanation. It can thus be made part of the 
definition of narrative explanation without philosophical difficulty.
Central Subjects as Necessarily Historical Entities
This definition of central subjects, while clever, leaves one key point unclear. It does 
not  specify  why the  mode  in  which  singular  central  subjects  must  be  explained 
should  be  narrative.  But  this,  Hull  argued,  was  hardly  in  need  of  explanation. 
Narratives, following Danto, are inherently temporal. For Hull, this also made them 
inherently  historical.  Any event/object captured under a description in which it is a 
philosophical individual (and thus a central subject) must therefore also be what Hull 
called an “historical entity.” If a philosophical individual is to be explained as such an 
individual,  in other words, it  must be explained historically.  For  if  its  definitional 
individuality precludes contrast or comparison, it can  only be contextualised. How 
else could it be dealt with? An historical entity, Hull argued, must be a “coherent,  
unitary  entity  that  either  persists  unchanged  or  develops  continuously  through 
time.”  This  does  not  require  any  recourse  to  essentialism,  however,  as  “for  an 
historical entity to remain the same entity no degree of similarity between earlier and 
later stages in its development is required, so long as this development is spatio-
temporally continuous.” Indeed, to detail such development in an historical entity is  
precisely the explanatory function of narrative. To illustrate this, Hull used the thought 
experiment of Moses. “Few,” he remarked, “if any traits which characterized Moses 
when  he  was  discovered  by  the  Pharoah's  daughter  in  the  bullrushes  also 
characterized him when he led the Israelites out of Egypt or when he died in sight of 
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the  Promised  Land.”  Because  of  his  spatial  and  temporal  continuity,  however,  it 
remains possible to talk of Moses as both a theory and a central subject. “It is,” Hull  
argues, “the link-on-link continuity of Moses' body (and to some extent his mind) 
that  makes  him  a  single  individual  and  the  same  individual  through  time...” 
Conversely, Hull offered the example of the London landmark known as Big Ben. 
“Big Ben,” he argued, “has changed very little since it was first cast, but this lack of 
change is not the reason it remains the same individual. Like all historical entities, it  
remains the same individual because of spatio-temporal continuity.”589 One should 
not  mistake  change,  in  other  words,  for  a  fundamental  characteristic  of  narrative 
explanation. We might have comparatively little to say about Big Ben, and perhaps a 
narrative account of it  might choose to focus on, for example,  how it  attained its  
iconic  status.  Even in  such a  circumscribed case  as  that,  however,  there  is  still  a 
requirement for a central subject. And central subjects, when defined as individuals 
in the philosophical sense, require treatment as historical entities.
Of  course,  when  limited  to  human  beings  and  large  clocks,  this  idea  of  central 
subjects as historical entities seems relatively straightforward. As we have already 
seen, however, it begins to seem a good deal more problematic when applied to more 
abstract entities. Hull apparently realised this, almost immediately cautioning that 
the “notion of an historical entity becomes less intuitively clear when it is extended to 
include lineages, social movements, and the like.” In order to clarify this point, Hull 
used the biological concept of a “species” as an example of both central subject and 
historical entity. Individuals of any given species, Hull argued, are “paradigm cases of 
historical entities.” This much is made clear by the example of Moses. But what of the 
entire  species called  Homo sapiens? This presents a problem, Hull argued, in that an 
entire  species  has  traditionally  been  seen  as  a  general entity.  But  this  need  not 
necessarily be the case. For while we frequently wish to treat individual examples of 
Homo sapiens as members of a general class – for example, in the practice of medicine 
– there are also perspectives and descriptions under which Homo sapiens, as a whole, 
can be seen as an individual. And under those descriptions, Hull argued, Homo sapiens 
can be seen as both an historical entity and a viable central subject for narrative. This 
initially seems counter-intuitive, Hull argued, as traditionally “logicians have treated 
organisms and species of organisms as two very different sorts of things.” In modern 
logic, that difference has been expressed as “the class-membership relation.” That is,  
589 Ibid., p.256.
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organisms are individuals and “their names are proper names.” Species, on the other 
hand, are “classes and their names are common nouns to be defined in terms of their 
essential traits.” For example, the title “Cygnus olor” is a proper name awarded to any 
creature possessing the traits we associate with that species. Or, as Hull put it, any 
“large, white aquatic bird with a long neck and a hoarse, honking call.” This is a  
classic application of the kind of logic served up by the nomothetic philosophy of  
science in general  (and by logical  positivists  like Hempel in particular)  in that  it 
makes a sharp distinction between the particular and the general, defining the former  
exclusively in terms of the latter.590
Evolutionary  theory,  however,  has  frequently  forced  biologists  to  adopt  a  more 
historically  conscious  perspective.  This  is  because  the  “class-membership”  view 
breaks down almost entirely when applied to populations of individuals evolving 
over time. For the evolution of one species into another is a profoundly gradual affair 
–  the  accumulation  of  tiny  genetic  changes  over  time.  Any  one  generation,  if 
examined,  differs  very  little  from  its  immediate  progenitors.  Yet,  given  enough 
generations,  the  differences  may  become  significant  enough  to  erase  even  the 
suspicion of common ancestry. If a species is to be defined as  essentially a series of 
traits, however, then where is the line of exclusion to be drawn? When the organism 
ceases to exhibit just one of the essential traits – an Ur-swan that had not yet evolved 
its distinctive honk? Perhaps, but this would result in a huge number of supposedly 
distinct species that actually differed very little. Moreover, for continuous qualities 
like size or length of neck, the decision as to what constitutes “large” or a “long 
neck” could only be arbitrary. This approach thus replaces one definitional problem 
with several. Perhaps the line should be drawn when the organism no longer exhibits 
several of the required traits? In this view, Hull argues, “Moses was the individual 
who did enough of the most important things that Moses was supposed to have 
done.”  Or,  alternatively,  “swans  are  those  birds  which have  enough of  the  most 
important traits characteristic of swans.” But this raises questions as to the usefulness 
of traits as species identifiers at all.591
While defining a species as a suite of traits might work well enough when confined 
to the animal economy as observed over small intervals of time, it clearly does not  
exhaust the possible descriptions of what a species  is. The problem here is not that 
590 Ibid., p.257.
591 Ibid., pp.257-258.
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the right way of thinking about and enumerating traits has yet to be found, although 
this field has improved immeasurably since Hull published his paper. Instead it is a  
problem of essentialism – an insistence on defining species in purely  general  terms. 
Richard Dawkins has described this biological essentialism as the treating of “tapirs 
and rabbits, pangolins and dromedaries, as though they were triangles, rhombuses,  
parabolas or dodecahedrons.” The rabbits we encounter in the world, according to 
this view, “are wan shadows of the perfect 'idea' of rabbit...”592 And this, it would 
seem, is born out of an emphasis on generality. All that a rabbit is, in other words, is 
defined by those qualities it has in common with  other rabbits. By way of contrast, 
Dawkins offers the evolutionary view:
If there is a 'standard rabbit,' the accolade denotes no more than the centre of a 
bell-shaped  distribution  of  real,  scurrying,  leaping  variable  bunnies.  And  the 
distribution shifts with time. As generations go by, there may gradually come a 
point,  not  clearly  defined,  when  the  norm  of  what  we  call  rabbits  will  have 
departed so far as to deserve a different name.593
In fact, Dawkins points out, “after a hundred million years it may be hard to believe 
that the descendant animals ever had rabbits for ancestors.”594 Yet at no point were 
the traits of one generation all that different from those of the previous. Considered 
over  time then,  the  concept  of  static  traits  is  clearly  inadequate.  Equally  clearly, 
tinkering with such an idea is not enough. It must be revised – or at least augmented. 
The solution Hull proposed was to define what a species is historically. In this view, 
the traits a species possesses at any one moment in time are not assessed according to 
some Platonic criteria for membership, but seen as dependent on the ancestry of that 
species. These traits will seem to cluster, of course, but this is because of the ancestor-
descendant relationship. We have effectively replaced the merely assumed concept of 
the  static  and  essential  trait  with  a  genuine  understanding  of  the  accretion  of 
historical  transformations.  Species  are  thus  more  naturally  (and  more  accurately) 
defined by tracing their link-on-link – or rather ancestor-on-ancestor – development. 
Therefore,  Hull  concluded,  “both  organisms and species  are historical  entities.”595 
And this  analysis,  Hull  argued,  could easily be  applied to  any historical  entity – 
whether traditionally considered as history or science:
Similarly,  many  common-sense  classes  in  other  areas  might  profitably  be 
592 Richard Dawkins,  The Greatest Show on Earth: The Evidence for Evolution.  Bantam: London, 2009. 
p.22.
593 Ibid.
594 Ibid., p.23.
595 Hull, 'Central Subjects and Historical Narratives,' pp.258-259.
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conceptualized  as  historical  entities,  specifically  the  central  subjects  of  human 
history.  Protestantism  might  not  seem much  like  an  individual,  but  if  it  is  to 
perform  the  function  of  a  central  subject,  it  must  be  interpreted  as  such.  As 
Herbert Butterfield observes in his criticism of the Whig interpretation of history: 
'Sometimes it would seem that we regard Protestantism as a Thing; a fixed and 
definite object that came into existence in 1517...' Protestantism surely has no fixed 
and definite limits but it is a thing, an historical entity.596
In other words, we can very often treat what has traditionally been regarded as a 
general form  as  an  individual  –  and  thus  a  viable  central  subject  for  historical 
narration. And this, Hull argued, is possible for any philosophical individual. This is 
precisely  the  logic  which  lies  behind  the  rendering  of  what  appear to  be  highly 
general entities – such as “warfare” or “Russia” – into central subjects which might 
be narrated. After all, insisting that “warfare” or “Russia” has a constellation of fixed 
and immutable traits is precisely the kind of misplaced generalisation which, while it  
might be possible in a limited sense, is unlikely to achieve a deep understanding of 
either. We would, for the most part, be better served in our studies of these concepts 
to  instead  examine  their  unique  spatio-temporal  (i.e.,  historical)  development.  It 
must be remembered, however, that adopting such a temporal viewpoint does not 
necessarily provide a  universally better approach to explanation. In Hull's example, 
for  instance,  one can imagine situations  in  which a  static  view of  a  species  as  a 
constellation of traits would be not only desirable, but essential. Similarly, it is foolish 
to suggest that we would not want to know something of the common characteristics  
of “warfare” if they were at all discoverable.597 Hull's goal, in other words, was not to 
supplant, but to augment. For by trading the ability to generalise, we potentially gain a 
much deeper understanding of the individual. Hull, in a later paper, referred to this 
as  the  difference  between  “subsuming  a  particular  under  a  general  law,”  and 
“individuating the particulars being subsumed.”598 
By “individuating the particulars,” however, it is important to note that Hull was not  
talking about a process entirely independent of laws. Like Gould, he argued that “laws 
are relevant to historical explanations but not as premises from which the events to 
be explained are derived.” Instead, Hull argued, the laws and general theories of 
596 Ibid., p.259. (emphasis in original) The original citation can be found in Herbert Butterfield,  The 
Whig Interpretation of History. Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1973. p.43.
597 For one interesting example of an attempt to say something general about the human activity of  
warfare, see: Doyne Dawson, 'Evolutionary Theory and Group Selection: The Question of Warfare,' 
History and Theory. Vol. 38, No. 4, Theme Issue 38: The Return of Science: Evolutionary Ideas and 
History (December 1999). pp.79-100.
598 Hull, 'The Particular-Circumstance Model of Scientific Explanation,' p.77.
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science  “provide  the  theoretical  context  in  which  historical  entities  are 
individuated.”599 This is not an endorsement of ineliminable randomness fouling up 
a deterministic machine, however, but merely another way of approaching the same 
phenomena – whether they are governed by known laws or not. Treating a planet as  
a point mass, for instance, allows for their treatment according to the mathematics of 
motion. But Mars, for example, is much more than simply a point-mass, and there are 
many other ways in which we might describe and understand it – many of which 
will not require (or allow) the use of nomothetic laws. Most importantly, however,  
both points of view are explanatory. Whatever the advantages of the evolutionary 
view, the generalist view of species continues to do useful work in biology every day. 
This does not imply, however, that any given phenomenon will yield equally to both 
approaches. “Ideally,” Hull argued, “we would like to possess both general laws and 
theoretically significant historical entities, but sometimes we have to be content just 
with tracing historical entities through time.”600 Thus, we might reasonably conclude 
that, depending on the information being sought and the available evidence, most 
scientific  disciplines  will  favour  one  explanatory  approach  over  the  other.  This 
matches the observed situation in the scientific spectrum very closely.
Over the course of this chapter and the previous, we have argued for a vision of 
science in which we might treat  any truth claim, regardless of its generality,  as a 
theory. We have also argued that arguments of observation poverty offer no credible 
philosophical  obstacle  to  this.  From such a  liberal  beginning,  we might  then use 
Hull's  criterion  to  decide,  on  the  basis  of  the  individuality  of  the  appropriate 
description of  the truth claim in question,  whether it  is  a fit subject for narrative 
individuation or for nomothetic generalisation. This is the current state of our model.  
With respect to those subjects which are appropriate for the narrative model, we now 
face two remaining tasks. First,  we must construct the narrative. And second, we 
must attempt to confirm or disconfirm it. We have already offered some broad hints 
as to how both of these steps might be accomplished. With respect to the definition of 
narration, we have suggested that it consists in tracking the historic interactions of 
the multiple laws, events, objects, and other infuences which are relevant to a central 
subject. Similarly, we have also seen the beginnings of a solution to the problem of 
confirmation in Chapter Five's example of tetrapod evolution. We will have a good 
deal more to say regarding confirmation when we discuss the work of Carol Cleland 
599 Ibid., p.70.
600 Ibid., p.77.
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later  in  this  chapter.  For  now,  we  must  turn  our  attention  to  the  first  of  these  
outstanding  steps  –  providing  a  more  formally  acceptable  definition  of  what 
constitutes narration.
What is Narration?
Any formal  definition  of  narrative  which  might  hope to  satisfy  our  condition of 
nomothetic compatibilism would be wise to begin with the “particular-circumstance” 
model advanced by Hull. This model, it will be recalled, was loosely defined by Hull 
as an inversion of the traditional emphasis of the nomothetic-deductive model on 
laws  over  initial  conditions.  By  reversing  this  emphasis,  Hull  claimed,  we  can 
provide a principled way of “individuating the particulars.” More importantly, the 
mechanism by  which  this  reversed  model  must  necessarily  operate  constitutes  a 
good formal definition of the term “narrative.”601 Such a definition must satisfy our 
requirement for nomothetic compatibilism, given that it effectively is the nomothetic-
deductive model. To show how narrative fows from this inversion of the traditional 
direction of reasoning, let us consider just how the nomothetic method works in an 
abstract  sense.  A nomothetic-deductive  account,  in  the  classical  sense,  generates 
general theories and laws from the assessment of what is  common to a group of 
individuals,  and then seeks  confirmation by applying those  theories  and laws to 
individuals as yet unexamined. Narratives reverse this process. A narrative is not the 
abstraction of a single law or theory from all relevant individuals, but is instead the 
application  of  all  relevant  theories  and laws to  a  single  individual.  Moreover,  in 
keeping with the “particular-circumstance” nomenclature,  we might also note the 
explanatory  outcome is  similarly  inverted.  That  is,  we are  interested  in  how the 
central subject came to be what it – and it alone – is, rather than being interested only 
in the properties it shares with every other event/object in its class. The narrativist  
philosopher of science Benjamin Jeffares uses the example of a potted plant on a 
windowsill. Suppose this plant, Jeffares argues, were to sprout weeds. How would 
one go about explaining this? With reference to the work of the philosopher Kim 
Sterelny, Jeffares argues that there are two ways to approach this problem:
Sterelny has suggested there is a distinction between actual sequence explanations 
of history, where one tracks the minutiae of causes and effects, with robust process 
explanations, where one utilises higher levels of processes that one can compare 
601 Ibid., pp.70,75-76.
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across cases.602
This “actual  sequence” versus “robust process” vision of explanation corresponds 
well with Hull's vision of “particular-circumstance” explanation. More importantly, 
both accounts can be understood as being complementary to the nomothetic-deductive 
model. A “robust process” explanation for the presence of weeds in a potted plant, 
Jeffares argues, might be as simple as: “people tend to have their windows open at a 
time of the year when some species of plants disperse wind blown seeds.” This is, of 
course, far short of what we might call a law – hence the more modest term “robust 
process.” Despite the acknowledgement of uncertainty this term embodies, however, 
a “robust process” still exhibits the broad generalising intent which is the hallmark of 
nomothetically  inspired  explanation.  As  Jeffares  remarks,  “such  regularities  can 
explain not only the appearance of weeds in my potted plant, but also in yours.” 
Moreover, by linking the appearance of weeds to the opening of windows, the same 
cited regularity can also help explain why one person might have more weeds in their 
potted plants  than another –  perhaps they spend more time with their  windows 
open? This kind of explanation embodies the nomothetic approach, even if it does 
not take its ideal form. Sterelny's “actual sequence” approach, on the other hand, is 
useful in cases where such generalising process explanations cannot be applied, or 
for which we simply desire greater detail. An “actual sequence,” Jeffares argues, can 
be defined as a “unique explanation that cites the particular variables and unique 
contingencies of history.”603 Such actual sequences, Jeffares argues, are precisely what 
is meant by the term “narrative”:
An actual  sequence  account  of  how a  particular  weed got  into  my plant  pot, 
would force the describer to detail the events that allowed a windborne seed to get 
into the soil of the particular pot in question. On such and such a day, the house 
owner left the window open. It was windy that day, and a particular weed was 
dispersing seed, one of which drifted in through a window... Such an explanation 
might well be very difficult, although not impossible to confirm in detail, but it 
would account for the facts of this particular instance.604
This sequence, Jeffares argues, would represent a “narrative that accounted for a state 
of affairs: the presence of a weed in a particular pot plant.” In order to obtain this 
level  of  detail,  however,  note that  we must give up  any possibility  of  the  resulting  
explanation being generally applicable. And yet the regularities which also underwrite 
602 Benjamin  Jeffares,  Testing  Times:  Confirmation  in  the  Historical  Sciences.  PhD Thesis,  Australian 
National University, 2008. p.24.
603 Ibid., p.25.
604 Ibid.
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the general “robust process” account are all still at work. In fact, these basic laws and 
theories can even be pressed into service in order to help verify Jeffares' narrative. The 
basic  laws of  physics  are  at  work on the  airborne seeds,  for  instance,  as  are the 
biological  facts  of  seed dispersal.  Climate  must  also  play a  role,  as  the  airborne 
dispersal of seeds is a good deal more difficult in the rain. The list goes on. What is  
happening  here  is  that,  following  Hull,  we  are  inverting  the  classic  nomothetic-
deductive model, and in doing so, defining narrative. This definition is as follows: an 
ideal narrative details all of the interactions of all relevant laws and generalisations upon an  
individual central subject. This is our formal definition of the term, which satisfies both 
the requirement for nomothetic compatibility and the long-held conviction among 
historians and historical scientists that their proper task is the investigation of unique 
particulars.  It  also  possesses  the  additional  advantage  of  providing  a  principled 
account of the broad sense of narrative we saw Mark Day deride as “thin” in the 
Introduction. For the above definition is entirely agnostic regarding the exact nature 
of its possible central subjects. They might be water molecules, human beings, ideas, 
buildings, organisations, or nations. All that  Hull's model requires is  that they be 
philosophical individuals. It  would be difficult to conceive of a more fexible and  
inclusive definition of narrative than this. 
If this definition of narrative consists merely in the viewing of any given problem 
from a different direction, however, it might be argued that there is simply no need 
for narrative – even if it is a theoretically valid mode of understanding. This is, to 
some extent, a valid criticism. In Jeffares' example at least, the difference between the 
two modes is purely one of focus. In other words, both the “robust process” and the 
“actual  sequence”  are  roughly  equal  in  explanatory  power.  There  is  thus  no 
compelling reason to choose the narrative over the nomothetic. For if there really is 
nothing  exceptional  about  the  means  by  which  the  weeds  got  into  Jeffares' 
hypothetical potted plant, then why would we ever have need of anything other than 
a “robust process” account? After all, it provides a much more concise account of the 
particular event,  with the added bonus of potentially covering a large number of 
other events of a similar type. In cases like this, it would seem, narrative explanation 
is merely a long-winded way of explaining something which might be explained far  
more easily with a simple reference to some general principle. In this way, one might 
argue for narrative as a decidedly inferior mode of explanation. 
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This  is  not  always  the  case,  however.  There  are  two  possible  situations  which 
potentially  make  the  use  of  narrative  explanation  not  only  desirable,  but  even 
necessary if  we  wish  to  have  any explanatory  information  at  all regarding  an 
individual event/object. The first of these is introduced by the requirement to explain 
some  observed  complication  or  outright  exception  to  a  general  process.  As  an 
example of this, Jeffares suggests the case of a potted plant “in an air-conditioned 
office without opening windows.” It is difficult to imagine a general process by which 
stray seeds might find their way into such environments, although there are many 
different narrative “actual sequences” by which this could plausibly occur. Perhaps a 
windborne seed was carried into  the  building after  having alighted on  an office 
worker's clothing while they were on their way to work? Or perhaps a seed made the 
torturous (and unlikely)  trip  through the building's  air  conditioning ducts  to  the 
potted plant in question? In either case, no outright abrogation of any natural law is 
required.  In fact,  if  such an abrogation  were required in order to justify an actual 
sequence,  then  that  would  be  excellent  grounds  for  considering  that  sequence 
falsified. 
Despite  this,  however,  we  would  not  expect  seeds  to  survive  the  trip  through 
byzantine air conditioning structures often enough to be able to effectively generalise 
that process – especially given how radically such ducting varies from building to 
building.  We  could,  if  we  wished,  seek  confirmation  from  lower-level  laws  and 
theories – those concerning airfow, turbulence and the like – in order to show that 
such a trip was possible. We might even conduct experiments to this effect. Perhaps a 
large quantity of seeds could be dumped directly into the air-conditioning ducting of 
an office building, the large input being used to raise the likelihood of a successful 
passage  through  the  system.  This  would  (in  theory)  allow  an  estimate  of  the 
statistical likelihood of such a trip. But any overall generalisation regarding how seeds 
get into air-conditioned offices would have to be so vague as to be almost useless.  
More importantly, even if such a generalisation were possible and could be applied to 
the explanation of any particular contaminated plant, it would be quite transparently 
inferior  in  terms  of  explanatory  power  to  a  narrative  explanation  properly 
constructed  and  supported.  This  is  because  there  are  too  many  other  “actual 
sequences” that could  not be covered by such a generalisation. Perhaps our theory 
about the offending seed coming into the building on a workers clothing was correct 
after all. In that case, our hard-won and exception-filled generalisation regarding air-
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conditioning ducts would tell us nothing useful. In such cases, we should be more 
than willing to give up broad generalised processes in favour of a detailed – but 
particular – account. 
Smoothing  out  such  wrinkles  in  the  operation  of  nomothetically  inspired 
generalisations, however, is hardly a sound basis for assigning narrative a  co-equal 
status as a mode of explanation. To support  this claim, we must turn to the second 
situation in which the use of narrative is necessary in order to obtain meaningful 
explanatory information regarding an event/object – those situations in which our 
central  subject  can  only  be  understood  in  light  of  the  interactions  of  multiple 
processes. This is narrative finally considered for its own sake, rather than merely as 
an aid to the nomothetic model. Jeffares summarises the approach as follows:
The past is  complex,  and when explaining the past  we can rarely use a single 
robust process as an explanation. That's not to say that on occasion we don't cite a 
single robust process that has occurred in the past to explain something in the 
present...  But  in order to explain a  state  of  affairs,  the historical  sciences  must 
frequently construct an explanation that details a series of events. An explanation 
of a landscape cannot cite a single robust process. It is  the result of a series of  
processes occurring one after another, frequently of quite different types. The rise 
and fall of a past culture cannot cite a single process; there is an interaction of a  
number of processes that lead to its downfall.605
This is precisely the kind of problem Hull's definition of narrative can help us to solve. 
Not  only do Hull's  “central  subjects”  provide  a  means by which to  identify  and 
define the individual which is to be narrated, his “particular-circumstance” model of 
narrative provides the conceptual framework in which such a narrative proceeds. 
Hull's argument that a central subject must necessarily be an historical entity also 
begins to fall into place here. Consider Jeffares' example of a particular “landscape.” 
That  which  might  be  said  about  landscape  formation  in  general only  loosely 
constrains  the  possibilities  of  such  a  system.  There  are,  in  other  words,  a  huge 
number of possible “actual sequences,” as evidenced by the bewildering variety of 
landscapes observed on this planet. On the other hand, if we use narrative to try to 
determine what sequence did in fact take place in any particular case, we must give 
up any claim to generality. In order to obtain greater explanatory power, in other 
words, we are driven to consider a particular landscape. And any particular landscape 
must necessarily be understood as the result of a great number of interlocking and 
interacting processes and forces of varying degrees of infuence. If we wish to see the 
605 Ibid., pp.25-26.
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landscape we are examining as the  outcome of such infuences,  how might this be 
done?  One  might  offer  an  account  of  a  single  “moment”  or  time-slice  of  that 
landscape, and try to detail all of the forces that are/were being brought to bear on 
that landscape  at  that  moment.  But  by  trying  to  take  all  temporally  extended 
information out of a description, we end up being able to explain almost nothing at 
all.  To  say  that  erosion  has  played  a  role  in  the  observed  shape  of  a  particular 
mountain, for instance, is to necessarily imply some kind of narrative description.  
For in any single instant of time, erosion cannot be detected. This is because erosion 
is not a thing, to be seen or not seen, but a process. And processes operate over time. 
Thus the choice is not between some temporal information and none, but between a 
lot or  a  little.  To  show  how  a  process  like  erosion  has  resulted  in  a  particular 
formation is to show how it has operated over time and how it has interacted with 
other processes operating over the same period. Thus, we must treat individuals as 
historical entities if we wish to make them central subjects. 
While  the generality of  this  model  of  narrative is  already considerable,  it  should 
nevertheless be pointed out that the permissiveness it makes possible with respect to 
possible central subjects also extends to those causal processes which might act upon 
them. We are not required, in other words, to place any theoretical limits at all on the 
nature of those processes which might be at work in any given narrative. In fact, 
given the way in which Hull has defined narrative, more precision would be limiting 
rather than liberating. If it is the role of the ideal narrative to detail the operation and 
interaction of  all of the relevant processes, events, objects, laws, and theories which 
have interacted to  produce  a  single  central  subject,  then  we must  necessarily  be 
extremely liberal as to the exact nature and scale of those processes. Indeed, as Kosso 
reminds us, we cannot even be sure we are dealing directly with processes at all. We 
might  just  as  easily  cite  other  singular  events  as  causally  infuential  upon  the 
historical entity of interest. This is why the central subject is such a crucial idea for 
Hull. It provides the criteria of relevance – and thus the limiting conditions – for any 
given narrative.  Beyond this,  essentially  any kind of law, process,  event  or object 
might potentially take on causal significance. The only permissible limit would seem 
to  be  the  requirement  that  the  infuences  in  question be  within the  realm of  the 
possible,  and  thus  be  somehow  empirically  accountable.  It  is  this  which  makes 
narrative  a  scientifically  legitimate  process,  regardless  of  whether  it  is  found  in 
paleontology or human history. And yet both Jeffares and Hull are still inclined to 
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talk  of  human history  and  the  “historical  sciences”  separately.  Why is  this?  The 
answer to this question brings us face to face with the most serious difficulty facing 
the application of Hull's narrative model to human history. 
The Problem of Process versus Particular in Human History
In  offering  his  “particular-circumstance”  model,  Hull  anticipated  objections  from 
those who felt that any model of historical explanation which retained any emphasis 
at all on general laws was unacceptable. He wrote:
This thesis is likely to evoke two polar responses. On the one hand, traditional 
philosophers are likely to insist that the only way to explain anything scientifically 
is  by  subsuming it  under  a  law of  nature.  But  these  philosophers  themselves 
present explanations in the absence of anything analogous to laws of nature... On 
the other hand, opponents of the Covering-Law Model are sure to complain that I  
give too much weight to laws of nature. Subsumption is neither necessary nor 
sufficient  for  explanation,  even scientific  explanation.  In  their  more  bumptious 
moments, these iconoclasts are led to exclaim that laws have nothing to do with 
scientific explanation. They are left,  however,  with the task of  presenting some 
other model of scientific explanation.606
On the surface, it is difficult to disagree with this assessment. Part One has already 
shown something of the difficulties involved in providing an explanatory model of 
narrative which is wholly independent of the nomothetic sciences. Similarly, Chapters 
Four and Five have examined the inability of the nomothetic model to adequately 
encompass explanation in the historical sciences. Hull's model of narrative science 
appears to offer us a way through this impasse, but the emphasis it retains on general 
laws  is  potentially  extremely  problematic  for  our  goal  of  applying  that  model  to 
human history. For it is certainly true that Hull's inversion of the traditional model 
seems only to allow for the individuation and explanation of central subjects in terms 
of laws and general processes. But, as Hull observed in his 1975 paper, “anyone who 
has ever read any history is aware that historical narratives seem to possess a unity 
far  greater  than  that  justified by the  causal  laws  one might  have connecting the 
various incidents mentioned.”607 This seeming contradiction makes it unclear as to 
whether human history as it is  currently understood can explain according to the 
definition  of  narrative  both  Hull  and  Jeffares  have  endorsed.  For  it  would  be 
impossible to deny that human history relies much more heavily on explanation in 
terms of particular events/objects than on laws, theories, and other general processes. 
606 Hull, 'The Particular-Circumstance Model of Scientific Explanation,' p.79.
607 Hull, 'Central Subjects and Historical Narratives,' p.260.
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Jeffares' own example of some of the infuences on the fall of the Roman Republic 
shows this, listing factors such as “actions of ambitious politicians, economic growth 
outstripping  administrative  capacity”  and  “external  political  threats.”608 None  of 
these  factors  would seem to  lend themselves particularly  well  to  explanations  in 
terms of any kind of general process. Have we finally arrived at a reason to separate 
history from the sciences, even if only pragmatically? Certainly we have arrived at a 
point  beyond  which  scientific  narrativists  like  Hull  and  Jeffares  are  somewhat 
reluctant to proceed. With reference to his own definition of narrative, for instance, 
Hull argued that human history is disadvantaged as it “does not have much in the 
way of  highly developed psychological  or  sociological  theories to  draw upon.”609 
Similarly,  Jeffares  argues  that  “historical  sciences  do  use  regularities,”  albeit  in  a 
“fashion distinct from the experimental sciences.” While Jeffares is very careful to 
allow that “those regularities are rarely law-like in the sense that positivists would 
recognise,” being “much more restricted in scope,”  this  is  still  a far cry from the 
seemingly lawless  terrain  of  the  “actions  of  ambitious  politicians.”610 While  these 
misgivings  were  not  enough for  either  of  these  scientific  narrativists  to  explicitly 
exclude history from the sciences, they nevertheless imply that human history is to 
be relegated to the outer edges of scientific respectability. If we are to carry the kind 
of narrative practice advocated by Hull and Jeffares into human history, therefore, 
this problem will need to be addressed.
The  process  of  modifying  Hull's  model  of  narrative  in  order  to  cope  with 
particularistic  causation  must  begin  with  a  realisation of  that  model's  theoretical 
purity.  In actual  practice,  there are some limitations to its use.  These come about 
because, in any area of historical practice, it is rare that the process knowledge we do 
have is sufficiently to constrain a system perfectly. In other words, the space of the 
possible allowed by our general knowledge is comparatively large, leaving a large 
number of possible “actual sequences.” It is, as we have already argued, the very 
purpose of a narrative explanation to enquire which of these potential sequences was 
the one that really did take place. In the best case scenario, that sequence could be 
determined by studying the interaction of known processes, theories and laws alone. 
But the best case scenario is, sadly, exactly that. The resolving powers of the available 
general theories in any given historical discipline are rarely so strong. Indeed, if they 
608 Jeffares, Testing Times. p.29.
609 Hull, 'Central Subjects and Historical Narratives,' p.264.
610 Jeffares, Testing Times. p.7.
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were, any narrative they produced would be essentially deduced from said laws and 
theories.  This  would be nothing less  than a triumph of the nomothetic-deductive 
model, and would render any application of narrative theory utterly unnecessary. So 
we  must  ultimately  conclude  that  the  kind  of  case  in  which  we  have  a  perfect 
understanding of all  of the relevant laws and processes which have interacted to 
produce  a  central  subject  represents  the  ideal  form  of  the  particular-circumstance 
model as Hull offers it. Just as the ideal form of the nomothetic-deductive model is 
the  timeless  and  universal  law  which  permits  of  no  exceptions.  In  both  cases,  
however, that ideal is rarely achieved. 
Hull was seemingly well aware that no theory of narrative could be so removed from 
actual historical practice and still remain credible. He had claimed, after all, to have 
created a model in which “there may be some general laws lurking around in the 
background  somewhere,  but  the  particular  circumstances  carry  the  explanatory 
load.”611 In an attempt to resolve this tension, he offered a conciliatory distinction 
between “historical reconstruction” and “inference from laws.” Sadly, this distinction 
was  to  prove  disproportionately  unkind  to  fields  such  as  human  history.  For 
disciplines  like  kinematic  physics  with  “very  powerful  theories,”  Hull  argued, 
“explanations  are  easy  to  produce.”  In  other  cases,  such  as  sociology,  even  an 
abundance of observational and experimental data had not led to the same level of 
theoretical  sophistication.  “It  is  certainly  true,”  Hull  argues,  “that  Peeping  Toms 
rarely  molest,  but  such  statements  hardly  have  the  same  stature  as  the  law  of 
universal gravitation.” That is, while such conclusions are  general enough, they do 
not constrain possible human behaviour all that well.612 Therefore, such disciplines 
cannot  be  said  to  possess  laws  strong  enough  to  allow  the  deduction  of  actual 
sequences according to the ideal form of Hull's model. Disciplines like population 
biology and meteorology represent “intermediary” cases, in that:
We  understand  the  processes  under  investigation  quite  well,  but  so  many 
variables are involved and changes occur so rapidly and erratically that inferences 
are difficult. In this connection, one often reads that evolutionary theory can be 
used to explain the past but not to predict the future. One difficulty with making 
inferences in evolutionary biology, not to mention other areas of science as well, is 
that too many contingencies are too important...613
In  situations  of  this  kind,  Hull  argues,  we are required instead to  reconstruct the 
611 Hull, 'The Particular-Circumstance Model of Scientific Explanation,' p.70.
612 Ibid., pp.70-71.
613 Ibid., p.71.
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actual sequences of the past on the basis of evidence – what Hull calls “records” – 
rather than infer what must have happened on the basis of theories and general laws 
alone. Of this concept of “records,” Hull writes:
Although certain examples are clear enough, it is far from easy to make a general  
distinction between those phenomena that count as records and those that do not. 
Friday's footprint in the sand obviously implied the prior existence of a human 
being  on  the  beach.  The  likelihood  that  any  other  natural  phenomena  could 
produce such a pattern is extremely small. Thus, a footprint can serve as a record 
of the past.614
On the other hand, Hull points out, if physicists were to discover “a container in 
which all the hydrogen atoms were on one side and all the atoms of nitrogen on the 
other,  they would infer  that  in the immediate past  a  partition separated the two 
gases.” In the case of the footprint, we have reconstructed the presence of a human 
being on the beach in the recent past through empirical  records. In the case of the 
separated gases, however, the prior state of the system is being inferred from known 
processes and laws. The difference, Hull argued, is that records are records “because 
their particular makeup is more a function of the contingencies of their history than 
anything  derivable  from  the  theories  governing  them.”615 Hull  then  used  this 
distinction to argue that “inferring the past on the basis of process theories is different in 
kind  from  reconstructing  the  past  on  the  basis  of  historical  records.”616 The  role  of 
reconstruction  from  records,  Hull  argued,  is  really  only  to  individuate  those 
historical entities which are ranged over by process laws. And this distinction, he 
claims, must “apply to all historical endeavours.” This would seem to relegate  all 
heavily  record-based/reconstructive  disciplines  –  such  as  paleontology,  human 
history,  evolutionary  biology  and archaeology  –  as  explaining  in  a  fashion  quite 
inferior to “process theories.”
This inferiority is not merely apparent, however, for there is also a clear asymmetry 
of explanatory power inherent in this division. This is because, in narratives that are 
more inferential than reconstructive, we have processes, laws, and theories in order 
to  help  tell  us  which historical  entities  are “theoretically  significant,”  rather  than 
merely  “commonsense.”  But  where  there  are  no  known  or  obviously  applicable 
theories and/or processes, Hull argued, we are in far less of a position to know this.  
We are unable to know if the historical entities/narratives we have constructed are, 
614 Ibid.
615 Ibid., pp.71-72.
616 Ibid., p.74. (emphasis in original)
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for  want  of  a  better  term,  correct.  Because  of  this,  Hull  deemed  reconstructive 
narratives  to  be  less  explanatory  (and  thus  less  desirable)  than  those  based  on 
inference.  We  can,  he  writes,  “produce  historical  explanations  of  commonsense 
entities such as people without much in the way of general laws governing their 
behaviour.  However,  if  and when we  do  possess  such theories,  the  explanations 
derivable  from  these  theories  must  take  precedence  over  our  commonsense 
explanations.”617 This is the position in which human history finds itself. For even a 
profoundly  historical  discipline  like  paleontology  has  the  myriad  theories  and 
processes of biology to help decide where any given fossil might fit into the history of 
life on Earth.  Human history would seem to have no such advantage.  We might 
argue that the Battle of Austerlitz is a historically significant example of the class 
“battle,” but we have no general theory of battles in order to legitimate this. This is 
essentially what Jeffares is  arguing when he states that “historical  sciences do use 
regularities.”618 Human history, it would seem, does not. Or, at least, not to anything 
like the same extent.  The question is:  is  this  enough to  exclude history from the 
sciences?
Fortunately, there are good reasons to think that some degree of reconstruction/event 
causation is unavoidable in  any example of historical science. In order to illustrate 
this, let us consider once again the example of the K/T extinction. The best currently 
available theory of that event argues that it was the result (at least in part) of climate  
change  caused  by  a  meteor  impact.  Explaining  the  K/T  extinction  in  this  way, 
however, requires invoking the meteor strike as a  particular – a unique event. And 
any particular is, by Hull's own argument, a potential central subject. If we therefore 
examine this meteor strike as a central subject  in itself, the picture changes. At this 
level,  the laws and processes involved become much more immediately relevant. 
Why did the meteor disrupt the climate? Because the  kinetic  energy it  possessed 
coming into the atmosphere had to go somewhere when the Earth's surface brought it 
to a halt. The result was that energy causing part of the Earth's crust to temporarily 
change places with the sky. We know that particulates in the atmosphere can impact 
the climate, and so it is reasonable to conclude that this is was the result. These are all  
processes  which  are  quite  generalisable  and  very  well  understood.  Yet  the 
uniqueness and contingency involved in this event are never eliminated entirely. That 
is,  while  we might say that  that meteor killed the  dinosaurs,  an identical meteor 
617 Ibid., pp.77-78.
618 Jeffares, Testing Times. p.7. (emphasis added)
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arriving, say, five hundred million years earlier – while obeying the  same  physical 
laws – could not have had the same effect, for there were not yet any dinosaurs to kill. 
Thus, from the interaction of a well understood set of processes and laws, we have 
generated a  particular with a clear element of contingency,  despite our knowledge of  
those laws and processes. More importantly, we have generated a particular we can use 
in an explanatory capacity. Part of the explanation for the extinction of the dinosaurs 
(if the meteor impact hypothesis is correct) must be that a meteor struck the Earth at a  
particular time and in a particular location.  This is  the “actual sequence” part of the 
explanation. We can be quite sure that the meteor obeyed the relevant laws and set in 
motion the appropriate processes. Yet, in order to have had the  additional effect of 
killing the dinosaurs, it had to have struck at that time. Thus we are still dealing with 
the underlying structures of nomothetic science – just at a single step removed. We 
have merely added a  narrative explanation as an intermediate link – “that  piece of 
debris, acting according to those laws, entered the atmosphere at that time, and struck 
in that place.” 
An event significant to the historian can therefore be understood as a process localised 
to  a  single  occurrence.  A significant  meeting in  the  life  of  an historical  actor,  or  a 
contingent  event  which  derails  a  causal  chain,  can  be  understood  as  causally 
significant in  exactly the same way as a known process or law might. This kind of 
event  causation does  not  therefore  pose  a  serious problem for  the  application  of 
Hull's  narrative  model  to  human history.  The  reason for  this  is  because  singular 
events and objects  themselves qualify as central subjects, and are thus explicable by 
the narrative process. Thus there is the possibility of  recursion within Hull's model. 
We can use one narrative object – a central subject – as part of the explanation for 
another.  This  essentially  gives  scientific  meaning  to  Danto's  observation  that 
narrative sentences function as particularistic theories and can themselves be collected 
together to render larger narrative constructions. Moreover, such particular historical 
moments,  as  Hull  himself  points  out,  are  reconstructed  by  the  historian  from 
empirical  evidence  –  “records.”  And  records,  he  continues,  are  generated  by 
“ordinary lawful processes.”619 Thus, we can construct a model of explanation the 
consistency  of  which  is  maintained  by  the  assumption  that  our  narrative 
constructions must ultimately cite, as Jeffares argues, “causal processes that are within 
the  domains  of  the  sciences.”620 All  that  is  required  to  satisfy  Hull's  model  of 
619 Hull, 'The Particular-Circumstance Model of Scientific Explanation,' p.72.
620 Jeffares, Testing Times. p.30.
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narrative  is  that,  if  we  follow  this  chain  down  far  enough,  we  reach  general 
processes, theories and laws eventually. If we are to claim, in other words, that  only 
the rules of science permit us to infer past events from present evidence, then we 
must also be ready to admit that some of those “rules” might actually be narratives. 
This  allows us  to  give  scientific  meaning  to,  for  instance,  Kosso's  claim that  the 
generality  of  accounting  claims  is  not  directly  proportional  to  their  explanatory 
usefulness.  This  wrinkle  in  Hull's  vision  of  narrative,  however,  has  significant 
implications for how narratives are made answerable to evidence. And so it is to this 
final question of confirmation that we now turn. 
Carol Cleland, the Asymmetry of Causation, and Confirmation by Consequences
What  kind  of  confirmation  logic  does  the  theory  of  narrative  we  have  so  far 
advanced require? We already have a place to begin looking for an answer to such a  
question. T. A. Goudge, it will be recalled from Chapter Five, hinted at a method for  
long-term  confirmation  by  consequences  through  what  he  called  “negative 
predictions.”621 And we have already shown how it was something very much like 
that method which was ultimately used to dismantle A. S. Romer's theory of tetrapod 
evolution. The question before us now is: can this vision of “negative” prediction be 
developed  into  a  fully  fedged  logic  of  confirmation  which  is  applicable  to  all 
historical study? This is a critical issue, for  without  such a generalisable method we 
will have no way to test our narrative theories for accordance with reality. This will 
effectively  render  our  entire  model  of  narrative  useless.  The  remainder  of  this 
chapter,  therefore,  will  be devoted to outlining how just  such a general model of 
confirmation has emerged from the work of the philosopher of science Carol Cleland. 
Before we begin the work of exploring this mechanism, however, let us be clear about 
the criteria it must satisfy if it is to be of use to us. First, it will have to be compatible 
with the model of narrative we have just outlined. More importantly, it must be able 
to cope with the particularistic causation and nested narrative structures which we 
have argued are required for a model of narrative fexible enough to include human 
history. Second, we should be able to show that such a logic is somehow  required, 
rather  than  merely  a  post  hoc convenience.  That  is,  it  should  be  a  demonstrable 
consequence of some fundamental feature of the world. And lastly, it should satisfy 
our requirement for nomothetic compatibilism. To this end, let us briefy return to the 
621 T. A. Goudge, 'Causal  Explanations in Natural History.'  The British Journal for the Philosophy of  
Science. Vol. 9, No. 35 (November 1958). p.197.
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work of Benjamin Jeffares. Jeffares, in summing up his conception of narrative, offers 
us the following definition:
Narratives thus have the following character. They document the changes in state 
in a central  historical  subject.  Those changes in states will  be the result  of  the 
operation  of  particular  processes.  We  may  well  speculate  that  processes  are 
operating  in  tandem  rather  than  sequentially.  These  processes  might  work  at 
different levels and invoke causes from quite different domains. Volcanism and 
erosion  are  two  rather  different  processes,  and  in  a  narrative  recounting  the 
formation of a volcanic island, we may well invoke both processes. Each process 
may well be linked to the final state of the island in its own way.622
As  per  the  previous  section,  we  will  wish  to  make  some  revisions  to  this.  For 
instance, we will need to acknowledge some degree of contingency by allowing for 
event causation. As well understood a process as volcanism might be, in other words, 
we must  treat  volcanic  activity in  that time and  that  place  as  (at  least  in  part)  a 
contingent event. We might also wish to add the observation that we can achieve 
such an explanation of why volcanic activity occurred in that time and that place by 
taking  it  as  a  central  subject  of  its  own,  and  inferring  and/or  reconstructing  a 
narrative regarding the processes and events which caused it (and  only it). This is 
what  is  meant  by  narratives  being  able  to  be  nested  in  recursive  structures.  In 
addition to allowing narrative to become a much more fexible explanatory model, 
however,  this  nesting  process  also  confers  additional  benefits  for  the  process  of 
confirmation. Jeffares continues:
At this point, we can begin to see how we can isolate our epistemic tasks, for tasks 
they are. In effect, we can break down our narratives into a string of processes or 
transformations. Each process can be viewed independently for the purposes of 
confirmation...  A narrative is  made up numerous sub explanations,  all  dealing 
with single transformations from one state to another.623
We  do  not  need,  in  other  words,  to  confirm  an  entire  narrative  at  once.  “The 
benefits,”  Jeffares  argues,  “of  viewing  a  narrative  in  Hull's  way,  as  a  series  of 
transformations,  are  that  we  can  instead  try  to  confirm  individual  nodes,  the 
individual transitions within a narrative.”624 That does not mean, however, that we 
can  only confirm  or  disconfirm  narratives  at  the  level  of  minutiae.  For  not  all 
“individual nodes” are of equal causal/explanatory importance. In Chapter Five, it 
will be recalled, various attempts to gather support for or against Romer's hypothesis 
were examined. All were, to use Jeffares' terminology, individual nodes in Romer's 
622 Jeffares, Testing Times. pp.30-31.
623 Ibid., p.31.
624 Ibid., p.32.
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postulated  narrative.  Some,  however,  could  be  accounted  for  by  only  slight 
modification  of  Romer's  account.  Others  –  specifically,  evidence  gathered  from 
Acanthostega and  Tiktaalik –  could not.  This  tells  us  that  the  choice  of  individual 
“nodes” or “transformations” is of profound importance when seeking to confirm a 
narrative. For if we don't have to confirm an entire narrative at once, nor do we have  
to  confirm  every single “sub  explanation”  either.  A well  chosen  node  will  have 
disproportionate confirmatory power. This realisation is of crucial importance for the 
logic of historical confirmation.
The other requirement for building a logic of confirmation recalls the arguments of 
Peter Kosso. Kosso's argument, it will be recalled, was essentially that “observation” 
as a scientific term is not strictly a function of spatial and/or temporal proximity, but 
is instead a term that implies a chain of “accounting claims” which bring information 
from the event/object in question to the observer. In this sense, one cannot say that  
physics studies the observable and history the unobservable.  For both disciplines 
have accounting claims between them and their  observations.  For the physicist  it 
might  be  the  relevant  theories  of  light  propagation  and  microscopy,  and  for  the 
historian  it  might  be  the  geology  of  fossilisation.  In  both  cases,  the  term 
“observation” remains appropriate. From Kosso's viewpoint, therefore, one cannot 
distinguish physics from paleontology on the basis of observability. How then is such 
a  distinction  to  be  made?  As  this  thesis  has  argued  at  various  points,  we  can 
distinguish the nomothetic from the historical sciences with reference to intent. The 
nomothetically oriented sciences are interested in extracting generalities from their 
events/objects  of  interest.  Because  of  this  focus  on  what  events/objects  have  in 
common, these disciplines are able to enjoy the advantages of experimentation. For, if 
we are ultimately interested in what properties all examples of an event/object share, 
then any single instance of that event/object will do. As Jeffares' argues, “the chemist 
can  repeatedly  observe  the  solubility  of  sugar  in  warm  tea  without  having  to 
reconstitute her sugar cube: another sugar cube will do the same job.”625 Moreover, 
any generalities discovered in the course of such investigations should be as equally 
applicable to future instances of sugar dissolution as to those in the past. 
The historical sciences, by contrast, are interested in aspects of the world which are 
singular and unique. But experimentation is logically of limited use to such sciences. 
625 Ibid., p.14.
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If  the aforementioned chemist  had some reason to be interested in  that particular  
sugar cube, for instance, then another one would  not,  by definition, “do the same 
job.” Of course, it is difficult to imagine how we could come to have such an interest 
in a particular sugar cube. Consider instead the geologist who wishes to know how a 
particular rock formation came to be. In such cases, experimentation is impossible. 
For if a central subject really is an individual, there is definitionally no other example 
of  it.  This  leaves  little  option but  to  attempt to unravel  the causes of  the central 
subject itself. The question that needs to be asked in such cases is: what causal events 
and processes  interacted  to  produce  this  particular formation?  We must,  in  other 
words,  examine  the  subject  with  a  narrative.  This  leads  us  neatly  to  Hull's 
“Particular-Circumstance” model, as previously examined. If we are to treat central 
subjects  as  historical  entities,  however,  we  must  now  ask  whether  there  is  some 
feature common to  all historical enquiry which we might exploit for confirmation 
purposes. This property must be exceedingly broadly defined in order to cover all 
possible central subjects – which might, after all, be  any individual unique under a 
description, from Protestantism to The Himalayas to Australopithecus Afarensis.
A good  candidate  for  such  a  process  is  the  observation  that,  in  any example  of 
historical explanation, we are engaged in a process by which we are postulating a 
pattern of  past causes for evidence observed in the present. This is the case whether 
what is being explained is a rock formation, an archaeological site, a collection of 
fossilised  remains,  or  a  written  document.  Indeed,  this  is  even  the  case  when 
attempting  to  account  for  a  central  subject  which  no  longer  exists.  For  even  to 
hypothesise that it  once existed presupposes that we have some  present reason to 
think it did. What makes historical sciences  historical, then, is this postulation of a 
particular  past cause (or pattern of causes) for observable  contemporary evidence. In 
this sense, our narratives are essentially particularistic theories of how that particular 
constellation  of  contemporary  evidence  was  produced.  As  the  philosopher  Carol 
Cleland has argued:
The focus of historical research is on explaining existing natural phenomena in 
terms of long past causes. Two salient examples are the asteroid-impact hypothesis 
for  the  extinction  of  the  dinosaurs,  which  explains  the  fossil  record  of  the 
dinosaurs in terms of the impact of a large asteroid, and the “big-bang” theory of 
the  origin  of  the  universe,  which  explains  the  puzzling  isotropic  three-degree 
background  radiation  in  terms  of  a  primordial  explosion.  Such  work  is 
significantly different  from making a  prediction and then artificially creating a 
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phenomenon in a laboratory.626
This language of theory – seemingly common to all historical practice – would thus 
seem  to  be  a  good  place  to  attempt  to  ground  a  similarly  pervasive  logic  of 
confirmation for all historical enquiry. For it is precisely this direction of reasoning – 
from  present  evidence  backwards  to  past  causes  –  which  underlies  not  just  the 
language of historical theory, but the entirety of narrative theory. This is in contrast to 
the direction of reasoning inherent in nomothetic science, which reasons forwards 
from causes to effects via general laws and/or theories. The question then becomes: 
can this unique directional feature of historical enquiry be exploited for the purposes 
of confirmation? Carol Cleland has argued that it can. And the unique feature which 
makes this possible, she argues, is the basic asymmetry between the two directions:
Localized events tend to be causally connected in time in an asymmetric manner. 
As an example,  the eruption of  a volcano has many different effects  (e.g.,  ash, 
pumice, masses of basalt, clouds of gases), but only a small fraction of this material 
is required in order to infer that it occurred; put dramatically, one doesn't need 
every  minute  particle  of  ash.  Indeed,  any  one  of  an  enormous  number  of 
remarkably small  subcollections of these effects  will  do. Running things in the 
other direction of time, however, produces strikingly different results. Predicting 
the occurrence of an eruption is much more difficult than inferring that one has 
already occurred.627
The underlying idea here is that any  single cause will almost always have  multiple 
effects, but that the reverse is hardly ever true.628 This is what the philosopher David 
Lewis  has  dubbed  the  “asymmetry  of  overdetermination.”629 And  since  one 
consequence of this asymmetry is that we do not need to catalogue every effect of a 
cause in order to determine the nature of that cause, this can be of immense use to the 
historian. Cleland invites us to consider:
... the difficulty involved in committing the perfect crime. Footprints, fingerprints, 
particles of skin,  disturbed dust,  and light waves radiating outward into space 
must  be eliminated.  Moreover,  it  isn't  enough to  eliminate  just  a  few of  these  
traces. Anything you miss might be discovered by a Sherlock Holmes and used to 
convict  you.  Finally,  each  trace  must  be  independently  erased.  You  cannot 
eliminate  the  footprints  by  removing  particles  of  skin  or,  for  that  matter,  one 
footprint by removing a different one. In stark contrast, preventing a crime from 
626 Carol  E.  Cleland,  'Methodological  and  Epistemic  Differences  between  Historical  Science  and 
Experimental Science,' Philosophy of Science. Vol. 69, No. 3 (September 2002). p.475.
627 Cleland, 'Historical Science, Experimental Science, and the Scientific Method,' p.989.
628 The classic example of multiple causes having a single effect is the firing squad – where multiple 
bullets from multiple guns all contribute to a single effect: the death of the victim. The comparative 
rarity of such examples, however, is compelling evidence for precisely the asymmetry that Cleland 
and Lewis argue for.
629 David Lewis, 'Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow,'  Nous.  Vol. 13, No. 4 (November 
1979). pp.473-475.
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occurring is easy... don't fire the gun. In other words, erasing all traces of an event 
before it occurs is much easier than erasing all traces of it after it occurs.630
More importantly, there are good reasons to believe that this particular feature of 
causation is a fundamental feature of the universe – or at least the universe above the 
quantum level. Its source has been the subject of some speculation, Cleland notes, but  
“there is general agreement... that it represents an objective and pervasive physical 
phenomenon at least at the macro-level of nature.”631 And it is this pervasiveness, 
Cleland argues, which provides not only a confirmation logic for historical science, 
but  also  a  philosophical  justification  for  why historical  enquiry  must  proceed  in  the  
manner it does. “Scientists engage,“ Cleland argues, “in two very different patterns of 
evidential  reasoning and,  although there  is  overlap,  one  pattern predominates  in 
historical  research  and  the  other  pattern  predominates  in  classical  experimental 
research.”632 As this thesis has often had occasion to observe, the perceived inability 
of historical research to fully utilise either the logic (laws) and method (experiment) 
of classical science has been at the root of either its perceived epistemic inferiority or 
its rhetorical banishment from the realm of the sciences altogether. Cleland, on the 
other hand, argues that it is “not an accident that historical research emphasizes one 
pattern and experimental research the other.” More specifically, she argues that not 
only the existence but the character of both the narrative and the nomothetic modes 
are  underwritten  by  this  asymmetry  of  causation,  and  that,  as  “each  practice  is 
tailored to exploit the information that nature puts at its disposal, and the character 
of  that  information differs,  neither practice  may be  held  up as  more objective or 
rational than the other.”633 Let us now see how such claims might be given substance.
As Jeffares has already argued, classical experimental/nomothetic science proceeds 
from the desire to isolate what events/objects have in common, rather than what 
makes them unique. As Cleland states it,  the “hypotheses investigated in classical 
experimental  science  postulate  regularities  among  event-types.”634 If  we  are 
interested in the properties  that  all  sugar cubes share,  in other words,  then “any 
sugar  cube  will  do.”  This  leads  logically  to  an  emphasis  on  repeatability and 
630 Cleland, 'Methodological and Epistemic Differences between Historical Science and Experimental 
Science,' pp.487-488. (emphasis in original)
631 Cleland,  'Historical  Science,  Experimental  Science,  and the  Scientific  Method,'  p.989.  See  also: 
Cleland, 'Methodological and Epistemic Differences between Historical Science and Experimental 
Science,' pp.489-490.
632 Cleland, 'Methodological and Epistemic Differences between Historical Science and Experimental 
Science,' p.474.
633 Ibid., p.476.
634 Ibid. 
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predictability. For if “any sugar cube will do the same job,” then we might repeat the 
dissolution as many times as we have sugar cubes. Moreover, we can also assume 
that any general pattern we notice will hold as well tomorrow as it did today. In this 
sense, predictions can be made for future cases which are as yet unexamined. This is 
the  most  basic  justification  for  the structure of  nomothetic  science.  The historical 
sciences, on the other hand, have no such generalising aim. To use Hull's language,  
they  seek  to  establish  (by  both  inference  and  reconstruction)  the  causes  and 
contingencies which have given rise to some central subject. Our only stricture is that 
the central subject in question must be an individual, at least in the sense in which the 
enquirer is interested in it. How this is done, Cleland argues, might vary between 
disciplines, but always reduces to the postulation of past causes as an explanation for 
presently  observable  evidence.  Thus,  as  Cleland  puts  it,  “the  hypotheses  of 
prototypical  historical  science  differ  from  those  of  classical  experimental  science 
insofar as they are concerned with event-tokens instead of regularities among event-
types.” This singular focus, Cleland argues, “helps to explain the narrative focus of 
many historical explanations.”635 Of course, in the ideal narrative – as we have argued 
from Hull's model – we would still be able to derive each causal transformation of 
the  central  subject  from  some  law  or  theory.  Thus,  the  difference  between  the 
narrative and nomothetic would be merely semantic. However, as Cleland notes:
The  complexity  of  the  causal  conditions  and  the  length  of  the  causal  chain 
(connecting the cause to its  current traces)  bury the  regularities  in  a  welter  of 
contingencies.  Accordingly,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  historical  explanations 
often  have  the  character  of  stories  that,  lacking  reference  to  specific 
generalizations, seem inherently untestable.636
The presence  of  contingency,  in  other  words,  acts  to  complicate  the  operation of 
narrative  in  its  ideal  form.  The  required  emphasis  on  particularity  complicates 
matters even further, as it largely precludes the possibility of the kind of repeatable 
experimentation which would allow the separation of contingency from regularity. 
Thus  the  historical  scientist  is  forced  to  try  to  work  out,  without  the  benefit  of  
experiment, precisely that mix of contingencies, events, objects, processes, theories, 
and laws which combined to produce the constellation of evidence in which they are 
interested. They do this by producing narratives which relate the impact of these 
various forces upon the particular they are interested in – their central subject. They 
are,  however,  deprived  of  a  means  to  isolate  their  central  subject  –  or  a  system 
635 Ibid., p.480.
636 Ibid.
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identical  to  it  –  and  vary  the  causal  infuences  at  work  one  by  one  in  order  to 
determine  their  infuence.  The  crucial  question  therefore  remains:  how  can  we 
responsibly speculate as to whether the narrative we have postulated is correct. This 
is the last remaining argument by which human history and the historical sciences 
might plausibly be shown to be logically inferior.
Cleland's answer to this question is broadly similar to the confirmation by consequences 
we briefy sketched in Chapter Five. Instead of prediction and experiment, Cleland 
argues, historical scientists “focus their attention on formulating mutually exclusive 
hypotheses  and hunting for evidentiary traces  to discriminate among them.” The 
ideal goal of such an enterprise is to find what Cleland calls a “smoking gun.” A 
smoking  gun,  she  argues,  “is  a  trace(s)  that  unambiguously  discriminates  one 
hypothesis from among a set of currently available hypotheses.”637 More precisely, we 
seek an evidential consequence (trace) that should be exhibited by only a subset of  
the available narrative hypotheses. If it is found, then we have generated a reason to 
accept only those hypotheses which require the presence of that consequence/trace. 
In  this  sense,  a  smoking  gun  is  nothing  more  than  a  particularly  well-chosen 
evidential  trace  which  exhibits  disproportionate  confirmatory  power.  A piece  of 
evidence, in other words, that a narrative cannot be restructured around. An example 
of  this  was  seen  in  Chapter  Five.  As  we  saw,  the  evidence  which  steadily 
accumulated over the course of the twentieth century calling into question Romer's 
assumptions regarding the climate of the Devonian era was not sufficient to disprove 
his main hypothesis. In Cleland's terms, we might say that the discovery that the 
Devonian climate was more temperate than had previously been thought was not a 
smoking gun. What was a smoking gun, however, was the subsequent discovery that 
early tetrapods possessed rudimentary limbs – or, more accurately, structures which 
would become limbs – yet could not have used these limbs for terrestrial locomotion. 
This  represented  a  fundamental  repudiation  of  Romer's  hypothesis  that  limbs 
evolved in tetrapods specifically for terrestrial locomotion. We are driven instead to 
accept one of the alternative classes of hypotheses which postulate that the structures 
which became limbs in the first tetrapods evolved while the ancestor organisms were 
still  exclusively water-dwelling.  Cleland's model thus captures extremely well  the 
kinds of confirmatory operations we saw in Chapter Five. All that remains is to tie 
this method to the asymmetry of causes.  This must be done, as we have already 
637 Ibid., pp.480-481.
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discussed, in order to meet the objection that the narrative method is merely a post 
facto rationalisation  for  the  inferiority  of  historical  enquiry  to  the  experimental 
method. 
Cleland argues that this difference in both methodology and confirmation structure is 
not merely arbitrary, but is a necessary consequence of the asymmetry of causation. 
In  order  to  establish  this,  she  returns  to  the  most  basic  distinction  between 
experimental and historical enquiry – that of the direction of reasoning. Despite their 
clear  interrelationship,  Cleland  argues,  the  asymmetry  of  causation  forces  vastly 
differing methods on the two modes of explanation because  the path from causes to  
effects is rarely identical to the path in the other direction. Recall Cleland's earlier example 
of a volcanic eruption. An eruption, she argues, has many more and different effects 
than causes. Moreover, given that any given cause is likely to have multiple effects, 
we do not need to catalogue all possible effects in order to infer that a particular  
eruption occurred. Reasoning in this direction, however, is necessarily particularistic. 
This is because finding ash deposits from Mount Saint Helens cannot and does not 
constitute  evidence  for  the  eruption  of  Mount  Pinatubo.  Remaining  in  the 
particularistic realm, it is also plain that predicting any particular volcanic eruption – 
that is moving from causes to effect – is  much more difficult. As we have already 
observed of particularistic (and thus narrative) explanations in general, there are so 
many  potential  interlocking  causes  and  contingencies  that  contribute  to  any 
particular volcanic eruption that prediction becomes effectively impossible. This is 
the asymmetry of causation in action. When compared to the difficulty of prediction, 
it is  much easier to show that a particular eruption has  already taken place. This is 
why  particularistic  explanation  is  far more  suited  to  reasoning  backwards  from 
effects  to  causes.  We require  only  some  of  the  multiple  effects  to  infer  back  to  a 
volcanic eruption. On the other hand, although the causes of the eruption might be 
fewer in number, we would need absolutely all of them – including contingent events 
– in order to have predicted it. Given that this is the case, we should logically expect 
this historical method to only be useful when reasoning in one direction – from effects 
backwards  to  causes.  Thus,  the  asymmetry  of  causation  helps  us  explain  the 
methodology of historical  research.  It  tells  us two things, Cleland argues:  “that a 
strikingly  small  subcollection  of  traces  is  enough  to  substantially  increase  the 
probability that  a past  event occurred,  and that there are likely to  be many such 
subcollections.”  Thus,  she  concludes,  the  “existence  of  so  many different  reliable 
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possibilities  for  identifying  past  events  provides  the  rationale  for  the  historical 
scientist's emphasis on finding a smoking gun.”638
By  contrast,  the  experimental/nomothetic  sciences  are  forced  to  proceed  very 
differently. For given the difficulty of predicting particular events in advance enforced 
by the asymmetry of causation, the experimentalist faces the problem of trying to 
isolate  which contributing causes had which effect – as well as which were  necessary 
for the effect to occur and which were not. This is because, Cleland argues, while 
effects overdetermine their causes, causes do not overdetermine their effects:
A good example is a short circuit that “causes” a house to burn down. Take away 
the  short  circuit  and  the  house  wouldn't  have  burned  down;  the  short  circuit 
“triggered” the fire. But the short-circuit isn't sufficient for the occurrence of a fire.  
Many other  factors are also required,  e.g.,  the presence of  fammable material, 
absence of sprinklers. The absence of any one of these additional factors would 
also have prevented the fire, even supposing that the short circuit had occurred. In 
other words, the total cause of the fire includes more than the short circuit. Local 
events (such as the short circuit) which are normally identified as the causes of 
later  events  (a  house  burning  down)  underdetermine  them;  considered  just  in 
themselves, they are not enough (even given the laws of nature) to guarantee that 
their reputed effects occur.639
This, Cleland argues, is the “other side” of the asymmetry of causation. That is, while 
“erasing  all  traces  of  an  event  requires  many  separate  interventions,  a  single 
intervention... is normally enough to prevent it from occurring in the first place.” By 
either removing  fammable  material,  preventing  the  short  circuit  or  both,  we  can 
prevent the fire. In either case, as historians, we will have little trouble inferring that a 
fire took place. Identifying the exact cause is slightly more problematic, but again – as 
historians – we are free to invoke a combination of a short circuit, fammable material, 
and a lack of sprinklers. If,  however, we are interested in reasoning forward from 
cause to effect,  we have a much more difficult  task,  as  to do so we will  need to 
disentangle these causes. We might wish, for instance, to hypothesise that  a short  
circuit  caused  the  fire  (via  well  understood  accounting  mechanisms  in  physics). 
Because this is underdetermined, however, we cannot be  sure that the short circuit 
alone was responsible. It could be that the  combination of the short circuit and the 
absence of sprinklers was responsible.  If  that is  the case,  we have over-attributed 
causal power to the short circuit, and have failed to effectively proceed from cause to 
effect.  However,  since we cannot install  sprinklers and then burn the  same house 
638 Ibid., p.491.
639 Ibid., p.488. (emphasis in original)
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down again, the question becomes difficult to settle. In order to guard against these 
kinds of false positives/negatives, the experimental sciences are forced to attempt to  
replicate the cause as much as is possible, while varying/eliminating other possible 
contributing circumstances. Because of this, experimental method is only feasible for 
those  phenomena  that  can be  so  replicated.  Therefore,  the  experimental  and/or 
nomothetic  sciences  are  much  more  useful,  by  definition,  in  dealing  with  those 
properties of phenomena which are constant across multiple examples. That is, we 
can only experiment in cases where, to quote Jeffares again, “any sugar cube will do 
the same job.” The asymmetry of causes thus not only explains historical method, but 
also neatly explains the focus upon generalisation and prediction in the forward-
reasoning experimental sciences. As Cleland argues:
Just as the overdetermination of past events by localized present events explains 
the practice of prototypical historical science, so the underdetermination of future 
events by localized present events explains the practice of classical experimental 
science. The hypotheses tested in classical experimental science are generalizations 
(conjectured  laws  and  theories),  as  opposed  to  statements  about  particular 
events... But they are only partial causes (triggers) of what subsequently occurs. 
Accordingly, there is a need to ferret out and control for additional factors that are 
relevant to the total causal situation; otherwise, the ostensible confirmations and 
disconfirmations  of  the  target  hypothesis  may be  mistaken...  In  brief,  classical 
experimental  research  is  best  interpreted  as  an  attempt  to  circumvent  the 
inevitable underdetermination of experimental results by test conditions.640
The  focus  on  generalisation  in  the  experimental  sciences,  however,  necessarily 
introduces an inability to deal with contingencies.  We could, for instance, build a 
replica of our stricken house in all details but one – a sprinkler system. A short circuit 
could then be induced and the result observed. We might then conclude that the 
short circuit alone was sufficient to cause the house to burn down. But perhaps there 
was  some  external  perturbation  in  the  original  circumstances  which  was  not 
replicated in the experiment. Perhaps, for instance, the weather had been extremely 
dry in the days leading up to the original fire, which contributed to the willingness of 
the house to burn. Despite the fact that weather is a system presumed to obey all  
known laws of science, it is – consistent with our earlier argument in adapting Hull's 
model  of  narrative  for  use  in  more  traditionally  historical  cases  –  a  contingency.  
Moreover, it is a contingency which could infuence the outcome of the experiment 
simply by being present in the original fire but not in the recreation. And if this is  
truly the case, then we may end up, once again, over-attributing causal power to 
some other factor. All of which is to say that contingencies, almost by definition, are 
640 Ibid., p.494.
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difficult to spot and control for – and their presence therefore greatly complicates 
experimental  science.  Because  of  this,  as  we  saw  Gould  argue  in  Chapter  Five, 
contingency might  reasonably be  considered the  signature of  the  narrative  mode. 
However, in order to invoke that narrative mode, we must – as we have learnt from 
Hull – shift our focus from the general to the particular. That is, if we are to try to 
account for those causal factors which were effectively unique to the original fire, then 
we  are  no  longer  able  to  make  such  effective  use  of  experimentally  replicated 
circumstances. We must instead attempt to formulate a narrative of only the events – 
contingent and process-governed alike – which took place in the  original fire. And 
this not only means that we are required to address our new central subject in a 
particularistic way, it also means that the subject of our enquiry has already taken place. 
Thus, we are now forced to shift the direction of our reasoning – instead of trying to 
reason from cause to effect, we are now reasoning from effects back to causes. In this  
way,  the asymmetry of causes which Cleland takes from David Lewis completely 
underwrites the methodology of both nomothetic and narrative modes of science. 
It should be noted at this point that Cleland does not go so far as to speculate on the  
actual  form of historical explanation. She does at one point suggest that this causal 
asymmetry is the reason historical explanations often have a narrative form.641 But 
she does not examine this in any detail. Indeed, at one point, she blithely interprets 
the term “narrative” in purely literary terms:
... historical methodology is often characterized... in terms of narrative histories. 
Analysis in terms of narrative histories does not, however, do justice to historical 
work  in  disciplines  such  as  astronomy  and  geology  that,  like  experimental 
physical science, do not involve even a prima facie appeal to purposes or ends. A 
more  general  understanding  of  the  methodology  of  historical  science  and  its 
differences from classic experimental science is badly needed.642
Here  Cleland  appears  to  assume,  in  precisely  that  manner  we  lamented  in  the 
opening  pages  of  Chapter  Four,  that  the  mere  presence  of  narrative  implies  an 
ineradicable subjectivism and corresponding lack of epistemic respectability. Indeed, 
with such an emphasis on “purposes” and “ends,” Cleland would seem to have an 
understanding  of  narrative  similar  to  that  of  W.  B.  Gallie.  It  seems  reasonable, 
however, to attribute this comment to Cleland's unfamiliarity with that more recent 
philosophy of science which has attempted to better define the concept of narrative. 
641 Ibid., p.480.
642 Ibid., p.475.
295
Regardless of her reasons, we can clearly see that Cleland's work fits in very well 
with  the  more  epistemically  sound  conception  of  narrative  offered  by  Hull  and 
Jeffares. We might even argue that Kosso, Hull, and Jeffares have effectively already 
provided  precisely  that  “more  general  understanding  of  the  methodology  of 
historical science” which Cleland so avidly seeks – and have done so through a better 
understanding of the very narrative she was so quick to deride. 
Despite this failure of imagination, however, Cleland has nonetheless added the final 
piece  of  the  narrative  puzzle  to  the  work  of  Kosso,  Hull,  and  Jeffares.  This  is 
manifested in several ways. First, her dispersal of causes lends itself well to Jeffares'  
requirement for the conceptual separation of causal chains, and the ability to isolate 
individual “nodes” in a causal chain/web. Cleland's “machinery,” as Jeffares terms 
it,643 allows  us  to  separate  the  causal  processes/events  by  which,  for  example, 
footprints were left at a crime scene from the processes/events by which fingerprints 
were  left  at  the  same  scene.  Second,  Cleland  has  provided  a  non-arbitrary 
philosophical  justification  for  why  Hull's  two  complementary  approaches  to  the 
same scientific reality require such radically different methods. Third, Cleland's work 
seamlessly exploits both the standardised language of observation offered by Peter 
Kosso, and the language of theory advocated by Arthur Danto. And last,  she has 
provided the logic by which narrative explanations can be meaningfully submitted to 
empirical tests without fear of being labelled  ad hoc. Taken together, therefore,  the 
work  of  all  of  the  authors  examined  in  this  chapter  can  be  synthesised  into  a 
complete model of scientific narrative explanation. At each of the three steps required 
to synthesise it, moreover, it has been shown that this narrative model does not offer  
any serious conceptual resistance to the inclusion of human history among the ranks 
of the sciences. More importantly, it achieves this without requiring any fundamental 
transformation of history into the dim likeness of the nomothetic-deductive ideal. It 
is this last point which is perhaps the most exciting, however, for it does not merely  
imply that history  can be a science, it implies that it essentially  already is. It is this 
theme which we will briefy take up in the conclusion.
643 The term “Cleland's machinery” is a shorthand borrowed from Benjamin Jeffares. See: Jeffares,  
Testing Times. pp.41-46.
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Conclusion
“The Future of Human History as a Science”
The basic assertion of this thesis – that the operations of human history can be fully 
captured within a recognisably scientific methodology and thus require no separate 
epistemology  –  is  far  from  new.  Similar  assertions  can  be  traced  back  to  the 
arguments  of  nineteenth  century  positivist  philosophers  such  as  Henry  Thomas 
Buckle and Auguste Comte,  who sought the specifically historical  laws by which 
human societies developed.644 Even earlier still, Enlightenment philosophers such as 
G.  W.  F.  Hegel  and  Giambattista  Vico  examined  human  history  with  a  view  to 
extracting  from  it,  if  not  laws,  then  some  underlying  general  principle.645 Such 
arguments have been examined and re-examined over the years, and there is no need 
to rehearse them again here. Suffice it to say that these approaches have fallen out of 
favour for the simple reason of their failure. No reliable laws of history have ever 
been identified – or at least none that were not simple truisms or otherwise useless in  
the  practical  work  of  historical  explanation.  Historians  opposing  such  strong 
positivism, such as Johann Droysen, have long argued that it was far more profitable 
for history to focus on the explanation of unique and particular circumstances.646 This 
focus  on  the  particular,  however,  was  almost  always  presumed  to  automatically 
remove history from the possibility of ever truly belonging to the sciences. And while 
debate  concerning  the  scientific  possibilities  of  history  has  never  completely 
disappeared, the failure of any one nomothetically inspired approach to realising that 
possibility  has  remained.647 This  failure,  coupled  with  the  compelling  arguments 
made by the mid-twentieth covering lawyers against the idealist notion of empathy, 
resulted  in  the  transplant  of  the  historical  concern  with  particularity  into  newer 
narrative philosophies of history. These new philosophies, however, like their idealist 
predecessors, were once again predicated on particularity being the proper focus for 
history. Because of this, they were seen as inherently and definitionally unscientific. 
This lack of epistemic foundations was ultimately to lead, via the tacit association 
644 Henry Thomas Buckle,  Introduction to the History of Civilization in England.  Routledge: London, 
1904.  Auguste  Comte,  The  Positive  Philosophy  of  Auguste  Comte.  3rd Edition.  Harriet  Martineau 
(trans). Kegan Paul: London, 1893. 
645 Giambattista  Vico,  New Science:  Principles  of  the  New Science  Concerning  the  Common Nature  of  
Nations.  David Marsh (trans.) Penguin Classics: London, 2001. G. W. F. Hegel,  The Philosophy of  
History. J. Sibree (trans.) Dover Publications: New York, 1956.
646 Johann Gustav Droysen, 'The Elevation of History to the Rank of a Science: Being a Review of The 
History  of  Civilization in  England by T.  H.  Buckle,'  in  Johann Gustav  Droysen,  Outline  of  the  
Principles of History. E. Benjamin Andrews (trans.) Ginn & Co.: Boston, 1893. pp.61-89.
647 Notable twentieth-century works guided by such a nomothetic impulse include: Oswald Spengler, 
The Decline of the West. 2 volumes. A. A. Knopf: New York, 1926 & 1928., and Arnold J. Toynbee, A 
Study of History. 12 Volumes. Oxford University Press: London & New York, 1948-1961.
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between “narrative” and the pejorative sense of  the term “story,” to  the  literary-
narrativist view that history was primarily a variety of fiction. 
From this long history it seems reasonable to conclude that the pervasive assumption 
that science must be a purely generalising enterprise has had profound consequences 
for the philosophy of history. The basic argument that history belongs to the sciences 
has not entirely disappeared, of course. However, those contemporary authors who 
would  argue  that  history  is,  or  should  be,  scientific  –  the  author  of  this  thesis 
included – are now highly unlikely to do so based on a strictly nomothetic model of  
science.  This  is  primarily  for  two  reasons.  First,  for  the  obvious  reason  that  all  
attempts to identify historical laws (or to provide non-trivial historical explanations 
in  terms  of  laws from other  disciplines)  have been  of  very limited success.  And 
second, because more recent philosophy of science has  finally begun to move away 
from the vision of physics as the ideal exemplar of what good science should look 
like. For these reasons, modern arguments for the scientific nature of history are far 
more likely to focus on other branches of the sciences as exemplars – exactly as this  
thesis has sought to do. There remains, however,  a crucial difference between the 
arguments this thesis has made and other modern arguments for the scientific status 
of history. For what previous approaches to the problem of scientific history have had 
in common is their injunction to transform history in some way in order for it to attain 
its scientific promise. 
Among Enlightenment and nineteenth century philosophers,  this  transformation  of 
history  into  science  was  usually  to  be  achieved  through  the  identification  and 
application of those laws which underwrote the processes of history. The covering 
lawyers of the twentieth century similarly argued that genuine historical explanation 
should  consist  in  showing that  historical  events  were  the  logical  consequence  of 
already existing laws. Among those twentieth and twenty-first century philosophers 
who advocate for the reconciliation of history with the sciences, there is admittedly 
no  such  overtly  nomothetic  argument.  There  is,  however,  a  vestigial nomothetic 
assumption present in their continued emphasis on some sort of generalisation as the 
defining goal of science. This assumption has meant that, because existing historical 
practice does not share this generalising aim, a requirement to transform history has 
remained. The implication is that whatever existing historical practice might be, it is 
not science. This is the key assumption this thesis has sought to challenge by offering 
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a narrative view of science which is also compatible with human history as it exists 
now. In order to fully appreciate the arguments which have led us to this conclusion, 
let  us  close  this  thesis  with  an  examination  of  some  of  these  contemporary 
transformation requirements. It is hoped that both the examination of the nomothetic 
assumption in Part One, and the attempt to provide a more nuanced understanding 
of  the  sciences  in  Part  Two,  will  have  provided  suitable  context  in  which  to 
appreciate  the  quite  remarkable  myopia  of  these  arguments.  Similarly,  it  is  also 
hoped that the obvious contrast between the work of the previous six chapters and 
the arguments on offer here will help to highlight the need for change. This is not a  
change  in  the  basic  principles  of  historical  method,  however.  For  these  are 
remarkably  sound,  given  their  epistemic  history.  The  required  change  is  almost 
entirely  conceptual.  That  is,  the  only  transformation  that  history  truly  requires  in 
order to realise its scientific potential is  in the way historians think about history 
itself and its place in the wider context of human knowledge.
The Requirement for Transformation
One of the most well-known contemporary transformative arguments for scientific 
history can  be  found in  the  concluding  chapter  of  Jared Diamond's  book,  Guns, 
Germs and Steel. Here Diamond argues that a scientific practice of history is possible – 
but that the resulting discipline would not necessarily resemble history as we now 
know it. He begins from firm foundations, arguing that:
... the difficulties historians face in establishing cause and effect relations in the 
history  of  human  societies  are  broadly  similar  to  the  difficulties  facing 
astronomers,  climatologists,  ecologists,  evolutionary  biologists,  geologists,  and 
paleontologists.  To  varying  degrees,  each  of  these  fields  is  plagued  by  the 
impossibility of performing replicated, controlled experimental interventions, the 
complexity arising from enormous numbers of variables, the resulting uniqueness 
of each system, the consequent impossibility of formulating universal laws, and 
the difficulties of predicting emergent properties and future behaviour.648
Overtly, there is nothing to object to in this assessment. Indeed, this thesis has argued 
similarly. What is it then, that renders the transformation of history a requirement? 
Diamond's reasons are plainly stated. “One cannot deny,” he argues, “that it is more 
difficult  to  extract  general  principles from  studying  history  than  from  studying 
planetary orbits.” However, he continues, “the difficulties seem to me not fatal.”649 
648 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: A Short History of Everybody for the Last 13,000 Years. Vintage 
Press: London, 2005. p.424.
649 Ibid., p.421. (emphasis added)
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This focus on the extraction of large scale general principles is the underlying theme 
of Guns, Germs and Steel (the book itself is an attempt to explicate “history's broadest 
pattern”) and neatly encapsulates Diamond's  vision of  what  history has to  do in 
order  to  become  scientific.  Put  simply,  history  must  do  whatever  is  required  to 
overcome or otherwise ameliorate any barrier to the acquisition of these “general 
principles.”And to do this, radical transformation would be required. Most notably, 
history would be required to assume a much broader temporal range. 
Consider, for example, Diamond's discussion of prediction. “Prediction in history,” 
he argues, “as in other historical sciences, is most feasible on large spatial scales and 
over long times,  when the unique features of  millions  of  small-scale  brief  events 
become averaged out.”  That  is,  historical  science should be  conducted at  a  much 
grander  scale,  in  order  to  allow  time  to  smooth  over  and  average  out  any 
contingencies. This would better allow the identification and extraction of general 
principles.  Thus  historians  could,  Diamond argues,  “recognize  factors  that  made 
inevitable  the  broad  outcome  of  the  collision  between  American  and  Eurasian 
societies after 13,000 years of separate developments, but not the outcome of the 1960 
U.S.  Presidential  election.”650 Similarly,  Diamond  argues  for  a  key  method  in 
historical  science  as  the  “natural  experiment,”  where  one  compares  naturally 
occurring “systems differing in the presence or absence... of some putative causative 
factor.” Examples of such “experiments,” Diamond argues, can be found in many 
existing sciences, including epidemiology and cultural anthropology.651 The purpose 
of studying these systems, Diamond argues, is to attempt to isolate the truly general  
principles at work in history from the merely contingent. 
The problem with such “natural experiments,” of course, is that they are vulnerable 
to  contingencies  affecting  their  outcomes.  Or  as  Diamond  phrases  it,  the 
“confounding effects of natural variation in additional variables besides the one of 
interest.” For Diamond's generalising view, this is potentially highly problematic. He 
offers no definitive answer to this concern in his highly schematic conclusion, other 
than to refer to the “formalized procedures” for dealing with such problems which 
have  emerged  from several  similarly  afficted  disciplines.652 What  Diamond does 
make clear is that, as with his account of prediction, the effects of contingencies in 
650 Ibid., p.424.
651 Ibid., pp.424-425.
652 Ibid., p.425.
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natural  experiments  must  be somehow  eliminated in order to  extract  the “general 
principles” that are the necessary aim of a scientific pursuit. This is because cultural 
and individual idiosyncrasies “throw wild cards into the course of history. They may 
make  history  inexplicable  in  terms  of  environmental  forces,  or  indeed  of  any 
generalizable causes.”653 It is the avoidance of just such contaminating contingencies, 
Diamond argues, that makes the much broader focus of Guns, Germs and Steel (and, 
by extension, any subsequent scientific treatment of human history) necessary. For if 
one  accepts  the  validity  of  the  generalising impulse  as  the fundamental  defining 
characteristic  of  science,  then  even  the  most  cursory  study  of  current  historical 
practice makes it clear that it is not merely desirable to transform history, but required. 
This line of argument also leads quite naturally to the epistemic separatism which 
has  been  an ongoing theme explored in  this  thesis.  For  if  we  invert this  kind of 
transformative argument, we are then forced to ask: what exactly is the epistemic 
status of those countless works of history which have lined the shelves of libraries for 
as long as there have been libraries? For if history  as it is practised  isn't able to be 
meaningfully connected with the scientific, then what is it? As the first three chapters 
of this thesis have argued, this question has been absolutely central to the philosophy 
of history since at least the nineteenth century. And, as we have seen, while there 
have been some spirited defences of historical autonomy from science – there has 
been little success in the establishment of a uniquely  historical epistemology. Such 
arguments have only deepened the perceived epistemic divide and contributed to the 
abandonment of history to the ghetto of glorified fiction. Sadly,  these are not the 
kinds of epistemic questions contemporary advocates for scientific history have felt 
compelled to address. Peter Turchin, for example, is an ecologist and mathematician 
who, like Diamond, advocates for the scientific practice of history. However, he goes 
further  than  Diamond  by  suggesting  that  the  historical  discipline  as  we  now 
understand  it  may  be  beyond  reform.  In  an  essay  published  in  Nature,  Turchin 
argues,  like  Diamond,  for  a  historical  science  modelled  after  the  kind  of  highly 
generalising science that has its ideal expression in universal laws. “It is time,” he 
argues,  “for  history  to  become  an  analytical,  and  even  a  predictive,  science.”654 
Precisely  what  he  means  by  this  is  spelt  out  in  his  analogy  of  “splitters”  and 
“lumpers,” which translates into a crude shorthand for the familiar particular versus 
general view of science:
653 Ibid., p.420.
654 Peter Turchin, 'Arise “Cliodynamics”,' Nature. Vol. 454 (3 July 2008). p.34.
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Every scientific discipline has its share of splitters, who emphasize the differences 
between  things,  and  lumpers,  who  stress  similarities  in  search  of  organizing 
principles. Lumpers dominate physics. In biology, splitters, who care most for the 
private life of warblers or the intricate details of a chosen signalling molecule, are 
roughly matched by lumpers, who try to find fundamental laws. Social sciences 
such as economics and sociology are rich in lumpers. Sadly, few are interested in 
applying  analytical  approaches  to  the  past.  History  has  an  alarmingly  small 
proportion of lumpers.655
Rather than transform this discipline of “splitters,” however, Turchin suggests that it 
might  be  more  beneficial  to  found  an  entirely  new  discipline,  which  he  calls 
“theoretical  historical  social  science”  or  “cliodynamics.”  “Let  history  continue  to 
focus on the particular,” Turchin argues. Cliodynamics,  on the other hand, would 
“develop unifying theories and test them with data generated by history, archaeology 
and specialized disciplines such as numismatics.” Turchin confronts the problem of 
contingency by arguing, like Diamond, that it  is not fatal.  For if it were true that 
contingency and complexity completely obscured any possible patterns in history, he 
states, “there would be no empirical regularities” available to find in any historical 
data of any kind. And this, Turchin argues, is simply not the case. The task of this  
“cliodynamics,”  then,  is  to  identify  such  patterns  and  attempt  to  ascertain  their 
causes.656 
With  respect  to  both  of  these  authors,  it  must  be  clearly  understood  that  their 
approaches represent extremely powerful methods with the potential to deliver real 
and  useful  results.  The  patterns  Diamond,  Turchin,  and  their  colleagues  have 
identified are quite real, even if their causes are still open to debate. Moreover, there 
can be no meaningful counter to Turchin's assertion that “not everything in history is 
contingent and particular.” Both Turchin and Diamond are much better placed to seek 
and find structural regularities in the operation of history than any past positivist or 
covering lawyer, simply because they know where and how best to look. Moreover, it  
is doubtful that either author would give any regularities found by such methods so 
grandiose a title as “law.” Indeed, nowhere in Turchin's essay, or in Diamond's entire 
book, do they speak of their conclusions in terms of laws. This alone, represents a 
vast  improvement  over  the  narrow  nomothetic  focus  of  the  positivists  and  the 
covering lawyers. Instead Diamond and Turchin talk of “pattern” and “dynamics.” 
This is a far more productive way to talk. 
655 Ibid.
656 Ibid., p.35.
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What is problematic, however, is the insistence by both Turchin and Diamond that it 
is only this generalising, large-scale approach to history which can be called scientific. 
For  by  emphasising  the  desirability  of  highly  general  conclusions  in  which  the 
contingent and particular have been stripped away, both Turchin and Diamond are 
forced  to  advocate  the  pursuit  of  methods  capable  of  achieving  this.  These  are, 
necessarily, those statistical methods which rely on large periods of time and space to 
smooth out the effects of the contingent. However, by only allowing for science as a 
generalising enterprise and thus seeking to ape the apparatus of the experimental 
method as far as possible, Turchin and Diamond are required to abandon existing 
historical  practice  almost  entirely.  Diamond  argues  in  his  opening  pages,  for 
example, that “it is impossible to understand even just western Eurasian societies 
themselves, if one focuses on them.” For him, the “interesting questions concern the 
distinctions between them and other societies.”657 But this represents a turning away 
from a truly staggering amount of information – nothing less than everything which 
can be said with any certainty about the history of the nations of western Eurasia 
without reference to other societies – the only failing of which is a stubborn resistance 
to  (or  irrelevance  within)  generalising  abstractions.  Moreover,  it  begs  a  further 
question: can the work of history as we now know it be called knowledge at all?  
While both Turchin and Diamond are formally silent on such questions, there is a 
clear implication that, whatever current history might be, it is beneath the concern of 
science. Turchin, for instance, concludes his essay as follows:
We must collect quantitative data, construct general explanations and test them 
empirically on all the data, rather than on instances carefully selected to prove our 
pet narratives. To truly learn from history, we must transform it into a science.658
This is as clear a dismissal of existing historical practice as one might want, as well as  
an expression of contempt for the narrative form. This implicit charge of bias and 
sophistry is, of course, potentially valid. Narrative explanation is certainly capable of 
such error.  This  is  especially true when contemporary assumptions that it  is  little 
more than a form of literature ensure that it is never held to any higher standard! But 
this raises the question of how we can know anything about particular things at all. 
For if the kind of generalised knowledge Turchin has in mind is all that really counts 
as knowledge, then it would seem that human beings might be said to know very 
657 Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel. p.11.
658 Turchin, 'Arise “Cliodynamics”,' p.35.
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little  indeed.  If  science  can  only function  on  this  general  level,  can  anything 
scientifically defensible be reliably said by “splitters”  without it being derived from 
some general principle or law? This seems unlikely, especially given the difficulty of 
applying such an approach in fields such as biology, geology, and archaeology. Such 
difficulties would seem to imply that this particularistic “splitter” knowledge is some 
other form of knowledge. But what other form of knowledge is there? It is in this light 
that Turchin's argument, while necessarily brief given the limited space available to 
him  in  Nature,  appears  particularly  self-defeating.  After  all,  he  explicitly 
acknowledges  in  his  opening  paragraphs  that  “every  scientific  discipline”  has 
“splitters” and “lumpers,” and that splitters include those biologists “who care most 
for the private life of warblers.” Presumably he is happy to still call such biologists 
scientists, however.  Why  then  should  those  historians  who  choose  to  focus  on  a 
particular area of time and/or space be any different? 
If we are to exclude from science all of those who are non-generalists, in other words, 
then  why  does  Turchin  allow  for  “splitters”  within  the  sciences  at  all?  More 
importantly,  if  they  are to  be  allowed,  what  method  is  it  that  these  scientific 
“splitters” are using? And whatever that method is, could it not be applied to history 
as  well?  This  is  precisely  the  question this  thesis  has  been  asking,  and we have 
concluded that  what human historians are doing shares the same underlying structure as  
what these “splitters” in the historical sciences are doing. More importantly, we have also 
argued that this underlying structure is precisely that narrative form which Turchin 
appears to hold in such contempt. But before we return to this point, we must briefy 
examine another strand of contemporary argument for the scientific transformation 
of history. This approach attempts to account for contingency in history in another 
way – by viewing history as an analogue of biological evolution. As will be shown, 
however,  this  approach  is  subject  to  the  same  conceptual  blindness  as  those  of 
Diamond and Turchin.  For  despite  being able  to  accommodate  something of  the 
contingency of history and being far less focused on a classical vision of science as 
the pursuit of purely general conclusions, the evolutionary approach still advocates 
for a radical transformation of history. 
Evolution and Human History
Just as the generalist approach of Diamond and Turchin did not emerge fully-formed 
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from the skull of Zeus, but can be seen as merely among the most recent of attempts 
to effect some interface between history and the traditionally generalising vision of 
science,  neither  is  the  modern  biological  approach  to  the  philosophy  of  history 
entirely without precedent. In the broadest sense, a biologically-inspired approach to 
the  philosophy  of  history  was  first  made  possible  by  the  publication  in  1859  of 
Darwin's  On  the  Origin  of  Species.  The  kinds  of  explanations  Darwin's  natural 
selection made possible seemed to suggest (as seen in Chapter Five) an approach to 
science  a  good  deal  more  friendly  to  the  historian  than  the  more  traditionally 
Newtonian/nomothetic mode. It was possible, in other words, for an explanation to 
be a good deal more historical than the ideal of physics might suggest, and yet still be  
scientific. This represented not an intrusion of science into history, but of history into 
science. As R. G .Collingwood argued in The Idea of History in 1946: “The victory of 
evolution in scientific circles meant that the positivistic reduction of history to nature 
was qualified by a partial reduction of nature to history.”659 More recently, Alonso 
Peña has characterised the hopefulness with which Darwinian biology was greeted 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as follows:
Here at last, was a scientific discipline that offered to provide the much desired 
rapprochement between science and history. Certainly, the new biology was a brand 
of science which explicitly addressed change and its mechanisms – as historians 
have always done. Moreover, and maybe this was its most alluring aspect,  this 
was  a  type  of  formal  qualitative science:  capable  of  proposing  hypotheses, 
identifying appropriate evidence, and suggesting experiments – all  without the 
need of  mathematics.  As it  were,  this  was a  sort  of  reconciliation between the 
strictness  of  Newtonian  physics  and  the  chaotic  human  world  with  which 
historians habitually dealt.660
Since Darwin there have been a number of attempts to realise the goal of a scientific 
history through the incorporation of elements from evolutionary biology. However, 
none have resulted in a lasting, defensible vision of the relationship between science 
and history. As  Peña puts it:  “passing through the vast edifices of Spencer,  Marx, 
Spengler, and Toynbee, we know now that this project was not successful. The social 
versions  of  Darwinian  evolution  were  either  too  general,  too  simplifying,  or  too 
unfalsifiable to be properly regarded as a brand of 'scientific history.'”661 Spencer's 
“social” Darwinism, for instance, attempted to apply evolutionary insights to human 
659 R. G. Collingwood,  The Idea of History.  Revised Edition. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994. 
p.129.
660 Alonso Peña, 'On the Role of Mathematical Biology in Contemporary Historiography,' History and 
Theory.  Vol.  38,  No. 4,  Theme Issue 38:  The Return of Science:  Evolutionary Ideas and History 
(December 1999). p.102. (emphasis in original)
661 Ibid.
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societies,  arguing  that  the  actions,  both  conscious  and  unconscious,  of  both 
individuals  and societies  as  a  whole were in  actual,  non-metaphorical,  Darwinian 
competition. Despite these failures, as Chapter Five has shown us, there nevertheless 
remains  much  agreement  between  the  methods  by  which  both  history  and 
evolutionary  biology  proceed.  The  prospect  of  harnessing  history  to  biology  has 
therefore remained extremely appealing. The real question, however, is this: what is 
it  that  makes  the  two  so  similar?  Is  it  because  the  facts  of  biology  and  human 
evolution are being  directly and  non-metaphorically  expressed in human history? Or 
are they merely linked by some deeper common explanatory structure? This thesis 
has argued for the latter, and has attempted to offer an account of what that common 
explanatory structure is.  As Matthew H. Nitecki,  in the introduction of  a volume 
entirely devoted to exploring the convergences between history and evolution, has 
eloquently argued:
The common element of evolutionary biology and history is the concept of change 
through time. Historians and evolutionary biologists seek to picture changing and 
dynamic processes, as they desire to reconstruct life from the remains of death. 
The  historian  gathers  the  extant  fragments  of  past  events,  and  imaginatively 
rebuilds those events from a few documents, some old letters, or from the pieces of  
cracked pottery. The evolutionist,  such as the paleontologist,  does precisely the 
same. From rock splinters bearing the dull imprint of once vivid organisms, one 
brings  back  to  conceptual  life  whole  populations  –  teeming hordes  of  strange 
creatures. Out of historical evidence the past is made present, whether the past is 
Caesar crossing the Rubicon or a trilobite crawling across the bed of a Paleozoic 
sea. In both cases historical explanations are similar and either none is, or both are,  
equally “good science”...662
The ways in which the analogy between history and evolution have  actually been 
pursued, however, have been less than satisfactory. This is because, at least in the 
philosophy  of  history,  such  arguments  from  analogy  have  almost  universally 
proceeded from biology into history. That is, attempts have been made to show that 
biological  concepts  crucial  to  evolution  were  being  directly  expressed  in  human 
history. Very rarely was any attempt made to proceed in the other direction. Rarer 
still was any attempt to identify the common form underlying both kinds of explanation. 
The prevailing assumption still seemed to be that biology was already a science, and 
if history wanted to be one too, it had best adhere as closely as possible to biological 
forms of explanation. And if there was a natural partnership between the two, then it  
was biology which was to be the dominant partner. It was, after all, closer to  real 
662 Matthew H. Nitecki, 'History: La Grande Illusion,' in Matthew H. Nitecki & Doris V. Nitecki (eds), 
History and Evolution. State University of New York Press: Albany, 1992. p.6. (emphasis in original)
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science.  Thus,  despite  the  fact  that  evolution  did  potentially  contain  some  key 
insights into how a science could look and act like while still being called a science, 
these insights were too often missed. The attempt to fashion history into the likeness 
of  physics  was replaced not  with a more  nuanced vision of  science,  but  with an 
equally misguided attempt to subordinate history to biology. 
A contemporary example of this style of reasoning can be seen in the work of William 
H. McNeill. McNeill was not primarily a philosopher of history, but was a pioneer in 
the field of modern large-scale environmental history – a then-emerging field which 
made the relationship between history and science of particular relevance. McNeill 
has detailed something of his views on the relationship of history and evolutionary 
biology in a 2001 paper entitled 'Passing Strange: The Convergence of Evolutionary 
Science with Scientific History.'663 In this paper, McNeill argues that the Darwinian 
revolution in biology was a part of a larger shift, in which the “old certainties of the 
Newtonian  world  machine”  were  “dissolved  into  an  evolving,  historical,  and 
occasionally  chaotic  universe.”  McNeill  is,  in  other  words,  not  merely  content  to 
extend the evolutionary worldview by analogy to history, but to  all of science. But, 
McNeill claims, there is a fundamental historicity which underlies the evolutionary 
worldview, and so it is really history, as opposed to physics or any other branch of the 
“hard” sciences, which is the most fundamental of disciplines. “It is time,” he argues, 
“for  historians  to  take  note  of  the  imperial  role  thrust  upon  their  discipline  by 
making a sustained effort to enlarge their views and explore the career of humankind 
on earth as a whole, thus making human history an integral part of the emerging 
scientific  and  evolutionary  worldview.”664 In  order  to  be  truly  scientific,  McNeill 
argues, history need not seek or apply laws, but it must orient itself in such a way as 
to allow its conclusions to fit neatly with those of these other scientific disciplines. 
But  despite  this  promising  start,  it  quickly  becomes  clear  that,  despite  the 
prominence he claims to give to history, McNeill actually requires a transformation of 
history through the wholesale importation of concepts from biology. At one point in 
his  paper,  for  instance,  while  focusing  on  the  perceived  uniqueness  of  human 
language  and  its  ability  to  accurately  transmit  meanings  between  individuals, 
McNeill argues that languages (and the ideas they express) are the appropriate focus 
663 William H. McNeill, 'Passing Strange: The Convergence of Evolutionary Science with Scientific 
History,' History and Theory. Vol. 40, No. 1 (February 2001). pp.1-15.
664 Ibid., pp.1-2.
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for human history. And the manner in which historians should deal with this fact, 
McNeill claims, is broadly Darwinian:
What makes humans different from other forms of life is our capacity to invent a 
world  of  shared  feelings  and  symbolic  meanings  and  then  act  upon  them  in 
concert.  Across the millennia of human life  on earth,  cooperative effort  among 
larger  and larger  numbers of  human beings proved capable of  getting desired 
results more or less dependably. Moreover, agreed-upon meanings associated with 
any new skill or idea that worked better than before tended to spread and alter the 
way humans did things. Shared meanings, in other words, were capable of rapid 
evolution, radically outpacing older biological processes of genetic mutation and 
selective survival.665
This is an example of transfer by analogy. Such transfers can often be theoretically  
justifiable. Which is to say, McNeill's assertion cannot, and should not, be summarily 
dismissed as empirically suspect.  It could very well be that McNeill – along with 
many other biologically inspired philosophers of history who hold similar views, are 
correct. The truth or falsehood of the assertion that the propagation of cultural ideas 
can be well understood using ideas borrowed from natural selection is not at issue – 
at least not in this thesis. What is more important for our purposes is McNeill's less 
overt assertion. For it seems that, for McNeill, if history is the fundamental form of 
knowledge –  then the fundamental form of history itself is Darwinian. The “process of 
symbolic evolution” he writes, “does not appear to be fundamentally different from 
biological evolution any more than biological evolution was fundamentally different 
from the physical and chemical evolution of the cosmos that preceded it.”666 If this is 
true,  it  is  implied,  then historical  knowledge can  only  be considered scientifically 
legitimate  when  it  is  offered  in  Darwinian  form.  Thus,  despite  the  fact  that 
evolutionary  biology  seems  to  offer,  as  Peña reminds  us,  a  way  to  scientifically 
conceptualise change without the need for nomothetic and mathematical methods, 
its use was often taken to imply a requirement for history to be radically transformed 
in the likeness of science. “We must apprentice ourselves to the natural scientists,” 
McNeill wrote, “and imitate them in making bold hypotheses if we are to understand 
the human career on earth more fully and develop ideas worth sharing with our 
scientific contemporaries.”667
At this point it might be objected that this thesis itself is guilty of a similar biological  
reductionism with respect  to the example of tetrapod evolution given in Chapter 
665 Ibid., p.7.
666 Ibid.
667 Ibid., p.6.
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Five. While  informed by evolution, however, our example was not  wholly determined 
by  it.  Further  still,  we  might  argue  that  the  K/T  extinction,  while  invoking  an 
evolutionary component in order to explain why species which depended upon a 
certain set of environmental conditions could not fourish in their absence, was just 
as much a narrative of the particular physics of a large mass moving in space. At this 
point, we need to ask what is doing the explaining in such narratives, and we are 
forced to conclude that it is not  only  evolution. The citation of evolution, in other 
words, is not what makes the K/T narrative explanatory. And if this is the case, what 
then is the effective difference between a narrative theory regarding the processes 
and contingencies which led to the evolution of language, and a narrative theory 
which attempts to articulate the processes and contingencies which led to the fall of 
the  Berlin  Wall?  What  makes one scientific and the other  not?  For  McNeill,  it  is 
because he has decided that Darwinian evolution is science, and if history proceeds 
through its cultural analogue, then it  must be so as well.  But this can only be an 
arbitrary choice. Could we not decide that only explanations which took the form of 
those in  geology at some level were scientifically legitimate? Or archaeology? Or, in 
the  classic  nomothetic  example,  physics?  After  all,  exactly  the  same  selection  of 
physics  as the “proper” science  to which all  others should aspire has historically 
underpinned the entire nomothetic/covering law argument. 
Darwinian evolution has much to recommend it to the historian, and it is certainly a  
far  better  fit  than strictly  nomothetic  physics.  But  rather  than slavishly  trying to 
apply it to history, we should be asking just how it is that evolutionary biology goes 
about  the  business  of  explanation.  More  importantly,  we  must  ask  what  status 
existing historical knowledge is to have if it cannot be rendered in Darwinian terms. 
For it seems clear that, just as was the case with Diamond and Turchin, much of what 
now  constitutes  history  could  find  no  home  at  all  within  a  discipline  which 
emphasises finding Darwinian analogues in human culture. Of course, it is important 
to once again stress that there is nothing fundamentally objectionable about this kind 
of Darwinian thinking. That is, McNeill's convergence of the sciences is real enough 
(if perhaps not of as messianic an importance as he might imagine). Moreover, just as 
was also the case with Diamond and Turchin, there are valuable insights to be gained 
from this  kind of  large-scale evolutionarily informed history.  And there are good 
arguments which can and have been made for the applicability of the evolutionary 
analogy to culture. What is problematic is what such arguments and analogies omit – 
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history as it is practised now. 
Final Words
This thesis has been, in the broadest sense, an attempt to try to speak on behalf of 
that  neglected  historical  knowledge.  And  it  has  done  so  not  by  attempting  to 
transplant superficially similar methods and ideas from more “respectable” sciences 
like  evolutionary  biology  into  human  history,  but  by  seeking  the  underlying 
explanatory structure which makes evolutionary biology analogous to history in the first  
place. In these pages we have sought to show how the current meaning and practice  
of history – that which is left out in the cold by those transformative approaches to 
history  –  can  be  preserved,  yet  also  realised  as  having  the  same  fundamental 
narrative structure as that underlying not only evolutionary biology, but also such 
disciplines as geology, paleontology, and archaeology. For this purpose, the question 
of  whether  or  not  large-scale  processes  can  be  determined  across  continents,  or 
whether culture can or cannot be understood as memetic, is simply irrelevant. As 
mentioned earlier,  it  is  not the invocation of some aspect of a more well-accepted 
science – whether physics or biology – which makes historical explanation legitimate. 
For why should historians limit themselves to writing in some narrow evolutionary 
mould? Surely what it really means for history to be a science is for it to have access 
to  any  and every  tool that other scientific fields have to offer, to be deployed in the 
service of that particularistic way of talking about the past which historical questions 
so often demand. We must take the best examples of knowing available to us and,  
rather  than slavishly  attempting to apply their  language and methods to  history, 
determine instead the underlying form they instantiate. Recall Nitecki's description 
of the convergence of history and evolution: 
Out of historical evidence the past is made present,  whether the past is Caesar 
crossing the Rubicon or a trilobite crawling across the bed of a Paleozoic sea. In 
both  cases  historical  explanations  are  similar  and  either  none  is,  or  both  are, 
equally “good science”...668
We  have  argued  that  it  is  a  common method  of  explanation  –  narrative  –  which 
produces this  convergence.  Thus,  if  we are to call  the work of  the paleontologist 
science, then we must say the same of the historian. For it is the contention of this  
thesis that empirically justifiable knowledge, wherever it is found and whatever form 
668 Nitecki, 'History: La Grande Illusion,' p.6. (emphasis in original)
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it  takes,  must  –  definitionally  –  be  scientific  knowledge.  And,  since  historical 
accounts do explain and can be tested, our definitions of science ought to cover them. 
Thus,  we  require  a  definition  of  science  which  can  cover  history  without  the 
requirement for radical transformation (whether this transformation is to be on the 
part of science or history is immaterial). That such a definition exists, can account for 
the contingency of historical explanation, and exists without breaking the successful 
nomothetic structures of science was the argument of Chapters Five and Six. What 
does such a definition require us – as historians – to concede? Comparatively little. We 
must abandon only that outdated notion that science is purely a generalising and 
nomothetic enterprise.
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